Why Consistency of Accounting Standards Matters: A Contribution to the Rules-Versus-Principles Debate in Financial Reporting

A cross-firm consistent application of accounting standards is sought in all major accounting regimes. Since many transactions and events are only vaguely or not explicitly addressed in the standards managers must often use judgment when applying accounting standards to particular transactions or events. This analysis concludes that a consistent application of accounting standards can only be ensured if the accounting standards themselves are internally consistent. By contrast, inconsistent standards—in the absence of clear guidance—permit managers to (more or less arbitrarily) choose between different accounting methods. Moreover, it is found that a consistent application presupposes the existence of specific guidance ('rules') in order to frame management's judgment. It is argued that the reliance on principles only—as requested by many in the accounting literature—fails to ensure a consistent application because it allows management to exert judgment differently in identical cases. The assessment includes arguments and propositions from the international discussion in the accounting literature and also refers to other related fields of research, such as legal theory.     

农村劳动力转移的途径和措施

大量转移农村剩余劳动力,是解决"三农"问题的关键。随着二元结构的不断加剧,农业对其他产业的影响也越来越大,已经成为其他相关产业发展的桎梏。因此,解决好农村剩余劳动力转移问题,使农民能够真正离开土地,走向富裕,也是农业经济发展的有效途径。     

Data Envelopment Analysis: A Practical Tool to Measure Performance

This paper describes a productivity method, data envelopment analysis (DEA), and how it can be used to measure performance using multiple performance measures. DEA compares organisations or parts of organisations that share common goals and use similar resources to produce similar products, and calculates the technical efficiency with which firms convert bundles of inputs into bundles of outputs. DEA has been used in both public and private settings, and the paper describes some of its applications within Australasia. A case study of New Zealand dairy farms is used to demonstrate the benchmarking capability of DEA. While built upon solid theoretical foundations, DEA is essentially a practical tool that can be used by academics for research as well as by managers and practitioners for improved performance measurement and accountability.     

商业银行采用经济增加值方式考核业绩的模式初探

一、我国商业银行业绩考核中存在的突出问题 1、指标考核,目标和利益多元化,容易引起部门之间的争执和抱怨 我国商业银行现行的业绩考核指标包括存款、利润、营业费用、资产收益率、不良贷款率等,是一个多指标体系.实际工作中,考核不同的部门往往采取不同的指标,具考核结果与职工的收入挂钩,例如考核财会部门用利润、营业费用指标;考核风险资产管理用不良贷款率指标等.由于银行业务固有的相关性,强调一个指标的增长,常常会引起另一个指标的相对下降,当各业务部门都站在本位的立场去处理问题时,就产生了目标与利益多元化的现象,从而引起部门之间持续不断的争执与抱怨.     

修正的房价收入比:衡量我国城市房价泡沫水平的更优指标

改革开放以来,我国城镇居民可支配收入连续多年高速增长,本文通过构建一个包含收入增长的模型,估算城镇居民可承受的按揭还款房价收入比极值。在此基础上,考虑到实际购房分为首付和按揭还款两部分,提出了修正的房价收入比这一新指标,用于衡量首付部分或按揭还款部分是否存在泡沫。通过实证检验,发现我国房地产市场的泡沫主要集中在首付部分,且当首付比例超过20%以后,所考察的13个重点城市的房价都存在严重的泡沫。     

A New Method to Measure the Performance of Leveraged Exchange‐Traded Funds

We examine the effects of daily return compounding, financing costs, and management factors on the performance of leveraged exchange‐traded funds (LETFs) over various holding periods. We propose a new method to measure LETFs’ tracking errors that allows us to disentangle these effects. Our results show that the compounding effect generally has more influence on tracking errors than other factors, especially for long holding periods and in a “sideways” market. The explicit costs (i.e., the expense ratios) and other factors (e.g., financing costs) can materially affect the performance of LETFs, especially for those with high leverage ratios and bear funds.     

