Institutional designs to alleviate liquidity shortages in a two-country model

Fujiki, 2003, Fujiki, 2006 extends the Freeman (1996) model to a two-country model, and demonstrates that elastic money supplies in foreign exchange markets yield efficiency gains in monetary equilibrium, and that several institutional designs achieve the desired elastic money supplies equally. This paper considers four institutional designs using a simplified version of the model of Fujiki, 2003, Fujiki, 2006, which includes a central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets, a combination of central bank discount window policy and the CLS Bank, foreign currency supply operations based on central bank swap lines, and cross-border collateral arrangements. These institutional designs yield the same efficiency gains in our model.     

Inflation targeting as a way of precommitment

This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which thegovernment assigns a publicly-announced inflation target toan instrument-independent central bank, but retains the discretionto revise the inflation target after wages have been set. Weargue that since this arrangement is transparent, it solvesCanzonen's private information problem, ensures perfect monitoringof the government, and makes reputauonal forces more effectiveCases are characterized in which, for this reason, inflationtargeting mitigates the inflationary bias of monetary policy.     

Making monetary policy: objectives and rules

What is it that monetary policy-makers do and how do they doit? The simple answer is that a central banker moves interestrates in order to maintain steady real growth and stable prices.In this essay, I examine the issues that arise in framing theproblem faced by monetary policy-makers. I begin with a discussionof how, over the past decade or so, central banks have beenmade more independent and more accountable. The result has beenthe virtual elimination of the inflation bias problem that iscaused by political interference in the monetary policy process,and better overall macroeconomic performance. The essay proceedswith an example of a formal version of the policy-makers' problem,describing their objectives and the information they need toformulate a policy rule. I conclude with a discussion of a simpleversus complex policy rules, the impact of uncertainty on policy-making,and how central bankers use formal modelling in making theirday-to-day decisions.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.     

Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro

This paper looks at what economic theory and empirical evidence have to offer about the institutional conditions that are most likely to lead to a stable currency. Both theory and evidence suggest that an independent central bank with the explicit mandate to pursue price stability provides an effective solution to the time-inconsistency problem. The EMU institutional set-up is well-equipped to support a stability-oriented monetary policy. The ECB appears to be the most independent central bank in the world. An added protection of monetary policy from the influence of unsound budgetary policies enhances the prospects of price stability. The Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth provide effective constraints against excessive deficits and encourage an environment of balanced budgets. The argument that both strong institutional arrangements and sound economic policy-making stem from a conservative attitude of the public is not dismissed altogether in this paper. We note, however, that this hypothesis is not formulated in a testable form and has ambiguous practical consequences. The hypothesis, nonetheless, serves as a useful reminder that the ECB should endeavor to draw its legitimacy not only from the text of the Treaty, but also from society as a whole.     

Central Banking in a Democratic Society

This Tinbergen lecture addresses two issues. The first concerns the principles of monetary policy in a low-inflation environment. The second, more fundamental, issue concerns the institutional arrangements by which monetary policy is set in a democratic society. Three conclusions are drawn: (1) Monetary policy matters. Despite some major mistakes, American postwar economic policy has led to far greater stability of the economy. (2) Strategies of opportunistic disinflation or pre-emptive strikes are based on hypotheses for which there is little empirical support. An alternative strategy, called cautious expansionism, would be preferable. (3) A central bank must be accountable and sensitive to democratic processes; there must be more democracy in the choice of decision makers and more representativeness in the governance structure.     

Can central bank communication effectively guide the monetary policy expectation of the public?

Central bank communication helps to optimize monetary policy. Therefore, it is essential to study whether central bank communication can effectively guide expectations via various communication methods. We study central bank communication in China using the events collected from its official websites and social media, and we divide them into formal and informal communications. We use the high-frequency quotation data of treasury bonds to identify monetary policy surprise caused by communication, which is measured by the target and path surprise. Then, we evaluate the forward-looking and backward-looking effectiveness of central bank communications. We show that central bank communications can help guide public expectations, but different topics and different forms of communication have heterogeneous effects. Forward guidance carries both potential benefits and drawbacks. It is worth noting that China's current central bank communications may have certain potential to be improved.     

THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND INFLATION TARGETING

There is widespread consensus that a goal dependent, but instrument independent central bank solves the democratic deficit. However, the standard solution to the democratic deficit risks reintroducing the biases of political control over monetary policy through the power of politicians to change the monetary policy rule. This paper considers the problem as an instance of the paradox of power in the sphere of monetary policy and proposes a solution drawing on criteria for the rule of law and the principles of constitutional economics. Finally a normative test of inflation targeting is proposed, again drawing on the constitutional economics literature.     

