Venture capital reputation and investment performance

I propose a new measure of venture capital (VC) firm reputation and analyze its performance implications on private companies. Controlling for portfolio company quality and other VC-specific factors including experience, connectedness, syndication, industry competition, exit conditions, and investment environment, I find companies backed by more reputable VCs by initial public offering (IPO) capitalization share (based on cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the VC), are more likely to exit successfully, access public markets faster, and have higher asset productivity at IPOs. Further tests suggest VCs’ IPO Capitalization share effectively captures both VC screening and monitoring expertise. My findings have financial implications for limited partners and entrepreneurs regarding their VC-sorting activities.     

Cross-border venture capital performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance in the Chinese VC market. We focus on the impact of foreign VC firms' (VCs') human capital and domestic entrepreneurs' experience on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using logit and Cox hazard models. After controlling for portfolio company quality, domestic VC industry development, domestic exit conditions and a number of other factors, little correlation was evident between VC performance and foreign VCs' human capital, such as experience, networks and reputation. In contrast, the domestic entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to VC performance. In particular, if an entrepreneur has more general experience in terms of the number of companies previously worked for or more special experience in terms of the number of companies previously served as a CEO or top manager, a portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through IPO or M&A, and the VCs are also likely to shorten their investment duration in the portfolio company.     

CARE Conference Hong Kong Polytechnic University,June 9, 2014: Equity Financing for Early‐Stage Companies in China

Many of the smaller private‐sector Chinese companies in their entrepreneurial growth stage are now being funded by Chinese venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) firms. In contrast to western VC markets, where institutional investors such as pension funds and endowments have been the main providers of capital, in China most capital for domestic funds has come from private business owners and high net worth individuals. As relatively new players in the market who are less accustomed to entrusting their capital to fund managers for a lengthy period of time, Chinese VCs and their investors have shown a shorter investment horizon and demanded a faster return of capital and profits. In an attempt to explain this behavior, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner of Harvard Business School have offered a “grandstanding hypothesis” that focuses on the incentives of younger, less established VCs to push their portfolio companies out into the IPO market as early as they can—and thus possibly prematurely—to establish a track record and facilitate future fundraising. This explanation is supported by the under‐performance of Chinese VC‐backed IPOs that has been documented by the author's recent research. Although they continue to offer significant opportunities for global investors, China's VC and PE markets still face many challenges. The supervisory system and legal environment need further improvement, and Chinese funds need to find a way to attract more institutional investors—a goal that can and likely will be promoted through government inducements.     

Private Equity,the Rise of Unicorns,and the Reincarnation of Control‐based Accounting

This article discusses the rise of intangibles‐intensive companies and private equity (PE) since the late 1970s, and the role of both in bringing about the creation of a streamlined, more flexible set of accounting rules that, since their approval by the IASB and FASB in 2009, have been used by private companies and their investors. The PE industry comprises both venture capital (VC) firms that fund high‐growth enterprises and leveraged buyout (LBO) firms that fund more traditional, cash‐generating operations. Mainly because of the greater risks associated with both VC‐backed firms and LBOs—risks that make them ill‐suited for most public investors—such companies tend to require the more direct and active oversight provided by PE investors. And as the author goes on to argue, the more direct and active ownership of PE investors, as compared to the governance provided by most public‐company boards, suggests that financial accounting and reporting play a fundamentally different role in private than in public companies. Whereas the primary role of public‐company GAAP has increasingly (since the creation of the SEC in 1933) been to provide information for outside investors when valuing companies, the most important function of accounting reports in private companies is internal control—more specifically, ensuring that the interests of the managers of their portfolio companies are aligned with those of all the providers of capital. And recognizing this difference in the role of accounting, both the IASB and FASB responded to the requests of various parties (including private companies) by approving in 2009 the use by private companies of a streamlined and more flexible set of accounting standards. To the extent that the workings of PE markets continue to reduce the numbers of U.S. public companies, the author predicts that the resulting increase in the use of private‐company GAAP will continue to shift the primary role of accounting away from valuation and back toward its traditional roots in internal control and corporate governance.     

