Institutional environment,ownership and firm taxation

This paper examines how ownership type and institutional environment affect firm taxation. Using a sample of Chinese‐listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we find that private firms enjoy a lower effective tax rate than local state‐owned enterprises. In addition, the preferential taxation of private firms is associated with local government incentives to promote local economic growth. We find that private firms located in regions with a lower level of privatization receive preferential tax treatment. Our results also suggest that decentralization and interjurisdictional competition lead to financial interdependence between local governments and private firms.     

Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export Performance? Evidence from Firm‐level Data*

This paper analyses the relationship between production subsidies and firms’ export performance using a very comprehensive and recent firm‐level database and controlling for the endogeneity of subsidies. It documents robust evidence that production subsidies stimulate export activity at the intensive margin, although this effect is conditional on firm characteristics. In particular, the positive relationship between subsidies and the intensive margin of exports is strongest among profit‐making firms, firms in capital‐intensive industries, and those located in non‐coastal regions. Compared to firm characteristics, the extent of heterogeneity across ownership structure (SOEs, collectives, and privately owned firms) proves to be relatively less important.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.     

How Does the Minimum Wage Affect Firm Investments in Fixed and Human Capital? Evidence from China

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of Chinese minimum wage regulations on the firm decision to invest in physical and human capital. We exploit the geographical and inter‐temporal variations of county‐level minimum wages in a panel data set of all state‐owned and all above‐scale non‐state‐owned Chinese firms covering the introduction of the new Chinese minimum wage regulations in 2004. In our basic regressions including all Chinese firms, we find significant negative effects of the minimum wage on human capital investment rates and no overall effects on fixed capital investment rates. When grouping firms by their ownership structure, we find that these results hold for most firms. Foreign‐owned firms are an exception to some extent, because the likelihood that they invest in human capital has not decreased in response to the policy.     

Commercial Policy and Foreign Ownership

Foreign multinationals often not only export but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the various effects of trade and industrial policies when exports and FDI coexist. We focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross‐border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm locally owned firms but benefit the foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits locally owned firms. These results could have strong policy implications for developing countries that attract an increasing share of world FDI.     

Is the effect really so large? Firm‐level evidence on the role of FDI in a transition economy1

Foreign subsidiaries usually perform better than domestic enterprises, but selection effects have been acknowledged in the literature. This article contributes by quantitatively evaluating the size of the selection effects and direct effects of FDI entry. We use a large panel of firm‐level data from Poland and match foreign‐owned firms to a control group of non‐foreign‐owned companies and analyse various performance indicators. In terms of efficiency measures, between 50 and 70 percent of the foreign affiliates advantage may be attributed to direct ownership effects. However, in the case of export intensity, the majority of the differential between the domestic companies and foreign subsidiaries is attributable to selection effects: MNEs choose export‐oriented companies and sectors.     

我国民营与国有上市公司投资价值的比较研究

鉴于学界在民营与国有上市公司的绩效、治理结构和投资价值上存在较大的争议,本文对2000年底前上市的1 026个公司在2001-2003年间的数据进行了全面的比较分析,发现:(1)民营上市公司的投资收益和账面值-市值比显著小于国有上市公司,因此具有较低的投资价值.(2)与国有上市公司相比,民营上市公司的盈利能力、发展潜力、资本运营能力和尝债能力均较低,但其股权结构较为分散,而且其经理层激励方式与国有上市公司差别不大.(3)民营上市公司投资价值较差的根源在于其盈利能力、发展潜力和资产运营能力较低.(4)与杨兴君、苏启林及张俊喜和张华的实证结果不同,民营与国有上市公司在股权结构、经理层激励、企业规模及地理位置上的差别无法解释两者投资价值的差异.在上述实证结果的基础上,本文提出了相关的政策建议.     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.     

