Exclusivity in licensing alliances: using hostages to support technology commercialization

We examine why exclusivity provisions are used in licensing alliances, and when restrictions in licensing scope (e.g., by product or geography) accompany these exclusivity provisions. We find broad support for the proposition that these features are associated with the contractual challenges of allying with licensees when they contribute valuable complementary capabilities toward the commercialization of licensed technologies. Evidence from our data suggests that exclusivity is used as a contractual hostage to safeguard licensee investments in complementary assets and to enable contracting over early stage technologies. Scope restrictions are employed to balance the tradeoffs between the value creation made possible by licensee complementary capabilities and the transactional hazards entailed in working exclusively with licensees. Our results also suggest that scope restrictions and other formal safeguards may be substitute mechanisms for managing similar transactional concerns in licensing alliances. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human‐capital‐intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from M&A legal advisors

Research summary: We examine how human‐capital‐intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm‐specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro‐data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains, while “stretching” lawyers with high firm‐specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm‐specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority‐based rent‐sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary: The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects, and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms, we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a trade‐off between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Grantbacks,territorial restraints,and innovation

We analyse the effect of grantback clauses in licensing contracts. While competition authorities fear that grantback clauses might decrease the licensee's ex post incentives to innovate, a standard defence is that grantback clauses are required for the patent-owner to agree to license its technology in the first place. We examine the validity of this “but for” defence and the equilibrium effect of grantback clauses on the innovation incentives of the licensee for both non-severable and severable innovations, which roughly correspond to infringing and non-infringing innovations. We show that grantback clauses do not increase the patent-holder's incentives to license when non-severable innovations are at stake but they do when severable innovations are concerned – suggesting that the “but for” defence might be valid for severable innovations but not for non-severable ones, in direct contradiction to regulation in some jurisdictions. Moreover we show that, for severable innovations, grantback clauses can increase the range of parameters for which follow-on innovation by the licensee occurs. Our work extends the large literature on sequential innovation to an environment where information diffuses through licensing rather than through the mere act of patenting. In this different informational set up we show that Green and Scotchmer (1995)’s conclusion that the initial innovator should have a patent of infinite breadth no longer holds.     

The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing

The licensing of technology entails a trade‐off: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology, changes such a trade‐off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U‐shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology‐specific product differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up

Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non‐discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard‐conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non‐discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold‐up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.     

Engaging the inventor: exploring licensing strategies for university inventions and the role of latent knowledge

A significant portion of knowledge generated by university inventors remains latent (uncodified but codifiable), even though this information is valuable to firms that have licensed their inventions and famously strong incentives exist to disseminate academic findings widely. However, the licensee may access and exploit this latent knowledge by engaging the inventor during the development phase. This paper examines the hypothesis that licensing strategies that directly engage the inventor increase the likelihood and degree of commercialization success. While this may seem somewhat apparent, firms in the sample under investigation vary substantially in the degree to which they engage the inventor: one third of the sample does not engage the inventor at all. On the other hand, the hypothesis might seem surprising given the norms of open science under which university labs are expected to operate. Regression analyses based on a unique dataset of 124 license agreements associated with inventions from MIT support the hypothesis and generate results that are robust to a variety of controls. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining post‐IPO venture performance through a knowledge‐based view typology

We extend the knowledge‐based view with a new typology and its application to post‐IPO firm performance. The typology categorizes knowledge development activity along the dimensions of familiarity (whether the firm has experience with the knowledge or it is new) and source (whether the firm creates it independently or with partners). We use this typology to determine direct and interaction effects of knowledge development activity on survival, RoA, and Tobin's q of newly public firms. Using a sample of 1,056 high‐technology manufacturing IPOs in 1990–2005, we find that focused, internal knowledge development correlates with higher performance. We also find a positive interaction effect in combining focused, internal and diversifying, alliance‐based knowledge development, and a negative interaction effect in combining diversifying, internal and alliance‐based knowledge development. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO incentives,innovation, and performance in technology‐intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior‐based incentive schemes

Building on the agency view of corporate governance, we propose that technology‐intensive firms use both outcome and behavior‐based performance criteria for rewarding CEOs. Using a sample of 206 firms from 12 U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that as technological intensity increases CEO bonuses are more closely linked to financial results and that total CEO incentives are associated with two indicators of desirable innovation behaviors: invention resonance and science harvesting. Invention resonance refers to the impact a firm's inventions have on other firms' inventions, while science harvesting reflects a firm's commitment to scientific research. As technological intensity increases, aligning bonus with financial results, total incentives with invention resonance, and total incentives with science harvesting predict firm market performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dynamic policy license for flexible spectrum management

