看法差异、信息不对称、卖空限制与价格形成

本文构建了一个有卖空限制的指令驱动的市场交易模型，在模型中考虑了交易者之间的信息不对称和看法差异，应用博弈均衡的分析方法，求解模型的均衡结果。通过对均衡结果的分析表明：市场均衡是知情与未知情者之间的一个混同均衡，均衡报价是未知情买卖者之间分配交易剩余的结果，其分配依据是买卖双方各自不能实现交易的相对风险。市场均衡时，一定存在正的买卖价差，价差由限价指令的执行风险补偿项和逆向选择风险补偿项构成。执行风险补偿项是资产分散度指标的减函数，是知情者比例的增函数，并且随交易者看法分散程度的提高而增大。逆向选择风险补偿项是资产分散度指标和知情者比例的增函数，并且随着未知情者对信息掌握程度的提高而减小。     

Relationship between the mode of land redistribution,tenure security and agricultural credit use in KwaZulu-Natal

Data collected from interviews with new landowners in KwaZulu-Natal in 1999 show that households on four government-assisted projects had less tenure security than households that acquired land via private transactions. Households in government-assisted projects also used less agricultural credit and had less liquidity and less wealth. The probability of households using agricultural credit increased with more secure tenure, more household wealth (number of durable goods), higher liquidity and higher levels of household education. It is recommended that more emphasis be placed on redistributing land through the private market and encouraging the creation of management committees or joint enterprises to utilise the land settled by large groups of beneficiaries. This would be a first step towards making tenure more secure, most notably in the government land reform projects. More secure tenure would improve the creditworthiness of emerging farmers, thereby creating incentives for investing in improvements and complementary inputs to raise agricultural performance.     

Working‐class consumer credit in the UK, 1925–60: the role of the check trader1

This article provides fresh insights into working‐class credit by examining the history of check trading. It explains the system's origins, and its dependence on a series of relationships involving check traders and their agents, retailers, and customers. Data from the market leader— Provident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd—is analysed to explore the scale and scope of the sector, and to examine its history from the early 1920s to the 1960s. Check trading was both an important and controversial supplier of credit to working‐class families, and the article explores criticisms of the system, and the reason for its popularity.     

THE POTATO MARKETING SYSTEM AND ITS CHANGES IN BANGLADESH: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A VILLAGE STUDY IN COMILLA DISTRICT

This paper analyzes the marketing system of potato in Bangladesh, especially the economic relations among farmers, traders, and cold storage owners and elucidates the structural changes in the rural economy through a village study. Investment in the potato market is capital‐intensive and risky, and is often considered to be vertically linked. The present study shows that farmers and cold storage owners do not invest in trading because of lack of time and “skill” to deal with urban traders. Besides, farmers face capital constraints and the amount of potatoes produced is too small to meet the demand of urban areas. Cold storage owners are confronted with increasing competition, which forces them to attempt to reach the storage capacity. Traders invest in the risky potato‐storage business. The return from it is declining but still high due to the “cheap” credit supply from the cold storage owners. There is no tied relation among the market agents any more.     

考虑有限关注的多个信息交易者竞争交易分析

文章假设在一个具有唯一风险资产的金融市场中，存在多个风险中性的信息交易者、很多噪音交易者、风险中性的做市商三类交易者，其中信息交易者是有限关注的，他们通过权衡关注和竞争两种因素选择交易量。文章首先建立了信息交易者具有不同关注度的一般模型，然后建立了具有相同关注度的模型，通过求解唯一线性均衡，推导它的均衡特征，得出结论：信息交易者的交易强度、期望收益随着其他信息交易者关注度和信息交易者数量的增大而降低，随着自身的关注度的增大而增大；信息交易者数量较少时，期望收益随着信息交易者关注度的增大而增大；而信息交易者数量较多时，期望收益随着信息交易者关注度的增大起初快速增大，然后缓慢降低。     

Boundaries of the Tournament Pricing Effect in Asset Markets: Evidence from Experimental Markets

Tournament compensation of asset traders has been shown to promote deconvergence from intrinsic value pricing in an experimental asset market where all traders are so compensated (James and Isaac 2000). This paper explores the extent of this effect as experimental design parameters—proportion of traders facing tournament compensation, details of the tournament contract, and time horizon of the asset being traded—are varied. We find that the original results are replicated using the original parameters, that a tournament contract modified to provide a penalty for underperformance does not necessarily eliminate the effect, and that reducing the proportion of traders facing tournament compensation to half the market largely eliminates the effect.     

