Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Attracting Long‐Term Investors Through Integrated Thinking and Reporting: A Clinical Study of a Biopharmaceutical Company

Faced with a large percentage of investors that chase short‐term returns, companies could benefit by attracting investors with longer‐term horizons and incentives that are more consistent with the long‐term strategy of the company. The managers of most companies take their investor base as a “given” that cannot be changed through their actions or words. Using the case of Shire, a biopharmaceutical company with a strong commitment to the goals of improving the safety of its products and the reliability of its supply chain, the authors of this article suggest that companies have the ability and the means to change their investor base in ways that are consistent with their strategy. One of the most promising ways of attracting such investors is integrated reporting, which provides companies with a means of credibly communicating the commitment of its top leadership to diffusing integrated thinking across the organization and to building strong relationships with important external stakeholders. In the case of Shire, both a commitment to integrated thinking and the adoption of integrated reporting appear to have helped the company attract longer‐term investors, which in turn has strengthened management's confidence to carry out its strategy of stakeholder engagement and investment.     

Opaque Financial Contracting and Toxic Term Sheets in Venture Capital

In a recent article in this journal, the authors documented the growing tendency of emerging growth companies to raise substantial equity while remaining privately held through private IPOs, or PIPOs. PIPO financing has created scores of “unicorn” firms—private enterprises with imputed market values of $1.0 billion or more—while allowing them to avoid the challenges of being publicly traded. But as has also been noted, the PIPO process, with its multiple financing rounds and increasingly complex terms, has almost certainly result in some inflated market valuations. Along with inflated values, the contracting process and many of the provisions that result from it often have economic consequences that are poorly understood by at least some of the participants, including the potential for significant wealth transfer between stakeholders as well as overall destruction of enterprise value. And the term sheets containing such provisions appear to become even more “opaque” and more “toxic” with each round of financing. More specifically, the liquidation preferences and ratchets often provided new investors in the later rounds of PIPOs can greatly affect the allocation of the risks and the ownership shares and, in so doing, transfer significant wealth from the entrepreneurs and other older owners. Using a numerical analysis of a representative term sheet, the authors discuss the process of financial contracting for early‐stage companies, providing examples of how negotiations can go wrong and showing exactly when and where the agreed‐upon conditions start to turn toxic for some of the stakeholders. The article closes with the authors’ assessment of the disincentives for entrepreneurs and early‐stage investors created by this often confusing and dilutive venture capital contracting and funding process.     

Market Interest in Nonfinancial Information

During the past two decades, more and more companies have volunteered to provide “corporate social responsibility” or “sustainability” reports that include information about their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies and performance. Such reporting has come about largely in response to demands by a wide range of stakeholders for information about how the company's operations are affecting society in a number of different ways. But do investors really care about companies' ESG performance and policies? Using data from Bloomberg, the authors provide the first broadly based empirical evidence of investors' interest in ESG data. More specifically, the authors show how interest in the top 20 ESG metrics varies with geographical location (European vs. American), asset class (fixed income vs. equity), and firm type. At the aggregate market level, there is greater interest in environmental and governance information than in “social” information. U.S. investors are more interested than their European counterparts in governance and less interested in environmental information. Equity investors are interested in a wider range of nonfinancial information than are fixed income investors. And whereas sell‐side analysts are primarily interested in greenhouse gas emissions, money managers tend to focus on a broader set of metrics. Similarly, pension funds and hedge funds have shown interest in more nonfinancial metrics than insurance companies. The authors' bottom line: Companies need to recognize the growing market interest in nonfinancial information and ensure that they are providing it according to the specific information needs of market users.     

