开放条件下的R&D与比较优势的动态变化

文章探讨了比较优势实现动态变化的路径问题,并着重讨论专业化的研发投入(R&D)对比较实现动态变化的影响,认为绝对的研发效率是比较优势实现动态转化的条件.在此基础上,讨论了动态比较优势与福利增长之间的关系,结论表明,比较优势实现动态变化对于保证福利水平的长期增长来说是必不可少的.     

从世界经济发展中解析动态比较优势

本文从传统比较优势贸易理论出发,认为一个国家针对产业来说的比较优势是动态变化的,甚至是多层次的;针对落后发展中国家,怎样转化动态比较优势,实现产业结构升级,提升竞争优势,提出四条建议。     

比较优势、劳动力流动与产业转移

劳动力流动的新趋势反映了劳动力要素成本的比较优势在我国区域之间的动态转化,东部地区逐步丧失劳动力成本的比较优势,中西部地区劳动力要素禀赋的显性优势开始呈现。产业转移直接产生于比较优势的动态变化,顺应劳动力流动的新趋势,做好产业在区域间的转移和承接,才能转变依靠廉价劳动力的外向型经济增长方式,促使东部沿海地区进行产业升级,同时带动中西部地区工业化和城镇化进程,在保持我国低劳动力成本优势的基础上实现区域间协调发展。     

劳动力比较优势、贸易利益与经济增长——基于中国的数据

本文通过对1990-2004年我国显示性比较优势指数(IRCA)进行测算,并利用测算结果对传统的劳动力比较优势与经济增长之间的关系进行了经验研究,得出以下结论:第一,十五年间,我国在资源密集型产品上从比较优势已经转变为比较劣势,显示出我国在相当程度上存在资源匮乏的局面;在技术资本密集型产品上逐渐显现出一定的比较优势;劳动力密集型产品自始至终都是我国的比较优势,但是,已经开始呈现弱化的趋势。第二,简单劳动力的比较优势在长期经济增长中会在一定程度上导致贸易利益损失,也就是说,劳动力要素的福利会使经济增长出现恶化的趋势。我国要实现经济稳定增长和贸易增长方式的根本转变,必须要协调好利用劳动力比较优势和建立国民创新机制二者之间的关系。     

“共同富裕”成就的获得与失去：日韩福利—生产体制的比较研究

“共同富裕”概念在中国的提出，敦促现有研究采取兼顾分配与增长的理论视角。文章拓展了福利—生产体制理论，以技能作为联结分配与增长的重要概念。文章的核心论点是：社会保护体系培养的技能与企业产品市场战略需求的匹配，有助于经济体获得快速发展。经济体的收入分配格局不仅可能受到工资议价和技能培养经由初次分配渠道的影响，也可能受到家庭福利和社会福利具有的再分配功能的作用。文章通过对日本与韩国达成又远离共同富裕的理想状态的表现进行比较，检验和讨论了上述论点。基于此，文章从培养高级通用型技能人才、完善集体工资议价制度、改革职业教育办学体系、增强家庭福利和社会福利的供给等方面为中国实现共同富裕目标提供了启示。     

发挥我国产业静态比较优势与培育动态比较优势构想

我国的产业发展具有静态比较优势和动态比较优势。在知识经济条件下，发挥产业动态比较优势具有重要意义，因此应充分发挥静态比较优势，着力培育动态比较优势，以实现我国产业技术跨越的构想。     

比较福利模型的构建及其测量

与效用概念的福利相比,与历史同期、与其他类似情况相比较而增加的收入或减少的支出,即比较福利,更具有可接受性。在劳动报酬方面贯彻"同工同酬"原则、在消费支出方面遵循"同物同价"原则的假设下,构建了一个比较福利模型。通过比较福利模型的理论分析,可以得出重要结论:(1)比较福利能够相对真实地反映单位之间、行业之间、地区之间的福利差异,避免"被福利"现象;(2)比较福利可以激励单位努力提高员工福利,激励行业展开行业福利竞争,激励地区提高地域福利。使用浙江省相关统计数据进行比较福利测量,可以得出一些有意义的结论:(1)从整体上看,国有单位比集体单位、其他单位具有压倒性优势的福利,提升非国有单位的活力任重而道远;(2)从绝对数看,金融行业具有压倒性优势的福利,但福利增长最快的是卫生社会保障和社会福利业;(3)就浙江省来说,宁波具有最高的地域福利,杭州及温州的地域福利均不高,仅列全省第六、第七。     