Economic freedom and cross-border venture capital performance

We investigate the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance using a large sample of 10,205 cross-border VC investments by 1906 foreign VC firms (VCs) in 6535 domestic portfolio companies. We focus on the impact of a domestic country's economic freedom on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using a probit model and the Cox hazard model. After controlling for other related factors of domestic countries, portfolio companies, VCs and the global VC market, as well as year and industry fixed effects, we find that a domestic country's economic freedom is crucial to cross-border VC performance. In particular, in a more economically free country, as measured by the raw values of, quartiles of or the ranking in the index of economic freedom (IEF), a foreign VC-backed portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through an IPO (initial public offering) or an M&A (merger and acquisition), and a foreign VC firm is likely to spend a shorter investment duration in the portfolio company. We also identify interesting evidence on the impact of many other level factors of domestic countries, portfolio companies, VCs and the global VC market on cross-border VC performance.     

Bringing Silicon Valley inside

In 1998, Silicon Valley companies produced 41 IPOs, which by January 1999 had a combined market capitalization of $27 billion--that works out to $54,000 in new wealth creation per worker in a single year. Multiply the number of employees in your company by $54,000. Did your business create that much new wealth last year? Half that amount? It's not a group of geniuses generating such riches. It's a business model. In Silicon Valley, ideas, capital, and talent circulate freely, gathering into whatever combinations are most likely to generate innovation and wealth. Unlike most traditional companies, which spend their energy in resource allocation--a system designed to avoid failure--the Valley operates through resource attraction--a system that nurtures innovation. In a traditional company, people with innovative ideas must go hat in hand to the guardians of the old ideas for funding and for staff. But in Silicon Valley, a slew of venture capitalists vie to attract the best new ideas, infusing relatively small amounts of capital into a portfolio of ventures. And talent is free to go to the companies offering the most exhilarating work and the greatest potential rewards. It should actually be easier for large, traditional companies to set up similar markets for capital, ideas, and talent internally. After all, big companies often already have extensive capital, marketing, and distribution resources, and a first crack at the talent in their own ranks. And some of them are doing it. The choice is yours--you can do your best to make sure you never put a dollar of capital at risk, or you can tap into the kind of wealth that's being created every day in Silicon Valley.     

Start-up investment with scarce venture capital support

Venture capitalists, representing informed capital, screen, monitor and advise start-up entrepreneurs. The paper reports three new results on venture capital (VC) finance and the evolution of the VC industry. First, there is an optimal VC portfolio size with a trade-off between the number of companies and the value of managerial advice. Second, advice tends to be diluted when the industry expands and VC skills remain scarce in the short-run. The delayed entry of experienced VCs eventually restores the quality of advice and leads to more focused company portfolios. Third, as a welfare result, VCs tend to provide too little advisory effort and to invest in too few companies. Testable implications are also discussed.     

PRIVATE EQUITY: SOURCES AND USES

Private equity capital is playing a large and growing role in the funding of small to medium-sized, high-growth businesses. Today's private equity investment typically takes the form of purchase of a minority interest in a post-start-up, high-technology company followed by an IPO a few years later. A large number of such investors are scouring the markets for new investment possibilities and the competitive pressures are growing.
Although private equity investors can and often do add significant value to a company, private equity is potentially expensive, in terms of both loss of ownership and loss of control over long-term strategic decisions of the company. Owner-managers who want to retain as much of both as possible are advised to install more formalized business procedures, expand the company's outside relationships, and become more familiar with the company's financial needs and options. These changes should reduce capital needs, reduce the costs of private equity funding, and increase negotiating leverage when dealing with large, sophisticated private capital investors.     

创业板公司IPO前后业绩变化及风险投资的影响

本文以创业板市场为样本,通过实证分析发现:风险投资在控制盈余管理方面有积极正面的影响;在上市时机选择方面,由于我国上市仍采用审批制,有风险投资和无风险投资在这一点上没有明显差异;同等资本下有风险投资持股的企业募集资金的金额少于无风险投资持股的企业,同时普通VC引入资金少于国有VC引入资金;有VC持股的企业发行后经营业绩的情况好于无VC持股的企业,风险投资的介入对于企业经营业绩有明显的正向作用。此外研究发现由于多数项目集中于政府手中,很多优质资源民间资本投资渠道不畅通,在这一点上具有国资背景的风险投资具备明显优势,容易以较低的风险进入。     

The Growing Blessing of Unicorns: The Changing Nature of the Market for Privately Funded Companies