An Experimental Investigation of Asset Pricing in Segmented Markets

This article reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets with distinct dividend claims. Some traders are able to transact in the markets for both assets, whereas others can trade in only one market. When some are restricted from transacting in one market, the ineligible asset that cannot be traded by all commands a super risk premium. Without this premium, unrestricted investors would not hold all the available shares of the ineligible asset. In addition, we find that although unrestricted traders have the opportunity to remove all risk, few take advantage of this hedging opportunity.     

基于SCP范式论我国出口信用保险业的有效竞争

我国出口信用保险业的市场化问题一直存在争议。文章根据产业组织理论SCP框架对我国出口信用保险市场的企业行为及市场绩效进行考察后认为,促进该行业的有效竞争将有助于从根本上改善企业行为,从而提高市场绩效。文章指出,应首先区分出口信用保险两类不同性质的业务（自然垄断性业务和竞争性业务）,根据不同业务性质制定差异化的政府监管战略,控制出口信用保险业务的市场化节奏,从而总体上使行业处于有效竞争状态。     

保险市场与农村信贷市场的对接模式研究

当前,绝大多数农村信贷风险都是由借款人来承担。针对这一现象,文章指出,引入保险机制,对完善农村信贷市场,建立健全农村金融服务体系,促进农民增收具有重要的战略意义。结合国际经验,文章探析了保险市场与农村信贷市场的可能对接路径：跨市场的机构合作,跨市场的产品和资金对接以及单一市场的机构业务创新。最后提出了完善农村金融市场体系的建议。     

证券市场信息反馈理论浅析

本文借助Glosten/Milgrom(1985)的信息模型来分析在证券市场存在非对称信息的情况下,做市商为避免在和知情交易者进行交易时由于信息的不完整性时产生损失,而确立一个股票买卖价格的差额。做市商通过观察交易者的交易委托类型,借助贝叶斯定理来学习信息的反馈,而股票的真正价值会随着交易过程的延续最终体现在股票的价格中。该模型的研究为我国做市商制度的发展和完善提供了必要的理论依据。     

我国中小企业信用担保的法律属性研究

银行与中小企业间信息不对称导致的市场失灵需要政府干预经济,建立中小企业信用担保体系是市场化的政府经济行为,中小企业信用担保机构是弥补市场缺陷和政府缺陷的社会中间层主体。文章认为,中小企业信用担保活动具有经济法属性,中小企业信用担保制度经济法属性的确定对于进一步研究该制度的宗旨、基本原则和发展模式等问题具有重要意义。     

结构性违约、信用分层与评级机构的策略性反应——来自中国信用债市场的证据

2014年以来,以主要集中于民企的"结构性违约"宣告了中国信用债市场刚性兑付的"结构性打破",债券市场进入了新的发展阶段。利用2013-2017年债券数据,本文深入分析了结构性违约对评级机构行为和效率的影响,主要有如下发现：首先,信用评级的市场公信力会因政府隐性担保导致的"刚性兑付"而削弱;其次,结构性违约爆发之后,信用评级的整体效率有所提升,但在不同发行主体呈现分化,对于非城投类企业,信用评级对发行利差的影响显著增大,意味着评级公信力的显著提升,而对于城投类企业,评级效率并未明显改善;进一步研究表明,出现这种情况的原因在于评级机构在违约后采取了差异化的评级策略,对于违约风险较大的非城投类债券,评级机构倾向采取"收紧评级"的策略;对于违约风险较低的城投债,评级机构倾向于采取"放宽评级"的策略。这种策略性行为是导致市场"信用分层"的重要原因,并有可能推升民营企业的融资成本。     

The role of market imperfections in the relationship between housing prices and household credit: Evidence from Taiwan

Given the credit market imperfections in Taiwan, this paper examines the threshold effects in the adjustment towards the long‐run equilibrium relationship between housing prices and household credit. The empirical findings verify the potential for regime shifts in the dynamically adjusted relationship between housing prices and household credit. Only when the benefits cover the cost of market imperfections, do housing and credit markets trigger convergence to their long‐run equilibrium. The hidden effect of the limitations on housing and credit markets is to raise the thresholds of the self‐adjustment mechanisms. As a result, economic boom‐bust cycles will be more severe and increase the fragility of financial sectors.     