Does ownership affect firms’ efficiency? Panel data evidence on Italy

This paper provides empirical evidence on the relation between the identity of ultimate owners and technical (in)efficiency by estimating stochastic production frontiers on Italian firm level panel data for twelve manufacturing industries over the 1978–93 period. Privately-owned independent firms are used as reference group and their efficiency is assessed against three alternative forms of ownership: subsidiaries of (privately owned) national business groups, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, and state owned firms. Even if cross-industry differences obviously exist a common pattern can however be identified. Overall, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (state owned firms) are found to be more (less) efficient than the reference group. On the contrary, no systematic difference is found between independent firms and subsidiaries of national business groups.First version received: July 2002/Final version received: September 2003We wish to thank the Editor Robert Kunst, a very constructive Referee, Luigi Benfratello, Maurizio Conti, Almas Heshmati, Giovanna Nicodano and the participants at the EARIE conference in Lausanne for helpful comments on a previous draft.     

The effects of company taxation in EU accession countries on German FDI1

This article investigates how company taxation affects German foreign direct investment (FDI) in European Union (EU) accession countries. In 2004 and 2007, 10 former socialist eastern European countries joined the EU. Although the EU integration is associated with increasingly favourable investment conditions, accession countries also pursue active strategies to attract foreign firms. In particular, taxes on corporate income have been significantly reduced during the last decade. We analyse whether corporate tax policies of eastern European countries affect three aspects of multinational activity: the location decision, the investment decision and the capital structure choice. The results suggest that local taxes are negatively related to both location and investment decisions. The analysis of the capital structure confirms that higher local taxes imply higher debt‐to‐capital ratios.     

Foreign-owned versus Domestically-owned Firms: Economic Performance in Japan

This paper utilizes micro‐panel data for firms located in Japan and examines differences in corporate performance between foreign‐owned and domestically‐owned firms in the 1990s. We find that foreign‐owned firms not only reflect superior static characteristics, but also achieve faster growth. Moreover, foreign investors appear to invest in firms that may not be immediately profitable, but those that are potentially the most profitable in the future. There is also no evidence that foreign investor is “foot‐loose.” These imply that foreign investors bring useful firm‐specific assets into the Japanese market, which may work as an effective catalyst for necessary structural reform.     

Foreign ownership wage premia in emerging economies

In this article we examine the relationship between wages, labour productivity and ownership using a linked employer–employee dataset covering a large fraction of the Czech labour market in 2006. We distinguish between different origins of ownership and study wage and productivity differences. The raw wage differential between foreign and domestically‐owned firms is about 23 percent. The empirical analysis is carried out on both firm‐ and individual‐level data. A key finding is that industry, region and notably human capital explain only a small part of the foreign–domestic ownership wage differential. Both white and blue collar workers as well as skilled and unskilled employees obtain a foreign ownership wage premium. Foreign ownership premia are more prevalent in older and less technologically advanced firms. Joint estimation of productivity and wage equations show that, controlling for human capital, the difference in productivity is about twice as large as the wage differential. Overall, results indicate that the international firms share their rents with their employees.     

Physical capital,knowledge capital,and the choice between FDI and outsourcing

Abstract There exist two approaches in the literature concerning the multinational firm’s mode choice for foreign production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract. One approach considers environments where the firm transfers primarily knowledge‐based assets and assumes that knowledge is non‐excludable. A more recent approach takes the property‐right view of the firm and assumes that physical capital is fully excludable. This paper combines both forms of capital assets in a single model. There are subtleties, and added structure is needed to establish what ex ante seems a straightforward testable hypothesis: relatively physical‐capital‐intensive firms choose outsourcing while relatively knowledge‐capital‐intensive firms choose FDI.     

The impact of privatization on firm performance in a transition economy

The Vietnamese privatization programme, launched in 1992, differs from the usual Western privatization programmes in terms of the residual percentage of shares owned by the state and the portion of shares owned by insiders. This begs the question whether these differences influence the effects of the programme on firm performance. This study measures the impact of privatization on firm performance in Vietnam by comparing the pre‐ and post‐privatization financial and operating performance of 121 former state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find significant increases in profitability, sales revenues, efficiency and employee income. Results of applying the ‘difference‐in‐difference’ (DID) method, wherein a control group of firms is used to pick up the influence of other determinants of firm performance, suggest that the performance improvements may indeed be associated with equitization. Regression analyses reveal that firm size, residual state ownership, corporate governance and stock market listing are key determinants of performance improvements.     

