Deposit insurance and banking system risk: Some empirical evidence

This paper examines the effect of federal deposit insurance on the riskiness of the commercial banking system. It is generally acknowledged that a system affixed rate deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to increase their risk-taking activities. Yet very little empirical evidence exists confirming or refuting this supposition. The coefficient of variation of bank profits and the standard deviation of profits are used as measures of bank risk. How these measures of bank risk are affected by deposit insurance coverage, and other variables thought to affect bank risk, is examined. Deposit insurance is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on bank risk. This result provides empirical support for the FDIC Improvement Act requirement of risk related deposit insurance premiums starting January 1994.     

Insider ownership and dividend signals: Additional evidence from the banking industry

This study investigates the relationship between the concentration of insider ownership and the share-price response to dividend-policy changes implemented by bank holding companies (BHCs). Using a cross-industry sample, previous research (Born 1988) found that there are differences in the magnitude of the share-price response to dividend initiations which may be explained by the concentration of insider ownership of the sampled firms. We hypothesize that the concentration of insider ownership does not play a role in differences in share price for BHCs due to the presence of regulatory monitors. The results of this study support our hypothesis.     

The linkage between insurance activity and banking credit: Some evidence from dynamic analysis

This paper investigates the long-run and short-run linkages between insurance activity and banking credit for G-7 countries. To minimize the pretest bias and overcome the structural changes, we adopt the bootstrap Granger causality test applied to full sample and subsamples with a fixed window size. The Johansen cointegration test with GMM-IV estimator finds a long-run positive relation between the series. The full sample results of bootstrap Granger causality test show that there is predictive power from life insurance activity to banking credit only for France and Japan, while the short-run causal relationships between nonlife insurance activity and banking credit are country-specific. However, parameter stability test results suggest that the short-run results in full sample are unreliable. The results of rolling VAR models report that the causal linkages between them are time-varying across various subsamples. These findings offer some useful insights for achieving the co-evolution between insurance and banking credit markets.     

Financial liberalization and banking efficiency: evidence from Turkey

This paper examines the banking efficiency in a pre- and post-liberalization environment by drawing on the Turkish experience by using DEA. The paper also investigates the scale effect on efficiency. Our findings suggest that liberalization programs were followed by an observable decline in efficiency. Another finding of the study is that the Turkish banking system had a serious scale problem during the study period. The second part of our analysis relied on econometric methods and found that one major reason for such system-wide efficiency decline has been the growing macroeconomic instability of the Turkish economy in general and financial sector in particular.

Impact of investor sentiment on mutual fund risk taking and performance: evidence from China

ABSTRACT

This study provides empirical rationale and guidance for incorporating investor sentiment into mutual fund enterprise information systems. It investigates the effect of fund-specific investor sentiment on fund risk taking and performance. Working on a sample of equity funds in China, our panel regressions reveal that fund risk-taking is negatively related to lagged fund-specific investor sentiment. Investor sentiment is negatively linked to subsequent fund performance, which conforms with the dumb money effect. Encouragingly, there is evidence that mutual fund managers in China possess investing expertise. Fund-specific investor sentiment shows asymmetric impacts. The dumb money effect is primarily driven by positive sentiment.     

Economies of scale and scope in French banking and savings institutions

In this study, we analyze the costs incurred by French commercial banks and savings institutions. One of the main distinctions between these two types of financial entities concerns management costs, which are higher for commercial bank demand deposits than for the savings institutions' tax-free livret A passbook accounts. Taking this differential into consideration by constructing separate models based on different principles, we find that the average overall and operating costs of the savings institutions are half those of commercial banks. As regards operating costs, small savings institutions enjoy a significant cost advantage over small commercial banks, but this cost advantage is smaller when one compares the performance of large savings institutions to the large banks. The results of our econometric estimates suggest a possible explanation, as we find increasing returns to scale for the banks and diminishing returns for the savings institutions. The value of the returns-to-scope parameter at the mean point appears to indicate a complementarity between certain pairs of outputs. Therefore, ouptut diversification appears to have a positive impact on cost levels for both savings institutions and commercial banks; while institution size, measured by the total assets, has a different impact in these two industries.     

