Zero-base budgeting: Prospects for developing a semi-confusing budgeting information system

This paper argues for the recognition that zero-base budgeting (ZBB) is a destabilizing process which may co-exist in the future with traditional budgeting systems (TBS) to form a semi-confusing information system. The stabilizing and destabilizing features of a semi-confusing information system are explored first. The characteristics of ZBB as a formal budgeting process are examined next to provide a comparative profile of its destabilizing features in a changing environment. Analytically, ZBB characteristics match with the destabilizing properties of a semi-confusing information system and this insight has substantial implications for the future use of ZBB.     

The use of performance information in cutback budgeting

Not having access to mainstream financial services, such as a bank account or a credit card, can lead to a variety of social and economic exclusions. In a number of countries, particularly Ireland, Spain, Canada and the UK, credit unions— member-owned financial co-operatives—play a significant role in reaching under-served and excluded communities, as well as providing ‘safe’ avenues for savings and credit. Yet many credit unions are facing financial and operational problems. This article looks at the experience of Welsh credit unions. The research has implications for policy development and government–credit union relations in Wales and further research on credit unions and financial inclusion.     

Capital budgeting, information timing, and the value of abandonment options

This paper investigates how an abandonment option influences the optimal timing of information in a sequential adverse selection capital budgeting model. While the divisional manager has imperfect private pre-contract information, headquarters can time whether the manager obtains perfect project information before (timely information) or after (delayed information) the contract is signed. In the absence of the abandonment option, headquarters favors timely (delayed) information if the investment costs are high (low). The presence of the abandonment option favors delayed information because under the timely information regime the value of the abandonment option is zero, whereas under the delayed information regime the value of the option is positive.     

Improving public services by sharing the right information

This article looks at the role that information sharing plays in supporting new models of public service delivery. It sets out the barriers to information sharing, attempts to overcome them and considers some of the factors involved in shaping a new direction for information sharing, such as changing public expectations and the rapidly changing regulatory environment.     

Status motives and agent-to-agent information sharing

Review of Accounting Studies - Although decision-making within firms improves when agents share information with one another, agents often have limited motivation to share because doing so takes...     

The emergence of information sharing in credit markets

We provide the first systematic empirical analysis of how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones. Lenders may, however, also lose market power by sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric information in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between lenders significantly. Stronger competition between lenders reduces information sharing. In credit markets where lenders may fail to coordinate on sharing information, the degree of information asymmetry, rather than lender competition, drives actual information sharing behavior.     

The capital budgeting process and the energy trilemma - A strategic conduct analysis

This paper examines capital budgeting and its role in the ‘energy trilemma’. The key focus is on the role of knowledgeable agency in the analysis of strategic conduct. In particular, this study demonstrates how accounting tools can be used by executive managers, who, whilst dominant in their own organisations, are themselves subordinate to government in the United Kingdom and at the European level. The strategic conduct of actors is examined in a narrative, theorised case study setting spanning an 11-year period from 2006 to 2017. The principal contribution to knowledge from this study is the extent to which strategic investment accounting has played a role in changing regulatory and government policy in a privatised industry. Government and regulators were forced to take the generators' concerns seriously, because the generators (based on knowledge derived from capital budgets) restricted their capital expenditure rather than mobilising their resources. The generators highlighted that not only was this a problem of environmental sustainability and price for consumers, but also one of long-term supply. They argued that the government had to address all aspects of the trilemma when creating policy.     

Strategies for information systems implementation: The case of zero base budgeting

The objective of this study was to develop specific strategies that could be used to ease the implementation of a zero base budgeting (ZBB) information system. Drawing from the organizational design literature, a model was constructed to test a hypothesis concerning the relationship between several coping strategies and the information imbalance an organization may experience with ZBB. The results of an empirical study suggested that organizations could use certain strategies to lessen the likelihood of an unsuccessful implementation of ZBB resulting from information processing requirements exceeding information processing capacity.     

Introducing the capital budgeting problem

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that many of the issues of capital budgeting are intuitive and can be presented to introductory managerial accounting students using relatively simple examples. Thus, this paper contains a set of 12 examples which other teachers may find useful. These examples can be used to supplement the teaching of traditional decision models and can provide the students with a richer understanding of the problem.     

