Stakeholder relations and the persistence of corporate financial performance

We examine the effect of a firm's relations with its nonfinancial stakeholders, including its employees, suppliers, customers, and communities, on the persistence of both superior and inferior financial performance. In particular, integrating and extending the resource‐based view of the firm and stakeholder management literatures, we develop the arguments that good stakeholder relations not only enable a firm with superior financial performance to sustain its competitive advantage for a longer period of time, but more importantly, also help poorly performing firms to recover from disadvantageous positions more quickly. The arguments are supported by the analysis of a series of first‐order autoregressive models. Our findings further suggest that the positive effect of good stakeholder relations on the persistence of superior performance is not as strong as that of some other firm resources, such as technological knowledge, but it is the only factor examined that promises to help a firm recover from inferior performance. Therefore, the role of positive stakeholder relations in helping poorly performing firms recover is found to be more critical than its role in helping superior firms sustain their performance advantage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives

Instrumental stakeholder theory proposes a positive relationship between fairness toward stakeholders and firm performance. Yet, some firms are successful with an arms‐length approach to stakeholder management, based on bargaining power rather than fairness. We address this puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all stakeholders care about fairness. Empirical evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology suggests that firms face a population of potential stakeholders that consists not only of so‐called ‘reciprocators,’ who do care about fairness, but also of self‐regarding stakeholders, who do not. We propose that a fairness approach is more effective in attracting, retaining, and motivating reciprocal stakeholders to create value, while an arms‐length approach is more effective in motivating self‐regarding stakeholders and in attracting and retaining self‐regarding stakeholders with high bargaining power. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do‐no‐harm versus do‐good social responsibility: Attributional thinking and the liability of foreignness

Research summary: The efforts of multinational corporations to be socially responsible do not always engender positive evaluations from overseas stakeholders. Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that two heuristics guide stakeholders in evaluating firms' social performance: foreignness and the valence of firms' social responsibility. We provide evidence from a field study of secondary stakeholders and an experimental study involving 129 non‐governmental organizations. Consistent with attribution theory, the liability of foreignness is minimized when firms engage in “do‐good” social responsibility (focused on proactive engagement creating positive externalities) but is substantial when firms engage in “do‐no‐harm” social responsibility (focused on attenuating negative externalities). In online supporting information, Appendix S1, we demonstrate that these evaluations have consequences for whether stakeholders subsequently cooperate, or sow conflict, with firms. Managerial summary: There is no guarantee that efforts to be socially responsible will improve multinational corporations' relations with overseas stakeholders, such as customers, governments, and activists. In a field study and an experiment, we unpack when foreign firms suffer from harsh stakeholder evaluations. Foreign firms especially suffer from harsh evaluations when they conduct “do‐no‐harm” CSR rather than “do‐good” CSR. Stakeholders attribute the motive for foreign firms' do‐no‐harm CSR to managerial interests and shareholder pressures, perceiving a wedge between managers and owners (who may be unmotivated to reduce the negative impacts of their business activities) and local stakeholders (who bear the social costs). A practical implication is that foreign firms gain more from highlighting do‐good rather than do‐(no)‐harm CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between corporate social responsibility and shareholder value: an empirical test of the risk management hypothesis

Do shareholders gain when managers disperse corporate resources through activities classified as corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Strategy scholars have recently developed a theoretical model that links such activities to shareholder value when a firm suffers a negative event; we test key portions of this theory of the ‘insurance‐like’ property of CSR activity. We posit that such activity leads to positive attributions from stakeholders, who then temper their negative judgments and sanctions toward firms because of this goodwill. We extend the risk management model by theorizing that some types of CSR activities will be more likely to create goodwill and offer insurance‐like protection than other types. We delineate several firm and event specific characteristics that we expect to influence the link between CSR activities and an insurance effect. We then test our model using an event study of 178 negative legal/regulatory actions against firms throughout the 11 years from 1993–2003. We find that participation in institutional CSR activities—those aimed at a firm's secondary stakeholders or society at large—provides an ‘insurance‐like’ benefit, while participation in technical CSRs—those activities targeting a firm's trading partners—yields no such benefits. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for future theorizing and research into the economic value of CSR engagement. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the duality of political and economic stakeholder influence on firm innovation performance: Theory and evidence from Chinese firms

Research Summary

In this study, we propose and test a multi‐stakeholder perspective to address variation in innovation performance across firms. Specifically, we analyze how a focal firm's innovation performance is shaped by its political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using a data set consisting of over 26,400 Chinese firms, we first find support for our predictions that a focal firm's innovation performance will be enhanced by both its government connections and the innovativeness of its economic stakeholders. We then analyze whether the interdependent effect of these political and economic stakeholders is more likely to be synergistic versus antagonistic, and find evidence consistent with the antagonistic view.

