The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition

We examine syndicates for 1,638 IPOs from January 1997 through June 2002. We find strong evidence of information production by syndicate members. Offer prices are more likely to be revised in response to information when the syndicate has more underwriters and especially more co‐managers. More co‐managers also result in more analyst coverage and additional market makers following the IPO. Relationships between underwriters are critical in determining the composition of syndicates, perhaps because they mitigate free‐riding and moral hazard problems. While there appear to be benefits to larger syndicates, we discuss several factors that may limit syndicate size.     

Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect

The markets for management buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe have experienced dramatic growth in the past ten years. In the U.K., buyouts accounted for half of the total M&A activity (measured by value) in 2005. And as in the U.S. during the‘80s, the greatest number of U.K. buyouts in recent years have been management‐ and investor‐led acquisitions of divisions of large corporations. In continental Europe, by contrast, the largest fraction of deals has involved the purchase of family‐owned private businesses. But in recent years, increased pressure for shareholder value in countries like France, Netherlands, and even Germany has led to a growing number of buyouts of divisions of listed companies. Like the U.K., continental Europe has also seen a small but growing number of purchases of entire public companies (known as private‐to‐public transactions, or PTPs), including the largest ever buyout in Europe, the €13 billion purchase this year of the Danish corporation TDC. In view of the record levels of capital raised by European private equity funds in recent years‐which, until 2005, exceeded the amounts invested in any given year‐we can expect more growth in private equity investment in the near future. In continental Europe, the prospects for buyouts remain especially strong, given both the pressure from investors to restructure larger corporations and the possibilities for adding value in family‐owned firms. But, as the authors note, today's private equity firms face a number of challenges in earning adequate returns for their investors. One is increased competition. In addition to the increased activity of U.S. private equity firms, local private equity investors are also facing competition from hedge funds and new entrants such as government‐sponsored operators, family offices, and wealthy entrepreneurs. Another major challenge is finding value‐preserving exit vehicles. Although an IPO is an option for the largest buyouts with growth prospects, most buyout investments are harvested either through sales to other companies or, increasingly, other private equity firms. The latter transactions, known as “secondary” buyouts, now account for a significant share of new funds invested by private equity firms across Europe.     

Institutional influence on syndicate structure and cross‐border leveraged buyouts

We explore the extent to which differences in countries’ formal and informal institutions reduce cross‐border leveraged buyout transactions and the potential influence these same institutions have on how private equity (PE) investors choose to enter these transactions. Although institutional differences have frequently been viewed as barriers to cross‐border investment, we find evidence that these same differences may motivate a PE firm's decision to enter the transaction with a syndicate of firms rather than undertaking the transaction on their own. Cultural differences between a PE firm and the target nation are significantly related to the choice to enter the deal via a multinational syndicate. The varying nationalities within the syndicate contribute to enhanced familiarity, with average institutional distances between the syndicate and target firms being significantly lower than for single‐PE‐led deals. Overall, deals undertaken by syndicates are more likely to be successfully completed and require less time in negotiation. These results persist even after accounting for selection bias with regard to target country choice. We explore whether other features of the syndicate are responsible for improved deal outcomes, such as repeated transactions with the same partners, but find no evidence that this is the case.     

Size and diversity in VC syndicates and their impact on IPO performance

This paper investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) syndicate size and composition on the IPO and post-IPO performances of investee companies in an attempt to shed some light on the extent to which larger and more diverse syndicates are more likely to suffer from internal agency problems which might hinder the decision-making process and lead to less value added for their portfolio companies. The question is of great relevance because, while the vast majority of the empirical literature compares VC backed IPOs with non-VC backed ones, most VC funding is provided by syndicates of two or more financiers. We construct alternative measures of size as well as diversity based on several VC characteristics such as age, geographic location, type and affiliation of VC firms and find that larger and more diverse syndicates are associated with higher underpricing and lower valuation at the IPO date. Furthermore, we provide evidence that that diversity and size are negatively correlated to the long-term performance of the IPO firms and this finding is robust to several alternative measures of long-term performance.     

Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration

Abstract:  Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two or more private equity firms invest together in an investee firm and share a joint pay-off, and are an enduring feature of the leveraged buyout (LBO) and private equity industry. This study examines the relationship between syndication and agency costs at the investor-investee level, and the extent to which the reputation and the network position of the lead investor mediate this relationship. We examine this relationship using a sample of 1,122 buyout investments by 80 private equity companies in the UK between 1993 and 2006. Our findings show that where agency costs are highest, and hence ex-post monitoring by the lead investor is more important, syndication is less likely to occur. The negative relationship between agency costs and syndication, however, is alleviated by the reputation and network position of the lead investor firm.     