The past 15 years have seen the emergence of large infusions of private capital at levels previously accessible only in public markets. One direct effect of these non‐public fundraisings is the spawning of private entities with market valuations reaching $1 billion, thereby achieving the status of unicorns. As the authors reported in an earlier study, by the end of 2015, there were 142 unicorns with an aggregate value exceeding $500 billion. The conviction of many investors and managers at that time was that these companies could best create value by staying private, often by adopting governance structures focused on creating superior operating performance. It was also widely believed that unicorns would remain outside the public markets longer and succeed in attracting even more private capital, thereby enabling their investors to capture a greater share of the increase in company value. In this study, the authors examine how the characteristics and dynamics of “the blessing” have changed in the past five years. Despite the widespread view that the valuations and private financing trend fueling this market were not sustainable, the authors report that by March 2020, the “net” number of unicorns had grown from 142 to 464, a number that doesn't reflect the transformation of over half of the 2015 sample through acquisition or public offering and their replacement by new unicorns. Further, the cumulative market valuation of unicorns more than doubled from $500 billion to $1.37 trillion, representing growth far greater than that in the public equity markets (some 26% per annum, as compared to 9% for the S&P 500) over the same period—and the blessing has become more diversified, both in terms of industry and geographical location. The authors also consider what happens when unicorns “graduate” to a different organizational form by means of an IPO, private buyout, or business failure. Analyzing the 107 firms that departed the sample between 2015 and 2020, the authors report that the average lifespan of a unicorn from its founding date to its exit date has been 9.5 years, indicating that such firms indeed remain privately owned for a longer time than in the past. Additionally, the study finds that the founders and initial investors in unicorns have fared quite well, cashing out their initial investment at almost six times invested capital, on average. These private investment performance metrics have been significantly higher than the returns to public shareholders in the same firms during the post‐IPO period, signifying that unicorn investors have captured much more of the value created in the company's growth phase than public stockholders.     

Size and diversity in VC syndicates and their impact on IPO performance

This paper investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) syndicate size and composition on the IPO and post-IPO performances of investee companies in an attempt to shed some light on the extent to which larger and more diverse syndicates are more likely to suffer from internal agency problems which might hinder the decision-making process and lead to less value added for their portfolio companies. The question is of great relevance because, while the vast majority of the empirical literature compares VC backed IPOs with non-VC backed ones, most VC funding is provided by syndicates of two or more financiers. We construct alternative measures of size as well as diversity based on several VC characteristics such as age, geographic location, type and affiliation of VC firms and find that larger and more diverse syndicates are associated with higher underpricing and lower valuation at the IPO date. Furthermore, we provide evidence that that diversity and size are negatively correlated to the long-term performance of the IPO firms and this finding is robust to several alternative measures of long-term performance.     

Opaque Financial Contracting and Toxic Term Sheets in Venture Capital

In a recent article in this journal, the authors documented the growing tendency of emerging growth companies to raise substantial equity while remaining privately held through private IPOs, or PIPOs. PIPO financing has created scores of “unicorn” firms—private enterprises with imputed market values of $1.0 billion or more—while allowing them to avoid the challenges of being publicly traded. But as has also been noted, the PIPO process, with its multiple financing rounds and increasingly complex terms, has almost certainly result in some inflated market valuations. Along with inflated values, the contracting process and many of the provisions that result from it often have economic consequences that are poorly understood by at least some of the participants, including the potential for significant wealth transfer between stakeholders as well as overall destruction of enterprise value. And the term sheets containing such provisions appear to become even more “opaque” and more “toxic” with each round of financing. More specifically, the liquidation preferences and ratchets often provided new investors in the later rounds of PIPOs can greatly affect the allocation of the risks and the ownership shares and, in so doing, transfer significant wealth from the entrepreneurs and other older owners. Using a numerical analysis of a representative term sheet, the authors discuss the process of financial contracting for early‐stage companies, providing examples of how negotiations can go wrong and showing exactly when and where the agreed‐upon conditions start to turn toxic for some of the stakeholders. The article closes with the authors’ assessment of the disincentives for entrepreneurs and early‐stage investors created by this often confusing and dilutive venture capital contracting and funding process.     

How an IPO Helps in M&A

An initial public offering (IPO) can often provide a powerful stimulus to private companies seeking to pursue an acquisition-driven growth strategy. Based on a comprehensive analysis of U.S. IPOs, the authors show that newly public companies are prolific acquirers. Over 30% of companies conducting an IPO make at least one acquisition in their IPO year, and the typical IPO firm makes about four acquisitions during its first five years as a public company. IPOs facilitate M&A not only by providing infusions of capital but also by creating ongoing access to equity and debt markets for cash-financed deals. In addition, IPOs create an acquisition currency that can prove valuable in stock-financed deals when the shares are attractively priced. The authors also argue that IPOs improve the ability of companies to conduct M&A by resolving some of the valuation uncertainty facing privately held companies.     