Managerial Summary

We show how a firm's innovativeness is influenced strongly by its relationships to external stakeholders. Specifically, we examine the potentially dual‐edged role of political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using extensive data on Chinese firms, we find: (a) that the higher the level of government connections, the greater a firm's innovativeness; (b) that firms located in proximity with more innovative economic stakeholders also tend to have higher innovation performance. We also look beyond these independent positive effects to examine the joint effect of these two forms of stakeholder influence, and here we see that more influence is not always better. Specifically, we find that the innovation benefit that typically accrues to firms in proximity to more innovative economic stakeholders is weakened when those firms also have higher‐level government connections.     

Social networking relationships,firm‐specific managerial experience and firm performance in a transition economy: A comparative analysis of family owned and nonfamily firms

The effect of social networking relationships, firm‐specific managerial experience, and their interactions on performance between family owned and nonfamily firms are studied. Using data from 106 organizations in Ghana, the findings show that family owned firms benefit more from networking relationships with bureaucratic officials than do nonfamily firms. However, nonfamily firms benefit more from networking relationships with community leaders and firm‐specific managerial experience than do family owned firms. Networking relationships with politicians impede performance for nonfamily firms. Nonfamily firms are better able than family owned firms to use their firm‐specific managerial experience to manage the resources and capabilities obtained from networking relationships with community leaders to create value. Moreover, firm‐specific managerial experience attenuates the detrimental effects of networking with politicians for both types of firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Do Social Media Affect Analyst Stock Recommendations? Evidence from S&P 500 Electric Power Companies' Twitter Accounts

Research summary : The importance of firm‐stakeholder relationships is gaining increasing attention. Although a theory of the drivers and consequences of stakeholder pressure has been developing, it focuses on pressures from organized stakeholders such as shareholders, NGOs, and activists, and does not incorporate the emerging possibility that individual voices may matter. By exploring corporate Twitter, which facilitates movement of individual stakeholders such as customers to a higher stakeholder class by providing them with a greater sense of power and urgency, we study the circumstances under which customer voices significantly affect analyst stock recommendations. We find that favorable reactions to firm‐initiated messages matter, directly or indirectly, depending on the messages' growth implications. Customer‐initiated negative messages have a significant impact only with high volume and formal institutions that support customer opinions. Managerial summary : Social media is increasingly used by firms for disclosing information and engaging stakeholders. Yet, we know little about whether and how social media usage matters. We show how corporate Twitter usage may influence analyst stock recommendations. Our interviews of securities analysts suggest that social media is not institutionalized yet, but increasingly used as a source of channel checks, especially for vibes, validations, and so on. Our analyses of corporate Twitter accounts show that both firm‐initiated and customer‐initiated tweets can have significant impact on analyst recommendations under certain conditions. For firm‐initiated tweets, the extent of retweets is an important factor, along with the content of tweets, in particular, growth implications. For customer‐initiated tweets, negative tweets matter, but only with high volume and regulatory structure that supports customer protection. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Looking good by doing good: The antecedents and consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief

Stakeholder theory suggests a relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP) because certain stakeholders reward certain types of CSR. This argument assumes that stakeholders attend to firms' CSR activities—an assumption that has yet to be examined. We fill this gap by extending stakeholder theory to the context of stakeholder attention to firm CSR and exploring the antecedents and consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief CSR. We test the resulting hypotheses on a sample of public companies that engaged in natural disaster relief efforts, finding that stakeholder attention partially mediated the relationship between disaster relief and CFP and that stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief was driven by the legitimacy, urgency, and enactment of disaster relief CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When is cash good or bad for firm performance?

Research summary: Cash can create shareholder value when used for adaptation to unfolding contingencies, but can also reduce value when appropriated by other stakeholders. We synthesize arguments from the behavioral theory of the firm, economic perspectives like agency theory, and the value‐creation versus value‐appropriation literatures to argue that the implications of cash for firm performance are context‐specific. Cash is more beneficial for firms operating in highly competitive, research‐intensive, or growth‐focused industries that are typical of contexts requiring adaptation in the face of uncertainties. Conversely, cash is more detrimental to performance in firms that are poorly governed, diversified, or opaque, as are typical of contexts where stakeholder conflicts, information asymmetries, or power imbalances can encourage value appropriation by other stakeholders. Managerial summary: Cash can create shareholder value when used for adaptation to unfolding contingencies, but can also reduce value when appropriated by other stakeholders. While cash‐rich firms have higher performance on average, with those in the 75th percentile having a market‐to‐book value 15 percent higher than those in the 25th percentile, we find that the performance benefits of cash depend on the context. Cash is more beneficial for firms operating in highly competitive, research‐intensive, or growth‐focused industries that are typical of contexts requiring adaptation in the face of uncertainties. Conversely, cash is more detrimental to performance in firms that are poorly governed, diversified, or opaque, as are typical of contexts where stakeholder conflicts, information asymmetries, or power imbalances can encourage value appropriation by other stakeholders. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing a model of reasoned risk‐taking: governance,the experience of principals and agents,and global strategy in high‐technology IPO firms