Competing institutional logics of information sharing in public services: Why we often seem to be talking at cross-purposes when we talk about information sharing

Sharing information and data across organizational boundaries has proved hard to achieve. This is, in part, because we have framed the problem, and possible solutions, in one of three conflicting ways that draw on powerful institutional logics: design, governance and enculturation. Five strategies for addressing this conflict are presented—contingency, combination, conflict, ambiguity and synthesis. The conclusion links the problem of information sharing to the paradoxical nature of information.     

Credit information sharing in the nexus between charter value and systemic risk in Asian banking

In this paper, we assess whether the link between charter value and systemic risk in banking is affected by credit information sharing at the country level. Using a sample of Asian listed banks, we document that banks with higher charter value exhibit lower systemic risk because these banks hold more capital. Nevertheless, we find that the self-disciplining role of charter value in banking is more pronounced for countries with lower depth of credit information sharing. Specifically, our findings also reveal that higher charter value alleviates systemic risk and increases capitalization, particularly in countries with lower quality of private credit bureaus. These findings suggest that higher charter value can be detrimental for financial stability due to an increase in bank systemic risk, particularly when private credit bureaus are of better quality. In order to overcome bank systemic risk, this paper advocates the importance of strengthening bank competition to limit charter value, in addition to promoting the development of private credit bureaus.     

Creditor rights,information sharing,and bank risk taking

Looking at a sample of nearly 2,400 banks in 69 countries, we find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk taking. Consistent with this finding, we also show that stronger creditor rights increase the likelihood of financial crisis. On the plus side, we find that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth. In contrast, we find that the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive. Greater information sharing leads to higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial crisis, and higher economic growth.     

Cross-boundary information sharing in regulatory contexts: The case of financial markets

Most studies about cross-boundary information sharing (CBIS) focus on private or public sector organizations only. There is limited research within regulated environments, which often requires information to be shared among multiple public, private and nonprofit organizations. This paper explores CBIS in different regulatory contexts, with a focus on financial markets in the USA, and finds some unique characteristics in terms of information asymmetries, incentive and governance structures, and structural complexity.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

Discrepancies between the roles of budgeting

Based on a number of recent empirical investigations of budgeting in Sweden, the paper emphasises the importance of considering the different linguistic and expressive components of budgeting in organizations. A number of such expressions of the budgetary role are outlined. Consideration is given to their different organizational contexts and, in an attempt to better appreciate their simultaneous contemporary functioning, their historical development. Both the organizational and research implications of such an expressive analysis of budgeting are emphasised in the conclusion.     

Persistence in capital budgeting reinvestment decisions – personal responsibility antecedent and information asymmetry moderator: A note

In this study we examine the effects of personal responsibility and information asymmetry on managers' tendencies to escalate their commitment to poorly performing investment projects. Consistent with the recommendations by critics of the escalation literature (e.g. Bowen, 1987), we provided subjects with unequivocal negative project feedback. However, counter to other recent conflicting studies adopting Bowen's recommendations, we reverted back to Staw's (1976) original methodology and incorporated "free-choice" into our personal responsibility construct. Our results confirm Staw's (1976) original proposition of a positive relation between a manager's personal responsibility for a poorly performing project and his/her subsequent escalation of commitment to the project. Further, we proposed that information asymmetry moderates the relation between the level of personal responsibility and escalation of commitment. Our results did not confirm this proposition. As such, results from our study re-establish personal responsibility as an important antecedent variable to escalation of commitment.     

银行信息网络QoS实现过程

在银行信息网络的构建中，数据传输是一个基本的功能。但随着网络技术的发展，业务虚用需求的多样化，银行信息网络已经从单一的数据网络发展成一个承载多种业务的、综合性的网络应用平台。在这样一个多业务共同运行的网络环境中，不同类型的业务对网络性能要求差别极大，这需要网络系统提供多种类型的、不同等级的QoS（服务质量）。QoS控制能力已经成为评价银行信息网络优劣的一个重要指标。