新经济与人力资本产权化

新经济时代人力资本产权将消融物质资本产权。将人力资本产权理论应用于企业的产权制度改革,无疑是国有企业摆脱困境、重新寻获动力的关键。构建国企人力资本产权制度及运营模式是解决国企深层次矛盾需要,是深化国企改革的突破点,是知识经济条件下实现国有企业改革第二次飞跃的动力所在。同时也为企业的产权制度创新提供强大的理论支持。     

国有企业人力资本长期雇佣制初探

人力资本是一种人格化的资本要素 ,是现代企业最稀缺的资源。为了留住人才 ,促进知识积累及企业可持续发展 ,迎接入世之后激烈的人才争夺战 ,适应知识经济发展趋势 ,提出一种与现行国有企业机制格格不入的用人机制 :长期雇佣制 ,并说明现代国企实行这种用人机制的必要性 ,从产权制度改革角度探讨实行长期雇佣制的路径———人力资本拥有产权。     

人力资本产权：形成中的人力资本市场分析

建立人力资本产权制度是知识经济时代的必然要求，但人力资本产权的实现必须依赖一个有效的运行机制，其中人力资本市场是人力资本产权实现的重要基础，因此，在市场化改革中必须高度重视人力资本市场的建立和完善。     

我国国企人力资本产权的缺陷及治理分析

我国国企人力资本产权存在着人力资本所有权、支配权和使用权残缺等弊端。治理人力资本产权缺陷应以承认并确立人力资本产权的天然归属权为基础,明晰人力资本产权。     

人力资本产权理论对国企管理改革的启示

现代企业制度研究与实践的发展,特别是人力资本产权理论的引入,对传统国企管理产生了冲击。同时,也对国企管理改革有重大的启示,即树立“人本”的管理思想、建立明晰的国企人力资本产权、建立人力资本产权的激励机制。     

人力资本产权理论对国企管理改革的启示

现代企业制度研究与实践的发展，特别是人力资本产权理论的引入，对传统国企管理产生了冲击。同时，也对国企管理改革有重大的启示，即树立“人本”的管理思想、建立明晰的国企人力资本产权、建立人力资本产权的激励机制。     

基于以人力资本产权主导的联合产权制度

我国民营企业成长的环境和发展历程造就了企业独特的一元化产权结构。联合产权制度是较完善的产权制度。因此,民营企业必须改革现存的产权结构,形成以人力资本产权主导或以劳动产权为主导的联合产权制度。人力资本拥有民营企业剩余索取权,在民营企业发展成熟阶段,劳动联合体拥有企业的剩余索取权。     

建立人力资本产权制度 促进收入公平分配

本文认为,实现收入公平分配、缩小居民收入差距、建立和谐社会是近年来我国政府追求的目标。收入由分配制度决定,而分配制度由产权制度决定,人力资本产权缺失是导致初次分配不公、居民劳动收入和要素收入偏低以及收入两极分化的根本原因。文章提出,为实现收入公平分配,必须从企业现有产权制度入手,建立公平、公正的人力资本产权制度和分配制度。人力资本产权的建立能实现劳动者与生产资料的真正结合,充分提高劳动者的生产积极性,激发劳动者的创新潜能,彻底解放生产力;能实现劳动者的主人翁地位,发挥劳动者的自治能力和监督能力,从根本上解决国有企业产权主体缺位、监督不力、效益低下等问题;能提高劳动者的劳动收入和要素收入,增加中等收入阶层比例,缩小社会贫富差距,缓解社会矛盾,有利于建立公平、有效率、和谐的社会。     

企业人力资本产权制度构建思考

随着人力资本在企业生产要素中的比重提高，人力资本的产权化已经到了不能被忽略的地步。人力资本产权制度主要包括人力资本个人所有权制度、人力资本参与收益分配制度、人力资本非物质激励制度等。人力资本产权制度的实施必须建立在对人力资本贡献价值的计量和相关法律法规完善的基础上。     

企业人力资本产权制度构建思考

随着人力资本在企业生产要素中的比重提高,人力资本的产权化已经到了不能被忽略的地步。人力资本产权制度主要包括人力资本个人所有权制度、人力资本参与收益分配制度、人力资本非物质激励制度等。人力资本产权制度的实施必须建立在对人力资本贡献价值的计量和相关法律法规完善的基础上。     

