Marriage and employment participation with wage bargaining in search equilibrium

We build an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint decisions on home production and labour market participation and analyse the implications of our results for a frictional marriage market. A worker's bargaining position reflects their productivity, and the productivity and employment status of their spouse. People sometimes accept transitory jobs only to raise the spouse's long-term wages. Firms sometimes reduce turnover by unilaterally increasing a worker's wage, ensuring that the spouse stays at home.     

Search,Concave Production,and Optimal Firm Size

This paper demonstrates that in a free entry search and bargaining economy with concave production firms over-employ. Bargaining allows the worker's wage to depend upon marginal productivity. As such, with strictly concave production, the wage declines as firms employ more labor. Firms react to this declining wage function by choosing an inefficiently large number of workers. However, in equilibrium, fewer firms are likely to enter causing aggregate employment and vacancies to fall.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: J30, J41, J50.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES

This article extends a classic on‐the‐job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump‐shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical.     

OPTIMAL SEARCH FOR OVERTIME WORK1

A search problem frequently encountered by workers is one in which wage and normal hours elements of employment contracts are uniform across firms in an industry, but opportunities for overtime working vary. Under these circumstances workers, in general, will not be indifferent between alternative contracts and may wish to exercise utility-maximizing choice by searching out acceptable overtime opportunities. This paper discusses the nature of this decision problem, and the worker's response to various changes in the market environment.     

Economic migration and business cycles in a small open economy with matching frictions

With the free movement of labour in Europe, economic migration has become an important determinant of labour supply. Cyclical migration exceeds one percent of the population in many countries and affects (un)employment and wage setting. The main contribution of this paper is that it models migration as an endogenous decision in a search-and-matching framework, where labour market institutions play an important role. It shows that, contrary to typical beliefs, migration can amplify business cycles. After a positive shock to the economy, immigration increases the labour force and initially unemployment. The latter reduces a worker's outside option in wage negotiations, resulting in a lower wage increase than when there is no migration. With cheaper labour firms post more job vacancies, which increases the probability that unemployed workers find jobs and attracts new workers to immigrate. Attenuated response of wages and the stronger response of employment to shocks result in a flatter Phillips curve.     

Gift Exchange and the Business Cycle: The Fair Wage Strikes Back

We extend the benchmark real business cycle model amending technology for fair wage considerations. Effort depends on current, alternative, and past wages. Past wages are treated as the worker's past wages (personal norm) or as the past wages of the society (social norm). This last model reproduces the high variability of employment, the low variability of wages, and the low wage–employment correlation without requiring a second source of impulsions. Wages and employment dynamics are adequately captured when norms adjust slowly to the environment. Fair wages are thus useful to solve the business cycle puzzle when we allow for intertemporal wage comparisons. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E24     

A spillover‐based theory of credentialism

I propose a model in which credentials, such as diplomas, are instrumentally valuable to workers. The model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker's wage to their output. A worker's productivity is influenced by the skills of their co‐workers, where such skills arise from an ability‐augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co‐workers. Credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market, thereby allowing them to match with high‐skill co‐workers in equilibrium. Despite the positive externality associated with a worker's investment, I show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium.     

Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?

The aim of the paper is to determine the impact of severance payment on the motivation of the worker to make an effort, when there is a risk for him to be dismissed once his effort was made. We highlight through a two‐stage model the various factors which influence the dismissal decision by the firm and the worker's effort, such as the initial wage, the litigation costs and the relative bargaining powers of the parties when the relationship ends or goes on. In this context, we show that the impact of the severance payment paid ex post in case of dismissal on the level of effort chosen by the worker ex ante may depend on such characteristics.     

ADVERSE SELECTION,LEARNING, AND COMPETITIVE SEARCH

I develop a model that allows for an analysis of the effects of time on adverse selection in the presence of search frictions. I find that, as a firm takes longer to adjust a worker's contract in response to learning about his type, inefficient overwork during the time before wage adjustment (probation) decreases. This provides a rationale for an optimal (minimum) probation period of about one month in the baseline scenario. Optimal probation duration varies with the degree of search frictions, the cost of effort, the relative productivity of different types of workers, and minimum wage regulations.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

Reciprocity and matching frictions

The ability of search and matching models to replicate stylized facts—such as volatilities and correlations—has been a center of attraction over the last couple of years. This paper introduces the Akerlof (Q J Econ 97:543–569, 1982) fair wage approach into an endogenous separation search and matching model. Within a RBC general equilibrium context, we show that the efficiency wage model outperforms its benchmark Nash bargaining pendant. In particular, the model generates the empirically observed volatilities in response to a productivity shock and replicates a strong Beveridge curve. Furthermore, we derive the Solow condition in a search environment and discuss the interactions of search and efficiency wage frictions. We show that search frictions create a wedge between the optimal wage/effort solution in the search and the competitive equilibrium. The efficiency wage consideration adds an additional margin to the firm's decision problem. As effort varies over the cycle, it changes the firm's optimal response to exogenous disturbances and amplifies the response to shocks.     