Risk Management—the Revealing Hand

Many believe that the recent emphasis on enterprise risk management function is misguided, especially after the failure of sophisticated quantitative risk models during the global financial crisis. One concern is that top‐down risk management will inhibit innovation and entrepreneurial activities. The authors disagree and argue that risk management should function as a “revealing hand” that identifies, assesses, and mitigates risks in a cost‐efficient way. In so doing, risk management can add value by allowing companies to take on riskier projects and strategies. But to avoid problems encountered in the past, particularly during the recent crisis, risk managers must overcome deep‐seated individual and organizational biases that prevent managers and employees from thinking clearly and analytically about their risk exposures. In this paper, the authors draw lessons from seven case studies about the ways that a corporate risk management function can foster highly interactive dialogues to identify and prioritize risks, help to allocate resources to mitigate such risks, and bring clarity to the value trade‐offs and moral dilemmas that often must be addressed in decisions to manage risks. Developing an effective risk management system requires, first, an agreement about a company's objectives, values, and priorities; second, a clear formulation and communication of the firm's “risk appetite”; and, third, continuous monitoring of a firm's risk‐taking behavior against its declared risk limits. Quantitative risk models should not be the sole—or even the most important—basis for decision‐making. They cannot replace management judgment and are best used to trigger in‐depth discussions among managers and employees about the most important risks faced by the firm and the best ways to respond to them.     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.     

Market Based Management™*—A Key to Nucor's Success

Ken Iverson, CEO of Nucor Corporation, transformed Nucor from the virtually worthless corporate shell that it was when he took over as president in 1966 into a Fortune 500 giant with current shareholder value in excess of $5 billion. How did Iverson do it? What are the secrets to his outstanding success? This article argues that an important part of the answer is Market Based Management, a relatively new set of management values and practices that aims to bring the power of a free-market society inside companies. Stated in brief, Market Based Management attempts to replace the traditional “command-and-control” management approach with decentralized decision-making that is designed to make full use of employees' “specific knowledge.” Employees' expanded decision-making authority is reinforced by a powerful incentive compensation system that rewards them handsomely for achieving corporate goals. The result, according to the authors, is highly motivated employees who “take ownership” for their role in contributing to the success of the enterprise.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

Syndication of European Buyouts and its Effects on Target‐Firm Performance

Using a unique dataset of 859 leveraged buyouts in Europe during the period 1999–2009, the authors' recent study reports that buyout financiers syndicate their transactions to other buyers to achieve benefits that include diversification of different types of target risk, the combination of complementary investor information and skillsets, and an increase in future deal flow. The authors also report that lead financiers structure their syndicates in ways designed to minimize syndication costs, in particular potential information and incentive problems with co‐investors in the syndicate, while also aiming to maximize the syndication benefits mentioned above. For example, through effective management of conflicts of interest with co‐investors within their syndicates, lead financiers are likely to acquire a reputation for looking out for the interests of their co‐investors that ends up increasing their own deal flow. As additional evidence in support of this claim, the authors also report finding that the post‐buyout profitability and growth of the target companies are higher when buyouts are syndicated (even after adjusting for the “endogeneity” of such decisions) and when the syndicates are structured to limit inter‐investor conflicts of interest within the syndicate. And as the authors point out, this finding, when viewed with the other main findings cited above, provides a more positive view of European buyout syndicates than the one projected by studies of Anglo‐American syndicates to date, whose findings have emphasized the potential for collusion among the buyout financiers.     

Corporate Governance and Labor Relations*

This article begins with the premise that since the corporation involves a symbiotic relationship between labor and capital, a single‐minded focus on shareholder value is likely to be shortsighted, and some degree of employee influence on corporate governance has the potential to increase an organization's efficiency and value. But the set of findings and implications that emerge from the author's analysis is a complicated one. On the one hand, “moderate” levels of employee ownership (for example, the 6% ownership of the average American ESOP) are associated with increases in corporate productivity and values as well as worker morale and productivity. On the other hand, majority employee ownership and corporate ownership and governance systems like “co‐determination” that give labor a major say on governance issues often lead to worker‐management alliances that end up hurting the firm's investors—and, in the longer run, the workers themselves— by reducing competitiveness. The author ends with a call for a balanced governance system that, while aiming to maximize the total value of the enterprise, seeks to encourage the participation and emotional allegiance of workers—and indeed all important corporate stakeholders.     