基于自助式福利组合的知识型企业福利点数方法研究

本文以自助式福利与传统福利之比较为切入点，分析了自助式福利是福利的一种创新形式，认为基于自助式福利组合的福利点数方法是激励知识型员工的有效手段，能够实现多赢，本文构建了知识型企业福利点数方法设计模型，并对福利点数方法实施进行实例探讨。     

动态比较优势理论:一种新的模型解释

大多数发展中国家在工业化的过程中都面临着贸易自由化的压力。一般而言 ,这些国家在低技术产品部门上具有比较优势 ,而在高技术部门往往处于比较劣势。静态的比较优势原理已很难为多数发展中国家所接受。比较优势由低技术产品向高技术产品转化 ,也就是说 ,如何发挥在高技术部门的动态比较优势的问题 ,早已成为这些国家普遍关心的问题。本文建立了一个一般均衡下的内生比较优势模型 ,分析了在连续时间福利函数下 ,发展中国家通过产业政策干预可以在高技术部门获得动态比较优势 ,并对动态比较优势的概念和干预期限做了更为合理的界定。     

比较优势动态演化视角下的产业升级研究:内涵、动力和路径

产业升级是产业结构转换和产业效率提高的过程,也是经济发展过程中产业内部逐渐形成的不断适应产业发展环境变化、不断进行技术创新的能力培育过程。引起产业发展条件变化的因素,其实也就是引起比较优势动态变化的各种因素。比较优势是产业分工的基础,因而也与基于分工基础上的产业升级有着密切的关系。本文试图探索产业发展环境条件发生变化的情况下的产业升级问题,即以比较优势的动态演化为视角对产业升级的内涵和动力,对比较优势的长期影响因素进行研究,并以中国为例探索比较优势动态变化中产业升级的路径问题。     

外商直接投资、知识产权保护与发展中国家的社会福利--兼论发展中国家的引资战略

本文在一个由发达国家企业和发展中国家企业所构成的寡头垄断的产量竞争模型中 ,考察了在发达国家企业所进行的产品创新型R&D投资具有溢出效应的情况下 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的外商直接投资 (FDI)所产生的福利效果。本文发现 ,即使发展中国家拥有生产成本相对低廉的优势 ,发达国家企业对发展中国家的FDI也只有在溢出效应较小时才可能发生。但这种情况下的FDI也可能损害发展中国家的同类竞争企业 ,甚至损害发展中国家的社会福利。当然 ,以上结论并不意味着引进外资必然损害发展中国家的利益 ,外资引进对发展中国家所产生的福利效果 ,在很大程度上取决于FDI的性质 (产品市场的所在国 )、发展中国家成本优势的大小以及它对知识产权的保护力度等因素。     

Advantages of backwardness and forwardness with shifting comparative advantage

This paper develops a multi-sector endogenous innovation model that is able to account for the dynamics of comparative advantage of each sector within the economy. The model in this paper assumes that two kinds of learning effects exist in R&D: advantages of backwardness and forwardness. It is shown that if the economy is divided into advanced and backward sectors, in the latter sectors, the advantage of backwardness dominates, leading to cyclic repetition of comparative advantage. However, in the former sectors, the advantage of forwardness becomes more significant, so comparative advantage among these sectors stabilizes. Thus, the direction of learning spillovers has a critical effect on the dynamics of comparative advantage. Given this result, it is shown that only R&D policies for the marginal sector are effective in facilitating economic growth. If a decision is made to facilitate R&D investment within advanced sectors, R&D taxes, rather than subsidies, should be imposed on this marginal sector. Moreover, it is shown that trade liberalization does not affect the intrinsic dynamics of comparative advantage among surviving sectors in the economy if the locus of this marginal sector does not change significantly after trade liberalization.     