Building State-owned Assets Supervision System and Conducting Mixed Ownership Reforms to Reinforce Each Other's Collaboration

Improving the state-owned assets supervision system (SOASS) can effectively get over the defects of systems and mechanisms and further promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the deepening of the reform can advance the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital. By analyzing the relationship between the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, we have found that collaborative promotion of the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital and promotion of the reform of mixed ownership can do good to ameliorating the corporate management mechanism, improving the market-oriented management mechanism of enterprises and completing the medium- and long-term incentive mechanisms, etc. to enhance business operation efficiency. Due to such prevailing problems as relative dispersion and vagueness of the policies relating to deepening the reform of SOEs, inconsistent progress of the reform of state-owned assets (SOAs) and SOEs, and corporate reform focusing on apprence, improving the SOASS and deepening collaborative development of the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs are hindered by some constraints. To construct and improve the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership collaboratively, we should make efforts to promote the reform in the following five aspects, namely, placing importance to policy coordination, boosting synchronism of the reform of SOAs and SOEs at different levels and in different areas to coordinate the nationwide reform of SOAs and SOEs, facilitating reform of the mechanism of enterprises of mixed ownership through mixed capital, and promoting the SOASS and stimulating classified monitoring and reform of mixed ownership based on classified reform of SOEs.     

Decentralization and Firm Investments: Evidence from China

Taking advantage of decentralization reform that enlarges the authority of county government in China, we construct a quasi‐experiment. Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we show that after the implementation of decentralization reform, firms located in decentralized counties experienced a significant increase in investment expenditure compared with other firms. We also find that after the decentralization reform, state owned enterprises (SOEs) experienced greater increase in investment expenditure on average compared with non‐SOEs, and that, within non‐SOEs, collective firms have an even larger increase in investments, followed by foreign firms and private firms. Further analysis shows that the influence of decentralization reform was more significant in more developed markets, and that the increased investment was associated with improved productivity, which was more pronounced in SOEs. These results are robust to an alternative sample and endogeneity issues. Overall, these findings support the view that decentralization reform improves government efficiency and creates positive externalities, thereby encouraging firms to invest.     

国企并购重组中的财务风险及其防范

企业通过重组其竞争对手的途径成为巨型企业是现代企业发展史上的一个突出现象。就我国而言,企业并购还有其特殊的作用:推动国有企业的体制改革,以期实现与国际先进的企业管理模式接轨,最终将国有企业做强做大。目前,国有企业改革已取得实质性重大进展,尽管还有一些攻坚任务,但国企改革最困难的时期已经过去,建立现代企业制度已是国企改革的既定方向。     

黑龙江省国有企业下岗失业人员的出路在哪里

作为老工业基地的黑龙江省面临着国有企业下岗失业问题的深深困扰,究其原因,这与黑龙江省国有企业的比重过大、资源型工业企业经营困难、国有企业改革深化等因素密切相关。国有企业下岗失业人员增多又给黑龙江省的经济发展、社会稳定带来巨大考验。为此,必须尽快为国有企业下岗失业人员提供再就业的渠道,或者为他们自己创造就业提供条件。     

The Business(es) of the Chinese State

The state industrial sector is the Achilles heel of China's otherwise remarkable economic performance over the past two decades. Most other countries in transition from socialism have transformed SOEs into commercial entities through systematic, market‐driven restructuring and privatisation to become more efficient and competitive. In China, a series of innovative, if often administrative, insitutional reforms since 1978 have begun to achieve the Chinese authorities' goal of ‘separating governemtn from business.’ But the Chinese State still maintains ownership of key enterprises, and government agencies carry out shareholder functions typically performed by private owners in a market economy. Although privatisation and restructuring of SOEs is occurring, it mostly pertains to small and medium sized firms. For the principal businesses, by contrast, the creation of large state enterprise groups and holding companies (and experiments in other forms of ‘state asset management’) have become the main form of restructuring. Today, China's SOEs still account for more than one‐quarter of national production, two‐thirds of total assets, more than half of urban employment and almost three‐quarters of investment. While direct budgetary subsidies have declined, explicit and implicit subsidies are still making their way to prop up loss‐making SOEs through the financial system and other routes. At the same time, SOEs are still producing non‐marketable products, resulting in a sizeable inventory overhang. These inefficiencies and distortions represent a drain on the country's resources and thus present a challenge to the Chinese leadership for reform. This paper sheds light on these challenges by analysing the incentives and constraints on China's SOE reform programme. Four critical aspects of the reforms are highlighted and evaluated against the backdrop of international experience: clarification of property rights; establishment of large group/holding companies and other new organisational structures; improved corporate governance incentives; and implementation of international financial accounting and auditing practices. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.     

