A theorist on basic questions of economic history

Abstract

The author of this slim, essay-like book—now translated into Swedish¹—s-is a leading economic theoretician, noted for his contribution to the development of Keynesian theory and to the theory of the short-run dynamics of the trade cycle, as well as to modem theory of macro-economic growth. He is, however, known to a generation of modern economists above all as a ‘market’ theorist within the Walrasian tradition. In the present book he abandons his role as a strict market theorist, concerned with such things as the ‘existence’ and ‘stability’ of market equilibria, and attempts to explain the historical emergence and development of the market system or economy as an institution or set of institutions. He disarmingly forfeits any claims to expertise on this topic, and I think wisely so; but he is far from being altogether a layman or a newcomer to economic history. He professes an early love of the subject, and although it was a romance that never resulted in marriage, he has, through constant association with leading British economic historians and through his own writings in the history of economic thought, preserved and developed some of the faculties of a historian. Yet, this book-as its title indicates-is essentially theoretical. Hicks develops a set of interpretative hypotheses mainly by a priori reasoning. The empirical references must be looked upon more as illustrations of his theses than as evidence in support of their empirical validity.     

Technical change and the ‘technology’ myth

Abstract

In recent years, historians and other English-speaking commentators on technical change and technical functions have often chosen to discuss these matters under the heading ‘technology’. Thus, there have been discussions about such matters as ‘echnological innovation’, ‘technological invention’, and even ‘the imperatives of technology’, ‘the technostructure’ and ‘technological drivenness’.¹ One economist with a special interest in historical matters, Kuznets, has virtually defined a separable condition of ‘modernity’ as the era of ‘technology’ — ‘The epochal innovation that distinguishes the modern economic epoch is the extended application of science to problems of economic production’ alternatively, it is ‘the utilization of a potential provided by modern technology’. An economic historian (Musson) has it that ‘applied science is … the major force behind modern economic growth’. And a prominent historian of the so-called ‘technology’, Forbes, has argued that in ‘our modern world both technology and engineering are branches of applied science’.²     

Finnish prohibition as an economic policy issue

Abstract

The experience of the Finnish Prohibition Act, which was in force from 1919 to 1932, shows that Finnish prohibition was not simply a question of ethics or morals, but was influenced in great measure by questions of economic policy. It can also be said that prohibition and the expedience of ‘going dry’ were examined from the economic viewpoint not only at the time in 1931 when the political decision-makers were deciding whether or not the experiment should be continued, but had been seen and discussed in this light right from the time of the passing of the Act.     

The Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis and Air Pollution in Finland

Abstract

The historiography of mercantilism has been described as a series of disconnected still pictures which reflect the shifting viewpoints of economic thought.¹ However, historians have favoured different concepts of mercantilism not only in response to the shifts of economic science but also because they have held, explicitly or implicitly, different opinions on the problem of how economic ideas are formed and of the role they have played in historical development. The following reexamination of some of those ‘stills’ concentrate on such differences.²     

The settlement preferences of Scandinavian emigrants to the United States, 1850–1960

Abstract

In the past, text books have made a false distinction between the former agrarian structure of Denmark on the one hand and of the remaining Scandinavian countries on the other. The proper dividing line should intersect the kingdom of Sweden, since farmers in Norrland and Finland were peasant-proprietors at the opening of the modern age while elsewhere in Scandinavia they were generally tenants. Much of the land not owned by peasants belonged to the Crown or the churchy but neither of them practised large-scale farming save in exceptional instances. Thus it is of crucial importance to establish at the outset the extent of landownership by the nobility and by other ‘persons of standing’ (stõndspersoner) about 1600 and how this changed during the century. In Sweden noble landownership is defined to include even land held by feudal right (donationer) and freehold or crown land for which a noble has bought or been given the right to levy taxes (frälseköp). Its status as noble property is not affected by whatever proportion of it may be held as virtual peasant freehold with hereditary rights of use (bördsrätt) and security against eviction and incorporation into the tax-exempt demesne farm (säteri) of the feudal property; such a holding is called skattefräise hemman.     