Workfare in an efficiency wage model

The impacts of introducing work requirements for welfare recipients are studied in an efficiency wage model. If the workfare package is not mandatory, it will reduce employment, profits, and utility levels of employed and unemployed workers. In contrast, mandatory effort requirements will generally raise both employment and profits and reduce the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Changes of utility levels of employed and unemployed workers have the same sign as the variation in the net wage. The possibility of a Pareto improvement may explain the widespread support for welfare to work experiments.      

Role of psychological variables in the determination of the worker's wage: Further evidence from the United States

The current study examines the roles of three psychological variables, job satisfaction, positive attitude and self‐satisfaction, in the determination of the worker's wage. Using two samples from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths, 1979 (NLSY79), the study for the first time models a possible simultaneous relationship among these four variables and estimates these equations by an appropriate two‐stage procedure. Our results indicate that the worker's wage is positively related to these psychological variables. This finding has important policy implications and thus it calls for future research in this direction.     

A Keynesian model of search and labor market disequilibrium

The paper develops Keynesian employment dynamics in a search model with stochastic vacancy-availability playing the major role. A UV curve is derived from the search dynamics, and in effect represents a demand for searchers to maintain employment levels. The supply of searchers is determined from the real wage, the duration of the search necessary to locate a vacancy, and layoff probabilities. Persistent disequilibrium in the labor market is examined, and it is shown how a lowering of the real wage can increase employment and lower unemployment.     

DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.     

Human capital,reservation wages and job competition: Heckman's lambda re-interpreted

This study integrates insights from three theories into a single model explaining the simultaneous distribution of employment and wages. Human capital theory is taken as the general framework, whereas search theory and the more recent ‘crowding’ or ‘job competition’ hypothesis are used to explain selectivity in employment and the resulting bias in wage regressions. An empirical test on Belgian data, using a two-stage probit-OLS model, indicates that the crowding theory dominates the search hypothesis for men. For women, it seems to be outweighed by relatively higher reservation wages, probably due to women's different behaviour with respect to family responsibilities.     

DOUBLING U.S. EXPORTS UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION

President Obama's National Export Initiative (NEI) is targeted at doubling U.S. exports between 2010 and 2015. We apply USAGE to quantify what the NEI would need to do to foreign import‐demand curves and domestic export‐supply curves to achieve this target. USAGE is a dynamic economy‐wide model of the U.S. incorporating recession‐relevant factor market specifications including excess capacity and wage/labor‐demand elasticities that vary with the level of employment. In our central simulation, export‐promotion policies compatible with the President's target reduce the cost of the current recession from about 70 million 1‐year jobs for the period 2008–2020 to 45 million jobs. (JEL E17, C68, E62, E65, F16)     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS*

This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models.     

ENDOGENOUS HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND THE INTERACTION OF FRONTIER AND ADOPTIVE KNOWLEDGE ON GROWTH AND WAGE INEQUALITY

A three-sector, overlapping-generations growth model endogenizes the opportunity cost of human capital formation and the relative skill requirements of invention, innovation, and adoption of general-purpose technologies. As a result, the relative wage of skilled workers is a function of the endogenous ratio of total-to-adoptive knowledge (where the difference in knowledge stocks is frontier knowledge). Comparative statics are examined for the model's seven parameters. Simulations (representing a transition with phases to a more complex level of economic development) are presented for simultaneous exogenous shocks capable of matching (i) observed inverse movements of the relative wage and the detrended relative supply in the USA, (ii) the sharp slowing and recovering US multifactor productivity growth data since the 1970s, and (iii) a reconciliation of data used to support or deny skill-biased technological change as a major force driving up the relative wage since 1980.     

Career concerns and firm – sponsored general training

This article studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of workers' career concerns. The model builds on the argument that the provision of general training reduces the employer's monopsony power. In this context, it is shown that the worker's implicit incentives to provide effort increase with the level of acquired general skills. The employer takes this reciprocal effect into account and becomes more willing to invest in general human capital. When the positive effect of training on worker's effort incentives is strong enough, the equilibrium outcome may involve overinvestment relative to the first-best. It is also shown that a sharper increase in worker's power associated with additional training may either strengthen or weaken the employer's investment incentives and can have either beneficial or detrimental effects on welfare.