Does the Presence of Venture Capitalists Improve the Survival Profile of IPO Firms?

The role of venture capital in the creation of the public corporation is now widely recognized. This study investigates whether venture capitalists add value to the going public process by improving the survival profile of IPO issuers. The survival of IPO issuers is not only likely to depend on managerial actions but also on the effectiveness of key market participants such as investment bankers and analysts. The form and function of the venture capital industry allows venture capitalists to influence the actions of managers, investment bankers, and analysts, and attract institutional interest. Conducting survival analyses using the Cox hazard methodology, we find that the involvement of venture capitalists improves the survival profile of IPO firms. Several other variables that are potentially influenced by VC involvement like R&D allocations, analyst following, investment banker prestige, and success on road shows are also positively related to the survival time of IPO issuers.     

University of Texas Roundtable on The Role of Private Equity in the Financing and Restructuring of Oil and Gas Companies

In this second of two University of Texas roundtables, four highly successful veterans of the U.S. energy industry, with considerable experience running both public and private companies, discuss recent developments in this rapidly evolving industry. Among the most remarkable—and a major focus of this discussion—is the dramatic expansion of the output and productivity of the Permian Basin of West Texas, and the role of private equity in accomplishing it. Although the Permian has been a major source of oil and gas since 1920, the combination of massive horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has contributed to a tripling of production volumes from about 800,000 barrels per day to 2.5 million during the past ten years. In fact, the productivity gains are said to be so great that, even with the huge run‐up in the cost of acquiring acreage (to as high as $40,000 per acre), today's producers are projecting annual operating returns of 20% even if oil prices fail to rise above their current level of about $50 a barrel. What's more, there appears to have been a fairly clear division of labor between private and public companies in this recent development of the Permian. With most of the high‐priced acreage now being acquired by larger public companies, the primary role of private equity has been to identify and make good on opportunities to increase the productivity and value of smaller operations that can then be sold to public companies—companies that have the size and access to capital to benefit from the economies of scale produced by combining them with their other operations. Thanks to their earlier position in the value chain, investments by private equity groups have generally not only produced higher payoffs, on average, but involved larger operating and financial risks. And this difference in risk profile is reflected in a notable difference in hedging practices between public and private equity‐controlled companies. This difference was summed up as follows by a private equity partner who has also run several public oil and gas companies: To a much greater extent in private equity than in public companies, we think of our projects and companies as delivering value that is largely independent of changes in oil prices. Hedging is our way of saying we don't want to take oil price risk if we don't have to. We do not count on price increases to make our required returns. The returns come from operating the company successfully without the help of commodity prices.     

HARVESTING VALUE FROM ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS

This article discusses ways for entrepreneurs to gain liquidity from their businesses, either with or without a sale of the business. In today's financial arena there is a wide variety of methods and financing vehicles that can enable private companies to harvest liquidity to meet their own needs for growth, the consumption requirements of their founders, or the challenges of tax and estate planning. For companies with limited growth opportunities but fairly stable cash flows, the alternatives range from orderly liquidation to highly leveraged transfers of ownership such as those accomplished by leveraged buyouts, ESOPs, and mezzanine finance. For companies with abundant growth opportunities, value is typically maximized through sale to a strategic buyer or an initial public offering of equity (although a new hybrid called the "private IPO" has recently emerged that looks more like an LBO than an IPO).
In order to achieve its full potential, a company should be financed in such a way that enables it to continue through its natural business lifecycle, regardless of whether that matches the human lifecycle of its founder. So long as leadership succession can be arranged, the business lifecycle can determine the course of the company. Indeed, selling the business is the value-maximizing solution only if there is a strategic buyer willing to pay a premium above the business's stand-alone value, or if the founder wants to withdraw from the business and has no preferred successor.
Moreover, for the vast majority of companies, going public is not the recommended means for "cashing out." An IPO is likely to be a value-maximizing (and emotionally satisfying) experience only for (1) companies with valuable growth prospects that require funding for investment and (2) owner-entrepreneurs who are willing to subject themselves to the scrutiny and fluctuations of the market.     

The interaction between product market and financing strategy: the role of venture capital

Venture capital financing is widely believed to be influentialfor new innovative companies. We provide empirical evidencethat venture capital financing is related to product marketstrategies and outcomes of start-ups. Using a unique hand-collecteddatabase of Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups. Using a uniquehand-collected database of Silicon Valley high-tech start-upswe find that innovator firms are more likely to obtain venturecapital than imitator firms. Venture capital is also associatedwith a significant reduction in the time to bring a productto market, especially for innovators. Our results suggest significantinterrelations between investor types and product market dimensions,and a role of venture capital for innovative companies.     