Shareholding reform of state-owned enterprises and control

One of the most commonly used ways to restructure big and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China is through shareholding reform. This article classifies the shareholding reform into four modes and explores the relationship among these modes, in terms of the degree of control over controlled listed companies and governance efficiency. Using data of 285 SOEs during 1997–2000 (three years after their IPO), we find that restructuring modes affect the degree of control by controlling shareholders over listed companies. Furthermore, the controlling shareholder of incompletely restructured enterprises prefers a higher degree of control. In addition, the higher the degree of control, the more serious the problems of related trading and tunneling behaviors. We also find that restructuring modes affect the governance structure of listed companies, which in turn affect the degree of related trading and tunneling behaviors. These findings reveal that incomplete restructuring of SOEs before their listing is likely to make these enterprises be vulnerable to external control and thus negatively affects their governance efficiency.     

马克思所有制理论不断创新助推我国国有企业改革向股份制迈进

二十多年来,我国国有企业改革在马克思所有制理论指导下,不断发展创新,使国企改革先后经历了放权让利、承包经营、利税分流和建立现代企业制度等过程,改革取得明显成就。党的十六届三中全会提出“使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式”,这是我国公有制实现形式认识的重大突破,为公有制经济的实现形式开辟了新的道路,同时也必将助推国有企业向股份制迈进     

国企领导人制度“去行政化”的市场逻辑与改革路径

转型期国企领导人制度行政化的实践弊端日渐显现,已经成为完善国有企业现代企业制度、健全公司法人治理结构的主要掣肘。推行国企领导人制度“去行政化”改革,必须坚持党管干部原则,准确把握“去行政化”的实践要求,处理好增量改革与存量改革的关系,在国企分类管理前提下,逐步建立与社会主义市场体制与现代企业制度相适应,权责明确,能进能出,能上能下,收入能增能减的选人用人新机制。     

Chinese State Enterprises and their Reform

The far-reaching changes in the economic environment in China since the start of the reform period have directly affected enterprise behaviour and have important implications for future enterprise reform. The growth of market transactions has been accompanied by an increase in competition which has forced State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to cut costs and upgrade quality. The growing exposure of Chinese enterprises to international markets and foreign business practices has led to an upgrading of their organization and management structure. The multiplication of the sources of external funds for investment has facilitated the establishment of new enterprises and provided enterprises with wider opportunities for diversifying risk. And the rapid growth of the economy has provided room for the non-state sector to expand without a major contraction of the state sector. But many problems still remain, notably with regard to government interference in the day-to-day management of the SOEs, the development of appropriate and effective governance structures, the need for efficiency-enhancing industrial restructuring, and reform of employment relations and the social security system. This article considers these problems and makes recommendations regarding future reform initiatives particularly with regard to loss-making enterprises.     

Globalisation and Industrial Policy: The Case of China

After a quarter of a century of industrial policy, China's objective of nurturing a group of globally competitive state‐owned enterprises appears to have succeeded beyond most expectations. However, China's SOEs are far from catching up with the world's leading firms. Protection through state ownership in a massive, fast‐growing economy has permitted China's SOEs to earn large profits and achieve high market capitalisations, but this is not the same thing as building globally competitive firms. The fact that China's industrial policy has been unsuccessful after a quarter of a century of intense effort demonstrates how difficult it is to construct an industrial policy in the era of capitalist globalisation, which has produced intense global industrial concentration across large parts of the global value chain. Although the detailed content of the next stage of reform of China's large state‐owned enterprises is unclear, China's determination to build a group of globally competitive large companies remains undimmed.