Research on the governance of risky ventures, like the initial public offerings (IPOs) of high‐technology firms, has focused primarily on the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance. While such an emphasis is clearly important, it does little to shed light on potential relationships between governance and the strategies pursued by risky firms, nor does it take into account the complementary role of key stakeholders in affecting those strategies. To partially remedy this deficit we integrate agency and behavioral perspectives to develop a theory of ‘reasoned risk‐taking,’ whereby the nature of risks undertaken is a consequence of the interaction of governance mechanisms and stakeholder characteristics. We demonstrate our theory by predicting when corporate governance should be associated with strategic risk‐seeking beyond a firm's technical core—as seen in the degree to which it has expanded internationally. Surprisingly, even though venture capitalists (VC) are risk specialists, we find that technology‐based IPO firms are less likely (i.e., a negative relationship) to have extensive global sales when they are backed by a VC. In support of our reasoned risk‐taking theoretical framework, we find that VCs are indeed risk‐seeking when VC backing is complemented by the international experience of their board appointees, top management team (TMT) members, or both. IPO firms with significant insider ownership are similarly global risk‐seekers, and those effects are strongest with an internationally seasoned board and TMT at the helm. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategy,human capital investments,business‐domain capabilities,and performance: a study in the global software services industry

Research summary : In knowledge‐based industries, continuous human capital investments are essential for firms to enhance capabilities and sustain competitive advantage. However, such investments present a dilemma for firms, because human resources are mobile. Using detailed project‐level operational, financial, and human capital data from a leading multinational firm in the global IT services industry, this study finds that deliberate investments in improving general human capital can help firms develop superior capabilities and maintain high profits. This paper identifies two types of capabilities essential for success in this industry—technological and business‐domain capabilities—and provides empirical evidence justifying such investments. Theoretical and practical implications of capability‐seeking general human capital investments are discussed. Managerial summary : The primary managerial implication of this research is that capability‐seeking investments in developing general human capital through strategic learning (training and internal certifications) can enhance firm performance. Although investing in general human capital is risky, the firm considered this a strategic necessity in order to thrive in the fast paced IT services industry. By leveraging general technological skills in combination with business‐domain knowledge to address customer's business problems firms can earn and sustain higher profits. Our study also demonstrates how a developing‐country firm responded to strong competitive challenge from global rivals possessing superior capabilities by upgrading the capabilities of its employees through internal development. In doing so the firm was able to narrow the capability gap vis‐à‐vis its foreign peers and expand its business globally. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder‐bargaining perspective

This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility‐maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market‐based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resolving a dilemma of signaling bankrupt‐firm emergence: A dynamic integrative view

Research summary : Predicting the emergence of bankrupt firms relying on firm signals involves a stigma‐related dilemma. On the one hand, bankrupt firms tend to send positive signals through restructuring to decouple themselves from the stigma of bankruptcy. On the other hand, the preexistence of the bankruptcy stigma may reduce the signaling effectiveness of firms' restructuring efforts, making the outcome prediction difficult. We address this dilemma by developing a dynamic integrative view to extend signaling theory, arguing that subsequent signals from key external stakeholders can effectively help evaluate bankrupt firms' quality and reduce the ambiguity in interpreting firms' restructuring signals. Using a sample of U.S. public bankrupt firms under Chapter 11 reorganization, we find evidence supporting the argument. Managerial summary : Applications of signaling theory to predict reorganization outcomes are in their infancy. The dynamic integrative framework developed in this study is useful in identifying different types of signals and predicting outcomes of firms in crisis. The results of this study can be useful for various decision makers to predict the turnaround potential of bankrupt firms. Our results show that an increase in alliance partners, institutional investors, and securities analysts following a bankrupt firm predicts the firm's reorganization outcome. Moreover, firms that are able to gain positive attention from key stakeholders will also gain positive interpretations of their strategic efforts. Signals from alliance partners and institutional investors amplify the signaling effect of a firm's de‐diversification effort in predicting its reorganization outcome. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Boards of Directors,Innovation, and Performance: An Exploration at Multiple Levels

