共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Summary. In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's
utility function is , then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute
risk aversion. Their proof is restricted to the case where the number of observable outcomes is equal to two, and it uses
an argument that is specific to that case. In this note, we provide an alternative proof that generalizes their result to
any (finite) number of outcomes.
Received: March 21, 2001; revised version: June 21, 2001 相似文献
2.
Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Marcos B. Lisboa 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):555-575
Summary. The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk, aggregate uncertainty and moral hazard. There
is a large number of households, each facing two individual states of nature in the second period. These states differ solely
in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period each household chooses a non-observable action. Higher levels of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower levels of utility. Households' utilities are assumed
to be separable in action and the aggregate uncertainty is independent of the individual risk. Insurance is supplied by a collection of firms who behave
strategically and maximize expected profits taking into account that each household's optimal choice of action is a function of the offered contract. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows
that the appropriate versions of both welfare theorems hold.
Received: December 7, 1998; revised version: October 25, 1999 相似文献
3.
4.
Summary. The dynamics of a stochastic, two–period principal–agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over
time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent
after the first period into account.
Compared to deterministic environments significant changes emerge: First, fully separating contracts are optimal. Second,
the principal has two opposing incentives when designing contracts: the principal ‘experiments,’ making signals more informative;
yet dampens signals, thereby reducing up–front payments. As a result, ‘good’ agents' targets are ratcheted over time.
Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: December 1, 2000 相似文献
5.
Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the
precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information
acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications
based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of
heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
6.
Summary. We examine the strategic role of information transmission in a repeated principal-agent relationship where the agent produces
information that is useful to the principal. The agent values continuous employment for the principal because he makes a relationship-specific
investment that can yield rents to him when the relationship is renewed. Assuming that the parties are sufficiently impatient,
we show that full disclosure of the information produced occurs early in the relationship when the principal can commit to
a long-term relationship, when the agent observes his valuation of continuous employment after making a report on information
produced, or when the agent obtains a low valuation of continuous employment before making a report. By contrast, a strategic
delay in the transmission of information occurs when the principal can only commit to a short-term relationship and the agent
obtains a high valuation of continuous employment before making a report.
Received: October 15, 1997; revised version: July 27, 1998 相似文献
7.
Roman Inderst 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):419-429
Summary. This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both
a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters
the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands
in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining
theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer.
Received: September 10, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I benefitted from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Holger Müller, and Roland Strausz, and from comments made by an
anonymous referee. 相似文献
8.
Summary. The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information.
Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private
information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.
Received: March 15, 2000; revised version: August 24, 2000 相似文献
9.
Summary. This paper proves the C
1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that
the instantaneous utility is C
1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions
on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity
of the integrand.
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997 相似文献
10.
Konstantinos Serfes 《Economic Theory》2001,18(2):333-348
Summary. We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow
a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically,
i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period
generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. The results we obtain serve as an extension to
the results in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) in a setting where agents behave non-myopically. In particular, we examine
the following two questions: 1) If we have a sequence of allocations that are in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow
for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full
information economy? 2) Given a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate
non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation?
Received: May 25, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999 相似文献
11.
Philip Bond 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):375-394
Summary. The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract
and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of maximal contractible information. Several characterizations are exhibited. In particular, it is shown that if either (a) punishments are bounded everywhere,
or (b) deviations from truth-telling are either always or never detected, then maximum contractible information coincides
with where is the information partition of agent j. An argument is given for why (b) may be expected to hold.
Received: August 7, 2000; revised version: December 21, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Michael Chwe, Douglas Diamond, Lars Stole, Robert Townsend, Nicholas Yannelis and an anonymous referee for
helpful comments. 相似文献
12.
Summary. While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved,
the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order,
typically simultaneously. This paper shows that, when there is incomplete information, such an approach removes an important
avenue for information transmission: the bargaining agenda itself. Compared to the standard model, pooling on offers by the
informed is reduced and a signaling equilibrium arises when the agenda is determined endogenously. Signaling is carried out
by use of an issue-by-issue bargaining agenda.
Received: September 3, 1997; revised version: May 11, 1998 相似文献
13.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):393-415
Summary. We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an
appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that
in this case ‘unraveling’ may occur. Furthermore, the resulting outcome can be either stable, or unstable.
Received: July 1, 1997; revised version: May 30, 1998 相似文献
14.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》2000,15(2):463-468
Summary. Ekeland and Scheinkman (1986) prove the necessity of a standard transversality condition under certain technical conditions.
Their result is one of the most powerful on the necessity of a transversality condition currently available in the literature,
and their proof involves numerous estimations and relies on Ekeland's variational principle and Fatou's lemma. This note relaxes
some of their assumptions and provides a simple proof that uses neither Ekeland's principle nor a convergence result like
Fatou's lemma.
Received: April 24, 1998; revised version: September 8, 1998 相似文献
15.
Shurojit Chatterji 《Economic Theory》2002,20(4):837-847
Summary. This paper provides conditions for the almost sure convergence of the least squares learning rule in a stochastic temporary
equilibrium model, where regressions are performed on the past values of the endogenous state variable. In contrast to earlier
studies, (Evans and Honkapohja, 1998; Marcent and Sargent, 1989), which were local analyses, the dynamics are studied from
a global viewpoint, which allows one to obtain an almost sure convergence result without employing projection facilities.
Received: April 7, 2001; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
16.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
17.
Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information
about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time,
she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that
i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed
by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up
selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price.
Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000 相似文献
18.
Summary. If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over
consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any
competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n.
The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: September 12, 1999 相似文献
19.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):427-433
Summary. This note provides a simple proof of the necessity of the transversality condition for the differentiable reduced-form model.
The proof uses only an elementary perturbation argument without relying on dynamic programming. The proof makes it clear that,
contrary to common belief, the necessity of the transversality condition can be shown in a straightforward way.
Received: January 22, 2001; revised version: April 2, 2001 相似文献
20.
Jan Wenzelburger 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):649-672
Summary. This paper develops an adaptive learning scheme for a standard version of the OLG model with pure exchange. Perfect forecasting
rules which generate perfect foresight orbits are approximated by cubic spline functions. These approximations are successively
constructed using historical data only. Trajectories generated by this scheme converge to perfect foresight orbits globally
for all initial conditions. This result holds for all parameterizations guaranteeing the existence of a monetary steady state
and hence is independent of consumers' savings behavior. It generalizes to all one-dimensional models of the Cobweb type.
Received: October 5, 2000; revised version: February 15, 2001 相似文献