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1.
一、当事人合意选择的法律不应及于合同的独立成分合同的独立成分是指载于涉外合同之中而与合同相比具有一定独立性的部分条款。主要包括法院管辖权条款、法律选择条款和仲裁条款等。合同独立成分的效力是与合同其他部分的效力相分离的。例如:我国《涉外经济合同法》中规定:“合同约定的解决争议的条款,不因合同的解除或者终止而失去效力。”这里的“合同约定的解决争议的条款”包括了管辖权条款、法律选择条款和仲裁条款等,由于合同独立成分的效力与合同其他成分的效力相分离,所以,支配合同独立成分的法律的确定与支配合同其他成分的法律的确定是不同的。  相似文献   

2.
李洪涛 《经济师》2009,(3):92-92
商品数量是计算单价、总价的重要依据,也是国际货物买卖的重要交易条件之一,在合同中规定好数量条款对于双方顺利完成合同有着重要的意义。文章从在合同中订立“溢短装条款”、规定约数、数量公差等方面进行了论述。  相似文献   

3.
文静 《时代经贸》2011,(14):166-166
对外贸易合同对贸易双方的行为进行约束,具有较强的法律效应。合同质量的好坏,取决于合同中订立的各项条款是否明确、科学、严谨、完善,是否符合各个国家的规定。为避免贸易纠纷,外贸人员要高度重视贸易合同的订立,把握好合同中的每个条款。  相似文献   

4.
一、霸王合同似乎已成行业“惯例” 最近,不断传出消费者协会炮轰“霸王条款”的消息,而在诸多“霸王条款”中跟房产有关的主要包括房产销售、房产贷款及房屋买卖租赁等方面的内容。在法学理论中与“霸王条款”相对应的概念是我国《合同法》第39条规定的“格式条款”或“格式合同”,  相似文献   

5.
郝向耕 《经济师》2000,(1):134-134
格式合同是由一方当事人、有关团体或国家机关制定的,或由国家法律直接规定的,包括全部交易条款的一种合同。它是随着公用事业在社会生活中扮演愈来愈重要的角色而出现的。它主要有二个特征:一是合同条款由一方当事人预先拟定,其目的在于以此条款与多数不特定人缔结合同;二是载入合同的条款是单方拟定的,不是在签定合同时由双方协商拟定,因此,格式合同具有单方拟定的性质,如银行储蓄存款就是一种格式合同。格式合同在相同条件下适用于一切不特定的相对人,其优点之一是能节省时间。对于交通运输、保险、银行等行业来说,其业务量大…  相似文献   

6.
王静 《大陆桥视野》2014,(22):16-16
在市场经济条件下,工程项目承、发包双方的权利义务关系主要是通过工程施工合同来确定的。随着各种相关法律制度的不断完善,建筑合同法的条款越来越严密,建筑工程施工过程中会发生各种复杂状况,项目承包方对于合同风险的管控亟待加强,必须用有效的合同管理降低企业风险。  相似文献   

7.
ECC合同中的"缺陷改正"程序   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
英国土木工程师学会1995年11月出版的第二版“工程施工合同”(TheEngineeringandConstruc-tionContract,简称ECC合同)核心条款第4条对工程“缺陷”及其“缺陷改正”程序作出了明确的规定,这有利于合同各方共同努力以达到工程预定的质量目标。工程“缺陷”的定义ECC合同核心条款第11.2(15)款明确指出,“缺陷”是指不符合工程信息的工程,即不符合招标文件中对合同工程所作出的规定和说明,或不符合招标文件中对承包商实施工程所采用方法的要求。若承包商承担部分工程的设计,“缺陷”也指承包商负责设计的那部分工程不符合当今适用…  相似文献   

8.
新《合同法》第三十九条规定,格式条款是指当事人为了重复使用而预先拟定,并在订立合同时未与对方协商的条款。 格式条款,在日常生活中司空见惯。如在购买各种商品(房子、汽车、家电等)和各种车船票、办理邮购业务、拍发电报等民事活动中,我们经常会遇到含有各种格式条款的合同、通知、须知、告示、说明等。而且这些格式条款中,大多规定了一些免责条款或限责条款。如“商品离开柜台概不负责”的店堂告示,“雇工对其伤残自行承担”的生死合同,“邮局电报传递错误,便退还报费不承担其他赔偿责任”的电报纸背面的发电须知等等。鉴于格式条款与…  相似文献   

9.
在工程分包合同中"pay-if-paid"和"pay-when-paid"两个条款的使用一直存在着很大的争论,不同的国家对这两个支付条款的有关规定和解释差异很大,但总体而言,这些国家都是持否定的或严格限制的态度。本文主要根据美国、英国、中国和其他一些国家/地区或组织对这两个支付条款的相关法律规定和合同范本展开分析,以便中国承包商能在签订合同时关注当地对这两个条款的相关法律规定和使用情况,以规避相关法律风险。  相似文献   

10.
在国际货物买卖中,出售在途货物具有重要意义。而在途货物的风险转移确定直接涉及买卖双方的切身利益,它关系到是由卖方还是由买方承担损失的问题。因而,明确在途货物风险转移的具体时间和条件有着重要的实际意义。联合国国际货物销售合同公约(CISG)中的第六十八条对此做出了规定,本文对该条款所涉及到的相关问题进行了探讨。  相似文献   