ESG Investing in Graham & Doddsville

The author describes how and why the world's best “business value investors” have long incorporated environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into their investment decision‐making. As the main source of value in companies has increasingly shifted from tangible to intangible assets, many followers of Graham & Dodd have delivered exceptional investment results by taking an “earnings‐power” approach to identifying high‐quality businesses—businesses with enduring competitive advantages that are sustained through significant ongoing investment in their core capabilities and, increasingly, their important non‐investor “stakeholders.” While the ESG framework may be relatively new, it can be thought of as providing a lens through which to view the age‐old issue of “quality.” Graham & Dodd's 1934 classic guide to investing, Security Analysis, and Phil Fisher's 1958 bestseller, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, both identify a number of areas of analysis that would today be characterized as ESG. Regardless of whether they use the labels “E,” “S,” and “G,” investors who make judgments about earnings power and sustainable competitive advantage are routinely incorporating ESG considerations into their decision‐making. The challenge of assessing a company's sustainable competitive advantage requires analysis based on concepts such as customer franchise value, as well as intangibles like brands and intellectual property. For corporate managers communicating ESG priorities, and for investors analyzing ESG issues, the key is to focus on their relevance to the business. In this sense, corporate reporting on sustainability issues should be viewed as analogous to and an integral part of financial reporting, with a management focus on materiality and relevance (while avoiding a “promotional” approach) that is critical to credibility.     

ESG Integration in Investment Management: Myths and Realities

The number of public companies reporting ESG information grew from fewer than 20 in the early 1990s to 8,500 by 2014. Moreover, by the end of 2014, over 1,400 institutional investors that manage some $60 trillion in assets had signed the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI). Nevertheless, companies with high ESG “scores” have continued to be viewed by mainstream investors as unlikely to produce competitive shareholder returns, in part because of the findings of older studies showing low returns from the social responsibility investing of the 1990s. But studies of more recent periods suggest that companies with significant ESG programs have actually outperformed their competitors in a number of important ways. The authors’ aim in this article is to set the record straight on the financial performance of sustainable investing while also correcting a number of other widespread misconceptions about this rapidly growing set of principles and methods: Myth Number 1: ESG programs reduce returns on capital and long‐run shareholder value. Reality: Companies committed to ESG are finding competitive advantages in product, labor, and capital markets; and portfolios that have integrated “material” ESG metrics have provided average returns to their investors that are superior to those of conventional portfolios, while exhibiting lower risk. Myth Number 2: ESG is already well integrated into mainstream investment management. Reality: The UNPRI signatories have committed themselves only to adhering to a set of principles for responsible investment, a standard that falls well short of integrating ESG considerations into their investment decisions. Myth Number 3: Companies cannot influence the kind of shareholders who buy their shares, and corporate managers must often sacrifice sustainability goals to meet the quarterly earnings targets of increasingly short‐term‐oriented investors. Reality: Companies that pursue major sustainability initiatives, and publicize them in integrated reports and other communications with investors, have also generally succeeded in attracting disproportionate numbers of longer‐term shareholders. Myth Number 4: ESG data for fundamental analysis is scarce and unreliable. Reality: Thanks to the efforts of reporting and investor organizations such as SASB and Ceres, and of CDP data providers like Bloomberg and MSCI, much more “value‐relevant” ESG data on companies has become available in the past ten years. Myth Number 5: ESG adds value almost entirely by limiting risks. Reality: Along with lower risk and a lower cost of capital, companies with high ESG scores have also experienced increases in operating efficiency and expansions into new markets. Myth Number 6: Consideration of ESG factors might create a conflict with fiduciary duty for some investors. Reality: Many ESG factors have been shown to have positive correlations with corporate financial performance and value, prompting ERISA in 2015 to reverse its earlier instructions to pension funds about the legitimacy of taking account of “non‐financial” considerations when investing in companies.     

