Consumer Adaptation Strategies: From Austrian Shilling to the Euro

On 1st January 2002, in 12 countries of the European Union, euro notes and coins replaced existing national currencies. The currency changeover required citizens to adapt in various ways. They had to learn to handle new coins and notes, and evaluate prices in the new currency. Data on how these tasks were performed by Austrians are presented. In particular, Austrian consumers applied four different strategies to establish price intuition for the euro: a conversion strategy, an intuitive strategy, an anchor strategy, and a marker value strategy. Data on these strategies show that their application varies across socio-demographic characteristics, differs with purchase situations, relates to euro attitudes, and changes over time. Although the introduction of the euro took place about 5 years ago, the adaptation process is still ongoing.     

The Unifying Role of the Single Currency

Perhaps the single most tangible symbol of the European Union is its single currency, the euro. Within the European Economic and Monetary Union, it was seen as a tool to ensure that European integration would be truly irreversible. However, the euro has also contributed to cleavages and asymmetries. This article reviews whether the euro can fulfil the unifying role envisioned for it, examing the importance of the euro in four crucial European relationships.     

Can the Euro Survive?

One of the fascinating aspects of the European debt crisis has been the resilience of the euro. For much of 2011, the euro was a key reserve currency, oblivious to the chaos ravaging European economies. Now, however, the gravity of the crisis is finally dragging down the euro. As the Euro zone debt crisis enters its third uncertain year, the question about whether the euro can survive rises. This paper argues that the euro can survive given policymakers still have in hand various tools. These tools include creating exit rules, implementing new stabilisation rules and instruments, adopting new fiscal policy, introducing conditional Eurobonds, using inflation differentials and providing more independence to the European Central Bank.     

The Euro's place in the world monetary system

The European Union is striding ahead on schedule towards European monetary union (EMU). Eleven member states will introduce the euro for book-keeping purposes on 1.1.1999, assigning responsibility for monetary policy to the European System of Central Banks. On 1.1.2002, the euro will also be in circulation as notes and coins, and the participating countries will abandon their national currencies by 30.6.2002 at the latest. But what part will the euro play in the world monetary system? And what conclusions do we need to draw?     

Driven by the markets? ECB sovereign bond purchases and the securities markets programme

At the height of the European sovereign debt crisis, the European Central Bank decided to purchase distressed European government bonds. Even worse, and more importantly, the ECB is providing direct support of several hundred billions of euros to troubled banks via its normal monetary policy operations by granting them the opportunity to refinance at an interest rate of 1%. This article argues that these purchases will result in common monetary policy being dominated by national fiscal policies. The most worrisome aspect is that the euro area appears to have stumbled into unconventional monetary policies that, once started, will be difficult to exit. In the euro area, properly functioning financial markets are at risk.     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.     

Steering the Unsteerable? Aggregate Fiscal Stance and Spillover Effects in the Euro Area

The concept of aggregate euro area fiscal stance and the underlying assumption of significantly positive cross-country fiscal spillovers is a highly debated topic. The European Commission seems intent on using this concept as a basis for introducing top-down coordination of European fiscal policies. This article argues that the spillover effects of fiscal impulses in one country to the rest of the euro area would be rather limited. Introducing fiscal top-down coordination would require a substantial shift of political competencies from member states to the European level. A discussion of potential changes to the current fiscal framework would need to be part of a wider debate on the future of the European Economic and Monetary Union.     

Vier Jahre Eurokrise: Wege zu neuem Systemvertrauen

Political gridlock, violations of European law and inconsistent political communication have turned the euro crisis into a crisis of confidence in public policy. To re-establish trust in the system, Europe needs a comprehensive approach consisting of three elements. First, rules can invigorate societies if they provide for cross-border competition in a revived single market and abstain from top-down provisions. Second, new growth perspectives — e.g. by reassigning major parts of the EU budget — can enhance the selfconfidence of societies. And finally, a pan-European debate on common goals and values can help answer the essential question of Europe’s sense and purpose. As the euro can only ever enjoy as much trust as the institutions governing the euro area, the solution of the European confidence crisis is crucial to the fate of the common currency.     

The franc zone of West and Central Africa

In the francophone countries of West and Central Africa a currency system has long been in place which was originally based on the French franc and is now based on the euro. A look at how this system has operated over the years may highlight some useful experiences for the countries on the eastern and southern periphery of the euro area that are now considering pegging their national currencies to the euro and could help to clarify the opportunities and risks arising for both these countries and the present participants of European Monetary Union.     

The Competitiveness of European Financial Markets

The countries that together make up the euro area are undergoing a process of far-reaching change, with established national financial markets merging into one new European market accompanied by deregulation, cross-border consolidation, and increased competition within the euro area. These developments will help to increase longterm economic growth and will have a strong bearing on the international competitiveness of the European financial sector, leading to innovation and modernisation. This paper presents the underlying rationale of financial integration and increased competitiveness of European financial markets and provides a snapshot of where financial integration has been successful and where work is ongoing. It also notes important historical experiences of U.S. financial integration. It concludes by highlighting the role and recent activities of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem in promoting and enhancing further financial integration. JEL Classification F15, G15     

Why price‐level dispersion went up in Europe after the financial crisis

Persistent price differences across euro area countries are an indication of incomplete economic integration. We analyse long‐ and short‐run developments of price‐level dispersion in the euro area and compare the results with price dispersion across US cities. We find that monetary and economic integration in Europe has been successful in establishing a major downward trend in price‐level differences across countries since 1960. After the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, diverging economic conditions across euro area countries led to higher income dispersion, which contributed to a widening of price‐level differences again.     

