债务异质性假说与资本结构选择理论的新解释

西方资本结构选择理论是有局限性的。建立在债务同质性假说基础上的西方资本结构选择理论对中国企业资本结构缺乏足够的解释力,因为针对经营性负债与金融性负债的异质性假说更符合中国国情。经营性负债与金融性负债是具有异质性和互补性的两类负债,依恃债务异质性假说,主流的啄食顺序理论和权衡理论都需要重新解释。     

Tax‐Aided Financial Services Companies and the Cost of Capital

Over the past two decades, the governments of several European countries have implemented special tax devices to attract the finance centres of multinational companies. This paper determines how the cost of capital for investments made by multinationals is affected by the tax regimes, bringing into play the Irish financial services company, the Belgian co‐ordination centre, the Dutch finance company and the Luxemburg company coupled with a Swiss finance branch. It gives evidence that intermediation of a tax‐aided services company in the financing scheme of a foreign subsidiary provides an important tax saving. However, the home and source countries' tax regimes influence the hierarchy of the less heavily taxed treasury and finance centres. The methodology relies on the marginal effective tax rates theory and consists of an extension of Alworth's (1988) model to include treasury centres.     

我国上市公司资本结构决定因素的理论与实证分析

本文以资本结构理论为基础,对我国上市公司资本结构的决定因素进行了实证检验.结论是,公司规模、抵押担保能力、盈利能力、偿债能力、成长性、非债务税盾是影响上市公司资本结构的因素.另外,面板数据检验的结果表明,股票市场状况也是影响资本结构的重要因素.     

Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing

A capital structure theory based on corporate control considerations is presented. The optimal debt level balances a decrease in the probability of acquisition against a higher share of the synergy for the target's shareholders. This leads to the following implications: (i) the probability of firms becoming acquisition targets decreases with their leverage, (ii) acquirers' share of the total equity gain increases with targets' leverage, (iii) when acquisitions are initiated, targets' stock price, targets' debt value, and acquirers' firm value increase, and (iv) during the acquisition, target firms' stock price changes further; the expected change is zero and the variance decreases with targets' debt level.     

对冲基金新特点及其对中国资本市场的影响

1997年亚洲金融危机以后,由于人们普遍认为对冲基金是这次危机的罪魁祸首,对冲基金格外受到各国的关注。近几年来,对冲基金表现出了新的特点,随着中国对外开放的扩大,对冲基金必然要影响中国的资本市场。近期看,对冲基金对中国的资本市场不会有太大的影响;从长远看,对冲基金进入中国资本市场是迟早的事情。而对冲基金的运作模式,将对我国金融体制改革的深化和资本市场的发展起到很好的借鉴作用。     

资本结构、资本成本与APV法

企业价值评估中的调整现值法（APV法）首先由美国著名经济学家斯图尔特.迈尔斯（S.Myers）提出。有人也把它归类于DCF方法中的一种,虽不完全相同,但至少也是采用现金流折现计算,是与折现现金流量     

The Leveraging of Corporate America: A Long‐Run Perspective on Changes in Capital Structure

In a study published recently in the Journal of Financial Economics, the authors of this article documented a substantial increase in the use of debt financing by U.S. companies over the past century. From 1920 until the mid‐1940s, the aggregate leverage of unregulated U.S. companies was low and stable, with the average debt‐to‐capital ratio staying within the narrow range of 10% to 15%. But during the next 25 years, the use of debt by U.S. companies more than doubled, rising to 35% of total capital. And since 1970, aggregate leverage has remained above 35%, peaking at 47% in 1992. Moreover, this pattern has been observed in companies of all sizes and operating in all unregulated sectors. Changes in the characteristics of U.S. public companies during this period provide little help in explaining the increase in corporate leverage. For example, the displacement of tangible by intangible assets in many sectors of the U.S. economy during the past 50 years would have led most economists to predict, holding all other things equal, a reduction rather than an increase in aggregate corporate leverage. Instead, according to the authors' findings, the main contributors to the increases in U.S. corporate leverage since the 1940s have been external changes, including increases in corporate income tax rates, the development of financial markets and intermediaries, and the reduction in government borrowing in the decades following World War II. The authors' analysis also identifies these last two changes—the development of financial markets, including the rise of institutional investors and shareholder activism, and the post‐War reduction in government debt—as having played the biggest roles in the leveraging of corporate America.     

Social Capital,Trust, and Corporate Performance: How CSR Helped Companies During the Financial Crisis (and Why It Can Keep Helping Them)

The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.     

Toward Real‐Time Financial Reporting: How to Reduce Investors' Information Gap and the Cost of Capital

Public companies are struggling to provide detailed and accurate guidance in a turbulent world. Many have dropped guidance altogether, or substantially reduced the precision of their guidance. However, they pay a price for the resulting increase in investor uncertainty in the form of a higher cost of capital and reduced equity valuations. This article provides evidence that improving investors' information can help to reduce the cost of capital of public companies. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. The article explores ways for both individual companies and financial regulators to improve investor information and reduce the cost of capital. For individual companies, the proposed solution is more frequent and voluntary provision of information about actual performance in lieu of more extensive financial guidance. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. Quarterly reporting is a matter of tradition while today's information technology could easily provide investors with real‐time, or close to real‐time, financial information. Internal financial controls, the quality of financial reporting, and the cost of capital might all be improved by mandating faster reporting cycles.     

