What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?

When boards hire CEOs, the board and successor CEO have an opportunity to redesign the predecessor's compensation contract. The CEO's relative bargaining power will influence the outcome of compensation negotiations. Analyzing 508 successions, we find that total compensation of successor CEOs increases by 69% over their predecessor, but the structure of successor compensation is heavily influenced by the predecessors’ contracts. When the board's bargaining power is large, successors have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of salary. When the CEO's bargaining power is large, there is a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk and relatively greater proportion of salary.     

What Determines Demographic Similarity Between Incumbent CEOs and Their Successors? A CEO Informal Power Perspective

As CEOs reach the end of their tenure, they attempt to influence the decision about who will replace them in order to safeguard what they have put in place. This prompts them to favor candidates who share similar demographic profiles whom they believe will carry on where they leave off. We suggest that as CEOs are not usually given the authority to name a successor, they make use of informal power to exert their influence. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 137 CEO successions in 67 German diversified companies between 1985 and 2007 and find strong support for our theoretical reasoning that the more informal power incumbent CEOs have, the greater the demographic similarity between them and their successors. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Value of CEO Mobility: Contextual Factors That Shape the Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Market Performance and CEO Compensation

This study examines the value that prior CEO experience has for the companies that hire such CEOs—as reflected in the firms’ subsequent market‐based performance—as well as its value for the CEO that possesses this experience—as reflected in his or her initial compensation. While we suggest that shareholders tend not to benefit from firms hiring experienced CEOs, we also argue that particular firm and industry contextual factors that shaped the prior CEO experience help ameliorate this detrimental effect. Regardless, we also suggest that prior CEO experience generally stands to benefit the CEOs, in that it brings them a compensation premium over those CEOs without such prior experience. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 654 US CEO succession events that occurred between 2001 and 2004 and found broad support for our hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research as well as what they mean for firms hiring experienced CEOs and for CEO careers more generally. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

To get the best new CEO,must the old CEO go? Power distribution in external CEO successions

When chief executive officers (CEOs) are replaced by external successors, they frequently retain high levels of power. We found that outgoing CEOs' announced post‐succession involvement is negatively related to their successors' power. Additionally, we found that the magnitude of the stock market reaction to succession announcements is greater when the outgoing CEOs are allowed to continue to retain significant influence, and diminished when the new CEOs are awarded significant position power when they become CEO. These results suggest that to improve long‐term performance, companies should keep outgoing CEOs around and not grant new CEOs too much power. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of CEO incentives on deviations from institutional norms in foreign market expansion decisions: Behavioral agency and cross-border acquisitions

CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars. We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrating that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives. We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in 4,184 cross-border acquisitions.     

The blind power: Power-led CEO overconfidence and M&A decision making

The behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident. We also show that power-led overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of economic circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make diversifying acquisitions, relative to non-overconfident CEOs. The results suggest that the findings of previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs could be driven by power-led overconfident CEOs.     

Dealing with celebrity and accountability in the top job

Today, human resource executives assume prominent leadership roles in their firms and play important roles in the strategy process. Along with the expansion and evolution of the HR function, the responsibilities of coordination, control, and accountability for organizations and their leaders, particularly the CEO, remain. Forming strong relationships with CEOs thus is viewed as one way to encourage HR's prominence in the firm's overall success, particularly its financial health. In recent years, CEOs' presence in the mass media has surged as well, with some CEOs achieving celebrity status. Celebrity status has the potential to increase CEO discretion, decrease CEO accountability, and expand firm resources. As such, achieving celebrity status can affect the relationship between CEOs and HR executives in regard to accountability. In this article, we discuss accountability as a key job demand and address some of the complexities and dynamics of CEO accountability. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency

We examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on labor investment efficiency (LIE). The findings suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have lower LIE. The findings are robust to alternative measures of CEO overconfidence and LIE and after accounting for endogeneity and CEO experience, age, managerial ability, high tech industry, and economic recession. Further analysis shows that: i) our findings are not due to the relation between net hiring and contemporaneous non-labor investments and the difference between high- and low-skilled labor, ii) firms with more analyst following, financially constrained firms, and firms located in states with wrongful discharge laws force CEOs to invest more efficiently in labor. In contrast, firms with dominant CEOs or facing high economic policy uncertainty are less efficient in labor investments, iii) firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than those of non-overconfident CEOs, and iv) a lower LIE caused by CEO overconfidence has negative impacts on a firm's future profitability.     

Contextual Influences on Executive Selection: Firm Characteristics and CEO Experience

This study examines the relationship between antecedent organizational characteristics and the pre-succession experience of individuals chosen as chief executive officer (CEO) – relationships that have received limited attention in past research. A sample of 214 CEO selection decisions was used to test hypothesized relationships between the firm characteristics of size, performance, growth, advertising intensity, risk and individual attributes pertaining to the experience of selected CEOs. Results indicate the following relationships: pre-succession profitability, size and advertising intensity are associated with the chosen executives' organizational tenure levels; pre-succession firm size and risk are associated with the age of selected CEOs; and, pre-succession profitability and advertising intensity are associated with type of functional background experience. Findings provide new insights into the relative importance of pre-succession experience associated with different organizational contexts in CEO selection decisions.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Ceo Locus of Control and Small Firm Performance: an Integrative Framework and Empirical Test*

Previous research on the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) locus of control is mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control and organizational outcomes. In addition, distinct substreams have emerged in which intricately related phenomena are studied separately. to overcome this fragmentation and polarization, we provide and empirically test an integrative framework based on previously tested hypotheses on the impact of CEO locus of control. Our approach differs from prior research in two ways. First, it simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and organizational performance. Second, we consider the CEO to be both a formulator and implementor of organizational strategies. Besides the observation that CEO locus of control seems to matter a lot in terms of explaining organizational performance in the present sample, our results demonstrate that an integrative approach increases our insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by revealing why some CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others.     

