Founder management and the market for corporate control for IPO firms: The moderating effect of the power structure of the firm

This study draws on agency and stewardship theory to evaluate the relationship between alternative governance regimes (founder versus non-founder CEO) adopted at the time of going public on post-IPO economic outcomes in the market for corporate control. We find that the presence of founder CEOs reduces the likelihood of post-IPO change of control but enhances target IPO firm wealth by increasing acquisition premiums. Additionally, we examine whether measures of CEO power over the board moderate the relationship between founder management and target IPO firm wealth. Our results suggest that CEO duality is the most effective instrument of CEO power available to founder CEOs to positively influence target firm wealth. Further, we find that while founder CEOs utilize power derived from CEO duality to increase acquisition premiums, non-founder CEOs use board leadership power to expropriate shareholder wealth.     

Founding Family Firms,CEO Incentive Pay,and Dual Agency Problems

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.     

Founder CEOs,personal incentives,and corporate social irresponsibility

This study integrates organizational identity (OI) theory and upper echelons theory to explore the impact of CEOs’ founder status on corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We theorize that compared with other CEOs, a founder CEO is more likely to generate a high degree of OI with the firm, which will drive the founder CEO to actively avoid CSI that may damage the positive image and long-term development of the firm. Furthermore, we argue that CEO duality and CEO ownership will strengthen the aforementioned relationship by increasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. Conversely, CEO underpayment will weaken the relationship between founder status and CSI by decreasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. We obtained empirical evidence in support of our arguments from a large Chinese private listed company dataset. Overall, this study’s theory and evidence clearly show that founder status and personal incentives can jointly shape CEOs’ CSI decisions, thereby providing useful insights for corporate shareholders and government agencies to better prevent and govern firms’ CSI.     

The Moderating Effects from Corporate Governance Characteristics on the Relationship Between Available Slack and Community-Based Firm Performance

Recent perspectives on community investments suggest that they are opportunities for firms to create value for shareholders and other stakeholders. However, many corporate managers are still influenced by a widely held belief that such investments erode profits and are therefore unjustifiable from an agency perspective. In this paper, we refine and test theory regarding countervailing forces that influence community-based firm performance. We hypothesize that high levels of available slack will be associated with higher community-based performance, but that this relationship will be moderated by three important governance variables: board independence, investment fund ownership, and CEO ownership. We find support for our hypotheses in longitudinal study of a large sample of U.S. corporations.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.     

Inherited corporate control and returns on investment

This paper contributes to the literature on management in family firms by investigating how succession in family firms affects returns on investment. The identities of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the board (COB) were used to establish whether the management of the firm can be characterized as founder, descendant, or external management. A unique, unbalanced panel data set on listed Swedish firms covering the period from 1990 to 2005 was used in the analysis. The results show that founder management has a positive effect on the returns on investment in family firms, whereas descendant management has a negative impact. An external CEO as a successor in family firms leads to more efficient investment policies with increased firm value as a result. That is, when studying corporate governance in family firms it is important to account for what type of management the firm has. Further studies are required to understand the relationship between ownership, control, management, and firm performance.     

The Long‐Term Impact of Entrepreneurial Self‐Efficacy and Entrepreneurial Orientation on Venture Performance

We collected multi‐wave survey data to assess the lagged effects of entrepreneurial self‐efficacy (ESE) and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) on firm performance over a five‐year period. The results of our study indicate that ESE and EO are both positively associated with firm performance but in different, and interesting, ways. Entrepreneurially self‐efficacious founder/managers may help improve the performance of very young firms but such benefits dissipate over time. An EO, on the other hand, does not appear to be particularly beneficial to very young firms. However, our results suggest an EO may play an increasingly valuable role as new firms mature.     

Founder retention as CEO at IPO in emerging economies: The role of private equity owners and national institutions

We integrate the institutional perspective with research on the governance role of private equity firms in an investigation of Founder-CEO successions in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in emerging markets. Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African continent between January 2000 and August 2016, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology and find that higher levels of private equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention as CEO, especially in the context of low-quality formal institutions. Further, in societies with high tribalism, higher private equity ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention. Voids in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as a key organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which in turn confers on the firm an ability to access required resources.     

