Technological learning,technological substitution,and technological change

From a simple dynamic model of competition between product lines it is shown that the shape of learning curves has a powerful influence on the dynamics of technological substitution. Learning of both production efficiency and marketing efficiency is considered. It is asserted that both types of learning are important and that the two are complementary. It is further speculated that production learning is probably more important for commodities and in situations of low per capita income, whereas market learning gains ascendancy in cases of high income and specialized and diversified product lines. In closing, it is noted that simple competitive models are misleading, first because complementarities and coevolutionary processes are probably as important in the overall development of technology as are competitive processes, and second because optimization of the technological system's parts does not guarantee improvement of the performance of the system as a whole.     

Technological forecasting at the Korean stock market: A dynamic competition analysis using Lotka–Volterra model

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to analyze the dynamic relationship between the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) and Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ), two competing markets at the Korean stock market, in the viewpoint of technological forecasting of competition. The Lotka–Volterra system of equations, one well-known competitive diffusion models, is adopted to represent the competitive situations of the Korean stock market and it is estimated using daily empirical index data of KSE and KOSDAQ during 1997–2001. The results show that there existed a predator–prey relationships between two markets in which KSE acted as a prey for the time being after the emergence of KOSDAQ. This interaction was altered to symbiotic relationship and finally to pure competition relationship. We also perform an equilibrium analysis of the estimated Lotka–Volterra equations. As a result, we find that there is an equilibrium point in a dynamic sense. However, the equilibrium point could be unstable in the latest pure competition relationship.     

Diffusion, substitution and competition dynamism inside the ICT market: The case of Japan

Under the new information society paradigm that emerged in the 1990s, contrary to its conspicuous achievement as an industrial society, Japan is experiencing a vicious cycle between non-elastic institutions and insufficient utilization of the potential benefits of information and communication technology (ICT).However, a dramatic deployment of mobile telephones with Internet access service such as NTT DoCoMo's i-mode service in the late 1990s provides encouragement that, once the potential is exploited, Japan's institutional systems can effectively stimulate the self-propagating nature of ICT. The rapid deployment of Internet Protocol (IP) mobile service in Japan can be attributed to worldwide advances in the utilization of personal computers (PCs) and the Internet. Thus, a complex technology web triggered by the dramatic advancement of PCs and the Internet and co-evolving diffusion, substitution and competition dynamism has emerged in the global ICT market, particularly in Japan's mobile communication business.The above observations prompt the hypothetical view that, despite a lack of institutional elasticity, recent advances in Japan's IP mobile service deployment can be attributed to a co-evolutionary dynamism between diffusion, substitution and competition inside the ICT market. Thus, policy questions could be how to create such a co-evolutionary dynamism by means of ICT innovation, enriched functions, reduced price and competitive environment.In order to demonstrate the foregoing hypothesis, an empirical analysis of the mechanism co-evolving diffusion, substitution and competition dynamism inside Japan's ICT market is attempted by utilizing four types of diffusion models identical to respective diffusion dynamics.     

Generalized Lotka-Volterra equations and the mechanism of technological substitution

This paper demonstrates that if technological substitution is viewed as the result of competition between old and new technology in which new technology wins, and if generalized Lotka-Volterra equations are taken to describe this competition, then various models of technological substitution can be obtained as very special cases. It is argued that this could lead to a better understanding of the substitution process itself.     

Dynamic R&D competition with memory

We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough.     

Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (1) asymmetric communication and (2) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously establish communication channels even though they would earn higher payoffs if jointly they chose to restrict within-group communication.     

Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency

This paper contrasts models of common agency in which principals compete in incentive contracts (that is, they make take it or leave it offers) with models where principals offer agents menus of incentive contracts from which the final contract is negotiated. It is shown that pure strategy equilibria in incentive contracts are robust to the possibility that principals might offer menus. In addition, a no-externalities condition is given such that any pure strategy equilibrium allocation with menus can be supported with competition in incentive contracts. The no-externalities condition is restrictive, but it is shown that it applies in most well-known common agency problems, including, for example, the Bertrand pricing problem.     

Optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria

This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey, F., 1927. A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal 37, 47–61; Diamond, P., Mirrlees, J., 1971. Optimal Taxation and Public Production, II: "Tax Rules". American Economic Review 61, 261–278) to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. Insurance markets are prime examples: consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In such a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey–Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that, in addition to the standard formula, they include first-order effects which reflect the deviations of prices from marginal costs and the response of equilibrium quantities to the taxes levied. An explanation of the additional terms is provided. It is shown that a condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the direction of the deviations from the standard case.     

Analysis of threshold cointegration with asymmetric adjustments in the Hong Kong grocery industry

High market concentration in the Hong Kong grocery industry has been prevalent over many years with the domination of a few large supermarket chains. However, no research has been conducted on the price dynamics between the supermarket and non-supermarket sectors to investigate whether the non-supermarket sector can impose competitive discipline on the dominating supermarket chains. We argue that standard cointegration tests cannot allow for transaction costs and distinguish whether the price co-movement is attributable to price competition or collusion. Our study therefore fills this research gap by adopting the threshold cointegration tests in a three-regime threshold vector error-correction model to account for the asymmetric price adjustment dynamics between supermarket and non-supermarket sectors of Hong Kong and evaluate the market power of the supermarket sectors in the presence of transaction costs. Our results favour the presence of cointegration between the supermarket and non-supermarket price indices with asymmetric adjustment dynamics. We interpret the results of statistically significant downward price adjustments in the outer-band regimes as the evidence of mutual price competition. Nevertheless, the supermarket sector has stronger market power than the non-supermarket sector, and therefore can sustain higher price level without inducing substantial competition pressures inside the neutral band.     