This work reports on an investigation of the dynamics of governance over breakthrough innovation within Fortune 1000 firms. The primary research question investigates the boundary of agency theory within the firm. Using agency and stakeholder theoretic perspectives, the study tests the hypothesis that innovation will thrive in firms that combine a board of directors operating in accordance with a high agency theoretic focus in addition to an innovation governance board operating deeper within the firm that employs a strong stakeholder theoretic orientation in its behavior. The model is tested with data from 98 large firms. Results suggest that the relationship between board of directors' behavior and the firm's overall innovativeness is mediated by innovation decision‐making boards that (1) promote projects that are breakthrough in scope, (2) incorporate input of diverse constituencies within the firm, (3) exhibit patience with financial results, and (4) engage in frequent, informal interactions with project teams. Firms exhibiting high board of director agency orientation in combination with loyalty to mandate, patient financial capital disposition, inclusiveness, and project team interaction as described above for innovation governance board decision‐making prove to be the most innovative as measured by external indicators. For firm innovativeness, consolidated managerial power and behavior is frequently present at the upper levels of the firm, but must be broken down at deeper levels of the firm. This research offers implications to innovation decision‐makers as to how to proceed if the intent is to offer commercializably successful breakthrough innovations.     

An Attention‐Based View of Family Firm Adaptation to Discontinuous Technological Change: Exploring the Role of Family CEOs' Noneconomic Goals

Recent studies show that managerial attention is a particularly important precursor of established firms' responses to discontinuous technological change. However, little is known about the factors that shape managerial attention‐response patterns. Our qualitative study investigates how the attention of family firm chief executive officers (CEOs) to discontinuous technological shifts, the interpretation and decision‐making processes associated with these changes, and ultimately organizations' responses are affected by CEOs' noneconomic goals. Based on seven longitudinal case studies in the German consumer goods industry, the paper induces a process model that extends the findings of the literature on the attention‐based view and helps to explain heterogeneity in family firms' adaptation to discontinuous technological change. This study shows that the family CEO's specific noneconomic goals—such as power and control, transgenerational value, the maintenance of family reputation, the continuance of personal ties, or personal affect associated with the family business—determine whether the CEO assesses an emerging technology as relevant enough to warrant a reaction from the firm. Moreover, the family CEO's noneconomic goals constrain the set of considered responses. The outcome of this sensemaking process determines the organization's response. For instance, in the specific context of this study, the goal of “family power and control” entailed an immediate interpretation of the focal trend as important for maintaining influence, and resulted in an unconstrained set of responses and, ultimately, high innovation in the new domain. Over time, family CEOs might reevaluate the emerging trend based on their goals and adapt organizational moves accordingly. The paper identifies and discusses how ambiguities and dilemmas may arise during this process. Our findings contribute to the literature on adaptation to discontinuous technological change and to family firm research.     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholder Orientation and Acquisition Performance

Research summary : In this article, we study how a firm's stakeholder orientation affects the performance of its corporate acquisitions. We depart from prior literature and suggest that orientations toward employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities will affect long‐term acquisition performance both directly and through its interactions with process characteristics, such as preacquisition relatedness and postacquisition integration. Analyses of data on a sample of 1884 acquisitions show overall a positive association between acquirers' stakeholder orientation and acquisition performance. In addition, we find support for a positive moderation of business relatedness on the performance impacts of stakeholder orientation. Structural integration has a similarly positive moderation effect only for some of the stakeholder categories. Managerial summary : Does collaboration with stakeholders during an acquisition pay off in terms of performance? The results of this research show that it is worth engaging stakeholders during the M&A process, but that the efficacy of involvement practices may depend on the type of stakeholders and the characteristics of the acquisition. While acquiring firms that take account of suppliers and local communities consistently overperform in their acquisitions, the inclusion of employees might be not beneficial (and even harmful) when the target firm operates in a dissimilar business or when managers do not plan to maintain it as a separate entity. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing for stakeholders,stakeholder utility functions,and competitive advantage

A firm that manages for stakeholders allocates more resources to satisfy the needs and demands of its legitimate stakeholders than would be necessary to simply retain their willful participation in the firm's productive activities. We explain why this sort of behavior unlocks additional potential for value creation, as well as the conditions that either facilitate or disrupt the value‐creation process. Firms that manage for stakeholders develop trusting relationships with them based on principles of distributional, procedural, and interactional justice. Under these conditions, stakeholders are more likely to share nuanced information regarding their utility functions, thereby increasing the ability of the firm to allocate its resources to areas that will best satisfy them (thus increasing demand for business transactions with the firm). In addition, this information can spur innovation, as well as allow the firm to deal better with changes in the environment. Competitive advantages stemming from a managing‐for‐stakeholders approach are argued to be sustainable because they are associated with path dependence and causal ambiguity. These explanations provide a strong rationale for including stakeholder theory in the discussion of firm competitiveness and performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.