Financial repression and debt liquidation in the USA and the euro area

Rising debt levels have caused a revival of financial repression in the euro area and the USA. The Federal Reserve directly represses US bond yields and assists in financing the state budget, resulting in an overall liquidation effect from falling bond yields of about three per cent of total government revenues and one per cent of GDP in 2011. In the euro area, the ongoing actions to contain the European debt crisis have also repressed interest rates, easing debt-servicing costs in all European countries and reducing the interest rate payments for the German government by about one to two per cent of total government revenues. This article argues that a slight rise in infl ation could even liquidate German debt.     

EMU and Trade Revisited: Long‐Run Evidence Using Gravity Equations

In this paper, we present evidence of the long‐run effect of the euro on trade for the twelve initial EMU countries for the period 1967–2008 from a double perspective. First, we pool all the bilateral combinations of trade flows among the EMU countries in a panel cointegration gravity specification. Second, we estimate a gravity equation for each of the EMU members vis‐à‐vis the other eleven partners. We apply panel cointegration techniques based on factor models that account for cross‐dependence and structural breaks. Whereas the joint gravity equation provides evidence on the aggregate effect of the euro on intra‐European trade, by isolating the individual countries, we assess which of the member countries have obtained a larger benefit from the euro. The results show that the euro has had a positive though small effect on trade. Belgium and Luxembourg, France and Italy are the countries more benefited from the introduction of the euro. The effects for exports to third countries are in general more moderate, and, with the exception of Greece, there is no evidence of diversion effects.     

Challenges and perspectives for a single market for financial services in Europe

The introduction of the euro has highlighted the fact that Europe’s financial markets are still characterised by a high degree of fragmentation. This threatens to impede the process of structural reform which is hoped to increase the competitiveness of the European economy. The modernisation of the European economy should therefore start with the modernisation of its financial services markets.     

欧洲主权债务危机及其对中欧贸易的影响研究

随着希腊主权债务危机的爆发,整个欧元区乃至全球又一次地笼罩在经济危机的阴影下。由于欧元体制等问题,使得希腊的债务危机逐渐演变成为欧元区债务危机,其对全球金融市场和主要经济体都产生了重大的影响。本文首先阐述欧债危机产生的背景和原因,进而分析欧债危机对中欧贸易的主要影响,并提出相应的对策建议。     

Economic sentiment shocks and fluctuations in economic activity in the euro area and the USA

Economic sentiment indicators can provide a wealth of information for macroeconomic policy formulation and analysis. Despite this, economic sentiment is often neglected by mainstream economics. This article assesses whether there is a potential role for economic sentiment to amplify business cycle fluctuations. This paper integrates the European Commission Economic Sentiment Indicator data into an econometric analysis of the euro area business cycle. The investigation of the euro area economy suggests that sentiment shocks do have an impact on important macroeconomic variables such as output, retail sales, and unemployment. There is furthermore significant evidence that economic conditions and shocks affect economic sentiment.     

Legitimierung,oder das demokratische Dilemma der Euro-Rettungspolitik

European policies imposed in the euro crisis have disabled democratic policy choices at the national level, while the present European euro-rescuing regime lacks democratic legitimacy. But policy choices might now become politicised in the Europe-wide competition of partisan candidates for the Presidency of the European Commission. In that case, voters might indeed be mobilised for or against radically opposed policy options — the continuation of the present austerity regime and the move to a transfer union. The risk is, however, that the escalation of transnational conflict might further divide rather than democratise Europe.     

The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure at the Heart of EU Economic Governance Reform

While the euro officially came into being in 1999, it was the introduction of euro notes and coins 20 years ago in January 2002 that made the common currency a tangible reality for European citizens. The circle of member states has since grown from 11 to 19, and a growing section of the population no longer has any personal experience with a “national” currency, yet the debate on the legal and institutional framework underpinning the common currency has never gone away.

     

Can a Reliable Framework for Sovereign-Backed Securities Be Established?

The European Commission has proposed the introduction of sovereign-backed securities (SBSs) as a class of safe assets for the euro area. SBSs are generated by an issuing agency that would purchase a representative portfolio of national sovereign bonds from the euro area. Purchases are financed by issuing (at least) two types of structured bonds: a risk-free senior SBS tranche and a risky junior SBS tranche. Overall, we recognise that the SBS concept has the potential to improve financial stability and financial integration in the euro area. However, we highlight several potentially severe technical and political problems. Most important for the SBS concept to function properly are the de-privileging of national sovereign bonds in bank regulation, rules to ensure conditionality in times of crisis and measures to prevent disincentives for national public finances. If such conditions remain elusive, we advise against the introduction of SBSs.     

Das Securities Market Programme — viele Vorteile für den Euroraum

The Eurosystem’s Securities Market Programme (SMP,) the purchase of government bonds of euro area countries strongly affected by the crisis, started in 2010 and ended in 2012. The SMP benefited all parties concerned – the Eurosystem, all euro area countries and the crisis countries. The positive experience with the SMP can be replicated in the private sector with the creation of an exchangetraded fund (ETF), a Smart Beta ETF - SMP Fund. Like the SMP, the SMP Fund would buy government bonds, according to the ECB capital key. As an ETF, the SMP Fund would have low costs. Profits above the German Bund benchmark would be shared: 80% to investors, 10% to the SMP Fund and 10% to advisers who recommend the purchase. The related risks would be reduced by the diversification of the SMP Fund, the financing mechanisms of the euro area, especially the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the banking union. The SMP Fund could support the euro area fiscal capacity and the EU capital markets union. Past and future SMP profits create a fiscal capacity for the euro area with an initial amount of 50 billion Euro.