Hospital Mergers with Regulated Prices

We study the effects of a hospital merger in a spatial competition framework where semi‐altruistic hospitals choose quality and cost‐containment effort. Whereas a merger always leads to higher average cost efficiency, the effect on quality provision depends on the strategic nature of quality competition, which in turn depends on the degree of altruism and the effectiveness of cost‐containment effort. If qualities are strategic complements, then a merger leads to lower quality for all hospitals. If qualities are strategic substitutes, then a merger leads to higher quality for at least one hospital, and might also yield higher average quality provision and increased patient utility.     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.     

Regulatory quality,financial integration and equity cost of capital

We study the impact of international financial integration on firm‐level equity cost of capital in the presence of regulatory differences. International financial integration reduces the domestic cost of capital in the presence of well‐defined regulations that make it easier for foreign firms to overcome information asymmetry. We study this relationship for 55 countries for the period 2002 to 2014. Using multilevel mixed estimations, we find a negative relationship between cost of capital and both financial openness and regulatory quality. However, economies with better regulatory quality have a positive relationship between financial openness and cost of capital. Our results inform policy on the cost of higher level of regulations on firms’ equity cost of capital, especially when an economy has a high level of financial openness.     

POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACY

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re‐elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy.     

Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices*

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering the effect of both introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi‐altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received body of theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.     

金融危机救助方案与成本分担机制分析

各国政府应对本轮金融危机的救助虽取得一定成效,但仍然引发了关于救助方案的选择和救助成本等相关问题的探讨。英美等发达国家的救助基本遵循了依靠市场或私人机构进行救助,政府尽量不采取直接的干预,以减少政府救助成本。资产负债表重构这一救助方式能将救助成本分担到私人机构,在合适的条件下应用,可以降低救助道德风险发生的可能性,并且极大地减少政府的救助成本。     

Testing the ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis in the Italian Banking Industry

In this paper we test the so‐called ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (QLH), according to which firms with market power are less efficient. Using data on the Italian banking industry for the period 1992–2007, we apply a two‐step procedure. First we estimate bank‐level cost efficiency scores and Lerner indices. Then we use the estimated market power measures, as well as a vector of control variables, to explain cost efficiency. Our empirical evidence supports the QLH, although the impact of market power on efficiency is not particularly remarkable in magnitude.     

Regulation and pricing of pharmaceuticals: Reference pricing or price cap regulation?

We study the relationship between regulatory regimes and pharmaceutical firms’ pricing strategies using a unique policy experiment in Norway, which in 2003 introduced a reference price (RP) system called “index pricing” for a sub-sample of off-patent pharmaceuticals, replacing the existing price cap (PC) regulation. We estimate the effect of the reform using a product level panel dataset, covering the drugs exposed to RP and a large number of drugs still under PC regulation in the time before and after the policy change. Our results show that RP significantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices within the reference group, with the effect being stronger for brand-names. We also identify a negative cross-price effect on therapeutic substitutes not included in the RP system. In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that RP is more effective than PC regulation in lowering drug prices, while the cross-price effect raises a concern about patent protection.     

Dueling policies: Why systemic risk taxation can fail

Two policy instruments for the banking sector are investigated, namely systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity about bailout policy. Bailout expectations can induce moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking by banks. Systemic risk taxation induces banks to prefer uncorrelated investments, leading to lower systemic risk formation. Constructive ambiguity generates uncertainty about bailout prospects. However, systemic risk taxation also may inform banks about the regulator׳s concern for financial stability and thereby its bailout policy. This result leads to a trade-off between systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity and highlights the need to consider interdependence across policies when evaluating their effectiveness.     

A dynamic‐efficiency rationale for public investment in the health of the young

In this paper we assume away standard distributional and static‐efficiency arguments for public health and instead seek a dynamic efficiency rationale. We study a lifecycle model wherein young agents make health investments to reduce mortality risk. We identify a welfare rationale for public health under dynamic efficiency and exogenous mortality even when private and public investments are perfect substitutes. If health investment reduces mortality risk but individuals do not internalize its effect on the life‐annuity interest rate, the “Philipson‐Becker effect” emerges; when the young are net borrowers, this works together with dynamic efficiency to support a role for public health.     

The “Business Climate” and Economic Inequality

“Business climate indexes” characterize state economic policies, and are often used to try to influence economic policy debate. However, they are also useful in research as summaries of a large number of state policies that cannot be studied simultaneously. Prior research found that business climate indexes focused on productivity and quality of life do not predict economic growth, while indexes emphasizing taxes and costs of doing business indicate that low‐tax, low‐cost states have faster growth of employment, wages, and output. In this paper, we study the relationship between these two categories of business climate indexes and the promotion of equality or inequality. We do not find that the productivity/quality‐of‐life indexes predict more equitable outcomes, although some of the policies underlying them suggest they might. We do find, however, that the same tax‐and‐cost‐related indexes that are associated with higher economic growth are also associated with increases in inequality.     

TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

Cost metafrontier approach for measuring the Malmquist productivity index: An example of bank groups formed after the financial reform in Taiwan

This study attempts to provide a framework under the variable returns to scale hypothesis to account for the effect of the cost scale efficiency change in the decomposition of the cost metafrontier Malmquist productivity index (CMMPI). In addition, the meta‐cost efficiency and cost frontier gap between subordinate banks of financial holding companies (FHC) and independent banks are also examined. A total of 34 banks in Taiwan are empirically analysed from 1999 to 2012. The results indicate that the meta‐cost efficiency, meta‐technical efficiency and meta‐allocative efficiency scores of subordinate banks of FHC are better than those of independent banks. The banking industry in Taiwan is found to have an improvement in cost metafrontier Malmquist productivity. The subordinate banks of FHC are also found to exhibit positive CMMPI and decomposition components, but do not achieve a significant improvement except in the case of the technical gap ratio change. The empirical results recommend that Taiwanese banks place more policy focus on the issue of scale adjustment, which should be beneficial. Based on the CMMPI decomposed results, we can gain further understanding of the growth path to enhance operational performance.     

Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation

This paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third-degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous. The results provide rich implications for antitrust policy.     

On the role of job assignment in a comparison of education systems

Abstract This paper re‐examines how differences in systems for financing education influence GDP by highlighting a neglected function of education policy: it affects the magnitude of gains from job assignment. When more productive jobs demand more skill, privately financed education can increase productivity gains from matching between jobs and skill by increasing the availability of highly educated people. This differs from the standard argument that publicly financed education increases the total amount of human capital by equalizing educational opportunities. It is shown that if job opportunities have large variations in productivity, education policy may face a serious efficiency–equity trade‐off.     

Competition and waiting times in hospital markets

This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients: high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of monopoly, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high.     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

BANK EFFICIENCY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY

Advances in information technology and bank consolidation have altered the way banks operate by necessitating that banks control costs and provide services efficiently to remain competitive. Given the unique role bank operations play in the transmission of monetary policy, a key unresolved question is whether bank efficiency alters monetary policy outcomes. Using a stochastic frontier approach to measure cost‐efficiency and panel data of U.S. bank balance sheets, we show that banks with greater cost‐efficiency are more sensitive to monetary shocks. (JEL E52, E44, E51)