THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Since the formulation of the M & M irrelevance propositions 40 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes current firm value. Some finance scholars have followed M & M by arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the increased probability and costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M & M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other “contracting”) costs, and information costs (the main factor in the pecking order theory) all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much if not most of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (leverage ratios) and flows (specific choices between debt and equity). Even if companies have target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation from those targets—one that will depend on the transactions and information costs associated with adjusting back to the target relative to the costs of deviating from the target. As the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the target.     

Do Managers Have Capital Structure Targets? Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs

The two main theories of capital structure—the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory—have opposite predictions about the expected relationship between corporate leverage and profitability. According to the tradeoff theory, companies that earn higher profits will use more debt both to shield their income from corporate taxes and to discipline corporate investment policy. In contrast, the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable companies will borrow less mainly because they have less need to borrow.
Corporate spinoffs provide a unique opportunity to investigate the influence of profitability and other asset characteristics on the design of capital structure. In their study of 98 spinoffs over the period 1979–1997, the authors began by investigating the popular argument that managers routinely assign more debt to subsidiaries than parents in order to leave the parents less encumbered—a possibility they reject after finding that the average leverage ratios of the parents and spunoff units were roughly equal. At the same time, the authors reported large differences in the leverage ratios among both parents and spun-off units, and that the variation was explained primarily by differences in three factors: asset tangibility and the level and variability of cash operating profits. Consistent with the tradeoff theory (but not the pecking order), the study found a significantly positive correlation between a post-spinoff company's cash profitability and its assigned debt load, as well as a negative correlation between debt and the variability of operating cash flow.     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.     

Proactive Leverage Increases and The Value of Financial Flexibility

Traditional tradeoff models of corporate capital structure, although still featured prominently in finance textbooks and widely accepted by practitioners, have been criticized by financial economists for doing a poor job of explaining observed debt ratios. Moreover, the observed ratios are far less stable than what would be predicted by the standard tradeoff models. In a study published several years ago in the Review of Financial Studies, the authors of this article aimed to shed more light on the underlying forces governing capital structure decisions by analyzing a set of major changes in capital structure in which companies initiated large increases in leverage through substantial new borrowings. They then attempted to explain why these companies chose to increase leverage and how their capital structures changed during the years after the large debt issues. As summarized in this article, the authors' findings indicate, first of all, that the large debt financings were used primarily to fund major corporate investments—and not, for example, to make large distributions to shareholders. And the changes in leverage ratios that came after the debt offerings were driven far more by the evolution of the companies' realized cash flows and their investment opportunities than by deliberate or decisive attempts to rebalance their capital structures toward a stationary target. In fact, many of the companies chose to take on even more debt when faced with cash‐flow deficits, despite operating with leverage that was already well above any reasonable estimate of their estimated target leverage. At the same time, companies that generated financial surpluses used them to reduce debt, even when their leverage had fallen well below their estimated targets. Taken as a whole, the findings of the authors' study support the idea that unused debt capacity represents an important source of financial flexibility, and that preserving such flexibility—and making use of it when valuable investment opportunities materialize—may well be the critical missing link in connecting capital structure theory with observed corporate behavior.     

Valuing Companies with Cash‐Flow@Risk

The classic DCF approach to capital budgeting—the one that MBA students in the world's top business schools have been taught for the last 30 years—begins with the assumption that the corporate investment decision is “independent of” the financing decision. That is, the value of a given investment opportunity should not be affected by how a company is financed, whether mainly with debt or with equity. A corollary of this capital structure “irrelevance” proposition says that a company's investment decision should also not be influenced by its risk management policy—by whether a company hedges its various price exposures or chooses to leave them unhedged. In this article, the authors—one of whom is the CFO of the French high‐tech firm Gemalto—propose a practical alternative to DCF that is based on a concept they call “cash‐flow@risk.” Implementation of the concept involves dividing expected future cash flow into two components: a low‐risk part, or “certainty equivalent,” and a high‐risk part. The two cash flow streams are discounted at different rates (corresponding to debt and equity) when estimating their value. The concept of cash‐flow@risk derives directly from, and is fully consistent with, the concept of economic capital that was developed by Robert Merton and Andre Perold in the early 1990s and that has become the basis of Value at Risk (or VaR) capital allocation systems now used at most financial institutions. But because the approach in this article focuses on the volatility of operating cash flows instead of asset values, the authors argue that an internal capital allocation system based on cash‐flow@risk is likely to be much more suitable than VaR for industrial companies.     