Skill,syndication, and performance: Evidence from leveraged buyouts

This paper studies why buyout firms syndicate and how this influences buyout performance. I find evidence that skill plays an important role in syndication and its effect on performance. The results suggest low-skill firms utilize syndication to pool skill, resources, and information to overcome firm-specific deficiencies and improve performance, but no such effect exists for high-skill firms. This evidence is robust to potential endogeneity concerns and other alternative explanations. Additionally, this paper is the first to use a robust statistical network methodology studying the formation of syndication networks that allows for a consistent estimation of effects within the network despite the lack of independence among observations.     

Fare Thee Well? An Analysis of Buyout Funds’ Exit Strategies

This paper analyzes exit strategies of buyout funds in portfolio companies following initial public offerings (IPOs). We use a data set of 222 buyout‐backed IPOs in the United States from 1999 to 2008, including hand‐collected data about each exit process, to draw a detailed roadmap of buyout investors’ divestment processes. Using this data, we document the timing and aggressiveness of the exit strategies, and analyze to which degree a multitude of possible determinants influence the choice of a given exit strategy. Our results indicate that buyout funds remain invested in their portfolio companies for a substantial period of time after the IPO, and that the choice of a given exit strategy depends not only upon the characteristics of each respective portfolio company, but also on the financial success of the deal from the perspective of the buyout investor.     

Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value

This paper estimates the value of tax benefits in 76 management buyouts of public companies completed in the period 1980 to 1986. The median value of tax benefits, estimated at the time the buyout company goes private, has a lower bound of 21% and an upper bound of 143% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders. The estimated value depends on the rate buyout debt is repaid and the tax rate applied to the interest deductions. The paper also presents evidence on the actual taxes paid and debt repayment rates by these companies after the buyout. The results in this paper suggest that tax benefits are an important source of the wealth gains in management buyouts.     

Does Poor Performance Damage the Reputation of Financial Intermediaries? Evidence from the Loan Syndication Market

We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large‐scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or monitoring by the lead arranger. However, the effect of borrower bankruptcies on syndication activity is not present among dominant lead arrangers, and is weak in years in which many lead arrangers experience borrower bankruptcies.     

CEO Risk‐taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure

This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO risk‐taking incentives on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When CEO risk‐taking incentives are high, syndicates are structured to facilitate better due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates have a smaller number of total lenders and are more concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a greater portion of the loan. Moreover, CEO risk‐taking incentives have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a good reputation and a prior lending relationship with a borrowing firm, while they have a greater effect on the syndicate structure when borrowing firms have low information transparency, are financially distressed or have low growth prospects.     

The Agency Structure of Loan Syndicates

Leaders of loan syndicates often delegate some administrative tasks to banks known as co‐agents. One reason is that co‐agents are specialized banks that help split the costs of managing the syndicate. Another reason is that co‐agents monitor the leader on behalf of syndicate members to mitigate informational asymmetry problems. Large sample tests on the Dealscan database provide support for both arguments. Evidence of repeated contracting between the same banks explains the moderate magnitude of monitoring effects.     

Auditor choice and information asymmetry: evidence from international syndicated loans

Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower proportion of the loan after issuance. Further analysis demonstrates that this effect exists only in countries with strong creditor rights and in those countries with high levels of societal trust, suggesting that both sound formal and informal institutional factors are prerequisites for lenders and borrowers to benefit from differential audit quality on loan syndicate structure efficiency. Furthermore, we find that the loan syndicate structure benefits for borrowers that employ Big N auditors are higher for borrowers with greater information asymmetry problems, but we do not find that Big N audits are able to address the information asymmetry and moral hazard issues between the lenders themselves.     

Borrow Cheap,Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts

Private equity funds pay particular attention to capital structure when executing leveraged buyouts, creating an interesting setting for examining capital structure theories. Using a large, international sample of buyouts from 1980 to 2008, we find that buyout leverage is unrelated to the cross‐sectional factors, suggested by traditional capital structure theories, that drive public firm leverage. Instead, variation in economy‐wide credit conditions is the main determinant of leverage in buyouts. Higher deal leverage is associated with higher transaction prices and lower buyout fund returns, suggesting that acquirers overpay when access to credit is easier.     

Do Lead Banks Exploit Syndicate Participants? Evidence from Ex Post Risk

Loan syndication involves a repeated game between lead banks and syndicate members. Lead banks do not use their private information to exploit syndicate participants but rather focus on accurately certifying loan quality. Using borrowers' financial ratios (shifts in Altman's Z scores) after origination to proxy for bank private information, we find that lead banks syndicate larger proportions of loans that subsequently do not experience lower Z scores. Performance pricing covenants under which borrowers commence to pay higher spreads if ratios (or credit ratings) deteriorate constitute a positive signal reducing agency costs and are associated with higher proportions of syndication.     