中央企业EVA评价制度实施效果的理论解释

从2010年起国有资产管理委员会以EVA(经济增加值)指标取代ROE(净资产收益率)指标对所有中央企业进行绩效考评。本文通过实地调研分析发现这次EVA评价制度在不同企业中的应用有着明显差距,在一些企业中新绩效评价制度有效果,但是在不少央企内部企业中遭遇到明显的抵制(Resistance)。本文通过对四个案例公司实行EVA绩效评价的案例和访谈资料进行剖析,探讨新制度对企业的经营理念、战略行为的影响,在梳理相关理论文献的基础上,以归纳型案例研究为研究方法,提出了探索管理制度成功及其影响因素的理论框架,归纳了制度认知度、企业经营理念文化差距、总部控制能力、管理制度与经营战略匹配性是管理制度成功的四个权变因素。本文的理论分析聚焦于有效实施新的管理制度的情景条件;从管理实践而言,本文也阐释了公司总部(包括国资委)应该如何推进一项新的管理制度并达成预计效果的基本路径。     

On the Jensen Measure and Marginal Improvements in Portfolio Performance: A Note

The marginal performance contribution made by new assets in a portfolio is identified. The maximum change in a portfolio's Sharpe performance from the addition of new assets is a simple function of a generalized Jensen index and the unexplained covariances from a multivariate market model. Deviations from a higher dimension market line may be used to rank the desirability of asset additions to an existing portfolio. Statistical tests for the equality of the performance contributions by new assets is possible.     

Risk and Regulation in Derivatives (or Why Derivatives Are a Blessing,Not a Curse)

In this article, first published in 1994, the authors aimed to defuse the widespread hysteria about derivatives fueled by media accounts (like Fortune magazine's cover story in the same year) by offering a systematic analysis of the risks to companies, investors, and the entire financial system associated with the operation of the relatively new derivatives markets. Such analysis ended up providing assurances like the following:

• As long as most companies are using derivatives mainly to limit their financial exposures and not to enlarge them in efforts to pad their operating profits, reported losses on derivatives should not be a matter for concern. “Complaining about losses on a swap used to hedge a firm's exposure,” as the authors note, “is like objecting to the costs of a fire insurance policy if the building doesn't burn down.”
• To the extent that companies are using derivatives to hedge—and what evidence we have suggests that most are—the default risk of derivatives has been greatly exaggerated. An interest rate swap used by a B‐rated company to hedge a large exposure to interest rates will generally have significantly less default risk than a AAA‐rated corporate bond issue.
• Thanks to the corporate use of derivatives, much of the impact of economic shocks such as spikes in interest rates or oil prices is being transferred away from the hedging companies to investors and other companies better able to absorb them. And in this fashion, defaults in the economy as a whole, and hence systemic risk, are effectively being reduced, not increased, through the operation of the derivatives markets.

Moreover, the authors warn in closing that the likely effect of then proposed derivatives regulation would be to restrict access to and increase the costs to companies of using derivatives markets. As one example, the excessive capital requirements associated with derivatives facing bank dealers—based on gross rather than net measures of exposure—and which regulators have since proposed extending to nonbank dealers—were expected to have the unintended effect of encouraging dealers to sell precisely the kinds of riskier, leveraged derivatives that Bankers Trust sold Procter & Gamble, and that functioned as Exhibit A in the Fortune article.     

THE VIABLE EVA CENTER (OR, HOW TO SLICE A COMPANY SO IT DOESN'T BLEED)

How a company is sliced, or broken up into divisions of various sorts, has a huge effect on the accountability and hence the behavior of its managers. Senior management faces a tradeoff between delegating authority to subordinates who have the best information for specific decisions, and maintaining authority to avoid parochial behavior that might hurt the organization as a whole. Divisions exist within companies to provide a framework for such delegation. A divisional structure allows decision-making authority to be pushed down along with accountability for results. Thus, how divisions are established is critical to decision-making, motivation, and accountability.
The ultimate test of a well-formed division is a high degree of correspondence between division financial results and financial results for the company as a whole. When an increase in divisional EVA can contribute to a decline in company-wide EVA, this is evidence of a poorly formed division, or what the author calls a "non-viable" EVA center. This article provides a framework for defining a "viable EVA center" as well as three ways of making existing divisions more viable: (1) use of transfer pricing and intrafirm charges; (2) reorganization; and (3) aggregation of divisional results.     