Assessing Project Risk

Finding the appropriate discount rate, or cost of capital, for evaluating investment projects requires an accurate estimate of project risk. This can be challenging because project risk cannot be estimated directly using the CAPM, but must instead be inferred from a set of traded securities, typically the equity betas of comparable firms in the same industry. These equity betas are then unlevered to undo the effect of comparable companies' financial leverage and obtain estimates of “asset” betas, which are then used to estimate project risk. The authors show that asset betas estimated in this way are likely to overestimate project risk. The equity returns of companies are risky not only because of their existing projects but also because of their growth opportunities. Such growth opportunities often include embedded “real options,” such as the option to delay, expand, or abandon a project. Because such real options are similar to leveraged positions in the underlying project, a company's growth opportunities are typically riskier than its existing projects. Therefore, to properly assess project risk, analysts must also unlever the asset betas derived from comparable company stock returns for the leverage contributed by their growth options. The authors derive a simple method for unlevering asset betas for growth options leverage in order to properly assess project risk. They then show that standard methods for assessing project risk significantly overestimate project costs of capital—by as much as 2–3% in industries such as healthcare, pharmaceuticals, communications, medical equipment, and entertainment. Their method should also be applied to stock return volatility to derive project volatility, an important input for determining the value of a firm's growth opportunities and the appropriate time for investing in these opportunities.     

HOW DO CFOs MAKE CAPITAL BUDGETING AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS?

This paper summarizes the findings of the authors' recent survey of 392 CFOs about the current practice of corporate finance, with main focus on the areas of capital budgeting and capital structure. The findings of the survey are predictable in some respects but surprising in others. For example, although the discounted cash flow method taught in our business schools is much more widely used as a project evaluation method than it was ten or 20 years ago, the popularity of the payback method continues despite shortcomings that have been pointed out for years. In setting capital structure policy, CFOs appear to place less emphasis on formal leverage targets that reflect the trade‐off between the costs and benefits of debt than on “informal” criteria such as credit ratings and financial flexibility. And despite the efforts of academics to demonstrate that EPS dilution per se should be irrelevant to stock valuation, avoiding dilution of EPS was the most cited reason for companies reluctance to issue equity. But despite such apparent contradictions between theory and practice, finance theory does seem to be gaining ground. For example, large companies were much more likely than their smaller counterparts to use DCF and NPV techniques, while small firms still tended to rely heavily on the payback criterion. And a majority of the CFOs of the large companies said they had “strict” or “somewhat strict” target debt ratios, whereas only a third of small firms claimed to have such targets. What does the future hold? On the one hand, the authors suggest that we are likely to see greater corporate acceptance of certain aspects of financial theory, including the use of real options techniques for evaluating corporate investments. But we are also likely to see further modifications and refinements of the theory, particularly with respect to smaller companies that have limited access to capital markets.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Strategic Financial Management: Lessons from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Each of today's three dominant academic theories of capital structure has trouble explaining the financing behavior of companies that have seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In conflict with the tradeoff theory, the authors’ recent studies of some 7,000 SEOs by U.S. industrial companies over the period 1970‐2017 notes that the vast majority of them—on the order of 80%—had the effect of moving the companies away from, rather than toward, their target leverage ratios. Inconsistent with the pecking‐order theory, SEO issuers have tended to be financially healthy companies with low leverage and considerable unused debt capacity. And at odds with the market‐timing theory, SEOs appear to be driven more by the capital requirements associated with large investment projects than by favorable market conditions. The authors’ findings also show that, in the years following their stock offerings, the SEO companies tend to issue one or more debt offerings, which have the effect of raising their leverage back toward their targets. Whereas each of the three theories assumes some degree of shortsightedness among financial managers, the authors’ findings suggest that long‐run‐value‐maximizing CFOs manage their capital structures strategically as opposed to opportunistically. They consider the company's current leverage in relation to its longer‐run target, its investment opportunities and long‐term capital requirements, and the costs and benefits of alternative sequences of financing transactions. This framework, which the authors call strategic financial management, aims to provide if not a unifying, then a more integrated, explanation—one that draws on each of the three main theories to provide a more convincing account of the financing and leverage decisions of SEO issuers.     