Birgit Karlsson,Egenintresse eller samhällsintresse,Nazityskland och svensk skogsindustri 1933–1945

Abstract

In Vol. XV (1967) of this journal, Alan S. Milward and Jorg-Jöhannes Jäger published criticisms of my article on Swedish iron are exports to Nazi Germany.¹ Turning first to Milward's contribution, this is based on the assumption that the German economy was a ‘blitzkrieg war economy’ in the period preceding the attack upon the Soviet Union. This view, which has been expressed before by B. H. Klein, undoubtedly brings a number of valuable refinements into the hitherto exaggerated estimates of the level of German armaments at the outbreak of the Second World War.² But when he goes on to say that ‘in such a war economy all considerations of potential armaments-producing capacity were rejected in favour of present armaments-producing capacity’,³ Milward palpably oversimplifies a complex problem. In fact, the demand for an armaments programme ‘in depth’, to quote General Thomas, did make itself heard long before the autumn of 1941.     

In defence of Heckscher and the idea of Mercantilism

Abstract

In his recent reappraisal of Heckscher's Mercantilism ² Dr. Coleman raised certain questions concerning Heckscher's methodological approach which transcend the immediate problem of the nature and validity of the idea of ‘mercantilism’ and have a bearing upon the broader issue of the relationships between economic conditions, ideas and policy. To the present writer, the danger that Heckscher's development of the idea of mercantilism will drive yet another wedge between the political and the economic historians as Dr. Coleman fears,³ is less serious than the danger that Heckscher's apparent reluctance to admit the influence of economic conditions upon economic ideas,⁴ and his readiness to pass directly from generalizations about economic ideas to generalizations about economic policy, will widen the existing gap between economic historians and historians of economic doctrine, two groups of scholars whose mutual services should be considerable. To the student of economic ideas who seeks to rescue his discipline from the sterile pursuit of tracing the genealogy of particular analytic propositions, of which some of his colleagues seem inordinately fond, the matter is one of crucial importance.     

Sweden's iron ore exports to Germany, 1933–1944

Abstract

Rolf Karlbom's article about Swedish iron ore exports to Germany during the Nazi era¹ is an attempt to examine a very important problem as yet unsolved—the significance of the Swedish ore deliveries to Germany. His study begins with the following two questions:² 1. ‘How much of the total consumption of this raw material by German industry did Swedish ore cover during these years?’

2. ‘How far was access to Swedish iron ore a sine qua non for the continuance of the armaments programme?’

3. These basic questions indicate the main problems. Karlbom's answers to them are not wholly convincing because of some weaknesses in his approach.

     

Reconsidering peasant communes in the Levant,c. 1850s–1940s†

The unfounded belief that there was a peasant commune in the Levant very similar to the Russian mir, and that it was inefficient, precluded historians from understanding the true role of the institution of mushā? in this region. The mushā? land title represented the attachment of a particular community to specific plots of land. In this context, ‘community’ often meant nuclear and extended families in suprahouseholds, as well as the entire village. People in these communities tended to derive income from land according to recognized arrangements such as mutual use of grazing lands, and joint or individual cultivation with or without land repartition among cultivators. The comparison with mir was relevant only for one form of the institution, namely, repartitioned mushā?. Redistribution or repartition varied according to specific ‘factors of production’ or to informal and formal property rights. It did not prove less efficient than the reformed, individualized system of land management, and was possibly more effective in resisting laws that allowed the seizure of lands that had not been cultivated for three years. All forms of mushā? required greater communal mutual support and responsibility, which significantly reduced risks in times of crisis.     