R&D and manufacturing production specialization in developed economies

A study of the relation between technology and manufacturing production specialization in a series of developed economies is performed by means of models relating indicators of revealed symmetric comparative advantage of value added and exports to similar measures of comparative performance of R&D expenditure, capital intensity, total factor productivity and wage costs. The production and R&D specialization are shown to be substantial and sticky. This contrasts with the evidence of a substantial degree of convergence in the patterns of the other variables. Regression estimates show that, although all variables play their part, the impact of comparative R&D efforts on production specialization is by far the strongest. This impact is found to be stronger in the smaller economies and it is especially important in research-intensive industries. The influence of comparative wages is, moreover, found to be positive here, suggesting the dominance of a labour skill and efficiency wage effect over a wage cost competitiveness effect. These findings are shown to conform quite well with the predictions of Schumpeterian theory and of certain contributions to ‘new trade theory’ that have stressed the importance of dynamic economies of scale.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.     

Welfare Measures in Dynamic Firm R&D Games

The present paper examines the welfare effects of a dynamic Research and Development (R&D) game at the firm level in a two-country, two-firm, intra-industry trade context. Economists do not use the trade balance as a measure of economic welfare, but it is often used in the public arena. The primary result of the paper is that the dynamic time path of social surplus and the trade balance do not track well together. This paper suggests that economists thinking about dynamic R&D games will have to defend imports as having a positive effect on social surplus regardless of trade balance effects.     

Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets

We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries.

We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers.     

Comparative Advantage and Economies of Scale: When Does Ricardo Dominate Smith?

This paper develops a two-country, two-sector (X and Y) model of international trade. One country has comparative advantage in the increasing returns Y-sector. The direction of trade depends on the relative size of the countries and the relative strength of economies of scale and comparative advantage. An equilibrium where the smallest country exports the Y-good and the largest country loses from trade is possible. A dynamic equilibrium where the X-sector is subject to learning by doing locks in the initial pattern of specialization. Yet, there may be few welfare gains from protecting the X-sector in the small country.     

Strategic policies and growth: an applied model of R&D-driven endogenous growth

We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer (1990) [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102] and Grossman and Helpman (1991) [Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge]. Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R&D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R&D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R&D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R&D, as well as to take greater advantage of global R&D spillovers. Here, we find significantly high growth effects together with sizable gains in social welfare at low incidence to tax payers.     

Multi-market interaction and decentralization of R&D decisions

In this paper, we analyse under what conditions it is profitable for a multi-divisional firm to encourage divisions to perform independent R&D, and when it is better to centralize R&D so that the level be chosen co-operatively. Under Bertrand competition, firms always centralize R&D decisions. Under Cournot competition, however, with divisions of the same firm producing substitute products, the strategic advantage of decentralizing R&D compensates the co-ordination loss when the degree of substitutability among the products is not too high; in all other cases (when products are very good substitutes or when divisions of the same firm produce complement goods) the pay-off to co-ordination is greater than the strategic advantage of decentralization. Social welfare is maximized when firms centralize R&D.     

Timing of innovation policies when carbon emissions are restricted: An applied general equilibrium analysis

This paper studies the timing of subsidies for emissions-saving research and development (R&D) and how innovation policy is influenced by a carbon tax. We develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with both general R&D and specific emissions-saving R&D. We find two results that are important when subsidizing emissions-saving R&D in order to target inefficiencies in the research markets. First, the welfare gain from subsidies is larger when the carbon tax is high. This is because a high carbon tax raises the social value of the emissions-saving technology and that this increase in value is not fully appropriated by the private firms. Secondly, the welfare gain is greater when there is a falling time profile of the rate of subsidies for emissions-saving R&D, rather than a constant or increasing profile. The reason is that knowledge spillovers are larger in early periods.