CEOs’ regulatory focus and firm internationalization: The moderating effects of CEO overconfidence,narcissism and career horizon

While the international business literature has mainly focused on the firm- or industry-level antecedents of internationalization strategies, scholars have recently advocated a greater focus on the microfoundations of firms’ strategic decisions. Building on the regulatory focus theory, this study focuses on how CEO promotion and prevention foci impact firm internationalization. Looking into dispositional and situational attributions, this study also theorizes how these factors moderate the relationship between a CEO’s psychological motivations and firm internationalization. Using data from publicly traded US firms listed in the Fortune 500, the findings of this study show that a CEO’s promotion focus is positively associated with the extent of a firm’s internationalization, whereas a CEO’s strong prevention focus limits the extent of a firm’s internationalization. The findings also reveal that the relationship between a CEO’s regulatory focus and the extent of a firm’s internationalization is moderated by a CEO’s overconfidence, narcissism, and career horizon. These findings have important research and managerial implications for firms engaged in international business.     

Exploring nonlinear effects of family involvement in the board on entrepreneurial orientation

Family business research suggests that family involvement in the board (FIB) may have both positive and negative effects on entrepreneurship. To reconcile these conflicting views, this study builds on stewardship theory, agency theory, and the resource-based view and proposes a nonlinear relationship between FIB and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) to explore how board task performance moderates this relationship. Using a sample of 208 Belgian private family firms, the findings show an inverted U-shaped relationship between FIB and EO, with EO declining beyond moderate levels of FIB. Furthermore, board monitoring task limits the negative effects of high FIB on EO, whereas the board service task does not have any significant effect. This study offers a more nuanced view of the governance conditions that affect EO in the context of private family firms, an overlooked topic in the family business field.     

Corporate Governance and Strategic Change in SMEs: The Effects of Ownership,Board Composition and Top Management Teams

This paper investigates how governance mechanisms affect the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to introduce strategic change. Previous research typically assumes that governance mechanisms operate independently of each other. Building on agency theory and insights from the literature on small firm governance, we hypothesize that governance variables related to ownership, the board of directors and the top management team all affect strategic change and that it is important to examine the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms. Using a longitudinal sample of over 800 SMEs, our general logic and hypotheses are supported by the analyses. We find that closely held firms exhibit less strategic change than do SMEs relying on more widespread ownership structures. However, to some extent, closely held firms can overcome these weaknesses and achieve strategic change by utilizing outside directors on the board and/or extending the size of the top management teams. Implications for theory and management practice in SMEs are discussed. All three authors have contributed equally to the paper. Their names are listed alphabetically.     

Owner Commitment and Relational Governance in the Privately-Held Firm: An Empirical Study

This paper examines owner commitment and relational governance in the privately-held firm. The proposed model goes beyond agency theory to include research on organization commitment and organization citizenship behaviors, as well as stewardship theory, organizational social capital theory, social identity theory and social exchange theory. Results support predictions of stewardship theory and organizational social capital theory that owner commitment and firm performance are positively related.      

Factors influencing the choice between founder versus non-founder CEOs for IPO firms

Despite the innate advantage founder CEOs have by virtue of their founding vision, organizational influence, positive image, and ownership stakes to lead their firms at their initial public offering (IPO), extant empirical evidence indicates that between a third to half of IPO firms go public with non-founder CEOs at the helm. Relatively little however, is known regarding factors that influence the choice of founder versus non-founder CEO for firms issuing IPOs. This study examines the impact of factors such as founder characteristics, size of founding team, governance structure, ownership structure, top management team independence, venture capitalist influence, and the demand for equity financing on the probability of founder CEO at IPO.     

The Shareholder–Manager Relationship and Its Impact on the Likelihood of Firm Bribery

We examine the impact on firm bribery of two corporate governance devices heavily studied in corporate governance research—i.e., separation of ownership and control, and equity share of the largest shareholder. In addition, we investigate the impact of the principal–owner’s gender on firm bribery. From agency theory, we predict that firms with the owner also acting as a manager (owner–manager) are more likely to engage in bribery compared to their counterparts with separation of ownership and control. We argue that an increase of the equity share of the largest shareholder can either increase or decrease firm bribery likelihood depending on the net cost-benefit effect of such bribery actions. In addition, we predict that bribery is more likely to occur when the principal–owner is male rather than female. Using a rich dataset of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 2002–2005, we find that the equity share of the largest shareholder is negatively and male principal–owner is positively associated with the likelihood of firm bribery. Furthermore, we reveal that owner–manager is more likely to bribe when the principal–owner is male rather than female. We also observe that the effect of owner–manager is smaller as the equity share of the largest shareholder increases.     