CEO compensation structure following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns

To motivate managers to pursue shareholder interests, boards may design management compensation packages to reward managers for good firm performance. However, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that when CEOs are far from retirement, they have career concerns. In these cases, Gibbons and Murphy argue that it may not be optimal for their current compensation to be too dependent on firm performance. Testing this proposition, we find that abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of performance-based pay of newly hired CEOs when companies announce CEO successions. Since these newly hired CEOs are likely some distance from retirement, we interpret these results as being consistent with Gibbons and Murphy; it may be better to allow newly hired CEOs to be paid in human capital increases from the managerial labor market than to have their current pay too closely related to performance.     

Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential managerial entrenchment. Additionally, CEOs of firms with governance provisions that offer them protection from takeovers enjoy more generous pay. We also examine the change in CEO compensation relative to the change in shareholders' wealth. The evidence shows that when there is an increase in shareholders' wealth, the CEO is able to obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. On the contrary, when shareholders' wealth falls, there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Given the empirical evidence, we argue that CEO compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting.     

CEO succession with gender change in troubled companies: The effect of a new woman CEO on firm risk and firm risk perceived

The replacement of the CEO is one of the first actions a troubled company may take to recover from a critical situation. In this paper, we analyze the change in firm risk and firm risk perception when women are replacing men as CEOs of troubled companies. The analyses are based on a comprehensive dataset covering all registered companies in Norway from 2005 to 2014. We argue that a new woman CEOs increase the chances of improving the risk situation of troubled companies. Building on CEO succession and social identity theories, we study the firm risk situation under the lenses of risk perception and firm risk, and we find that a newly appointed woman CEO, following a man, tend to decrease the level of risk of the company. Furthermore, we find counterbalancing effects on these changes given the moderation effect of women on the board.     

Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity,Monitoring Complexity,and CEO Pay‐for‐Performance Sensitivity

We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board‐chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome‐based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large‐, medium‐, and small‐cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock‐based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome‐based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends

It is a common belief that CEOs must delegate to be successful. We hesitate to support this generalization and investigate how the distribution of responsibility within top management teams (TMTs) can influence the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Consistent with an agency theory perspective, our results indicate that CEOs may choose not to delegate their responsibilities to other executive TMT members, so as to benefit from an increased information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the board of directors. Taking the resource‐based view as a complementary theoretical perspective, we find that non‐delegating CEOs benefit from their greater firm‐specific knowledge, which the board of directors considers as a valuable resource that should be retained. Our work also demonstrates that a more intense CEO–TMT interaction weakens the relation between non‐delegation and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In sum, our research shows that the CEO’s delegation decision does not necessarily lead to a competence distribution that is in the firm's best interest; rather, it reflects a complex interplay between the potentially opportunistic career interests of the CEO, the involvement of other TMT members and the board of directors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Personality in context: effective traits for expatriate managers at different levels

The purpose of this article is to assess how management level as a contextual factor interacts with personal characteristics in predicting expatriate performance. In particular, we focused on proactive personality (the individual’s disposition to change the organizational environment) and self-control (the individual’s disposition to change oneself to fit the organizational environment). Surveying 307 business expatriate managers in China, we hypothesized that in relation to work outcomes, the effect of proactive personality would be stronger for CEOs while the effect of self-control would be stronger for non-CEOs. We found both proactive personality and self-control to have favorable effects on our performance indicators: job performance, effectiveness, and time to proficiency. In line with our prediction, we also found the effect of proactive personality on job performance to be stronger for CEO expatriates while the effect of self-control on performance was stronger for non-CEO expatriate managers.     

Pay for Talk: How the Use of Shareholder‐Value Language Affects CEO Compensation

The language that signals conformity to a prevailing norm can contribute to the appearance of managerial competency and organizational legitimacy. We argue that top corporate managers’ use of language that is congruent with a prevailing norm leads the boards of directors to evaluate the managers more favourably and to grant a higher level of compensation. We test this argument by analysing the letters to shareholders from 334 US firms and examine the CEOs’ expression of the shareholder value principle, which is a prevailing model of corporate governance in the USA. We found that the use of shareholder‐value language is significantly related to a higher level of CEO compensation and that the effect of shareholder‐value language is greater when shareholder activism is stronger.     

Strategic HRM as process: how HR system and organizational climate strength influence Chinese employee attitudes

In contrast to the high-performance work systems literature that focuses on HR practices, we follow Bowen and Ostroff in examining human resource management (HRM) processes, specifically the strength of an HR system (its distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus) and its contribution to the organizational climate (employees' shared perceptions of the HR system). Based on 810 employees within 64 units in three Chinese hotels, we examine how employee perceptions of HRM system strength and organizational climate are associated with employees' work satisfaction, vigor, and intention to quit. The distinctiveness of an HRM system was found to be related to the three employee work attitudes, and high climate strength increases both the positive relationship between consensus and work satisfaction, and the negative relationship between consensus and intention to quit. We draw on aspects of Chinese society to interpret these findings. Several important research and HR practice implications are highlighted and discussed.