National capacities to absorb and institutionalize external science and technology

This article describes a conceptual model of kechnology absorption and adaptation leading to a country's export-based conipetitiveness in high-technology products, and the results of the model's application to empirical data on 29 countries. The model is one output of a recently-completed, five-year investigation of indicators of high-technology development. The model's seven conceptual variables were operationalized by combining statistical data with expert-derived measures to produce composite indicators.

The seven indicators include four “leading” or infact indicators that are expected to be predictive of a nation's competitiveness, in high-techndogy products i n approximately 15 years, and three output indicators of current competitiveness: world market share, national emphasis on high technology products for export, and recent rate of change in world market share. Extensive assument of the validity and reliability of the indicators leads to the conclusion that the model is a useful tool, for both policy and research.     

Changes in National Technological Competitiveness: 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999

Georgia Tech's Technology Policy and Assessment Center, with support from the US National Science Foundation, has been generating High-Tech Indicators (HTI) — measures of national technology-based export competitiveness since 1987. This paper reports the HTI results for 33 nations in 1999 in comparison with those of 1990, 1993 and 1996. HTI includes four 'input indicators' and a key 'output indicator' — technological standing. We construct a new composite input indicator here and examine its predictive capability. Input indicators for 1990 and 1993 show intriguing relationships to 1999 technological standing. We compare the indicators for various groups — leading and emerging Western economies, rapidly developing Asian economies, former Eastern Bloc nations and lagging Latin American countries. The USA presently exhibits a dominant position, but signs strongly point toward increasingly broad-based competition in technology-based products.     

Changes in National Technological Competitiveness: 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1999

Georgia Tech's Technology Policy and Assessment Center, with support from the US National Science Foundation, has been generating High-Tech Indicators (HTI) — measures of national technology-based export competitiveness since 1987. This paper reports the HTI results for 33 nations in 1999 in comparison with those of 1990, 1993 and 1996. HTI includes four 'input indicators' and a key 'output indicator' — technological standing. We construct a new composite input indicator here and examine its predictive capability. Input indicators for 1990 and 1993 show intriguing relationships to 1999 technological standing. We compare the indicators for various groups — leading and emerging Western economies, rapidly developing Asian economies, former Eastern Bloc nations and lagging Latin American countries. The USA presently exhibits a dominant position, but signs strongly point toward increasingly broad-based competition in technology-based products.     

Technology Foresight for Wiring Up the National Innovation System: Experiences in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand

Since 1990, technology foresight has spread rapidly. We begin by analyzing the reasons for this before examining the specific political background to technology foresight in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The article analyzes and compares the approaches to foresight in these countries, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. We then propose a new rationale for technology foresight, which centers on its role in “wiring up” and thereby strengthening the national innovation system, before arriving at a number of conclusions.     

Strategic planning in public R&D organizations for agribusiness: Brazil and the United States of America

There is increasing evidence that public organizations dedicated exclusively to research and development (R&D) in agribusiness need systematic management tools to incorporate the uncertainties and complexities of technological and nontechnological factors of external environments in its long-term strategic plans. The major issues are: “What will be the agribusiness science and technology (S&T) needs be in the future?” “How to prepare in order to meet these needs?” Both Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, Embrapa), attached to the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) have developed a comprehensive strategic and operational planning process in order to answer these key questions in the 1990s. The main objective of this article is to present a comparative and preliminary analysis of concepts, methodologies, and processes utilized, and some results obtained by these public organizations.     

Will low technology products disappear?: The hidden innovation processes in low technology industries

Political discussions and analyses have usually been devoted to an understanding of the development of high technology products, although low technology products have dominated the industrial structure of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The important role of low technology products in these countries raises the question of whether we can observe a technological paradox in the industrial structure of the more advanced nations, the dominant role of this sector in spite of its competitive disadvantages because of high wages. Using the Danish packaging industry as an example, a central thesis in the article is that innovation processes are important in low technology industries. They are also often an integrated part of the marketing and production functions of the firm. The innovation processes in the low technology industries are therefore too complex for traditional R&D analyses to handle. The article points out that—especially in small firms—the “practical man” and his “tacit knowledge” play a very central role in both product and process development, and that low technology, even in the future, will play a central role in the industrial structure of the OECD countries.     

Technology Foresight Activities in Korea and in Countries Closing the Technology Gap

This article discusses technology foresight in selected countries which were politically dependent (colonial) before World War II and considered as “under-developed” in the post-war period. Most of them show considerable economic dynamism in the 1990s, which is not always based on their own scientific and technological capability. For this group of countries, national exercises in technology foresight are likely to be an important tool in planning the strategic direction for science and technology development in order to catch up economically as well as socially. In Korea, which has recently become an OECD member, comparative advantage based on factors such as low wages and protected industries are no longer effective as the economy is now wide open to the world. Foresight is being used to look at comparative advantages based on Korea’s own knowledge-creating activities. In southeast Asian countries, foresight is still in an infant stage, but most of these have medium-term planning cycles and have undertaken longer-term vision studies. In South Africa, a national foresight project is running, as is an adapting foresight process to make the large national research organization fit. In Latin America, an agenda has been set up which indicates the desire of several countries to engage in foresight activities using different approaches.     

