Coordination

Many economic games have multiple equilibria, some of which are better than others for everyone involved. Such coordination games are of special interest to economists because they raise the possibility that a group of individuals or even a whole economy might become mired in an unfavorable situation. This paper explains how to use playing cards in the classroom to implement an economic game with multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. Discussion can focus on policies and institutions that promote coordination on better outcomes. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory economics to teach concepts of team production and coordination and in intermediate microeconomics to teach game-theoretic concepts of Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Time required: Five minutes for reading instructions, 20 minutes for decision making, and about 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one or more decks of playing cards, each deck accommodating 26 people. One copy of the instructions should be made for each person. Payment to a randomly selected individual is optional and will require about a dollar or two.     

创新博弈中政府与企业的互动演化均衡

创新对提高企业的竞争力,促进社会进步和经济发展具有十分重要的意义。由于创新的风险和不确定性,使得创新在很大程度上取决于创新主体——政府和企业的行为。本文以进化博弈的复制动态方法为工具,构建了创新进化博弈模型,分析了在创新过程中,政府与企业的策略互动及其均衡。本文证明:政府的有效激励会促使企业选择创新,而企业的创新热情将促进政府建立和完善创新激励机制,博弈的进化均衡是政府从制度上确保降低企业创新的外部成本以激励企业进行创新,企业则选择持续创新以追逐创新收益。     

中、美汇率之争的博弈分析

经济全球化时代,两国汇率的形成是两国间博弈的结果。中国是世界上最大的发展中国家,而美国是当今世界上最大的发达国家。从博弈论角度考察,两国在汇率问题上的重复博弈能够达到一个子博弈完美那什均衡。本文对人民币和美元汇率的波动运用了博弈理论分析了双方的得益和支付,并提出了中方在汇率问题上的政策建议。     

The bubble game: A classroom experiment

We propose a simple classroom experiment on speculative bubbles: the Bubble Game. This game is useful to discuss about market efficiency and trading strategies in a financial economics course, and about behavioral aspects in a game theory course, at all levels. The Bubble Game can be played with any number of students, as long as this number is strictly greater than one. Students sequentially trade an asset which is publicly known to have a fundamental value of zero. If there is no cap on asset prices, speculative bubbles can arise at the Nash equilibrium because no trader is ever sure to be last in the market sequence. Otherwise, the Nash equilibrium involves no trade. Bubbles usually occur with or without a cap on prices. Traders who are less likely to be last and have less steps of reasoning to perform to reach equilibrium are in general more likely to speculate.     

电网企业购电的双向拍卖博弈模型研究

价值最大化包括经济效益和社会效益最大化。电力作为关系国计民生的行业，价值最大化自然成为电力和电网企业的共同追求。为实现价值最大化，根据博弈理论，构建发电企业与电网企业的双方叫价拍卖博弈模型，通过计算贝叶斯纳什均衡点，确定最优电价和企业的最优收益。据此，从v和C的视角给出对电网企业购电策略的启示。     

汇率调整无效力问题的微观与宏观研究范式评析——关于20世纪80年代以来汇率理论研究的变迁原因与发展特征分析

由"购买力平价悖论"、"汇率不相关悖论"以及"汇率不完全转移"现象所代表的汇率调整无效力问题,是20世纪80年代以来国际经济学界最为关注的问题。经济学家应用静态局部均衡分析与动态一般均衡分析对这一问题的发生机制与实践影响进行了理论与经验的解释,这些研究重塑与发展了现代汇率理论。本文的目的在于评价这些汇率理论的变迁原因与发展特征,即在阐明传统汇率理论的现实挑战——西方经济在微观-产业层次与宏观-国际层次上遭遇的汇率调整无效力的典型事实的基础上,论述与评价经济学家运用静态局部均衡分析与动态一般均衡分析在解决汇率调整无效力问题的过程中取得的标志性的方法论贡献。     