Electromagnetic spectrum for wireless communications is fully allocated by regulatory authorities, but this does not mean that it is fully utilized. Demand for greater capacity and new services requires new regulatory and technical models for spectrum sharing. This paper develops a regulatory model denoted the dynamic policy license. The dynamic policy license combines the assurances to licensees that come from holding a fixed license while maintaining regulatory flexibility. A dynamic policy license is similar to a traditional spectrum license that specifies a bandwidth, power, center frequency, location, and other parameters. However, one or more of these parameters is subject to change by the regulator over time. The allowed changes are restricted by the license to provide assurances and predictability to the licensee. The opportunities and challenges that this presents to both regulators and licensees is described. For instance, the dynamic policy license can be a regulatory tool for more aggressive spectrum sharing.     

Cross‐border acquisitions and the asymmetric effect of power distance value difference on long‐term post‐acquisition performance

Research summary : Inconclusive findings about the effect of national cultural differences on post‐acquisition performance may be created by the failure to distinguish among the different cultural dimensions and the asymmetry of cultural differences. To demonstrate a different approach, this study focuses on one dimension of national cultural values—power distance value (PDV) and develops a framework for the asymmetric effect of PDV differences in creating two types of conflicts. The analysis of 2,115 cross‐border acquisitions in the global information technology industry shows that PDV differences undermine the long‐term post‐acquisition performance of acquirers. This effect is stronger when acquirers are higher than targets in PDV than when the opposite is the case. This asymmetric effect of PDV difference depends on national status difference, business relatedness, and acquisition experience. Managerial summary: National cultural differences can create “cultural clashes” to undermine the value creation by cross‐border acquisitions. During integration, individuals react to the acquirer–target hierarchy according to their respective power distance value (PDV): the extent to which they value equality (low PDV) or hierarchy (high PDV). PDV divergence results in two types of conflicts, depending on whether acquirers are higher or lower than targets in PDV. The two types of conflicts vary in the magnitude of their harmful effect on post‐acquisition performance. Both types of conflicts are more detrimental when acquirers are higher than targets in country status and when individuals need to interact more intensely. Acquisition experience can both help and harm post‐acquisition performance. These findings offer important implications for managing cross‐border acquisitions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Parent hostility and spin‐out performance

Prior research has focused on the performance implications of positive or neutral parent‐child relationships, but neglected negative, conflict‐laden relationships. This study explores from an embeddedness perspective whether parent hostility (degree to which an incumbent firm disapproves of the spawning of a spin‐out from within its ranks) affects spin‐out performance and how spin‐outs can effectively react to it. Analyses of 144 technology spin‐outs support our arguments that spin‐outs suffer negative consequences from hostility. These are less severe, however, if the spin‐out pursues effective network development. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Home Safe: No‐Trade Clauses and Player Salaries in Major League Baseball

In this study, we examine the wage effects of no‐trade clauses in Major League Baseball. Using an accepted player salary equation and data from the 2003–2008 seasons, we find evidence that there is a trade‐off between monetary compensation and the risk reduction provided by a no‐trade clause. The results suggest that players may be able to simultaneously negotiate for a no‐trade clause and higher salaries, but this is constrained when players also seek to guarantee their income stream with long‐term contracts.     

Problem‐formulation and problem‐solving in self‐organized communities: How modes of communication shape project behaviors in the free open‐source software community

Research summary: Building on the problem‐solving perspective, we study behaviors related to projects and the communication‐based antecedents of such behaviors in the free open‐source software (FOSS) community. We examine two kinds of problem/project‐behaviors: Individuals can set up projects around the formulation of new problems or join existing projects and define and/or work on subproblems within an existing problem. The choice between these two behaviors is influenced by the mode of communication. A communication mode with little a priori structure is the best mode for communicating about new problems (i.e., formulating a problem); empirically, it is associated with project launching behaviors. In contrast, more structured communication fits subproblems better and is related to project joining behaviors. Our hypotheses derive support from data from the FOSS community. Managerial summary: We study how the way in which individuals communicate influence the project‐behaviors they engage in. We find that relatively unstructured communication is associated with the setting up new projects, while communication that is structured around an artifact is associated with joining projects. Our findings hold implications for understanding how management may influence project behaviors and problem‐solving: Firms that need to concentrate on more incremental problem‐solving efforts (e.g., because a sufficient number of attractive problems have already been defined) should create environments in which interaction is undertaken mainly via artifacts. On the other hand, if firms seek to generate new problems (e.g., new strategic opportunities), they should create environments in which open‐ended, verbal conversation is relatively more important than artifact‐based communication. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imperfect Patent Protection and Innovation

The paper studies the effect of strengthening protection on R&D incentives in the context of process innovation. It shows that for non‐drastic innovations, that do not render the pre‐existing technology obsolete, the innovator might favor imitation if the expected royalty rate determined by the court is sufficiently high. Since imitation is discouraged for very high levels of patent protection, R&D investment is maximized for an intermediate level of patent strength. This finding provides a theoretical explanation for emerging empirical evidence questioning the effectiveness of strengthening protection on innovation incentives. It also serves as a justification for the imperfections of the existing patent system that allows for some infringement.     

