The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in Japan

Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, central bankers around the world have been forced to abandon conventional monetary policy tools in favor of unconventional policies such as quantitative easing, forward guidance, and even lowering the interest rate paid on bank reserves into negative territory. Japan, which faced a crisis in its banking sector and came up against the theoretical zero lower bound on interest rates nearly a decade earlier, was a pioneer in the use of many of these unconventional policy tools. This article analyzes the effectiveness of Japan’s bold experiment with unconventional monetary policy. Using a panel of bi-annual bank data covering the full universe of Japanese commercial banks over a fifteen-year period, this study analyzes the effectiveness of quantitative easing policy on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Our findings suggest that Japan’s unconventional monetary policy worked: there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Japan. These results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects and generalized method of moments analysis.     

Quantitative Easing Forever? Financialisation and the Institutional Legitimacy of the Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Monetary Policy

Scholars of financialisation have argued that the emergence of finance-led grow regimes requires new instruments for effective conduct of economic policy. In this scholarship, central banks have been seen as the most promising actors to utilise one of the most synergetic policies, the maintenance of high and stable prices of financial assets. Since the financial crisis of 2007–8, central banks of the developed world have adopted various unconventional monetary policy measures that serve this function. But will these unconventional measures become institutionally legitimate and institutionalised as conventional practice, as suggested necessary by scholars of financialisation? In this paper, we answer to this question by studying the institutional legitimation of the Federal Reserve’s Quantiative Easing (QE) programmes. We argue that the QE programmes have been legitimated successfully but with institutional legitimation strategies, which cause institutional pressures that question the potential of QE from becoming a regular policy instrument and practice.     

The US monetary performance prior to the 2008 crisis

This article uses a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) approach to study the different shocks to the monetary performance in the two decades of the US economy prior to the 2008 financial crisis. By using the Federal Fund Rate as a measure of change in the monetary policy, this study shows that interest rate expectation is informative about the future movement of Federal Fund Rate and the anticipated monetary policy should be one of the crucial reasons in causing monetary and financial deterioration in the US economy. This article discusses a possible conjecture of a low interest rate trap when a persistent and prolonged low interest rate regime led to financial instability.     

Monetary policy: Why money matters (and interest rates don’t)

Since the late 1980s the Fed has implemented monetary policy by adjusting its target for the overnight federal funds rate. Money’s role in monetary policy has been tertiary, at best. Indeed, several influential economists suggest that money is irrelevant for monetary policy because central banks affect economic activity and inflation by (i) controlling a very short-term nominal interest rate and (ii) influencing financial market participants’ expectation of the future policy rate. I offer an alternative perspective: Money is essential for monetary policy because it is essential for controlling the price level, and the monetary authority’s ability to control interest rates is greatly exaggerated.     

What drives the global official/policy interest rate?

We construct a GFAVAR model with newly released global data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas to investigate the drivers of global official/policy interest rate. We find that 66% of movement in global official/policy interest rates is attributed to changes in global monetary aggregates (23%), oil prices (19%), global output (16%) and global prices (8%). Global official/policy interest rates respond significantly to increases in global output, inflation and oil prices. Increases in global policy interest rates are associated with reductions in global prices and global output. The response in official/policy interest rate for the emerging countries is more to global inflation, for the advanced countries (excluding the U.S.) is more to global output, and for the U.S. is to both global output and inflation.     

美联储应对金融危机的货币政策操作与效果

美国次贷危机发生后,银行体系遭受重创,信贷活动萎缩,市场利率上升,实体经济难以得到资金支持,美国经济陷入了衰退。为了刺激经济复苏,稳定金融市场,修复银行体系,美联储密集地进行货币政策操作,通过各种方式向市场注入流动性。本文对2007年以来美联储所采取的货币政策加以梳理,对其影响进行分析,并提出我国的应对之策。     

Interest on reserves,settlement, and the effectiveness of monetary policy

Over the last several years, the Federal Reserve has conducted a series of large scale asset purchases. The effectiveness of these purchases is dependent on the monetary transmission mechanism. Former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke argued that large scale asset purchases are effective because they induce portfolio reallocations that ultimately lead to changes in economic activity. Despite these claims, a large fraction of the expansion of the monetary base is held as excess reserves by commercial banks. Concurrent with the large scale asset purchases, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves and enacted changes in its Payment System Risk policy. In this paper, I estimate the effect of the payment of interest on reserves (as well as other payment policy changes) on the demand for daylight overdrafts through Fedwire. Since Fedwire provides overdrafts at a fixed price, any fluctuation in the quantity of overdrafts is a change in demand. A reduction in overdrafts corresponds with an increase in the demand for reserves. I show that the payment of interest on reserves has had a negative and statistically significant effect on daylight overdrafts. Furthermore, I interpret these results in light of recent theoretical work. I argue that by paying an interest rate on excess reserves that is higher than comparable short term rates, the Federal Reserve likely hindered the portfolio reallocation channel outlined by Bernanke. Thus, the payment of interest on reserves increased payment processing efficiency, potentially at the expense of limiting the ability of monetary policy to influence economic activity.     