博弈论在链式再保险中的应用

针对链式再保险关系的情况,本文运用博弈论的知识及定理、一般均衡理论和效用理论,讨论了链式再保险关系下的子博弈完美纳什均衡。     

纳什均衡的行为经济学精炼——基于群体感知度的认知层次模型及其实验检验

博弈论中纳什均衡解是基于完全理性人的假设,然而越来越多的经济实验结果显示:博弈结果有时与均衡预测解相悖,有时相互一致。本文在行为经济学中经典的有限理性认知层次模型上引入群体感知度参数,使得模型对于博弈结果的解释更加合理;文中也针对具体的博弈模型分析了群体感知度在形成博弈结果中的作用机理,也设计了一个简单实验对所得结论进行了检验。     

超越经济人的社会偏好理论:一个基于实验经济学的综述

实验经济学对传统经济人假设的系统反驳促使社会偏好理论应运而生.社会偏好理论的各个模型试图在维持理性假设下,通过将基于心理学和社会学的诸如公平、互利等与“自利”假设有着明显涵义辨识度的一些人类社会性情感因素纳入到效用函数中来进而修正经济人假设,并以博弈论为基本的分析工具力图构建新的博弈均衡来解释实验经济学所揭示的一系列悖论.本文围绕社会偏好在已有文献的基础上对其产生的背景、模型、测度、外溢以及检验等问题作了一个详细而系统的梳理     

大学生出勤率问题中学生与教师的博弈分析

博弈论的创新应用是解决各种现实问题的有力工具。在校大学生上课出勤率低是高等教育中的一个普遍存在的问题,长期以来没有得到应有的重视而一直无法有效地解决。已有的文献对在校大学生上课出勤率低的问题有很多研究,但多数从高等教育管理等教育学角度出发,运用信息经济学和博弈论工具来分析这一问题的很少。本文通过对教师与学生在出勤行为上的总结、分析和归纳,建立了教师与学生的各自收益函数,然后建立模型进行分析。通过寻找博弈矩阵的纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡,得到均衡状态下教师点名及＂懒惰学生＂旷课的概率。并在此基础上对如何提高学生出勤率给出建议。     

Knowledge, Beliefs, and Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts

In situations of strategic interaction it is important for agentsto consider not only what their rivals will do, but also whatthey know, what they know about what they know, and so on. Formalmodels of knowledge have been developed to help us keep trackof these levels of knowledge. This paper provides a non-technicalintroduction to one of these models, and investigates its foundations.It is then shown how the model can be used to analyse game-theoreticsolution concepts, in particular Nash equilibrium.     

产业技术创新战略联盟成员企业之间的博弈

主要基于博弈论的视角,针对当前产业技术创新战略联盟内成员企业之间的关系问题进行研究。通过建立基本假设,构建企业之间的博弈决策树,同时建立完全信息条件和不完全信息条件下的静态博弈模型,寻找纳什均衡解。在博弈求解的过程中,揭示成员企业信任机制的核心问题,发现解决成员企业互信合作问题的机制和方法。     

人民币债券市场准入问题研究

本文运用博弈论和信息经济学的相关理论,对境外机构发行人民币债券的市场准入问题进行了静态和动态博弈分析。文章求解了不完全信息下的贝叶斯纳什均衡和精炼贝叶斯均衡,对人民币债券市场准入中的现实问题进行了理论阐述和证明,并讨论了境外机构在境内发行人民币债券的各种影响。     

Coexistence of large firms and less efficient small firms under price competition with free entry

This study constructs a game of technology selection and Bertrand-like price competition in a market with free entry. It demonstrates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which a small number of firms adopting a large-scale technology coexist with, and charge a lower price than, a large number of firms adopting a small-scale technology. In this equilibrium, both available technologies and resources are allocated efficiently. This result provides a new economic rationale for antitrust law in general and, in particular, the US Sherman Act, wchich regards free entry and price competition as of foremost importance for maintaining market quality.     