The economics of discrimination in the granting of credit

Conclusion As a result of credit supply imperfections and inelastic demand, creditworthy consumers may not fully benefit from accurate credit assessments as is implied by the concept of qualified demand. Yet, despite the existence of house rates and prepackaged credit offers, consumers are still able to shop around for the best terms from creditors who are all competing to make profitable credit extensions. If creditors become less accurate in their credit risk assessment due to ECOL, as the cited empirical studies predict, their opportunity to make profitable credit extensions has diminished. In a competitive credit market, credit availability would decline as creditors would be compelled either to raise rates to compensate for greater default losses and other costs associated with less accurate credit evaluation or to cut those costs by applying more stringent credit standards. Otherwise, credit institutions would be unable to earn a return on invested capital sufficient for the risk involved and the supply of consumer credit funds would diminish. With the existing credit market, creditors may not be as compelled by competition to raise house rates (or able, if such rates are at ceiling levels) or raise credit standards, as is implied by a highly competitive market. However, creditors would still have the same economic incentive to repond to increased costs of doing business in ways which would reduce credit availability to qualified demanders. Furthermore, as credit extensions become less profitable, the economic penalty accorded invidious discrimination is diminished and credit grantors, who are so inclined, are more likely to engage in such practices. Alternatively, if legislators focused upon increasing competition in the consumer credit market, increased credit availability would result. And as this would increase the economic penalty for invidious discrimination, such practices would decline.     

噪声交易与股票流动性:兼对“正(负)相关”理论的评析及“流动性黑洞”现象的解释

噪声交易与股票流动性都是行为金融研究的重点，但二者的相关性问题学界一直未能达成一致，"正负之争"不休。文章改进Kyle （1985）的假设，构建符合中国实际的流动性数理模型，模型表明：噪声交易与流动性负相关，且相关关系受信息不对称、风险厌恶度等因素的影响。进一步，文章以中国沪深300指数的成分股数据证实了"噪声交易-流动性"关系，发现其存在显著的月历效应和市场行情效应。文章对"正（负）相关"理论进行了梳理和评析，为争论的清晰化、明朗化做出贡献。     

有限理性下资本供需信任行为进化博弈研究

由于资本市场中资本供需双方存在着信用方面的风险,文章将进化博弈理论引入到资本市场供给和需求行为中,构建了资本市场信任行为的进化博弈模型,绘制了复制动态相图,并对其影响因素进行了分析,得出资本市场中供给与需求的信任行为受到信用现实收益、信用预期收益和双方合作长期性的影响。     

中小企业信用担保的经济实质与商业化运营条件

中小企业信用担保是一种逆市场选择的制度安排,将政府信用运作于商业领域,通过市场化手段来实现政策性意图,担保机构作为政府信用转移的桥梁,同时也是政府信用风险的防火墙,逆市场选择所产生的成本和风险自然也就需要政府来最终承担。中小企业信用担保作为一个风险与收益不对称的政策性行业,商业化运营不是没有可能,但需要满足一系列较为苛刻的前提条件。     

Agricultural institutions, industrialization and growth: The case of New Zealand and Uruguay in 1870–1940

In this paper we apply a model of early industrialization to the case of New Zealand and Uruguay in 1870–1940. We show how differences in agricultural institutions may have produced different development paths in two countries which were similar under many respects. While in New Zealand the active role of the Crown in regulating the land market facilitated access to land, in Uruguay land was seized by a small group of large landowners. Our model shows that land concentration may have negatively influenced industrialization and growth by impeding the formation of a large group of middle-income landowners and, as a consequence, the development of a domestic demand for basic manufactures. We support this view with a comparative analysis of agricultural institutions and industrial development in New Zealand and Uruguay.     

Bubbles and experience: An experiment with a steady inflow of new traders

We revisit the effect of traders' experience on price bubbles by introducing either one‐third or two‐thirds steady inflow of new traders in each of four consecutive experimental asset markets. We find that bubbles are still reduced in the treatments with a steady inflow of new traders, but at a slower pace compared to the baseline treatment in which new traders are only introduced in the last market. Our analysis of individual trading behavior shows that the slower abatement of bubbles in the inflow treatments can be attributed mainly to the inexperienced traders who make more mistakes than experienced traders.     

Trader Participation in Disclosure: Implications of Interactions with Management

Technological advances are creating a shift in the information disclosure environment allowing more investors to interact with management. We examine three key levels of trader-management interaction to assess the accuracy of traders' market-tested value estimates and resulting market price. These data require an engaging experiment and a complex, contextually rich asset, which we create by playing a popular gaming app before the experiment. Participants view financial information, ask management questions, estimate value, and trade. We find that receiving non-personalized question responses improves trader estimates of value and market price efficiency relative to when traders ask questions but do not expect a response. This occurs because traders exert more effort estimating value and trading. However, receiving personalized versus non-personalized responses harms value estimates and market efficiency. This occurs because traders receiving personalized responses fixate on the interaction with management, dividing their attention and diverting it away from valuing and trading the asset.