The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Corporate Value and Performance

The last few years have seen a remarkable increase in the participation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in global capital markets. In this article, the author draws on a unique dataset of SWF international holdings—one that dates back to the year 2002 and includes individual SWF holdings in more than 8,000 companies in 58 countries—to provide evidence of the impact of SWFs on corporate values and operating performance. Contrary to claims that SWFs expropriate minority investors and pursue political agendas, the main finding of the author's study is that SWF ownership is associated with positive changes in both corporate market values and operating returns. In support of these findings, the author also identifies three important ways that SWFs work to increase the performance and value of the companies they invest in: (1) as long‐term holders that provide a stable source of financing; (2) as representatives of deep pools of international capital in search of global diversification opportunities that are likely to provide companies with a lower‐cost (as well as more “patient”) source of equity capital; and (3) as politically well‐connected strategic investors that enable their companies to leverage important connections when accessing new product markets.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

Save the Buyback,Save Jobs

In response to a recent New York Times op‐ed by Senators Schumer and Sanders deploring the effects of stock buybacks on workers and the economy, the authors explain the role of buybacks in increasing corporate productivity and in recycling “excess capital” from mature companies with limited growth and employment opportunities to the next generation of Apples and Amazons. Some companies, as Schumer and Sanders charge, are guilty of repurchasing shares in the name of “shareholder value maximization” instead of pursuing job‐creating investments. But as the authors argue, well‐run companies increase shareholder value not by boosting EPS through buybacks, but mainly by earning competitive returns on capital and investing in their long‐run “earnings power.” And by paying out capital they have no productive uses for, such companies give their own shareholders the opportunity to reinvest in other companies with promising prospects for growth and jobs. But the authors go on to note the tendency of companies to buy back shares not when their stock prices are low, but instead when the companies are flush with cash and nearer the top than the bottom of the business cycle. The result of this tendency, as research by Fortuna Advisors (the authors' firm) shows, is that fully three quarters of companies doing large buybacks during the period 2013‐2017 failed to produce an adequate “Buyback ROI,” a metric developed by Fortuna that indicates management's effectiveness in “timing” its stock repurchases. Given the usefulness of buybacks in recycling capital, the authors conclude that the most reliable solution to the corporate short termism and underinvestment problem is for companies to adopt better financial performance measures—including Buyback ROI—to guide their capital allocation. And when management determines that it has significantly more capital than value‐adding investments, but wants to avoid committing to unsustainable dividend increases, it should consider buybacks—but only if management is convinced that its stock price has not outpaced performance.     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.     

An Investment Management Methodology for Publicly Held Property/Casualty Insurers

Investment officers of publicly held property/casualty companies wrestle with the question of how best to contribute to shareholder value. Should they view themselves as managers of a closed‐end investment company that happens to be funded by insurance underwriting? Or should they instead be investing funds primarily to defease the firm's liabilities and thus support the operations of a company whose principal value derives from its insurance activities? The authors of this article suggest that the investment policy of most insurance companies should have two primary objectives: (1) immunizing insurance reserves with a fixed‐income portfolio and (2) earning “abnormal returns” on surplus in “a responsible and disciplined” way. The latter means adhering to an asset allocation approach that takes account of the risk‐reward tradeoffs presented by a broad variety of investment types as well as the accounting treatment of investment income. Both accounting and economic considerations lead the authors to suggest that after‐tax net investment income (“NII”), as defined by U.S. GAAP, is the best benchmark of performance. While focusing mainly on the fixed income part of the portfolio, the authors suggest active management and portfolio approaches that aim to produce a growing, but relatively stable NII. Consistent with GAAP's treatment of NII (which includes interest income but excludes most capital gains) as “recurring income,” the authors argue that the market appears to assign significantly higher multiples to NII than to other sources of reported income.     