Who chooses whom? Syndication,skills and reputation

We develop a model focusing on the dynamic aspect of syndication, namely, the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysis checks whether reputational concerns outweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract. Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals. The second focuses on who chooses whom. Sometimes, the syndication is impeded because the financier believes that his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract (hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).     

Syndicated loan spreads and the composition of the syndicate

During the past decade, non-bank institutional investors are increasingly taking larger roles in the corporate lending than they historically have played. These non-bank institutional lenders typically have higher required rates of return than banks, but invest in the same loan facilities. In a sample of 20,031 leveraged loan facilities originated between 1997 and 2007, facilities including a non-bank institution in their syndicates have higher spreads than otherwise identical bank-only facilities. Contrary to risk-based explanations of this finding, non-bank facilities are priced with premiums relative to bank-only facilities in the same loan package. These non-bank premiums are substantially larger when a hedge or private equity fund is one of the syndicate members. Consistent with the notion that firms are willing to pay a premium when loan facilities are particularly important to them, the non-bank premiums are larger when borrowing firms face financial constraints and when capital is less available from banks.     

Has persistence persisted in private equity? Evidence from buyout and venture capital funds

This paper presents new evidence on performance persistence for U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds. We use high quality cash-flow data from Burgiss's large sample of institutional investors (as of December 2020) which allows us to examine how persistence has changed over more than three decades of fundraising. Venture capital (VC) performance remains remarkably persistent across funds raised by the same general partner (GP). In contrast, buyout funds' performance persistence becomes noticeably weaker over time. The patterns are different when we restrict the analysis to information that would have been available to investors – interim performance on the previous fund at the time a new fund is raised – rather than using final, or latest, performance. We find little evidence of persistence for buyouts, especially post-2000. We continue to find persistence for VC funds though it declines post-2000. The differences are driven by interim performance reported at the time of fundraising being only moderately correlated to final performance and GPs avoiding fundraising when interim performance is poor. Finally, we look at GPs who introduce new fund styles and find that performance is noticeably lower for buyouts (but not VC). Exploring the reasons for these divergent trends in persistence between buyout and VC is a promising area for future research.     

Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?

We examine how leveraged buyouts from the most recent wave of public to private transactions created value. Buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006 are more conservatively priced and less levered than their predecessors from the 1980s. For deals with post‐buyout data available, median market‐ and risk‐adjusted returns to pre‐ (post‐) buyout capital invested are 72.5% (40.9%). In contrast, gains in operating performance are either comparable to or slightly exceed those observed for benchmark firms. Increases in industry valuation multiples and realized tax benefits from increasing leverage, while private, are each economically as important as operating gains in explaining realized returns.     

A theory of private equity turnarounds

This paper explores the advantage of private equity in fixing turnaround situations. Meaningful corporate value creation may require addressing operational problems, replacing management, or changing the incentive structure. Change may be implemented under either without change of ownership or through a buyout. The paper derives scenarios under which transferring ownership to private equity prior to implementing a turnaround can emerge as an optimal solution, even when current ownership can conceivably implement the same operational changes as private equity. Also considered is the possibility of investment syndication in which the private equity buyer shares the transaction with other private equity firms. Various alternatives are considered for implementing turnarounds; in particular, ones that allow for management replacement and others that are effectively management buyouts.     

Private Equity: Accomplishments and Challenges

The authors provide an overview of the main accomplishments of private equity since the emergence of leveraged buyouts in the 1980s, and of the challenges now facing the industry—challenges that have been encountered before during three major growth waves and two full boom‐and‐bust cycles. In so doing, the authors review a large and growing body of academic studies responding to questions like these:

• (1) How have PE buyout companies performed relative to their public counterparts? And to the extent there have been improvements in operating performance and productivity gains, how have such gains been achieved? What role have PE firms played in this process?
• (2) Especially in light of the large fees and profit shares paid to the PE firms, or GPs, and the significant “control” premiums over market paid to the selling companies, how have the returns to the LPs that provide the bulk of the funding for PE funds compared to the returns earned by the shareholders of comparable public companies?
• (3) Apart from the high fees earned by its GPs, why is PE so controversial? Beyond their effects on productivity and benefits for investors, what are the employment and other social effects of buyouts and PE?
• (4) What are the prospects for future PE returns to their LPs, especially in light of the volume of capital commitments and high purchase multiples that were being paid, at least until the onset of the COVID pandemic? And what role, if any, should PE activity be expected to play in the recovery from the pandemic?