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1.
In this paper, CEOs are considered as ‘cognizers’ charged with integrating views in the top management team; a role which should require high cognitive complexity especially in diversified multinational corporations. A methodology for studying top managers' cognitive complexity is described and then applied to a sample of 26 CEOs. The CEOs' cognitive maps of the structure and of the dynamics of their industry are analyzed in terms of their degree of complexity, in relation to the breadth of the business portfolio of the firm, its geographic scope and the links the firm has with foreign parents. The results of this exploratory test generally confirm the principle of requisite cognitive complexity, and reveal a new set of more precise hypotheses linking particular dimensions of the scope of the firm with particular dimensions of CEOs' cognitive complexity. 相似文献
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Founders create their organizations, yet are often expected to eventually become liabilities to these same organizations. Past empirical research on the relationship between CEO founder status (i.e., is the CEO also the founder?) and firm performance has yielded inconsistent results. This study of 94 founder‐ and nonfounder‐managed firms finds that founder management has no main effect on stock returns over a 3‐year holding period, but that firm size and firm age moderate the CEO founder status–firm performance relationship. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Attention is increasingly focused on the potential individual career and firm‐level benefits of international experience for upper level executives. This research examines the relationships between CEO international experience, CEO tenure, firm internationalization, succession events, and corporate financial performance. Results indicate a significant interactive effect between CEO tenure and outside succession on CEO international experience. In addition to a relationship with CEO international experience, there are two additional interactive effects in the examination of corporate financial performance: (1) CEO international experience and the degree of firm internationalization, and (2) CEO international experience and CEO succession. These interactive effects are evident in accounting and market indicators of corporate financial performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Timothy J. Quigley Donald C. Hambrick Vilmos F. Misangyi G. Alessandra Rizzi 《战略管理杂志》2019,40(9):1453-1470
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Ayse Karaevli 《战略管理杂志》2007,28(7):681-706
This study seeks to reconcile inconsistent findings on the performance consequences of new CEO origin. Drawing on five decades of empirical research on CEO succession outcomes, I develop a more refined theoretical conceptualization and a finer‐grained measurement of the underlying construct of the insider vs. outsider CEO, and build and test a more comprehensive and nuanced framework of the succession context. A longitudinal investigation of the U.S. airline and chemical industries (1972–2002) indicates that new CEO ‘Outsiderness’, conceptualized as a continuum raging from new CEOs who have a greater combination of firm and industry tenure to those who have no experience in the firm and the industry, has no main effect on post‐succession firm performance. However, significant moderating effects are found when environmental munificence, pre‐succession firm performance, and concomitant strategic and senior executive team changes are considered. Together, these findings highlight the need to consider both pre‐ and post‐succession contextual factors for evaluating the performance effects of new CEO outsiderness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
6.
We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
7.
This paper builds and tests the thesis that CEO influence evolves differently for founders and agents. We theorize that at the beginning of their tenures, founder CEOs can pursue market expansion more aggressively than agent CEOs, because they take office with the combination of motivation, power, and requisite knowledge that agent CEOs build over time. Subsequently, however, founder CEOs have less access to the administrative infrastructure necessary to sustain a growing firm, making them less able than agent CEOs to continue market expansion mid‐tenure and more severely constrained by market complexity. A longitudinal study of cable television operators confirms that the firm's market expansion follows an inverted U‐shape for agents and a downward slope for founders, while market complexity reduces market expansion, especially for founders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Based on two research streams, we investigate whether acquiring firms’ form of control might be associated differently with CEO rewards or excess returns. We theoretically reason that in manager-controlled corporations acquisitions may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders and CEO rewards might be based on nonperformance criteria. In owner-manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms acquisitions may benefit the stockholders. While CEO rewards of owner-controlled firms may be based on performance criteria, however, executive rewards of owner-manager-controlled firms may be based on both performance and nonperformance factors. The findings indicate that for manager-controlled firms acquisition announcements result in negative excess returns to shareholders. For owner-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms such announcements result in positive excess returns. The findings also suggest that increases in corporate size due to acquisitions are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards of manager-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms. For owner-controlled firms, excess returns are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
10.