Result-oriented and process-oriented evaluations of indicative planning

This paper comments on the methodology that Estrin and Holmes (Estrin, Saul, and Holmes, Peter, “Indicative Planning in Developed Economies.” J. Comp. Econom. 14, 4:000-000, 1990) employ to evaluate indicative planning in developed countries. An evaluation that focuses on results suffers from inevitable informational problems, thus necessitating an examination of the processes of indicative planning.     

A model of “coupled” technology transfer : A logistic curve approach

This article presents a mathematical model relating to the technology transfer problem. The origin of the problem stems from the existing trade-offs between the strategies of “technological progressiveness” and “static efficiency” employed by firms or countries defined as “leaders” and “followers,” respectively. The formulation of the model is based on the assumption that the technological development of a firm or a country follows a logistic growth curve when related to a specific technology. During the process of a “coupled” technology transfer, the development of the follower changes and its behavior is described by a first order nonhomogenous deferential equation. Different scenarios of the “coupled” technology transfer between the leader and the follower are being discussed.     

New information technology in India: The electronics riddle

The paper provides a critical assessment of India's electronics policy from its very inception to the present time. It is argued that despite its narrow scope and many shortcomings, the Indian government's new electronics policy based on the principle of liberalization is a step in the right direction. A much wider and speedier development of advanced electronics technology and its application in critical areas—e.g., transport and communication systems—is recommended for India and other similarly situated “non-electronic” developing countries. The implication of missing the electronics revolution by these countries would be their continuing dependence and backwardness.     

Home country effects of foreign direct investment: From a small economy to a large economy

Previous studies on home country effects mainly focused on FDI from large developed economies to other countries. But today's super recipient is a relatively larger economy than its investors and many of these investors are not classified as “developed economies.” A simple Ak type model implies that a small and more developed country investing in a large and less developed country will experience decreases in both employment and income disparity (compared to the recipient country) as the less-developed recipient country gains the higher technology of production through FDI inflows. The empirical results for the Four Tigers (source countries) and China (recipient country) are consistent with our theoretical model of FDI outflows. We also find that FDI outflows to China decrease the ratio of exports to GDP only for small source countries, even though a higher investment in China raises the share of these countries' exports-to-China to China's total imports.     

A re-examination of the technological catching-up hypothesis across OECD industries

This study re-examines the catching-up hypothesis at the industry level across the main OECD countries, using panel data econometric models involving technological gap indicators calculated with a nonparametric distance function suggested by Färe et al. [Färe, R.S., Grosskopf, M.N., Norris, M., Xhang, Z., 1994. Productivity growth, technical progress, and efficiency change in industrialized countries. American Economic Review 84, 66–83]. The results show that there is statistical evidence of a catching-up process at the industry level. Moreover, both tradables and nontradables sectors exhibit catching-up effects and technology adoption from abroad. This result complements the findings by Bernard and Jones [Bernard, A.B., Jones, C.I., 1996a. Comparing apples to oranges: productivity convergence and measurement across industries and countries. American Economic Review 86(5), 1216–1238., Bernard, A.B., Jones, C.I., 1996b. Productivity across industries and countries: Time series theory and evidence. Review Of Economics and Statistics 78, 135–146], Gouyette and Perelman [Gouyette, C., Perelman, S., 1997. Productivity convergence in OECD services industries. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 8, 279–295] and Hansson and Henrekson [Hansson, P., Henrekson, M., 1997. Catching up, social capability, government size and economic growth, in V. Bergström, eds, Government and Growth, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 61–126] that there is no (or even a slow) catching-up effect in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, social capability indicators evaluated for each country show that “Non-European” and “Central European” tradables sectors have a rather similar degree of inefficiency while “North European” countries are less efficient for both tradables and non-tradables. Lastly, both the cross country and the cross sectors dispersions of inefficiency levels are smaller for tradables sectors than for non-tradables.     

