RECURRENT BUBBLES*

We study rational bubbles in a standard linear asset price model. We first consider a class of bubble processes driven by multiplicative i.i.d. shocks. We show that a bubble process in this class either diverges to infinity with probability one, converges to zero with probability one, or keeps fluctuating forever with probability one, depending on investors' “confidence” in expected bubble growth. We call a bubble process having the last property “recurrent.” We develop sufficient conditions for a bubble process to be recurrent when it is driven by non‐i.i.d. shocks, when the risk‐free interest rate is not constant, and when the process is driven by non‐i.i.d. shocks and the risk‐free interest rate is not constant. In the last case we demonstrate via simulation that there can be a prolonged period in which both the bubble and the interest rate stay close to zero.     

International Trade and the Value of Time

I discuss a generalized Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek (HOV) model in which consumption requires time as well as money (as in Becker's theory of the allocation of time) and the amount of work that a worker can do per unit of time—her “ability”—varies from country to country. High ability implies high income per hour, which implies a high value of time and, therefore, high consumption of the good that is more “time‐saving.” Therefore, if domestic production of this good is not commensurately high, it would have to be imported. In this way, I demonstrate that international differences in worker ability constitute an independent source of gains from trade. The model is able to explain several observed features of North–South trade that are not explained by the HOV model. The theoretical possibility of a Leontief paradox‐type trade pattern is also demonstrated.     

The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model

I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed.     

Flexible Integration? Mandatory and Minimum Participation Rules

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is whether a subset of the members should be allowed to form “inner clubs” and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it leads to free‐riding when externalities are positive. I show that flexible cooperation is better if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small, but that rigid cooperation is the political equilibrium too often. Both regimes, however, are extreme variants of a more general system combining mandatory and minimum participation rules. For each rule, I characterize the optimum and the equilibrium.     

The Gain from International Trade in Pool Goods and Private Goods

It is well known that perfectly competitive free trade is potentially beneficial for all countries if all goods are both rivalrous and excludable in consumption (“private goods”) and recently (2011) the proposition has been modified to accommodate non‐rivalrous and non‐excludable goods (“public goods”), as well as non‐rivalrous and excludable goods (“club goods”). In the present paper the proposition is modified again, to accommodate rivalrous and non‐excludable goods (“pool goods”). The primary focus is on ocean fisheries, access to which is shared (not necessarily equally) by all countries. However the central proposition to be established is valid for all international pool goods.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

CREDIBILITY AND RENEGOTIATION OF OUTCOME FUNCTIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION*

Recent research has been motivated by the fact that the outcome function in implementation may not be “credible”. On the one hand, the players may try to renegotiate the final outcome, if there is another outcome which they prefer. On the other hand, the “social planner” may have an incentive not to implement the finaloutcome, if there is another outcome which he prefers. I show that in the exchange economy, the first problem is not serious. a planner with unlimited commitment power can design a “collusion-proof” mechanism, which is stable against all sorts of group devciation, including the ex post trade of goods among the agents. I will, However, argue tha hte second problem (the planner's commitment problem) can be very serious.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

ON DETAIL‐FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY*

Mechanism design theory has been criticized, because mechanisms depend on the detail of specification and agents’ behaviour relies on strong rationality assumptions. Hence the study of “detail‐free” mechanism design with weak rationality is important as a practical theory. This paper emphasizes that, even if we confine our attention to detail‐free mechanisms with weak rationality, there exists plenty of scope for the development of new and significant ideas. I describe my recent work along these lines, and argue that stochastic decisions work in large double auction environments, and that moral preferences improve the implementability of social choice functions.     

LOOKING AT THE “POPULATION PROBLEM” THROUGH THE PRISM OF HETEROGENEITY: WELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSES*

Upon introducing heterogeneity and dynamics into a model of the demand for children, a problem of optimal population is defined and analyzed. It is shown that from the perspective of social welfare, better‐educated individuals produce too few children while less‐educated individuals produce too many children and all individuals invest too little in the education of their children. The impact of several policy tools geared at addressing the “population problem” is investigated, in particular how child allowances and other tax‐subsidy policies can be harnessed to enhance welfare, and how and why early childhood education programs can mitigate the “population problem.”     