Bank ownership and cost efficiency: New empirical evidence from Russia

This paper investigates the cost efficiency of Russian banks with regard to their heterogeneity in terms of ownership form, capitalization and asset structure. Using bank-level quarterly data over the period 2005–2013, we perform stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and compute cost efficiency scores at the bank and bank group levels. We deduct from gross costs the negative revaluations of foreign currency items generated by official exchange rate dynamics rather than by managerial decisions. The results indicate that the core state banks, as distinct from other state-controlled banks, were nearly as efficient as private domestic banks during and after the crisis of 2008–2009. Foreign banks appear to be the least efficient market participants in terms of costs, which might reflect their lower (and decreasing over time) penetration of the Russian banking system. We further document that the group ranking by cost efficiency is not permanent over time and depends on the observed differences in bank capitalization and asset structure. We find that foreign banks gain cost efficiency when they lend more to the economy. Core state banks, conversely, lead in terms of cost efficiency when they lend less to the economy, which can result from political interference in their lending decisions in favor of unprofitable projects Private domestic banks that maintain a lower capitalization significantly outperform foreign banks and do not differ from the core state banks in this respect.     

Risk contagion in the banking network: New evidence from China

Based on data from 111 Chinese banks over the 2013–2016 period, this paper estimates the interbank bilateral lending matrix using the maximum entropy method. The estimated matrix is used to simulate the effects of credit and liquidity shocks on China’s banking network. Simulation results show that, under the extreme pressure scenario, the contagion arising from a liquidity shock is significantly stronger than the effect of a credit shock, indicating the importance of liquidity in the banking system. The contagion effect arising from a credit shock does not vary much over the sample period. However, the contagion effect arising from a liquidity shock decreases significantly, which could be attributed to contraction in interbank business due to stricter interbank business supervision. The simulation results also identify the most important and most vulnerable nodes of the banking system. An increase in the level of capital level can enhance the ability of banks to withstand credit and liquidity shocks. Our analysis also suggests that risk contagion faced by China’s banks varies across banking network structures.     

Compensation-based stock trading by corporate executive and aggregate management ownership of the firm: Some additional evidence

Managers place a low value on equity-based compensation because it exposes them to the risk of the firm. Such undervaluation and the need to achieve diversification may force a manager to sell his own stock of the firm in response to equity-based awards. In this paper we examine whether such stock selling by an executive depends on the aggregate level of management ownership of the firm. We argue that stock selling occurs at a high level of aggregate ownership where an executive has a low probability of being replaced. Our findings support this “management ownership” argument of compensation-based stock trading. One implication is that the board's effort to minimize agency conflicts becomes less effective once aggregate ownership increases to a certain threshold level. (JEL G30, G32) This research was carried out with the support of the Western New England College research fund.     

The number of banking relationships and the business cycle: New evidence from Colombia

We study the determinants of multiple bank–firm relationships using a uniquely rich data set comprised of information on individual loans of a large number of firms in Colombia. We control for firm-specific variables and find that the business cycle exerts important influence on the number of bank relationships sustained by firms. Our evidence suggests that the number of bank relationships is counter-cyclical, decreasing during macroeconomic expansions and increasing during contractions. However, this effect is stronger for large firms which have more access to alternative sources of funding.     

Non-wage benefits,corporate ownership and firm performance in post-communist economies: evidence from Ukraine

The economic reforms in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have fundamentally reshaped ownership and governance of economic production, notably through the privatization of former state-owned enterprises. These reforms were expected to transform management practices by displacing ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare arrangements administered by state-owned enterprises. Using data drawn from two large samples of Ukrainian establishments, we investigate, in two different time points, the relationship between non-wage benefits and firm performance during the period of transition to a market economy (1994–2004). We found that non-wage benefits continued to be a critical feature of HRM practices in Ukraine during this period, and were positively associated with firm performance.     

Mixed ownership of industrial firms in Japan: debt financing,banks and vertical keiretsu groups

In the 1980s, Japanese bank-driven corporate governance practices were often said to be part of the explanation for Japan’s economic success. However, these practices became suspected causes of Japan’s continuing recession following the burst of the financial bubble in 1990. Since then Japanese banks have suffered from increasing numbers of non-performing loans. Consequently, banks have become less able to act as the benefactors for Japanese firms. In response to the reduced supply of bank loans, Japanese firms have been exploring issuing corporate bonds and other types of public debt as alternative methods of debt financing. The objective of this paper is to examine empirically how Japanese manufacturers have responded to the deteriorating financial conditions of Japanese banks from a corporate finance perspective. In particular, we are interested in knowing whether Japanese banks’ involvement in corporate governance has declined with the increase in public debt issuances. Our empirical results seem to suggest that Japanese banks play a significant role in their client firms’ issuances of public debt and hence continue to play a significant role in corporate governance.     