THE EFFECT OF MOST‐FAVORED CUSTOMER CLAUSES ON PRICES*

We study the effects of introducing a Most‐Favored Customer (MFC) clause on price competition among major consumer electronics retailers. Our data spans the periods before and after the introduction of an MFC clause by Best Buy, which occurred between April 1, 2003 and March 31, 2004. After controlling for various factors (including product life‐cycle and seasonality effects), we find that, on average, Best Buy lowered its prices by 1.6% after introducing the MFC clause. Its competitors responded by cutting prices further: Buy.com by 3.5%, Circuit City by 2.2%, CompUSA by 3.2%, and Sears by 0.4%. We conclude that Best Buy's MFC adoption reduced prices.     

Screening and signalling for technology licensing: a comparison

This article studies, in an adverse selection set‐up, how a patentee licenses a new technology in a two‐period context where the licensee has private information on its marginal cost of production. Two different ways of licensing are considered: the patentee offers, in the first period, either a menu of contracts that screens the different types of licensee or a single contract that obliges the licensee to signal its true type. Of these two contracts, the better for the patentee depends on the probability of the innovation gives rise to a low marginal cost and the difference between the high and low cost. Findings explain, to some degree, the variety of licensing contracts observed in practice (some including only a fixed fee, and others including both a royalty and a fixed fee). This variety may be rationalised by the use of different devices (signalling or screening) aimed at alleviating the effects of opportunism. A welfare comparison of the two means for extracting hidden information from the licensee is also made.     

The Effects of Non‐Expensed Employee Stock Bonus on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese High‐Tech Firms

The choice of whether to expense broad‐based stock incentives has been a highly controversial debate in both academic research and practice circles. We provide insightful findings to reconcile certain debates regarding the effectiveness of non‐expensed, broad‐based stock incentives. Using a unique longitudinal dataset from Taiwanese high‐tech firms over the 1997–2008 period, our results indicate that non‐expensed employee stock bonus incentives exerted positive effects on short‐term organizational value added creation. The dilution effects of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan, however, exerted a negative influence on profitability and eroded share return. The negative effects were even more severe in the following year, and overexploitation of employee stock bonus also damaged the long‐term organizational performance of Taiwanese high‐tech firms. This negative aspect of non‐expensed employee stock incentives resulted in more evidence for changing the regulatory context of broad‐based stock incentives in Taiwan.     

Time‐use and well‐being impacts of travel‐to‐work and travel‐for‐work

This article contributes to our understanding of the complex patterns of travel‐to‐work and travel‐for‐work which increasingly characterise highly skilled employment, using 2015 data from a UK Midlands study comprising an online survey and follow‐up interviews. Travel‐to‐work essentially lengthens the working day, and is difficult to use productively, especially when commuting by car. Travel‐for‐work, by contrast, results in intense schedules especially when requiring overnight stays. Ownership of travel‐for‐work is ambiguous: it is employer driven, and travel time is often spent productively using mobile technologies, but is rarely rewarded with TOIL. While general dissatisfaction is reported with the commute, negative effects of travel‐for‐work (family, health, reduced leisure time) are mediated by positive impacts including experience of new working cultures, and infrequency of travel. Four factors appear central to the differing well‐being impacts: (1) frequency of travel; (2) ability to plan travel; (3) productive use of travel time, and; (4) reciprocal benefits of travel.     

Are incentives without expertise sufficient? Evidence from fortune 500 firms

Agency theory predicts that incentives will align agents' interests with those of principals. However, the resource‐based view suggests that to be effective, the incentive to deliver must be paired with the ability to deliver. Using Fortune 500 boards as an empirical context, this study shows that the presence of directors who lack top‐level experience but own large shareholdings is negatively associated with firm value, an effect that increases in the number of such directors. Firm value rises after such directors depart from boards, with the greatest increases occurring when many of these directors leave. While agency theory highlights the importance of the right incentives being in place, this research suggests that this can be ineffective if the right resources are not also in place. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.