The economic and social position of peasant freeholders in late seventeenth-century Denmark

Abstract

The overwhelming majority of Danish peasants in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were tenants on crown or privately owned estates. Thus they were directly affected by the consolidation of a seigneurial system which had emerged well before the seventeenth century but had become more firmly entrenched when the absolute monarchy in Denmark, established in 1660, began the alienation of the crown estates. However, the small minority of peasants known as freeholders (selvejere or jordegne bønder) did not entirely disappear, although their position was becoming increasingly uncertain.1 It is the aim of this article to define this small group, assess the economic and social implications of their position, and attempt to clarify the nature of peasant ownership of land in Denmark in the late seventeenth century.     

The ‘price revolution’ of the sixteenth century: Some Swedish evidence

Abstract

Since the publication in 1895 of George Wiebe's work, Zur Geschichte der Preisreuolution des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts, ¹ the ‘price revolution’ has been a generally accepted concept found in most historical textbooks. By the ‘price revolution’, Wiebe meant the general rise in commodity prices which occurred in western Europe during the 16th century, the primary cause of which according to him was the influx of silver from the new Spanish possessions in America. His explanation also came to be generally accepted, but perhaps an even more significant contribution to the influence which this book has wielded is the fact that he synthesized in readily usable form the price analyses in existence when he wrote, i.e. at the end of the 19th century. In the 1930s his tables still formed the basis of sweeping conclusions and generalizations.     

Finnish mortality in the eighteenth century: The sources and the reality

Abstract

Mr. Niels Steensgaard, in his ‘Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650’¹ referred in note 4, p. 14, to my article on the beginning of Anglo-Turkish relations, and stated: ‘Apparently Horniker is not aware of the existence of the French capitulations of 1569’. There is no point in arguing whether or not I am aware of them, but later on I will give my reasons for omitting reference to them in my article. The implication of Steensgaard's statement, however, is that they were new capitulations, which, of course, they were not. They were a renewal, in the form of a grant,² by Sultan Selim II of the treaty concluded between his predecessor Suleiman I Kanuni and Francis I in 1536.³ Revised capitulations were granted to France in 158l.4 These, and the treaty of 1536, gave the French certain exclusive privileges in the Ottoman Empire. And until 1593, when Elizabeth I of England obtained capitulations which gave her subjects the same privileges as those enjoyed by the French, France was the paramount capitulatory nation in the Levant.     

Select bibliography of contributions to economic and social history appearing in Scandinavian books,periodicals and year-books, 1981

Abstract

This issue of the annual bibliography of the Review is arranged according to themes. Within each of the eight sub-divisions the contributors are presented in alphabetical order. The country of publication is indicated by ‘D’ ‘F’ ‘N’ or ‘S’ for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively.     

SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR RÄDEL'S “PROFIT MAXIMIZATION—CAN IT BE JUSTIFIED?”*

In the confrontation of the principle of acquisition with the principle of self-sufficiency, Professor Rädel's suggestive and penetrating paper condenses Werner Sombart's work on modern capitalism. As is well known, Sombart characterized the economic objective of medieval man, as one of meeting needs, and that of modern man as one of seeking profits. To quote Rädel: “The principle of self-sufficiency (‘Bedarfsdeckungsprinzip’), the characteristic basic objective of economic activity of the middle ages, is replaced by the principle of acquisition, as much as ‘traditionalism’ is replaced by ‘rationality’ as formal principles of economic operations. It is the essential characteristic of the principle of acquisition that the primary aim of economic activity is no longer the satisfaction of the requirements of man, which are relatively limited and personal in nature, but rather the acquisition of wealth represented by a sum of money, which is entirely unlimited and of a more impersonal anonymous nature.”¹ Rädel also mentions the linkage, drawn by Sombart, between the “development of the modern democratic state, modern technology and the discovery of new continents” and the growth of capitalism, together with the formation of a “spirit of wordliness… and of lust for power.”²     

Reformist programmes in the planning for post-war economic policy during world war ii

Abstract

Extract

The Great Depression of 1929–33 saw the beginnings of a revolution in the history of economic policy formation in the West. When at the outset of the depression, the ‘Old Economic Policy’ was still seen to be in operation, an ever-increasing resistance arose against the consequent unemployment and indeed against the very notion of the inevitability of depression. For the economic policy, this meant a support for an active fiscal policy, as against the almost complete dominance of monetary means. During the 1930s, however, support for the ‘New Economic Policy’ was not widespread, and most of the instances of its application remained incomplete. The most resolute use of the new economic policy was made in Sweden by the Social Democratic government from 1932. The new economics was also strongly advocated by the British Liberal Party, which, however, hardly had any influence. The best known example of all is that enshrined in the New Deal of the Roosevelt administration.     

