城市开发问题的博弈分析

城市开发活动是开发企业与开发企业、开发企业与行政机构的互动行为 ,而城市开发行为的最优选择也是在各类投资主体之间的互动博弈中形成的。先行投资困境、优势区位问题、行政介入问题和可持续开发问题 ,都反映了投资主体博弈的特定后果。从博弈论的角度来思考 ,我们能对城市开发问题的实质内涵有更为深刻的理解。     

Multiple pay contingencies: Strategic design of compensation

Employment compensation has been a frequent target of change efforts in recent years, resulting in an abundance of proposals for so called non-traditional pay plans. This article reviews traditional and non-traditional plans, recognizing that they offer opportunities to complement and reinforce changes in organizations' strategic orientations and management practices.     

Modeling collective adaptive agent design and its analysis in Barnga game

This paper explores the collective adaptive agent that adapts to a group in contrast with the individual adaptive agent that adapts to a single user. For this purpose, this paper starts by defining the collective adaptive situation through an analysis of the subject experiments in the playing card game, Barnga, and investigates the factors that lead the group to the collective adaptive situation. Intensive simulations using Barnga agents have revealed the following implications: (1) the leader who takes account of other players’ opinions contributes to guide players to the collective adaptation situation, and (2) an appropriate role balance among players (i.e., the leader, the claiming and quiet players, which make the most and least number of corrections of the leader’s decision) is required to derive the collective adaptive situation.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note

In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper: delegating the production and R&D decisions to managers is never beneficial for the owners of the firm. When we tried to understand the driving forces of this result, we found however that the findings of Zhang and Zhang (1997) are incorrect. We explain why their derivations are wrong and demonstrate via counterexamples that the main propositions in their paper do not hold. In addition, we show how the correct solution of this R&D model with spillovers can be obtained. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regional business development policy in Central and Eastern Europe: a mechanism design perspective

This paper explains one aspect of the challenges faced by regional development policy in Central and Eastern Europe. At issue is a policy for the development and expansion of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The causes and dynamics of difficulties with SME development policies are analyzed in a mechanism design/game theory framework, in which “policy failure” arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. The model results deliver a cautionary note: that indiscriminate application of market criteria may be counterproductive in an environment characterized by severe constraints on material wealth accumulation.     

配送中心拣选策略仿真研究

以某大型超市配送中心为原型,利用仿真软件Flexsim对不同的拣选策略,建立了三个拣选系统仿真模型,并通过运行模型对应用结果进行整理,对拣选系统的拣选能力进行了分析,从而达到了对拣选策略仿真研究之目的。     

Rebates in a Bertrand game

We study a price competition game in which customers are heterogeneous in the rebates they get from either of two firms. We characterize the transition between competitive pricing (without rebates), mixed strategy equilibrium (for intermediate rebates), and monopoly pricing (for larger rebates).     

Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.     

Combining research and design: a methodological view of the path to sustainable development

This essay sketches a conceptual framework of a method for investigations into sustainable development issues by combining a method for scientific research with a method for designing. These kinds of investigation should not only focus on the development of a new theory explaining what sustainable development is, it also needs to focus on how sustainable development can be realized. Firstly, the two methods are described separately. After a comparison of the methods, the conceptual framework is sketched as a phase model and finally a translation of this conceptual framework into a more practical guideline is given. In practice, the practitioner does not follow a given phase model. The practitioner needs building blocks to build his own pattern. To guide the practitioner in building his own structure, some ‘rules’ or guidelines are needed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Strategic HRM as social design for environmental sustainability in organization

A strategic model of human resource management is proposed as a framework to support sustainable adaptation to the disruptive and dynamic challenges in the business context related to environmental sustainability. The implications of a whole‐systems ecological approach to the design and implementation of human resource systems are explored, and the literature on best HR practices to support environmental sustainability is summarized. Implications for practice and research are presented.     

Strategic management and fundraising: A planning model for resource development in the nonprofit organisation

Many nonprofits can benefit greatly from integrating their strategic, marketing and fundraising planning into an environmentally comprehensive process. Even during this critical period for them, many nonprofits typically have failed to implement this type of integrated planning because their corporate culture often nurtures: an inner process focus, leadership pathologies, professional balkanisation, reluctance to accept advancement as a global organisational activity, an unwillingness to accept the realities of a moving market and a lack of political will to undertake social advocacy on behalf of their clients. In order to succeed in the future, nonprofit organisations will need to approach strategic planning through an interdisciplinary methodology that will be shaped by multiple market audits focusing on: mission and institutional capabilities, image and competitive analysis, philanthropic feasibility and flexible integration of revenue/resource development. Nonprofits that adopt this interdisciplinary process will be rewarded by enhanced fundraising returns, once re-founded on a culture that has remained mission-relevant while becoming market-driven. The nonprofit that bases its planning on more effective use of intelligence gathering and flexible focusing of its human and financial capital will be more capable of acting upon a fluid environment and realising the institution's optimal future.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners ‘penalize’ managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Threats and bargaining in capitalism a differential game view

The paper examines the Nash bargaining equilibrium in a simple model of growth and distribution formulated as a differential game between workers, who may save or consume, and capitalists, who may consume or invest. Optimal threats announced by the social classes to affect the negotiated solution to their own advantage are also derived. It is demonstrated that the workers' threat takes the form of refusing to save while capitalists threaten to refrain from investing. The threats as well as the possible gains from cooperation determine the players' relative importance or bargaining power. It is shown that capitalists are in general in a stronger bargaining position than workers. The dependence of the bargaining power on the parameters of the model is examined.     

浅议西部油气资源开发对策与措施

西部拥有丰富的石油天然气资源,积极开发和利用西部的油气资源,将促进我国能源结构优化,增加能源供应的安全性,促进西部地区社会经济的发展,实现能源的可持续发展战略,实现西部资源优势向现实经济优势的转变,将是西部油气资源开发面临的主要问题,文章针对西部油气资源现状,从长远利益出发,以可持续发展的观点,分析未来西部油气资源开发的措施与对策。     

Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence

We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.     

Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach

We analyze a market in which advertising is the dominant marketing tool to create market share. We assume that an incumbent firm dominates the market during an initial stage, and that a new competitor is going to enter the market. In particular, we analyze the different advertising policies that the incumbent firm can adopt, before and after the entry of the rival. We explore three possible behaviours. In the first scenario the firm knows that the competitor will arrive at a given instant. In the second one we assume the original firm to be surprised, in the sense that it does not anticipate the entry of the opponent either because it does not expect the competitor to arrive, or it is not prepared to react before the entry takes place. Finally, in the third scenario, the original firm knows that the competitor will enter at a constant rate. We characterize a differential game model and compare the firms’ behaviours in a strategic perspective.     

Modern day fund raising: a whole new ball game

Modern technology and fierce competition for the philanthropic dollar have revolutionized fund raising. Some special approaches are now required. One approach this author recommends is the development of a symbolic theme appeal.