How Corporate Diversity and Size Influence Spinoffs and Other Breakups

In recent months, the list of large diversified companies that have decided they would be worth more as several smaller, focused companies has grown sharply. In many of these cases, it has been outside pressure from activist investors that has motivated these actions by management—and with some pretty favorable results. But what is driving these strategic actions and what is most important in determining whether breakups create value? To answer this fundamental questions, it is critical to decide whether large, diversified companies have a value recognition problem or a value creation problem. In this article, the authors present and try to integrate the findings of two separate but related research studies on business diversity and size with the aim of identifying their implications for corporate strategy and helping company executives create more value for their investors. The specific reasons for underperformance by large diverse companies vary greatly, but there are a number of potential problems discussed in this article, including organizational “distance,” capital allocation, human capital allocation, cross subsidies, and ineffective governance. Instead of waiting for activist investors to demand a breakup, executives of large diverse companies should be proactive in addressing the potential weaknesses of their organizations. Private equity firms understand how to make diversification work and many of today's executives could learn some valuable lessons from these firms. Large diverse businesses should embrace “Internal Capitalism,” a corporate culture and set of practices that emphasizes the importance of strategic decision‐making that is linked through continuous performance assessment to the corporate goals of boosting efficiency and sustainable growth.     

Responsible Investors: Who They Are,What They Want

This article by a long‐time partner in Domini Social Investments, a well‐known socially responsible investment firm, begins by describing four different approaches that institutional investors have currently adopted as they account for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations in their investment decisions: (1) the incorporation of internationally accepted ESG norms and standards (as set forth in, for example, the FTSE4Good Indexes); (2) the use of industry‐specific ESG ratings and rankings (such as those used for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes); (3) the integration of ESG considerations into stock valuation (as advocated, for example, in the Principles of Responsible Investment); and (4) the identification of companies whose business models successfully address the most pressing societal needs (often referred to as “impact investing”). The article then seeks to answer the question: what corporate ESG programs and policies can be most effectively used by managers seeking to attract institutional investors using these different approaches? The author describes three kinds of corporate ESG programs. In one approach, corporate managers focus on strengthening relations with non‐investor stakeholders, including employees, the environment, and local communities. In the second approach, corporations seek to create “shared value” by emphasizing products and services that help address society's most pressing needs. The third approach focuses on identifying and addressing the firm's industry‐specific ESG performance indicators (KPIs) that are most material to stockholders and other stakeholders. Given institutional investors' growing commitment to the incorporation of ESG concerns, corporate managers should understand the range of investors' approaches to ESG and how to account for them in their strategic planning. At the same time, they are encouraged to develop comprehensive ESG policies and goals, devote adequate resources to their implementation, and communicate efforts effectively to these investors and to the public.     

Drivers of Shareholder Returns in Tech Industries (or How to Make Sense of Amazon's Market Value)

Earnings according to GAAP do a notoriously poor job of explaining the current values of the most successful high‐tech companies, which in recent years have experienced remarkable growth in revenues and market capitalizations. But if GAAP earnings fail to account for the values of such companies, are there other measures that do better? The authors address this question in two main ways. They begin by summarizing the findings of their recent study of both the operating and the stock‐market performance of 169 publicly traded tech companies (with market caps of at least $1 billion). The aim of the study was to identify which of the many indicators of corporate operating performance—including growth in revenues, EBITDA margins, and returns on equity—have had the strongest correlation with shareholder returns over a relatively long period of time. The study's main conclusion is that investors appear to be looking for signs of neither growth nor efficiency in using capital alone, but for an optimal mix or balancing of those goals. And that mix, as the study also suggests, is captured in a cash‐flow‐based variant of “residual income” the authors call “residual cash earnings,” or RCE. In the second part of their article, the authors show how and why RCE does a much better job than reported net income or EPS of explaining the current market value of Amazon.com , one of the best‐performing tech companies in the world. Mainly by treating R&D spending as an investment of capital rather than an expense, RCE reveals the value of a company that is distinguished by both the amount and the productivity of its ongoing investment—both of which have been obscured by GAAP.     