Stable Tariffs and Retaliations*

A two‐country, two‐commodity model of trade is considered to reformulate the tariff retaliations. It is known that tariff retaliations lead to a Nash‐equilibrium, a non‐free‐trade outcome. However, the negotiation process underlying the Nash equilibrium does not capture the notion of retaliation properly. We use the “contingent threat situation” to reformulate tariff retaliations. In this context, we show that the free trade is a stable outcome. More surprisingly, this interesting result is also valid for the “Johnson case,” where one country is better off under the tariff‐ridden Nash equilibrium compared to free trade.     

Men of Steel Meet the Market: Interpreting Firm Behavior in Russia’s Metallurgy Industry

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) explains growing income inequality via the difference between the rate of return on capital and the growth rate of the economy: the “r > g” inequality. Even if it is true that r > g leads to increasing inequality, nearly every school of economic thought predicts that r will fall as the economy grows. Thus, for Capital (2014) to be a comprehensive theory of inequality, a more adequate theory of r is required. I term this the “Piketty Problem.” I offer a solution to this problem from an institutionalist perspective.     

Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching

In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of “many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues” is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, “matching without preferences over colleagues.” We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all stable matchings in the setting of “matching without preferences over colleagues,” for any set of preferences. Our construction directly extends to generalized matching settings.     

PLATFORM PRICING IN MIXED TWO‐SIDED MARKETS

When a consumer can appear on both sides of a two‐sided market, such as a user who both buys and sells on eBay, the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides. I develop a general model for such “mixed” two‐sided markets and show that a monopolist platform's incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand, which embody the bundling effect, and price‐cost margins adjusted for network externalities, which incorporate “two‐sidedness.” The optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar Lerner formula.     

“Love of wealth” and economic growth

In a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth framework it is shown that for an optimum a benevolent social planner cannot have an excessive “love of wealth”. With a “right” “love of wealth” an optimum exists and implies higher long‐run per‐capita capital, income, and consumption relative to the standard model. This has important implications for comparative development trajectories. The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility of getting arbitrarily close to the golden rule where long‐run per‐capita consumption is maximal. It is shown that the optimal path attains its steady state more slowly. Thus, the beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model. Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private ownership economy. One can then identify “love of wealth” with the “spirit of capitalism.” The paper thus implies that one needs a “right” level of the “spirit of capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.     

“Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting*

The article questions the methodology of “economics and psychology” in its focus on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same type of evidence, which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions, can just as easily reject hyperbolic discounting as well. Furthermore, a decision‐making procedure based on similarity relations better explains the observations and is more intuitive. The article concludes that combining “economics and psychology” requires opening the black box of decision makers instead of modifying functional forms.     

Completing Incomplete Revealed Preference Under Limited Attention

This paper discusses how to improve the identification of the preference of a decision‐maker (DM) with limited attention proposed by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012). in “Revealed Attention”. Their identification method relies on choice reversals so the obtained revealed preference is often incomplete. We propose three approaches to address this problem. The first one is accommodating a model‐free approach, which respects the DM's choice in making a welfare analysis, as long as it does not contradict the revealed preference of Masatlioglu et al. The second approach incorporates the DM's exogenously obtained attention/inattention information into the model of Masatlioglu et al. The third approach is to take framings that influence the DM's attention into effect for the identification.     

TWO OR THREE PROBLEMS CONCERNING SOCIAL STABILITY AND OUR MEASURES OF WELFARE: WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS LEARN FROM OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES?*

This paper takes up several problems that are related to psychology, political science and ethics—disciplines that we regard as neighbours on the boundaries of economics. I pay particular attention to such topics as mass psychology and social stability, democracy and economic performance and the notions of wellbeing and happiness. After laying out some of the history of academic discourse on these problems and notions, I reconsider the nature of discrepancy between microlevel motivations and macrolevel phenomena, trade‐offs between equality and liberty and the problem of measurement of social welfare and “happiness” from the perspective of “dissociation of intention and consequence”.     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

Differential Migration Prospects,Skill Formation,and Welfare

This paper develops a one sector, two‐input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy from the (inefficient) free‐market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration “lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law.