Agency costs in the banking industry: An examination of ownership behavior,leverage and dividend policies

This paper examines agency theory arguments in the banking industry by analyzing the effect of four variables that proxy for agency costs—earnings volatility, managers' portfolio diversification losses, bank size, and standard deviation of bank equity returns—on the three financial policy variables of managerial stock ownership, leverage, and dividend yield. It is one of the first studies that examines the determination of financial policy variables, in light of agency concerns, in the banking industry. The study examines the largest 104 U.S. banks during the period 1985–1989. Evidence suggests that bank size and a measure of the managers' portfolio diversification opportunity set affect the bank's level of managerial stock ownership, leverage and dividends.     

Multiple banking relationships,managerial ownership concentration and firm value: A simultaneous equations approach

This paper examines how the number of banking relationships affects the interaction between managerial ownership and firm performance, and sheds light on the conditions under which banking relationships play a role in alleviating shareholder–manager conflicts. Our results provide several interesting insights. We document that bank monitoring has substantial value when managers are improperly incentivized, but that it becomes less important when managers are properly incentivized. There is a substitution effect between the value-increasing benefits of managerial ownership and bank monitoring. We also find that any existing free-riding concerns from having too many banking relationships are problematical only when Tobin's Q is high and managerial ownership is high.     

Longevity risk and economic growth in sub-populations: evidence from Italy

Decisions in Economics and Finance - Forecasting mortality is still a big challenge for Governments that are interested in reliable projections for defining their economic policy at local and...     

Keiretsu and risk: An examination of the risk exposure of keiretsu banks in Japan

We compare risk positions adopted by keiretsu and non-keiretsu banks in Japan and examine how the risk positions of Japanese banks changed following the conclusion in 1997 of an escalating series of banking crises in Japan and East-Asia. The results indicate that keiretsu banks take less risk than non-keiretsu banks, and that Japanese banks in general adopted lower risk profiles after 1997. Japanese bank risk is positively associated with the ratio of non-performing loans to capital, interest rates, and private investment in residential construction, and negatively with the ratio of administrative expenses to average assets and the money supply     

The impact of private benefits on institutional ownership change: evidence from markets with different sentiments

This study investigates the relationship between private benefits and institutional ownership change in markets characterized by different investors’ sentiments. High-sentiment markets tend to overvalue a firm and thereby offer institutional investors a chance to sell shares and profit from overvaluation by forgoing the private benefits otherwise obtainable. Empirical analysis of ownership data from 1990 to 2008 reveals that, in high-sentiment markets, institutional investors sell more shares low in private benefits (dual-class firm share) than shares high in private benefits (non-dual-class firm share). In contrast, firm insiders, who consume significant private benefits in both dual-class and non-dual class firms, sell more dual-class firm shares in both high- and low-sentiment markets. Their ownership disposition is more likely driven by the need for diversification. Subsample analyses show that public pension funds drive the market-sentiment-related change of institutional ownership.     

Ownership structure and firm performance: Some empirical evidence from Spain

The ‘managerial’ and the ‘contractual’ theories of the firm imply different causes and consequences for the relationship between ownership and performance of firms. This paper provides a test of the two conflicting theories, using ownership and performance data from a sample of Spanish family- and non-family-controlled firms. We find evidence in support of the contractual theory of the firm, according to which firms choose their ownership structure maximizing economic value, net of contractual costs.     

Debt finance and the cost of management ownership: Some elementary results

Increased debt reduces a company's equity base, which reduces the dollar investment a manager must make to hold a given proportion of stock. Therefore, it is often argued, managers' effort incentives are improved by high leverage. This paper shows that while risky debt reduces the cost of providing managers with substantial equity ownership, the cheaper equity captures less of the fruits of the manager's effort. Managers' effort incentives are improved by high debt levels only under quite restrictive conditions. These conditions are more plausible when agency problems are due to a managerial propensity to expand size by investing in negative net present value projects. The results also imply that when debt is increased to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow, the accompanying covenants should allow for substantial cash distributions to shareholders even before bondholder claims are satisfied.     

Assessing ethical behaviours in the Spanish banking and insurance industries: evidence and challenges

This study aims to improve understanding of the ethical nature of the relations in two labour-intensive industries to facilitate the creation of an ethical culture. For this purpose, the authors first review literature related to the main influences on ethical behaviour, then perform an empirical analysis of those factors using a hierarchical stepwise regression of a database of 525 banking and insurance employees. Contrary to expectations, leadership has a less important effect on ethical behaviour than other organizational factors. The results reveal several implications for improving the management of ethical behaviour in these industries.