The theories of ‘stages of growth’

Abstract

The idea of a ‘virtuous circle’ has always been implied in the theories of ‘stages of growth’, though never systematically demonstrated, We are here concerned with two aspects of these theories: (1) the implied theory of circular causation with cumulative effects; (2) the implicit systematic biases. The biases operate through the selection of strategic factors on which interest is focussed and of assumptions concerning their role in historical processes. This selection of strategic factors and of assumptions about their role remains essentially a priori, however much illustrative material is amassed. It never is—and, in this teleological approach, it never can be—empirically verified or refuted. A fundamental preconception is, moreover, the similarity of evolution in different countries at different historical periods; this is why these theories can be used, and are used, for prediction. But similarity depends on the level of abstraction and the choice of features compared. Such comparisons can be refuted only by demonstrating that other principles of selection and comparison are equally possible—and, of course, ex post, that the predictions do not come true.     

Corruption and civic order — natural law and economic discourse in Sweden during the age of freedom

Abstract

Views on the history of economic thought have changed during recent decades, with regard both to content and to how it should be written. This special discipline was formerly dominated by an approach that was in principle anachronistic: modern economic theory functioned as the starting point and was projected backwards in time. The task of the history of economic thought was to depict the gradual perfecting of concepts and theories — the “box of tools” of which Schumpeter spoke.¹     

Food,fare and nutrition some reflections on the historical development of food consumption

Abstract

Cajsa Warg's old maxim ‘One eats what there is’ — apparently self-explanatory in its simplicity — has a different significance for the understanding of the historical development of food consumption and diet from what might be expected at first glance. The absolute food surplus which industrial and post-industrial society has generated during the last century has helped to conceal certain essential links between food consumption and more general economic and social development in fare-industrial society which was not characterised by self-generating and constantly increasing growth. The assumption of food scarcity in former times, allied to a paucity of research in this field, has among other things conjured up an image of a continual improvement and increase in food consumption coupled with the massive rise in productive capacity during the most recent centuries.     

English and French mercantilist thought and the matter of colonies during the 17th century

Abstract

Monetary enrichment was among the hottest topics in mercantilist writings of France and England in the 17^th century. How might wealth best be increased in a world that, until the close of this period, was to remain largely without the concept of the market? Colonies came to be seen as a means of increasing the home nation's wealth given the right political and economic conditions. The economists of the day enquired into whether colonies could enrich the nation, and if so, how they might best contribute to this. Three views on this formed over the course of the period. The first view was that the economic development of the colonies should be promoted as a basis for trade on a more equitable, albeit exclusive, basis with the home nation. The ‘predatory’ view saw the colonies as a means of enrichment through unfair trade with no major local investment. The third view held that colonies were the road to the impoverishment of the home country rather than its enrichment. These three views underpinned discussion of the colonial question throughout the 18^th, 19^th and 20^th centuries.     

Malthus and gender

This article re-reads Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population for his explicit discussion of men and women, masculinity and femininity. A feminist reading is possible, but not undertaken here. Rather, the purpose is simply to demonstrate how ‘gender’ was Malthus's own object of inquiry. Historical actors, perhaps especially economic thinkers, often considered gender far more fully and explicitly than almost all subsequent analysts of them. It therefore remains not just insufficient, but empirically erroneous not to inquire into how ‘men’ and ‘women’ were considered, constructed, instructed, symbolised or valued by the historical actors we study, including those in the political economy canon.