SMEs international growth: The moderating role of experience on entrepreneurial and learning orientations

New and small firms operating in the high-tech environments need strong entrepreneurial (EO) and learning (LO) orientations to enhance international growth. Yet, the relationship between these two key strategic dimensions and foreign growth can be contingent to the entrepreneur’s individual characteristics. Bringing together elements from strategic management, organization and entrepreneurship literatures, we employ a dynamic temporal perspective considering two levels of analysis, the firm and the entrepreneur, and we apply a fixed effects pooled time-series regression on a sample of 170 firms in two periods of time (2005 and 2015). Our findings indicate that SMEs that possess greater EO and LO have higher international growth. However, previous entrepreneurial and industry-specific managerial experience of the founder/CEO positively exert their effect on these relationships. Our results have important theoretical and practical implications for entrepreneurs and policy makers operating in highly innovative sectors.     

Power and responsibility: How different sources of CEO power affect firms' corporate social responsibility practices

Does greater CEO power come with more responsibility? Previous scholarly work in this field entails divergent results on this question. Based on the upper echelons theory and CEO power literature, this study aimed to explore the mechanisms underlying how different sources of CEO power, including structural, ownership, expert, and prestige power, affect firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and whether such relationships are moderated by firm visibility. Using a panel dataset comprising 6604 yearly observations of Chinese publicly traded firms from 2009 to 2019, we found that structural power is negatively related to CSR practices and that expert power is positively related to CSR practices, whereas ownership power and prestige power have no direct relationship with CSR practices. Our results show that firm visibility weakens the negative relationship between structural power and CSR practices and strengthens the relationship between expert power and CSR practices, respectively. Overall, this study reconciles the mixed results of previous studies on the impact of CEO power on CSR and integrates the effect of firm visibility as a contextual factor. This article concludes with practical recommendations on how to manage CSR engagement.     

A Note on Agency Conflicts and the Small Firm Investment Decision*

This paper explains how agency conflicts—and potential agency conflicts—can influence the investment decisions of small firms, and provides evidence of these effects using data from a recent survey of small firm investment practices. The survey asks business owners to identify their most important investment concern—overinvestment or underinvestment. We find that underinvestment concerns are more prevalent in growing firms, and those with concentrated ownership and control structures. Overinvestment concerns increase as firms adopt less‐concentrated ownership and control structures. These results suggest that the management challenges facing small firms shift as the degree of separation between ownership and control becomes greater.     

Ownership structure and earnings management in emerging markets—An institutionalized agency perspective

Previous earnings management research has largely focused on firm-level governance mechanisms in single countries or on macro-level variables in multiple countries. Building on this research, we incorporate firm ownership predictors along with national institutional dimensions to explore why firm decision makers in emerging markets vary in their earnings management behavior. Our theoretical framework integrates agency and institutional theories proposing that firm-level ownership mechanisms do not function in isolation, but are reinforced or attenuated by elements of the institutional governance environment. The multilevel empirical analysis of 1200 firms in 24 emerging markets indicates that controlling ownership is positively related to earnings management. We find that the level of minority shareholder protection in a country weakens this positive relationship. We also find that regulatory quality strengthens the negative relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management activity. It is hoped that awareness of how firm ownership structures interact with national-level institutions in affecting firm-level behavior will help managers and investors develop skills and practices to better cope with business norms in emerging economies.     

Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

TMT Departures and Post‐IPO Outside Director Additions: Implications for Young IPO Firms’ Survival and Performance

We draw on resource‐based logic to argue that relatively stable TMTs and boards are beneficial for young IPO firms because of the need to maintain and develop valuable firm‐specific capabilities and psychological attachment of pre‐IPO TMTs. Using panel data from 272 young IPO firms, we find that pre‐IPO TMT member exits negatively affect young IPO firms’ survival and performance. This negative effect is greater when more post‐IPO outside directors are added. We also find that the above interaction is positively and negatively associated with survival and performance when TMT ownership declines substantially and when firms have a founder CEO, respectively.