Valuation with Market Multiples: How to Avoid Pitfalls When Identifying and Using Comparable Companies1

An important part of the market multiple valuation process is selecting companies for comparison that are really comparable to the company being valued. The goal of assessing comparability is to align the relevant value drivers—especially risk and growth—of the comparable companies with those of the company being valued. In this paper, the authors examine the relevant value drivers for commonly used market multiples such as EBIT and EBITDA. They show that, in addition to risk and growth, analysts doing market multiple valuations need to take account of differences in variables such as cost structure, working capital, and capital expenditure requirements when assessing comparability. The authors also show that the degree to which different value drivers are important for assessing the comparability of companies differs across commonly used market multiples. In other words, some multiples are more sensitive than others to changes in certain value drivers. For example, when using a multiple like EBITDA in which certain expenditures (such as capital investments, working capital investments, and some expenses) are not deducted in the calculation of the denominator, assessing comparability based on such expenditures is more important than when using a multiple like free cash flow that deducts that expenditure in calculating the denominator. Or to cite another example, since EBIT and EBITDA make no attempt to reflect income taxes, using income tax cost structures to assess comparability is more important for enterprise value multiples based on these measures than for enterprise value multiples based on “after‐tax” measures of income such as unlevered earnings or free cash flow. In addition, not all multiples control for differences in cost structure, such as cost of goods sold or SG&A. If a multiple is affected by differences in those value drivers, the comparable companies must be similar to the company being valued on that dimension. Finally, the authors show that differences in capital expenditure and working capital requirements can also have large effects on certain multiples; and as a result, such value drivers also must be considered when assessing comparability.     

Coaches or Speculators? The Role and Impact of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

In this paper, we utilize a panel dataset that covers 1245 listed companies which accomplished their IPO during 2006 to 2014 in China to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) firms on executive compensation, equity incentive and pay-performance-sensitivity. We make several key findings: First, we find the presence of VCs can significantly raise the executive compensation. Second, high reputation VCs and private VCs increases the likelihood of granting executive equity incentives, whereas foreign VCs are significantly negatively related with executive equity incentive. Third, the pay-performance sensitivity of government VCs and foreign VCs is significant on stock return (RET) whereas insignificant on accounting performance (ROA). Moreover, the increasing VCs share in portfolio companies enhance the pay performance sensitivity on RET. Our results show that before VCs final exiting their post-IPO portfolio companies in China, VCs’ impact on executive compensation are more consistent with grandstanding theories and intending to provide higher cash compensation to encourage executives to raise the companies’ stock price, which is indicating VCs’ changing role from a coach into a speculator after the portfolio companies’ IPO.     

Public vs. Private Equity*

Many corporate executives view private equity as a last resort, as expensive capital that should be tapped only by companies that don't have access to presumably cheaper public equity. The reality of private equity, however, is more complex, and potentially quite rewarding, for both shareholders and management. This paper surveys some of the academic work on the costs and benefits of public vs. private equity, contrasting the private equity investment process with its public counterpart and exploring how such a process may add value. The importance of public equity, particularly for very large companies and growth companies with large capital requirements, is indisputable. But as investment bankers and other practitioners have noted, under certain circumstances the public markets effectively become “closed” to some public companies. Moreover, the cost of equity raised in public markets involves much more than the direct costs of underwriters, attorneys, and accountants. Some indication of the indirect costs is provided by the market's typically negative reaction to announcements of seasoned equity offerings. Although the negative reaction averages about 3%, in some cases stock prices drop by as much as 10%, thereby diluting the value of existing stockholders. Most academics attribute this reaction to the informational disadvantage of public stockholders. Private equity is designed in large part to overcome this information problem by replacing the monitoring performed by the typical public company board with the oversight of better informed and more highly motivated owners. A growing body of academic research suggests that private equity investors add value to the companies they invest in, and that the best investors are consistently effective in so doing. What's more, even public companies that tap private equity seem to benefit. As the author found in his own research on PIPES (Private Investment in Public Equity Securities) transactions, even though such securities are issued to private equity investors at a discount to the prevailing market price, the average market response to the announcement of such transactions is a positive 10%. In short, the participation of private equity investors is perceived to create value, and some of this value is shared with the rest of the market.