商业银行基层网点提高存款经营绩效有效途径的探讨

价值最大化是商业银行经营的终极目标。经营绩效是银行年度经营目标,也是银行价值最大化的重要标志。作为商业银行基层网点,提高经营绩效是必须深入研究并加以有效实施的重要课题,本文运用实证方法分析了商业银行基层网点的经营绩效,并针对其存在的问题,提出了相应的对策和建议。     

开发吉林玉米经济新路径

吉林省玉米经济发展已经有了较好的基础。“十一五”期间,吉林省应当进一步发挥资源优势和生态优势,以玉米经济和生态食品产业为重点,大力推进农业产业化经营,突出特色产品,加大科技投入,狠抓精深加工。力争经过几年的努力,把玉米经济建成吉林省的重要支柱产业,再造吉林产粮大省新优势。     

Long-Run Operating Performance of Initial Public Offerings in Japanese Over-the-Counter Market (1991–2001): Evidence and Implications

This paper implements a comprehensive study on the long run post-issue operating performance of more than 700 initially public offerings (IPOs) in the Japanese over-the-counter market (JASDAQ) from 1991 to 2001. Empirical results document dramatic and continuing operating underperformance that are robust to industry or mean reversion adjustment. The diagnostic tests for behavioral explanations further uncover the salient decline of market expectations by various measures over the post issuing years, as well as the upsurge in company expansion around the offering years followed by the striking dwindle soon afterwards. These findings jointly shed light on the systematic over-optimism of market investors and managers at the time of IPO events. The multiple regression analysis also demonstrates robust evidence that is favorable for the hypotheses of “Windows of Opportunity” and market timing. In contrast, we do not find that there are significant associations between changes in alternative insider ownership and the evolution of operating performance. We suggest the explanations based on the agency problem theory are not effective in explaining the long run operating underperformance of JASDAQ IPOs.JEL Classification Code: G30, G31, D80, D84     

Three Common Misconceptions About Markets (or Why Earnings Smoothing,Guidance, and Concern About Meeting Consensus Estimates are Likely to be Counterproductive)

Although many executives strive for stable earnings growth, finance theory and research have long suggested that the most sophisticated investors aren't especially concerned about “normal” levels of variability in reported earnings. More recent research by the authors and their McKinsey colleagues also suggests that extraordinary efforts to achieve steady growth in earnings per share quarter after quarter aren't worthwhile and may actually hurt the companies that undertake them. While such efforts to smooth earnings involve real costs, the research finds no meaningful relationship between earnings variability and valuation multiples or shareholder returns. Based on these findings, as well as considerable experience in advising companies, the authors offer the following advice to senior executives:

• Managers shouldn't shape their earnings targets or budgets just to meet consensus estimates. Companies that reduce spending on product development, sales and marketing, or other contributors to long‐term growth are sacrificing long‐term performance for the appearance of short‐term strength.
• As the year progresses, managers should likewise avoid costly, shortsighted actions to meet the consensus. Resist the temptation to offer customers end‐of‐year discounts to boost current‐year sales, or to resort to creative accounting with accruals. Investors recognize these for what they are: borrowing from next year's earnings.

Finally, companies should reconsider the practice of quarterly earnings guidance. Instead of providing frequent earnings guidance, companies should design their investor communication policies to help the market to understand their strategy, the underlying value drivers of their business, and the most important risks associated with the business—in short, to understand the long‐term health and value of the enterprise.     

上市公司高管腐败对经营业绩的危害及鉴证研究

选取2013~2014年发生高管腐败的49家上市公司作为相关样本和未发生高管腐败的49家上市公司作为配对样本,运用二元逻辑回归模型和多元线性回归模型进行实证研究后发现：高管腐败对经营业绩有显著危害。CEO 权力强度、股权分散性、股权流动性与高管腐败显著正相关,股权制衡度与高管腐败显著负相关,董事会规模、独立董事占比与高管腐败低度正相关,股权集中度、监事会规模、CEO 相对薪酬与高管腐败低度负相关。