Taxing the Financially Integrated Multinational Firm

This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate taxation in the presence of financially integrated multinational firms. Under the assumption that multinational firms use some measure of internal loans to finance foreign investment, we find that the optimal corporate tax rate is positive from the perspective of a small, open economy. This finding contrasts the standard result that the optimal‐source‐based capital tax is zero. Intuitively, when multinational firms finance investment in one country with loans from affiliates in another country, the burden of the corporate taxes levied in the latter country partly falls on investment and thus workers in the former country. This tax exporting mechanism introduces a scope for corporate taxes, which is not present in standard models of international taxation. Accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational firms thus helps resolve the tension between standard theory predicting zero capital taxes and the casual observation that countries tend to employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates.     

Economic integration and tax policy with endogenous foreign firm ownership

This paper analyses the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model where corporate taxation is motivated by the desire to tax profits accruing to foreigners and the number of foreign owned firms is endogenous. Increasing economic integration is modeled as a decline in trade costs or tariffs. It turns out that declining trade costs lead to increasing profit taxes if the government may use import tariffs. If tariffs are not available, declining trade costs induce profit taxes to decline as well. A mandatory reduction in tariffs also triggers profit tax reductions. We conclude that the existence of foreign firm ownership may fail to prevent profit taxes from declining as economic integration proceeds.     

Evolving corporate governance and the dividends behaviour regime in Japan

This study investigates empirically the implications which the changing ownership structure and control transfers in the Japanese corporate market may have for the dividend policy of listed firms. The results show that firms with more concentrated ownership may distribute fewer dividends, as ownership concentration reduces distribution pressure from the capital market. Moreover, we show that institutional shareholding, both financial and non-financial, enables corporations to pay lesser dividends and also that the unwinding of the cross-shareholdings allows for efficiency gain and provides impetus to pay higher dividends. The recent pattern of increasing individual shareholding, both of domestic and foreign private individuals, is consistently associated with a higher dividend payment. Furthermore, managerial ownership has negative effects on dividends payouts and is not associated with the earnings of firms. The results suggest that government ownership does not have any significant impact on the payment of dividends. Moreover, our results support the principle of the dividends relevancy and the choice of an appropriate dividends policy affects the value of the firm.     

Does Taxation Stifle Corporate Investment? Firm‐Level Evidence from ASEAN Countries

This article conducts a firm‐level analysis of the effect of taxation on corporate investment, using large‐scale panel data on non‐financial firms over the period 1990–2014, and controlling for macrostructural differences among ASEAN countries. We find a significant degree of persistence in fixed investment over time, which varies with firm characteristics, such as size, growth prospects, profitability and leverage. The non‐linear estimations indicate that taxation facilitates business investment (possibly by enabling public investment in infrastructure and human capital, and the proper functioning of government institutions), but this effect turns negative and stifles private investment growth as the tax burden increases.     

Political Connections and Firm Performance in Chinese Companies

This study uses panel data analysis to examine the relationship between political connections and firm performance in Chinese firms from 2004 to 2008. We define firm‐level political connections and demonstrate a robust result for the positive relationship between political connections and firm performance. In addition, we integrate the effects of ownership structure, related‐party transactions and political connections into our analysis and continue to show a positive relationship. We show that political connections dampen the negative effect on firm value of related‐party transactions. Finally, we demonstrate channels through which the benefits of political connections are realized in terms of greater cash holdings, larger long‐term loans, lower financing costs, larger sales and lower sales costs. Our results indicate that state‐owned and non‐state‐owned enterprises use political connections equally effectively to enhance performance.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.