Product market regulation,trend inflation and inflation dynamics in the new Keynesian Phillips curve

In this empirical paper, we take a close look at the impact of the observed decline in the product market regulation, and hence in the barriers to entry and in impediments to competition, on inflation dynamics since the early 1980s.We use an enlarged new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) allowing for entry of firms and increasing competitive pressures with the number of firms and non zero trend inflation.Using OECD indicators on product market regulations, characterized by persistent fluctuations, and taking into account the non stationary properties of the inflation process, we investigate the empirical relevance of this NKPC for inflation dynamics in the US and France, assuming VAR expectations. The results point out that product market regulation is a good candidate as an exogenous structural source of the observed persistence in inflation for the past thirty years in both the US and France.     

A substitution orbit model of competitive innovations

Successful innovation and diffusion of technology can be attributed to the identification of the orbit of emerging new technologies that complement or substitute for existing technologies. This dynamism resembles the co-evolution process in an ecosystem. In an ecosystem, in order to maintain sustainable development, the complex interplay between competition and cooperation, typically observed in predator-prey systems, create a sophisticated balance. Given that an ecosystem can be used as a masterpiece system, this sophisticated balance can provide suggestive ideas for identifying an optimal orbit of competitive innovations with complement or substitution dynamism.Prompted by such a sophisticated balance in an ecosystem, this paper analyzes the optimal orbit of competitive innovations and, on the basis of an application of Lotka-Volterra equations, it reviews substitution orbits of Japan's monochrome to color TV system, fixed telephones to cellular telephones, cellular telephones to mobile Internet access service, and analog to digital TV broadcasting. On the basis of substitution orbits analyses, it attempts to extract suggestions supportive to identifying an optimal policy option in a complex orbit leading to expected orbit.Key findings include policy options that are effective in controlling parameters for Lotka-Volterra equations leading to expected orbit.     

Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence from firm-level data in Indonesia

Using firm-level data we investigate the relationship between trade credit and suppliers' market structure and find a ∩-shaped relationship between competition and trade credit, with a discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly. This “big jump” arises because monopolists are more likely to not offer any trade credit than firms in competitive environments. Our model exploits the fundamentally different nature between cash and trade credit sales, arguing that firms are unable to commit ex ante to a trade credit price. We show that monopolists will often sell only on cash, while credit is always provided in competitive environments.     

Superneutrality, indeterminacy and endogenous growth

In this paper, we explore the possibility of having money as a source of indeterminacy in endogenous growth models. We adopt the simple Ak model of endogenous growth to be the main analytical vehicle whose balanced growth paths do not display local indeterminacy. Money is introduced via either a general cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint or a pecuniary transactions costs (PTC) technology. It is shown that local indeterminacy of the dynamics is due to the presence of an intertemporal substitution effect on capital accumulation that works against and dominates the conventional inflation effect of Tobin [1965, Money and economical growth. Econometrica 33(4), Part 2, 671]. If money is growth-rate superneutral, then the intertemporal substitution effect is absent so that local indeterminacy cannot occur. Finally, the strength of the intertemporal substitution effect depends positively on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.     

On the long-run wealth distribution in a simple Ramsey model with heterogeneous households

This paper analyzes the long-run wealth distribution in a Ramsey model where individuals have a common rate of time preference but different intertemporal elasticities of substitution. As a result, it is shown that heterogeneity among households in intertemporal substitution is sufficient for the existence of a non-degenerate long-run wealth distribution. We also investigate the properties of the long-run wealth distribution and the transition of capital and consumption using the phase diagram.     

Indeterminacy and multiple steady states with sector-specific externalities

This paper studies a two-sector model with aggregate and sector-specific external effects in production and inelastic labor supply. We first characterize the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of the steady states as well as their welfare properties. We particularly focus on the CES production functions and show that the steady state is generically either unique or there are exactly two. A simple geometrical methodology enables us to characterize the local dynamics of the steady state. We show that in order to get indeterminacy, the presence of both aggregate and sector-specific external effects is needed, along with low capital–labor elasticities of substitution and high, but bounded from above, elasticities in intertemporal consumption. We perform a sensitivity analysis and show that indeterminacy emerges for parameter values in line with those used in calibrations of standard RBC models, that is for unitary elasticities of input substitution and of intertemporal substitution in consumption.     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

Beyond (but back to?) the elasticity of substitution in international trade

The use of equations relating relative exports logarithmically to relative prices in international trade has always been subject to a large number of conceptual criticisms. The most severe criticisms of such ‘elasticity-of-substitution’ models focus on the variety of constraints which must be simultaneously placed on the parameters of conventional demand and supply equations to justify the assumed functional relation. The purpose of this paper is to put these conceptual criticisms to an empirical test, using a body of data which allows the constraints to be loosened, then confirmed or rejected, rather than being imposed ex ante. The results are favorable to the continued use of the elasticity of substitution.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).