内幕交易:理论、模型及实证研究

对内幕交易的研究始于证券监管的历史,近年来,随着理论的发展和数据的充足以及越来越多的国家加强对内幕交易的监管,内幕交易已成为金融市场理论中的热点研究领域。本文在综合国外研究成果的基础上,着重从理论、模型及实证三个方面对其发展进行了深入论介,最后对其未来的发展方向和研究重点提出了展望。     

国际资本流动趋势与中国资本循环结构分析

金融全球化是一个动态的发展过程,其程度随着跨国公司的对外资本扩张、机构投资者的投资规模扩大以及各金融主体之间依赖程度的提高而不断加深.在不同发展阶段的国家都不同程度地参与其中,分享金融全球化带来的利益,同时分担由此而产生的风险.文章在对金融全球化与国际资本流动的关系,趋势特征进行概述的基础上,分析了我国国际资本的循环结构并提出建议.     

Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.     

Policy Diffusion of the Emission Trading Scheme in China:Progress and Prospects

Chinese national emissions trading scheme(ETS)of greenhouse gas(GHG)was scheduled to start simulation trading in the power sector in 2020.Now it is good timing ...     

货币政策传导机制：理论发展与现实选择

货币政策的有效传导对提振市场信心、促进经济发展以及平抑经济波动具有重要意义。本文对货币政策传导机制的理论发展进行了系统梳理和评述,并有选择性地对已有理论所揭示的传导机制进行了实证检验。在此基础上,文章根据全球新型金融危机与货币政策之间的紧密联系,提出货币政策的金融市场传导渠道,并基于全景分析视角,将金融市场传导渠道与其他传统渠道共同纳入全景分析中的综合传导体系内,从而形成一个完备的货币政策传导机制的综合理论分析框架,为新形势下我国货币政策的现实选择提供新的理论基础。     

Open-Economy Macroeconomics: Developments in Theory and Policy

This paper views developments in open-economy macroeconomics through the lens of the debate over European monetary unification. The empirical tendency for nominal exchange rate regimes to affect the variability of nominal and real exchange rates alike can be rationalized by sticky-price theories or models of asset-market liquidity effects. But plausible liquidity models have difficulty generating enough persistence to match the data. Thus, the macroeconomic stabilization costs of forgoing the exchange-rate realignment option seem pertinent. It is argued that our theories of efficiencies due to a common currency remain unsatisfactory, despite recent advances. The paper concludes by reviewing theories of currency crisis     

Complexity Economics as Heterodoxy: Theory and Policy

Complexity economics has quickly become a powerful research program for real-world economics in recent years. This article provides an overview of complexity economics, and argues that it is incompatible with the “equilibrium” and “optimality” conceptions of the mainstream and its “market economy.” Instead, it develops older heterodox — including evolutionary-institutional — issues like self-organization, emergence, path?dependence, idiosyncrasies, lock-ins, or skewed power distributions. Also, the space for emergent institutions through the “intentionality” of agents, including their improving collective performance, reducing complexity, and others, is investigated. This article considers complex adaptive systems through “games on networks” in an “evolution-of-cooperation” perspective. Moreover, a surge in policy implications of economic complexity has emerged, even if still rather general. With some more specific implications derived, the article again reveals the close similarities with long-standing heterodoxies: namely, pragmatist policy conceptions in this respect.     

Business Cycles: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications

This paper looks at recent advances in the study of aggregate fluctuations. The emphasis is on three prominent areas of research: the stochastic growth model, economies which exhibit macroeconomic complementarities and models that emphasize heterogeneity. Each section of the paper outlines the theory, examines relevant empirical evidence and then discusses some policy implications of the analysis.     

A Cost-effective Approach to Attracting Low-income Countries to International Emissions Trading: Theory and Experiments

The cost-effectiveness of the KyotoProtocol and any similar non-global treatywould be enhanced by attracting additionalcountries to international emissions tradingand achieving this as soon as possible. Incontrast to what is heard in most of thedebate, such an enlargement is here taken to beattained with the new participants, atleast to begin with, being fullycompensated. This paper focuses on twoforms of compensation that can be used toattract poor countries to participate inemissions trading. The theoretical aswell as experimental evidence suggests that, ifpoor countries are more risk averse than richcountries, partial compensation in terms offinancial transfers is more cost-effective thanrelying solely on compensation in kind –emission quotas – as has been the case so far.Using money for partial compensation would alsoreduce the risk for ``hot air' allocations andthe ensuing political obstacles tocost-effectiveness that such allocations tendto create.     

现代中央银行政策:理论、挑战与重构

现代中央银行制度是一国宏观经济治理的重要内容,现代中央银行政策是现代中央银行制度及功能的主要体现。中央银行在演变过程中逐渐具备了为政府提供贷款、货币发行、最后贷款人、制定货币政策、制定宏观审慎政策等现代中央银行的功能。现代中央银行政策作为现代中央银行制度的核心构成,其理论框架主要包括最终目标、操作目标、政策工具、传导机制等。由于现代中央银行政策具有目标多元、工具复杂、从工具到目标间接传导等特征,因此提高政策精准度至关重要。中国构建了较为完整的现代中央银行政策框架,但在金融适度分权改革环境下,地方政府、企业、银行、居民等市场主体的行为选择使现有的中央银行政策需要进一步改进和完善,尤其是需要提高政策的精准性,包括提高政策基准变量计算的精准性,提高货币政策工具和宏观审慎政策工具的精准性,提高"双支柱"政策与财政政策、产业政策、国际金融政策等政策工具组合的精准性。     

Airline Deregulation: Neoclassical Theory as Public Policy

We present a common analytical framework for evolutionary and institutional economics, conceived as the study of systems that do not tend toward, nor necessarily fluctuate around, a steady state. Using an evolutionary equation, we derive an analytical theory of the relation between resource abundance and the rate of return available under differing institutional structures. We suggest that the recent political and financial turmoil around the world reflects incompatibilities between existing institutional structures and the increasing scarcity of resources. We apply this idea to the most fundamental determinant of any society's prosperity, profitability and even long-term survival, namely its fertility and rate of population growth.     

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.     

论开展电力排污权交易的几个关键问题及挑战

排污权交易强调用市场配置环境资源,改变了政府配置环境资源的管理传统,这将引起环境管理体制和运行机制的全面调整。文章从创造政策环境、建立和电力市场相适应的排污权交易市场、制订中长期总量目标等制度层面分析了我国开展电力排污权交易需要具备的5个前提条件,并针对当前环境管理面临的挑战进行了探讨。     

信息结构与金融监管激励:理论与政策含义

金融监管的设计是为了纠正市场失灵、保护存款人和投资者的利益,然而信息不对称条件下,监管者的目标会偏离这一社会目标,导致监管者提供有效监管的激励不足和监管的低效率.基于这一认识,本文通过建立存款人与监管部门、监管当局与金融机构三方的监管博弈模型,对金融监管中的激励问题进行了分析.结果表明,不同的信息结构决定着不同的监管激励水平,从而直接影响着监管效率和社会福利水平.信息不对称程度愈大,监管激励水平愈低,监管效率也就愈低.中国当前金融监管中的主要问题也正是监管者及金融市场的透明度较低而缺乏监管激励所致.因而我国金融监管改革的关键不在于是否从宏观层面加强或放松金融监管,而在于如何通过监管当局及金融市场的信息透明度建设为微观监管主体提供有效监管的激励.     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.