11.
Temporary water transfers, as achievable under option contracts, capture gains from trade that would go unrealized if only permanent transfers of water rights were possible. This paper develops a bilateral option contracting model for water which includes the possibility of conveyance losses and random delivery. Seller-optimal and socially optimal option contracts are characterized in terms of relevant base and strike prices, as well as contract volumes, from an ex-ante and an ex-post point of view. Lastly, welfare gains are estimated, and actual contract prices in California are compared to model-predicted prices.  相似文献   

12.
A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a contract with higher utility for the center at an arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA is the only mechanism that is individually rational, strategy-proof, selects stable outcomes, and is Pareto efficient. For general continuous utility functions, a variant of the QVA involving fixed tie-breaking is strategy-proof and also selects stable outcomes. However, there is no mechanism in this setting that in addition also selects Pareto efficient outcomes.  相似文献   

13.
企业会计契约:动态过程与效率   总被引:20,自引:0,他引:20  
雷光勇 《经济研究》2004,39(5):98-106
企业是利益相关者之间相互缔约形成的利益共同体 ,企业会计契约是企业契约的主要组成部分。利益相关者之间的利益冲突与协调是通过会计契约来实现的 ,而企业契约的执行所需要的计量与监督功能则具体落实在会计契约的动态运行与优化上。优化会计契约机制的经济途径是从决策行为的角度 ,将其剩余控制权配置给决策效率最大的参与者 ;而法律途径则是运用格式化方法将经过长期实践检验、对促使会计契约机制运行有效的惯例加以总结 ,以此节约会计契约结构的规范成本  相似文献   

14.
This paper explores whether the "main bank system" in Japan can be explained by a self-enforcing mechanism that motivates delegated monitorin g creditors to be committed not to execute inefficient liquidation even though all agents are risk-neutral. Using a multiple bank model, we specify a standard debt contract equilibrium in which the delegated monitoring creditor does not care about her reputation, and a main bank contract equilibrium in which the delegated monitoring creditor will attempt to honour the loan contract so as not to destroy her reputation. The results show that, under certain conditions, any equilibrium standard debt contract is dominated by an equilibrium main bank contract in which the debtor and the delegated monitoring creditor are strictly better off. Furthermore, the equilibrium main bank contract reflects the prominent features observed in actual bank loan contracts in Japan.
JEL Classification Numbers: D82, G21, G33, G34  相似文献   

15.
This paper explores how the choice of royalties and contract duration can be a device to mitigate opportunistic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. It presents a model where an upstream patent holder with no production capabilities licenses a product innovation, by means of royalty-only contracts, to several downstream firms that produce and market the new product. In a two-period signaling model, the profitability of short-term and long-term contracts is compared, given that the licensees’ costs may be inferred by observation of their output levels. For a sufficiently large difference in production costs, the patentee introduces a series of short-term contracts, rather than a long-term contract for the entire expected lifetime of the innovation. In such a sequence of contracts, both high- and low-cost firms pay the same royalty rate (which is not higher than that of long-term contracts) and reveal their costs in the first licensing period. Thereafter, royalties are smaller (than in the first period) for high-cost firms but larger for low-cost producers so as to increase expected total output and licensing income. Overall, royalties are not time-decreasing, in expected terms, as information evolves from incomplete to complete. This strategy is typically welfare-improving.  相似文献   

16.
This paper analyses the behaviour of an economy characterized by staggered wage contract rules specified in nominal and in real terms. It is shown that staggered contracts in real terms imply complex eigenvalues which cause oscillatory paths both for output and unemployment and stonger output losses in response to an unexpected and permanent fall in the growth rate of money supply.  相似文献   

17.
Steinar Holden 《Empirica》2001,28(4):403-418
How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.  相似文献   

18.
本文以农业产业化经营中的商品契约为例 ,说明商品契约完全有可能在长期内稳定 ,以至于足以保证龙头企业长期支配农户的土地和劳动力要素 ,从而达到与要素契约相同的效果。商品契约的稳定性主要是通过专用性投资和市场在确保履约方面的作用来实现的。这一结论在一定程度上证伪了科斯和张五常的一些看法。他们认为 ,企业和市场的区别就是要素契约和商品契约的区别。基于农业生产过程中的特殊性 ,单纯的要素契约很难在现阶段的农业生产过程中发挥作用 ,本文的结论不仅为农业产业化经营中的契约选择提供思路 ,也对中国农业发展的路径作了探讨。  相似文献   

19.
为了解我国导游人员的职业倦怠现状及其与职业压力、心理健康的关系。采用导游职业倦怠问卷、导游职业压力问卷和SCL-90症状自评量表,对湖南省269名导游人员进行了调查。结果表明导游人员的职业倦怠程度不严重,但在年龄、受教育水平、经济来源、合同执行状况等方面存在差异,且与职业压力、心理健康水平密切相关。  相似文献   

20.
In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism.Jel Classification: D8, H57, H54, K41, K23, L51  相似文献   

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