An interest-rate-spread-based measure of Turkish monetary policy

A coherent method to measure the effectiveness of a monetary policy improves the monetary authority’s management capacity and renders the possibility of applying sound policies prior to and during a crisis. The trend in employing complicated and ambiguity-bearing unconventional monetary tools in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis has increased the value of such a method. The aim of this article is to introduce a coherent and consistent monetary policy evaluation method for Turkey. Accordingly, we suggest that innovations in the spread between overnight interest rates and Treasury auction interest rates are informative for exchange rate, output, and prices. Empirical evidence for this identification reveals that positive innovation in spread (implying a tight monetary policy measure) decreases output temporarily, permanently decreases prices, and appreciates local currency. This result is also robust to alternative specifications.     

Near-zero U.S. Interest Rates,Primary Commodity Prices,and Financial Control in Emerging Markets

The U.S. Federal Reserve's monetary policy at the center of the world dollar standard has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except in moments of international crises, the Fed focuses inward on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies in the rest of the world. But this makes the U.S. economy less stable. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into emerging markets by carry traders that generate bubbles in international primary commodity prices and other assets. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a reflux of the hot money. Ironically, these near-zero interest rates hold back investment in the American economy itself.     

Financial market fragmentation and monetary transmission in the euro area: what do we know?

We provide a survey on the literature examining financial market fragmentation in the euro area and discuss the policy options how to reduce it. The fragmentation has increased markedly since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007. It declined somewhat from late 2012 onwards, but is still above the pre-crisis level. Interest rate pass-through has become less efficient primarily because of increased mark-ups and, to a certain extent, the lower responsiveness of bank interest rates to policy rates. The effectiveness of interest rate pass-through has become more heterogeneous across euro area countries, making a common monetary policy more difficult. The unconventional monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank has reduced financial market fragmentation notably; however, this policy was not without side effects. Enhancing financial and fiscal stability in the euro area is key for the efficient functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism.     

危机中美国定量宽松货币政策的实施效果——央行资产负债表的视角

金融危机爆发后,美联储采取定量宽松的货币政策。文章从央行资产负债表的视角,对定量宽松货币政策实施的背景、具体措施进行了阐述,并重点考察了定量宽松货币政策对央行资产、负债及其构成、货币政策决策的影响。研究表明,急剧膨胀的央行资产、大量投放的流动性必然造成将来通胀压力,定量宽松货币政策如何顺利退出,事关经济金融的稳定和货币政策的效果,也是央行在经济复苏阶段面临的新的课题。     

论金融危机对完善我国法律对策的启示

美国法律对美联储宽松货币政策规范不力、金融信贷管制法律松弛、金融监管体系存在法律漏洞、法律长期缺乏对金融技术与制度创新保持协调发展的规范等是酿成金融危机的关键因素。国际金融危机启示我们，必须坚持依法推进市场调节与政府调控相结合，强化和完善金融监管措施，强化对金融创新风险的严密防控，力求防范金融风险的法律监管机制全覆盖，而且应不断提升法律应对国际金融危机保增长的能力。     

Monetary policy and long-term US interest rates

This paper assesses the effect of federal funds rate innovations on longer-term US nominal interest rates across different periods. The evidence suggests that these responses change with changes in the monetary policy regime. Time periods considered are pre- and post-1979 and different Federal Reserve Chairman’s tenure. The response of longer-term interest rates to federal funds rate innovations are shown to be smaller and less persistent in the post-1979 period when the Federal Reserve placed more emphasis on inflation.     

Monetary transmission with multiple policy rates: evidence from Turkey

Quantitative easing policies have led to persistent divergence between officially announced policy rates and short-term money market rates in many economies, making it challenging to assess the stance of monetary policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Lack of data variation in short-term interest rates across time dimension has made it difficult to identify the monetary transmission mechanisms. In order to shed some light on this topic, we make advantage of a specific period from Turkey during which the central bank deliberately allowed the policy rates to diverge frequently from the interbank rates due to capital flow management purposes. Using bank-level flow data from this episode, we investigate the relationship between various short-term interest rate measures and bank loan/deposit rates through panel estimation methods. Our findings suggest that interbank rates are more relevant than central bank’s officially announced rates for the transmission of monetary policy when the two diverge from each other persistently. Interbank rates particularly play a key role in the pricing of loans and deposits. These findings provide helpful guidance for evaluating the monetary stance under unconventional policies.     