中国导游服务规范化过程的三方动态博弈分析

导游服务质量的管理和提升是一个系统工程,需要旅游主管部门和旅游业各大主体之间相互管理、相互监督、相互促进,进行长期的动态博弈。以旅游主管部门、旅游企业、导游人员为博弈主体,构建导游服务规范化过程的三方动态博弈模型。通过博弈树和支付矩阵来分析博弈过程中各方的收益,并在此基础上得出该三方博弈的混合策略纳什均衡,然后对博弈的均衡解进行分析,为导游服务规范化提供建议。     

An approach to intertemporal equilibrium with production

Conclusion This paper is devoted to considering the implications of intertemporal economic equilibrium in a model with production. To this end, a differential game with a Leontief technology is formulated. In the two-person zero-sum game, it was found that an intertemporal equilibrium is feasible. Furthermore, it was found to be decentralizable, with a required informational exchange mechanism no more onerous than in other decentralized procedures, including the tatonnement processes.In the non-zero-sum case decentralization is impossible for closed loop solutions. The interaction of the strategy sets introduces externalities even when production technology is convex. Finally, while a Nash solution is guaranteed, Pareto optimality requires a two-stage optimization approach.This paper was presented at the International Conference of the Atlantic Economic Society held in Vienna, Austria, May 10–18, 1979.     

An Austrian Foundation for Microeconomic Principles

Teaching Microeconomic Principles well, a blend of good pedagogy and good economics, is the professional obligation of many economists. Since such courses are conventionally grounded in neoclassical theory, professors who embrace the theoretical perspective of the Austrian School may seem to confront a dilemma unfamiliar to other teachers: Teach the course well, or teach good economics? The thesis of this paper is, simply, that there is no such conflict. Incorporating properly chosen attributes of Austrian theory makes one’s Microeconomic Principles course better. This conclusion would be rejected by those who identify Austrian economics as adding complex disequilibrium propositions to an equilibrium analysis indistinguishable from that of neoclassical theory, or who think it dismisses equilibrium entirely, but both positions misunderstand the School’s nature. Among Austrian theoretical attributes that enrich a Microeconomic Principles course are methodological individualism, ordinal subjective utility and cost, future orientation, entrepreneurship, a process view of competition, and consideration for market participants’ knowledge. In this paper these characteristics—many ostensibly shared, but not consistently respected, by neoclassical theory—are applied by developing conventional smooth supply and demand curves, and their interaction in markets, from individuals’ value comparisons of discrete units. The paper concludes that an Austrian foundation is simultaneously more theoretically accurate and closer to the student’s everyday life, a combination that means a better Principles course.     

哈耶克经济伦理观的局限

沿袭哈耶克的思想传统,运用现代博弈论分析制度的形成与自发的演化过程而产生的演化制度分析,形成了当代制度经济学中的一条理论主线.但他的经济伦理思想有局限的一面,哈耶克的自由理论、自发秩序理论、制度理论和平等思想中也存在着内在冲突和紧张,有其历史局限性.正确认识哈耶克的经济伦理思想对于完善我国市场经济秩序有着重要的借鉴意义...     

电网建设项目内部主体利益博弈与激励机制分析

通过博弈混合策略纳什均衡求解,对电网公司与承包商或监理单位之间的利益博弈关系进行了分析,解释了不确定环境下的多元利益相关者的合作博弈模型的可操作性;针对电网建设项目存在的信息不对称,同时借鉴委托代理理论的激励约束机制基本分析框架,建立了信息不对称条件下的最优激励与监控约束模型,并探讨分析了激励机制与监控约束机制在电网建设项目委托代理关系中的作用。     

对农村信用社高管人员激励与监管的博弈分析

农村信用社资产所有者与其高级管理人员之间关于规避道德风险（隐藏行动）的博弈,实质是高级管理人员激励机制的设计。激励机制要求农村信用社向高级管理人员让渡一部分利润。金融监管机构与农村信用社高级管理人员之间在监管行为上存在静态的非重复博弈,最优的监管概率和违规概率是一种混合策略纳什均衡。只有同时通过激励机制和监管机制,才能有效规避农村信用社高级管理人员的道德风险和违规行为。