A Tale of Two Stories: Sustainability and the Quarterly Earnings Call

One of the challenges companies claim to face in making sustainability a core part of their strategy and operations is that the market does not care about sustainability, either in general or because the time frames in which it matters are too long. The response of investors who say they care about sustainability—and their numbers are large and growing—is that companies do a poor job in providing them with the information they need to take sustainability into account in their investment decisions. Whatever the merits of each view, the fact remains that an effective conversation about sustainability requires the participation of both sides of the market. There are two main mechanisms for companies to communicate to the market as a way of starting this conversation: mandated reporting and quarterly conference calls. In this paper, the authors argue that neither companies nor investors can be seen as taking sustainability seriously unless it is integrated into the quarterly earnings call. Until that happens, the core business and sustainability are two separate worlds, each of which has its own narrator telling a different story to a different audience. The authors illustrate their argument using the case of SAP, the German software company. SAP was the first company to host an “ESG Investor Briefing,” a conference call for analysts and investors held on July 30, 2013 in which the company discussed both its sustainability performance and its contribution to the firm's financial performance. The narrative of this call was very similar to the narrative of the company's first “integrated report,” which was issued in 2012 and presented the company's sustainability initiatives in the context of its operating and financial performance. Nevertheless, the content and main focus of the “ESG Briefing” were very different from that of most quarterly earnings conferences, and so were the audiences. Whereas the quarterly call was attended mainly by sell side analysts—and the words “sustainability” or “sustainable” failed to receive a single mention—the ESG briefing was delivered to an investor audience made up almost entirely of the “buy side.”     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited

Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 50 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial "pecking order" in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required.
In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other "contracting") costs, and information costs all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (the levels of debt and equity in relation to the target) and flows (or which security to issue at a particular time).     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE‐backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested (“dry powder”), could increase the resilience of PE‐backed companies. In their study of PE‐backed buyouts in the U.K.—which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S.—the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE‐backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non‐PE firms. Moreover, such PE‐backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE‐backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.     

What Public Companies Can Learn from Private Equity Pay Plans

Studies of private equity pay, including one by current SEC commissioner Robert Jackson, have pointed to restrictions on equity sales as a key difference between private equity and public company pay. In this article, the author argues that there is another very important difference: equity compensation in PE pay plans is typically front loaded, with top executives of portfolio companies often required to buy shares, and receiving upfront option grants on three times the number of shares they purchase. Such front‐loaded equity compensation allows PE pay plans to avoid the unintended effects of the “competitive pay policy” that have been embraced by public companies for the past 50 years. Competitive pay—targeted, for example, to provide 50th percentile total compensation regardless of past performance—has the effect of creating a systematic “performance penalty,” rewarding poor performance with more shares and penalizing superior performance with fewer shares. The author's research shows that, for public companies during the past decade or so, the number of shares granted has fallen by 7% for each 10% increase in share prices—and that, primarily for this reason, the front loaded option grants used by PE firms have provided five times more incentive (“pay leverage”) than the average public company's annual series of equity grants. What's more, to the extent that PE pay has been guided by partnership and fixed‐sharing concepts rather than competitive pay, it is the spiritual heir to the value‐sharing concepts that guided public company pay in the first half of the 20th century. For 60 years, General Motors used value sharing in “economic profit”—10% of GM's profit above a 7% return on capital was the formula for the bonus pool for many years—as the basis for all incentive compensation. The author uses the GM history to highlight four ways to improve public company incentives and corporate governance.