Silvio Gesell: “A strange,unduly neglected” monetary theorist

Abstract

In recent years negative nominal interest rates came to the attention of a wider audience as one instrument to overcome the lower zero bound to conventional monetary policy. Modern proponents trace the origin of the proposal back to Silvio Gesell, a largely forgotten German autodidactic scholar of the interwar period, whose work provides valuable insight into heterodox late nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic thinking. Against this backdrop, the present article provides a comprehensive review of Gesell’s life and social economy, firmly linking him to German anarchism of the interwar period. It suggests that Gesell not only provided a monetary theory of interest, but put forward an independent monetary theory of economic crisis that is essential in understanding the historical origins of depreciative currency proposals. Moreover, the article maintains that Gesell’s monetary theory of interest can be seen as the missing link between heterodox economics, The General Theory, and anarchist economic theory.     

Does monetary policy affect the long-run expectations of non-stationary real interest rates?

In this article, we analyse whether the monetary policy affects the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate. The analysis is conducted through Beveridge–Nelson trend decomposition within a cointegrated vector autoregressive model based on the New Keynesian framework. We suggest an augmented test of the conventional co-integration test on the non-stationarity of the real interest rate, which checks whether the co-integration coefficient of inflation is one and the output gap affects the co-integration equilibrium of the nominal interest rate. We further suggest decomposing the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate into three trends: the interest rate shock (including the monetary shock), inflation shock and output gap shock. According to empirical analyses using monthly US data after the Korean War, the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate contains an interest rate shock trend and the impulse of the federal fund target rate induces a significant response of the interest rate shock trend. However, the interest rate shock trend has a very small portion of the long-run expectation of the non-stationary real interest rate, which may explain why the monetary policy was not particularly effective in the economic recovery after the global financial crisis.     

Neoliberal growth models,monetary union and the Euro crisis. A post-Keynesian perspective

The paper offers an account of the Euro crisis based on post-Keynesian monetary theory and its typology of demand regimes. Neoliberalism has transformed social and financial relations in Europe but it has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process. Instead, growth has relied either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe the financial crisis has been amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at restricting the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy. This neoliberal economic policy regime in conjunction with the separation of monetary and fiscal spheres has turned the financial crisis of 2007 into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe.     

What is on the ECB’s mind? Monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Taylor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.     

Bank lending and interest on excess reserves: An empirical investigation

This paper econometrically tests for effects on bank lending of the Federal Reserve’s policy of paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). Following the 2008 financial crisis, US banks decreased their loan allocations and increased holdings of excess reserves. A model of bank asset allocation shows that when the rate of IOER is higher than other short-term rates, banks will switch from zero excess reserves to a regime with higher excess reserves and lower lending. Using a sample of panel data on US banks from 2000 through 2018, we find evidence of a switch to a positive excess reserve regime in the post-crisis period. Controlling for market interest rates, loan demand, and economic activity, we find that IOER accounts for the majority of the decline in bank lending after the financial crisis.     

Hot Money Flows,Cycles in Primary Commodity Prices,and Financial Control in Developing Countries

Because the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuses on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies on the rest of the world. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on short-term dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into Emerging Markets (EM) with convertible currencies. When each EM central bank intervenes to prevent its individual currency from appreciating, collectively they lose monetary control, inflate, and cause an upsurge in primary commodity prices internationally. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a return of the hot money to the United States (and to other industrial countries) as commercial banks stop lending to foreign exchange speculators. World prices of primary products then collapse. African countries with exchange controls and less convertible currencies are not so attractive to currency speculators. Thus, they are less vulnerable than EM to the ebb and flow of hot money. However, African countries are more vulnerable to cycles in primary commodity prices because food is a greater proportion of their consumption, and—being less industrialized—they are more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of their commodity exports. Supply-side shocks, such as a crop failure anywhere in the world, can affect the price of an individual commodity. But joint fluctuations in the prices of all primary products—minerals, energy, cereals, and so on—reflect monetary conditions in the world economy as determined by the ebb and flow of hot money from the United States, and increasingly from other industrial countries with near-zero interest rates.