Monetary Policy Implementation in Japan: What They Say versus What They Do

Since the 1970s, many central banks – including the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the Bank of Korea and the Bank of Japan – have announced that they have ceased direct credit controls. Researchers have tended to accept 'what they say', without gathering empirical evidence on 'what they do'. The Bank of Japan announced that it was abandoning direct credit controls in 1982. Since then, the monetary policy literature on Japan has focussed on formal policy tools, such as interest rates. This paper presents empirical research on the actual implementation of monetary policy by the Japanese central bank. The emphasis is on the period in the mid- to late-1980s when monetary policy was stimulatory and real-estate-related lending expanded rapidly, and the period in the early 1990s, when asset prices fell, resulting in the subsequent banking crisis and recession. The paper first briefly surveys the literature. Empirical research is then presented in three parts. Secondary sources are accessed to gain information on the mechanism of monetary policy conduct. New field work is then presented, which uses primary sources to probe the details of monetary policy implementation. Finally, econometric evidence is gathered to test various hypotheses concerning monetary policy procedures. The research successfully establishes the details and nature of the Bank of Japan's monetary policy implementation during the 1980s and early 1990s. The findings suggest the need for a modification of the generally prevailing view, as well as the need for further research on the actual implementation of monetary policy in other countries.     

地方政府赤字财政下的物价控制与货币政策选择

货币经济学的一个基本观点就是,紧缩的货币政策能够降低通货膨胀,而扩张性的货币政策能够导致通货膨胀。费德斯坦指出,没有充分考虑财政政策的影响,这是货币经济学的严重缺陷。因此,文章结合我国当前的财政政策,探讨了在地方政府赤字财政下,中央银行如何控制和治理通货膨胀。文章认为,在地方政府赤字财政下,如果政府通过银行融资具有优先权的话,紧缩的货币政策不仅不能够控制通货膨胀,反而加速了通货膨胀。     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

金融二元结构与货币政策有效性

金融二元结构的存在是金融管制的必然结果,即正规金融与非正规金融并存。为了研究非正规金融对货币政策有效性的影响,首先利用改进的?值法估测出1994-2012年非正规金融的规模,结果显示,近几年,其已占正规金融规模的1/3左右。在此基础上,利用多种实证计量方法重点分析了非正规金融与货币政策有效性的关系,结果表明:非正规金融与作为货币政策中介目标的货币供给量M2存在长期稳定的协整关系,而且是促进M2扩张的Granger原因;同时,正规金融、货币当局债券发行与其国外资产均对货币供给量M2产生不同程度的影响。金融二元结构的存在造成中央银行无法精确观测和调控货币供给总量,削弱了央行货币政策制定和实施的效果。     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

影子银行对货币政策的影响——基于内生货币理论视角

影子银行的迅速发展使其成为我国金融体系的重要组成部分,由于其具有一些与传统银行类似的功能,继而对我国货币政策调控的有效性提出了挑战;后凯恩斯货币理论认为货币本质上属于一种债权-债务关系,是非中性的交易媒介,而央行是否能够有效的控制货币供应量呢?本文基于内生货币理论的视角,重新诠释影子银行对我国货币政策的影响,以期对货币政策的制定提供有益借鉴。     

Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

It is argued that credibility problems in macroeconomics hardlyexist, and certainly do not motivate central bank independence.The Rogoff banker, and much work which follows should be interpretedas blueprints for good policy, not institutional reforms. Thereare likely to be significant but at present unquantified costsassociated with central bank independence once the interactionof monetary and other policymakers is recognised. The evidencethat central bank independence reduces inflation or brings otherbenefits is questioned     

Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor

Controlling inflation is a central problem in transition economies. This paper asks under what conditions or even whether central bank independence helps in this task. The conclusion shows that merely imposing legal independence on the central bank may be ineffective or even counterproductive. It is necessary to make a monetary strategy and the responsibilities and restrictions of central bank policy transparent to the public. In addition, it is important that the right nominal anchor is selected—one that is, or is believed to be, effective and sustainable. Both monetary targeting and inflation targeting are assumed to be unsuitable for most transition countries. Instead, some kind of dynamic exchange rate targeting appears to be the most reasonable choice.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

弱化我国货币政策传导机制因素探讨

当前我国货币政策传导机制不顺畅，其主要原因是：需求不足制约了中央银行货币供给，经济实体经济结构与金融经济结构的不对称阻碍了货币政策传导的信贷渠道，传导机制的机构活力不足，金融市场发育不成熟使货币政策实施的有效空间减少，等等。因此，必须认真研究提高货币政策传导效率的途径，使中央银行货币政策意图顺利实现。     

Lessons from historical monetary unions - is the European monetary union making the same mistakes?

This article examines three historical monetary unions: the Latin Monetary Union (LMU), the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), and the Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union (AHMU) in an attempt to derive possible lessons for the European Monetary Union (EMU). The term ‘monetary union’ can be defined either narrowly or broadly depending on how closely it conforms to Mundell’s notion of ‘Optimal Currency Area’. After examining each of the historical monetary unions from this perspective, the article concludes that none of them ever truly conformed to Mundell’s concept, nor does the EMU. Nevertheless, the article argues that some lessons may be learned from these historical experiences. First, it is necessary that there exist robust institutions such as a common central bank and a unified fiscal policy in order to withstand external shocks. The three early unions could not withstand the shock of WWI. Another important lesson is that continuing national rivalries can undermine any monetary union.