Chief executives must allocate their scarce time for scanning efforts among relevant domains of their firms' external environment and their firms' internal circumstances. We argue that high‐performing CEOs vary their relative scanning emphases on different domains according to the level of dynamism they perceive in their external environments. The concepts of dominant logic and sector importance were used to develop predictions about which external domains and which internal domains should receive relatively more or less scanning emphasis in external environments that, overall, are more dynamic or more stable. A field survey of 105 single‐business manufacturing firms evaluated CEOs' scanning emphases and firm performance. Results indicated that, for dynamic external environments, relatively more CEO attention to the task sectors of the external environment and to innovation‐related internal functions was associated with high performance. In stable external environments, however, simultaneously increased scanning of the general sectors in the external environment and efficiency‐related internal functions produced higher performance. These relationships were strongest between relative scanning emphases among domains and sales growth. We discuss the implications of these results for researchers and practitioners. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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While the direct influence of CEO tenure on firm performance has been examined in the strategy literature, the underlying channels of influence have remained largely unexplored. This article draws upon the career seasons paradigm, learning perspectives, and marketing literature to examine whether firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationships are the pathways through which CEO tenure influences firm performance. Results from the analysis of a large data set reveal that: (1) CEO tenure has a positive and linear association with firm‐employee relationship strength but an inverted U‐shaped association with firm‐customer relationship strength; (2) industry uncertainty intensifies these associations; and (3) firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationship strength mediate the effects of CEO tenure on firm performance. These findings have implications for a more balanced and nuanced view of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
13.
Despite widespread recognition of the importance of strategy–structure fit, e.g., diversification and divisionalization, research has yet to address the possibility of similar fit issues for other structural forms of organization, such as the choice of franchised vs. company‐owned governance structures. In this study, we depart from the usual debates regarding the superiority of one governance structure over another and argue that performance differences between these two alternative governance structures may be attributable more to the matching of one structure with a correspondingly appropriate strategy. Specifically, we posit that stores will act in fit‐enhancing ways by pursuing strategies that are more congruent with their governance structure; i.e., that franchised stores, with their more flexible and decentralized structures, will be more likely to pursue strategies that emphasize flexibility and local adaptation, whereas company‐owned stores will tend to pursue strategies that emphasize predictability and control. We also argue that those stores acting in such a manner will enjoy subsequent performance benefits. We develop these ideas around strategy/governance structure fit and test our hypotheses using longitudinal data from over 6000 stores within one of the biggest U.S. restaurant chains from 1991 to 1997. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
14.
This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
15.
Interpartner Fit and Its Performance Implications: A Four-Case Study of U.S.-China Joint Ventures 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
In previous research on international joint ventures, a commonly accepted conceptualization and operationalization of interpartner fit is lacking. As a result, empirical studies have either failed to confirm theoretical predictions or produced inconsistent findings that are difficult to reconcile. Using a multiple-case method, this study developed a model in which interpartner fit is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct consisting of the compatibility between the partners strategic objectives, contribution and joint management of critical resources, consensus on the venture's operating culture and strategy, and structure of relative bargaining power and control over the venture's operation. The longitudinal case studies demonstrated the relationship between interpartner fit and joint venture performance and also revealed the rich dynamics and changes in interpartner fit'misfit over time. 相似文献
16.
We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20‐year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low‐, medium‐, and high‐discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner‐controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager‐controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
18.
We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
19.
A recent study by Fitza argued that the prior estimates of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) effect are conflated with events outside the CEO's control, are largely the result of random chance, and that the true CEO effect is smaller than has been previously estimated. We suggest that the empirical methodology employed by Fitza to support these claims substantially overstates the “random chance” element of the CEO effect. We replicate Fitza's findings, highlight methodological issues, offer alternative conclusions, and using multilevel modeling (MLM), suggest that his analyses mischaracterize the CEO effect. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
20.
Zeki Simsek 《战略管理杂志》2007,28(6):653-662
While CEO job tenure is seen as influencing firm performance, the intervening mechanisms that govern this influence have remained largely unexplored. Given that individuals in the firm most closely influenced by the CEO are members of the top management team (TMT), we focus on the CEO‐TMT interface as one important intervening mechanism. Specifically, our tested model suggests that CEO tenure indirectly influences performance through its direct influences on TMT risk‐taking propensity and the firm's pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives. Results from structural equation modeling are consistent with this model and support its associated hypotheses. In the discussion, we trace the implications of our study for research and practice. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献