How “Competitive Pay” Undermines Pay for Performance (and What Companies Can Do to Avoid That)

Almost all proxy statements say that the company's pay programs are designed to achieve pay for performance and to provide competitive pay. While companies assume that these objectives are perfectly compatible, attempts to provide competitive pay often have the effect of undermining pay for performance. As currently practiced, competitive pay means that the company's target pay levels match the pay levels of its peer companies regardless of past performance. By targeting the dollar value of an equity award each year, competitive pay plans effectively reward poor performance in a given year by increasing equity grant shares in the following year—and, conversely, such plans penalize superior performance in one year by reducing the number of shares in the next. Likewise, the target share of the annual incentive award increases with poor performance and decreases with superior performance. In this fashion, the competitive pay approach distorts incentives and weakens the link between cumulative pay and cumulative performance. The authors show that the focus on competitive pay is a modern development that replaced the sharing formulas that governed executive pay in the first half of the twentieth century. Companies adopt the competitive pay model because they believe it does a better job of achieving the three main objectives of executive pay: strong incentives; retention; and limited shareholder cost. While competitive pay directly addresses retention risk, it can greatly weaken management incentives. Furthermore, boards tends to rely on competitive pay data to set target compensation because they have no meaningful measure of incentive strength and the actual cost to shareholders. Without quantitative measures of incentive strength and shareholder cost, boards run the risk of retaining poor performers and losing superior performers. Using a case study of Dow Chemical, the authors show how companies can measure the incentive strength of their executive pay plans, and how a simple pay plan using annual grants of performance shares can provide “perfect” pay for performance.     

The Paradox of Transparency,Short‐Termism and the Institutionalisation of Australian Capital Markets

As the ultimate corporate decision‐makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being ‘captured’ by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter‐intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short‐termism.     

Organizational Capital and Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity: The Effect of Management Quality Practices

This paper examines the influence of organizational capital, as evident in management quality practices, on the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We provide novel and strong evidence that investment sensitivity to internal cash flows decreases in the presence of superior management practices. We also find that superior management practices reduce the firm's financing frictions, evident in lower capital constraints. Our results are robust to numerous tests. Overall, our findings suggest that intangible organizational capital is important for investment decisions and that superior management practices contribute to value‐maximizing behavior.     

Commemorating the 50‐Year Anniversary of Ball and Brown (1968): The Evolution of Capital Market Research over the Past 50 Years

We commemorate the 50th anniversary of Ball and Brown [1968] by chronicling its impact on capital market research in accounting. We trace the evolution of various research paths that post–Ball and Brown [1968] researchers took as they sought to build on the foundation laid by Ball and Brown [1968] to create a body of research on the usefulness, timeliness, and other properties of accounting numbers. We discuss how those paths often link back to the groundwork laid and questions originally posed in Ball and Brown [1968].     

The Sustainable Growth Rate of Non–profit Organisations: The Effect of Efficiency, Profitability and Capital Structure

The activity growth of non–profit organisations is financially contrained by their efficiency, profitability and capital structure. In this paper, a very general expression relating these four organisational parameters is derived and its practical use is discussed.     

The Impact of Quasi‐Regulatory Reforms on Boards and Their Committees During the Period 2001–2007

This study investigates the cumulative impact of quasi‐regulatory and regulatory reforms, and political pressure on board composition and sub‐committees of boards over the period 2001 to 2007. Based on a sample of 450 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, we find that most firms complied with the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice by 2007. In particular, 85% of firms had an independent board and there was a significant increase in majority independent committees (audit, remuneration and nomination). While there was an increase in majority board independence, the increase in the mean level of board independence to 71% was modest. The level of compliance was highest for large firms, but the impact was largest on small firms, which changed their board composition the most. The relation between firm characteristics and board composition declined between 2001 and 2007, and changes in board composition were not able to be explained by changes in firm characteristics. If it is assumed that firms on average select their board to reflect their economic needs, this suggests that the changes in board composition may have been costly for firms.     

The Gain‐Loss Spread: A New and Intuitive Measure of Risk

The standard deviation, arguably the most widely‐used measure of risk, suffers from at least two limitations. First, the measure has little intuitive appeal (defined as it is by the square root of the average quadratic deviation from the arithmetic mean return). Second, investors tend to associate risk more with bad outcomes than with volatility per se. To overcome these limitations, this article introduces a new measure of risk, the gain‐loss spread (GLS), which takes into account the probability of a loss, the average size of the loss, and the average gain—all variables that investors consider relevant when assessing risk. The author presents evidence that the GLS is both highly correlated with the standard deviation—thus providing basically the same information about risk—and more correlated with mean returns than both the standard deviation and beta, thereby offering a tighter link between risk and return.     

新资本监管规则对实体经济融资结构和系统性风险防范的影响研究

中国的新资本管理办法已于2013年开始实施。本文从优化实体经济融资结构和防范系统性风险两个方面,分析了新资本管理办法的重要作用。在优化实体经济融资结构方面,本文提出了单位贷款资本消耗的分析框架,结合新资本管理办法的多层次资本缓冲要求,分析了银行合意资本充足率的决定机制、单位贷款资本消耗的变化。在此基础上,本文证明了新资本管理办法在提高风险敏感性的同时,还会提高银行对小微企业和居民消费的信贷支持。在防范系统性风险方面,本文梳理并分析了新资本管理办法对于改善系统性风险防范的机理。最后,本文对提高我国银行业新资本管理办法的实施质量及防范监管套利提出了政策建议。