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Trend

Corporate Social Responsibility, or “CSR,” has recently become a subject of study by financial economists. While there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to support all variety of positions, broad‐based statistical evidence about the CSR movement is in short supply. This article presents some new empirical evidence that aims to answer three related questions about CSR: First, are corporations increasing their “investment” in what is considered socially responsible behavior? Second, does corporate investment in social responsibility affect a company's financial performance and shareholder value? Third, why do companies invest in CSR: to increase shareholder value, or to uphold a “moral” commitment to non‐investor stakeholders and “society”? Using a social responsibility metric that measures the net CSR strengths (i.e., strengths less concerns) of each S&P 500 and Domini 400 company, the authors report that the average net CSR for both indexes decreased during the 15‐year period (1991‐2005) of the study—though the Domini 400, as might be expected, experienced a smaller decline. The authors also report that corporate strengths have increased, on average, but at a slower rate than the “concerns,” which suggests that corporate CSR efforts may be aimed at a moving target with steadily rising expectations and requirements. Second, the authors report that companies with more CSR strengths or fewer CSR weaknesses produced higher ROA over the same 15‐year period. The authors' findings here suggest a “circular” causality in which profitable companies are more likely to invest in CSR initiatives to begin with, but then find their performance further improved by such investment. Third, the authors' findings suggest that most companies devote resources to CSR initiatives as a means of maximizing long‐run value rather than out of a prior commitment to stakeholders. More specifically, the study shows that companies appear to invest more heavily to build CSR strengths than to eliminate CSR concerns. And as the authors conclude, this behavior is consistent with a strategy of using CSR as a form of “risk management” that promotes corporate strengths in order to limit the potential negative effects of—perhaps by diverting attention from—their weaknesses.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.     

REVISITING MARKET EFFICIENCY: THE STOCK MARKET AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM

Well‐functioning financial markets are key to efficient resource allocation in a capitalist economy. While many managers express reservations about the accuracy of stock prices, most academics and practitioners agree that markets are efficient by some reasonable operational criterion. But if standard capital markets theory provides reasonably good predictions under “normal” circumstances, researchers have also discovered a number of “anomalies”—cases where the empirical data appear sharply at odds with the theory. Most notable are the occasional bursts of extreme stock price volatility (including the recent boom‐and‐bust cycle in the NASDAQ) and the limited success of the Capital Asset Pricing Model in accounting for the actual risk‐return behavior of stocks. This article addresses the question of how the market's efficiency arises. The central message is that managers can better understand markets as a complex adaptive system. Such systems start with a “heterogeneous” group of investors, whose interaction leads to “self‐organization” into groups with different investment styles. In contrast to market efficiency, where “marginal” investors are all assumed to be rational and well‐informed, the interaction of investors with different “decision rules” in a complex adaptive system creates a market that has properties and characteristics distinct from the individuals it comprises. For example, simulations of the behavior of complex adaptive systems suggest that, in most cases, the collective market will prove to be smarter than the average investor. But, on occasion, herding behavior by investors leads to “imbalances”—and, hence, to events like the crash of '87 and the recent plunge in the NASDAQ. In addition to its grounding in more realistic assumptions about the behavior of individual investors, the new model of complex adaptive systems offers predictions that are in some respects more consistent with empirical findings. Most important, the new model accommodates larger‐than‐normal stock price volatility (in statistician's terms, “fat‐tailed” distributions of prices) far more readily than standard efficient market theory. And to the extent that it does a better job of explaining volatility, this new model of investor behavior is likely to have implications for two key areas of corporate financial practice: risk management and investor relations. But even so, the new model leaves one of the main premises of modern finance theory largely intact–that the most reliable basis for valuing a company's stock is its discounted cash flow.