Technology Forecasting Activities in Japan

Japan started its development in science and technology later than other countries but was nevertheless quite successful. Many factors contributed to this success—and one of them was the adaptation of large foresight studies at the end of the 1960s. In Japan, the Science and Technology Agency (STA), among others, in 1971 started to conduct a large study on the future of science and technology. The Delphi method was one technique used for foresight activities. This was not considered a tool of prediction but an instrument to systematically look into the long-term future. Among the aims of this type of national activity is the identification of areas of strategic research and of generic technologies most likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits. Although many countries stopped their national foresight activities in the 1970s, the Japanese Delphi process continued and was applied every five years. In 1997, the sixth study was finished. Yet, Japanese technology policies are less consistent than is commonly believed and involve an assortment of policy measures and actors/agencies pragmatically devised to address diverse, ever-changing, and sometimes conflicting needs embedded in a broad range of issues. Forecasting results provide the “language” to communicate among Japanese actors in science, technology, and society.     

Regional, national, and spatially explicit scenarios of demographic and economic change based on SRES

We report here spatially explicit scenario interpretations for population and economic activity (GDP) for the time period 1990 to 2100 based on three scenarios (A2, B1, and B2) from the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). At the highest degree of spatial detail, the scenario indicators are calculated at a 0.5 by 0.5 degree resolution. All three scenarios follow the qualitative scenario characteristics, as outlined in the original SRES scenarios. Two scenarios (B1 and B2) also follow (with minor adjustments due to scenario improvements) the original SRES quantifications at the level of 4 and 11 world regions respectively. The quantification of the original SRES A2 scenario has been revised to reflect recent changing perceptions on the demographic outlook of world population growth. In this revised “high population growth” scenario, A2r world population reaches some 12 billion by 2100 (as opposed to some 15 billion in the original SRES A2 scenario) and is characterized by a “delayed fertility transition” that is also mirrored in a delayed (economic) development catch-up, resulting in an initially stagnating and subsequently only very slow reduction in income disparities. The spatially explicit scenario interpretation proceeds via two steps. Through a combination of decomposition and optimization methods, world regional scenario results are first disaggregated to the level of 185 countries. In a subsequent second step, national results are further disaggregated to a grid cell level, taking urbanization and regional (rural–urban) income disparities explicitly into account. A distinguishing feature of the spatially explicit scenario results reported here is that both methodologies, as well as numerical assumptions underlying the “downscaling” exercise, are scenario-dependent, leading to distinctly different spatial patterns of population and economic activities across the three scenarios examined.     

Trade-related spillovers and industrial competitiveness: Exploring the linkages for OECD countries

This study examines how trade-related spillovers impact the OECD countries' industrial competitiveness; with an emphasis on China's innovative efforts and reintegration into the global economy. In comparison with the major R&D countries, benefits attributable to spillovers are found to be more sizable for the rest of the OECD countries.This result is consistent with the observed convergence of competitiveness between the two groups of countries during 1990–2009.Moreover, our empirical results suggest China's trade-related spillovers can produce both positive and negative effects on OECD countries' industrial competitiveness. The persistence of the spillover effects is found even after controlling for trade openness creating possible spurious association. Finally, our finding TFP growth as the competitiveness driver stresses the consequential role of STI (science, technology, and innovation) policies in supporting sustainable and balanced growth.     

State of the “life span revolution” between 1980 and 2000

Using data for 163 countries, state of the “life span revolution” over the period 1980–2000 is studied in terms of measures of cross-country inequality and through least-squares and quantile-regression estimation of simple convergence models. Four main points are noted. First, dynamics of the cross-country distribution of life expectancy during these 20 years seem markedly different from those for the preceding decades: instead of the sharp “convergence” noted until the 1980s, there is lack of convergence and an indication of “divergence”. Second, the divergence is particularly marked during the 1990s. Third, spread of HIV/AIDS has probably been a significant factor in generating divergence during the 1990s. Fourth, besides the sizable temporal heterogeneity, quantile-regression estimates of convergence models reveal a substantial heterogeneity across the top and the bottom quartiles within each period.     

Understanding changes in exchange rate pass-through

Recent research suggests that there has been a decline in the extent to which firms “pass-through” changes in exchange rates to prices. This paper provides further evidence in support of this claim. Additionally, it proposes an explanation for this phenomenon. The paper then presents empirical evidence of a structural break during the 1990s in the relationship between the real exchange rate and CPI inflation for a set of fourteen OECD countries. It is suggested that the recent reduction in the real exchange rate pass-through can in part be attributed to the low inflationary environment of the 1990s.     

The elusive Phillips curve

The empirical evidence that has accumulated over the past twenty years for major countries, and especially the United States, Canada, and the U.K., suggests three distinct “phases” for the Phillips curve. In the “early” phase the coefficient on the unemployment variable was correctly signed and statistically significant; in the “middle” phase, as further studies were made and the data period extended, the unemployment coefficient tended to become numerically smaller and often to be statistically insignificant; in the “late” phase, as yet more studies accumulated and the data period was extended into the seventies, the unemployment coefficient was sometimes perversely signed and also statistically significant. This paper offers a possible theoretical interpretation of this phenomenon. The theoretical analysis is supplemented with some empirical simulations.