Market structure,common ownership,and coordinated manager compensation

We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80% of the firms are commonly owned.     

Private benefits from control block trades in the Spanish stock exchange

A control block trade can be explained by the expectation of financial gains, shared by all shareholders, or by the expectation of private benefits, exclusive to the buyer and possibly at the expense of other shareholders’ rents. The market for corporate control contributes to social welfare when it improves the efficiency of the allocation of resources. When the objective of a block transaction is private benefits, social welfare may be negatively impacted as minority shareholders could withdraw from the market. Therefore the estimation of private benefits would allow the efficiency of the market for corporate control to be assessed. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to calculate private benefits in the Spanish market for partial control. Using a sample of partial control transactions over the period 1990–2016, we find that the median of private benefits is negative, therefore it appears that there is no inefficient use of resources in the Spanish partial control market as a whole, however private costs are detected. The variability of private benefits is explained in a significant way by variables related to the control structure of the target firm, such as the controlling position of the buyer after the transaction, the contestability of control and the cross-shareholdings between the buyer and large shareholders. Performance and the size of the firm are significant as well.     

Institutional monitoring,coordination and corporate acquisitions in China

Within the context of corporate acquisition decisions of China’s Publicly Listed Corporations (PLCs), this paper investigates the monitoring and coordination behaviour of institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders are divided into four groups: large outsider, large insider, small outsider and small insider. The outsider and insider categorization, respectively, represents the absence of significant business links with relevant PLCs. In China, institutional shareholders tend to either monitor the acquisitions decisions of PLCs or coordinate their response with the controlling shareholders (coordination in the present context amounts to cooperation). Using micro data from China’s stock market over the 2003–2008 period, we find that (through ex-ante coordination with the controlling shareholders) the insider institutional investment tends to increase the likelihood of PLC acquisitions. However, through ex-ante monitoring of the PLC acquisition offers, the outsider institutional investment tends to decrease the acquisition likelihood. We find that, through ex-post monitoring of PLC acquisitions, institutional investors with large shareholdings can help improve the post-acquisition performance of Chinese PLCs. On the other hand, institutional investors with small shareholdings tend to coordinate their actions with the controlling shareholders. Accordingly, small institutional shareholders cannot affect the post-acquisition performance of China’s PLCs. Finally, we find that the so-called ‘cherry-picking effect’ exists only in the case of large outsider institutional investors.     

Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option

We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers share profits with shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the share of profits to be distributed between workers and shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The distributive share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Property rights and the stock market-growth nexus

Using threshold estimation techniques, this study examines whether the growth effect of stock market development differs according to the different levels of property rights and minority shareholders protection in a cross-section of 85 jurisdictions during the post-crisis period. The results demonstrate that the impact of stock market liquidity on growth is positive and significant only in jurisdictions where there is high level of property rights protection. Similar effect is discerned in the case of strong minority shareholders protection. Using the market size as a measure of stock market development, the paper also documents a positive growth effect of market size when property rights and minority shareholders protection are strong. However, there is mixed evidence in the low to medium degrees of protection. Further analyses using other broader governance indicators as threshold variables and instrumental variable threshold regressions reaffirm the main findings. The study upholds the “better finance, more growth” proposition and contributes to the identification of thresholds above which institutional quality can positively shape the impact of stock market on economic growth.     

苏州民营经济转型升级的对策

作为市场经济主体的民营经济,在经济结构调整和产业转型升级中都担当着主要角色,并成为发展服务外包和信息技术等新兴产业的主体。苏州市民营经济体在取得显著成就的同时,自身的问题和缺陷也正在逐步暴露,民营经济发展已进入了转型升级的关键时期。本文着重探讨了在产业结构优化升级和长三角一体化的宏观背景下,苏州民营经济的现状、转型升级的对策以及如何突出重点突破难点等问题。     

我国国有企业分配制度中存在问题之初探

合理有效的分配制度不仅是公平正义的重要体现,也是经济发展、社会稳定的重要保证。近年来,作为重要市场主体的国有企业,在分配制度的设计和执行方面存在诸多不适应市场竞争的问题。国有企业应该顺应市场竞争的现实需要,建立与劳动贡献成正比的员工收入分配机制,健全对经营者、监管者的收入激励约束机制,构建科学合理、公平公正的分配制度。     

New evidence on shareholder wealth effects in bank mergers during 1980-2000

This paper employs two unique bank event study methodologies to calculate abnormal returns for bidder, target and combined firms. The first methodology is a modified market model that controls for shocks common to the banking industry. The second is an EGARCH (1, 1) model that adjusts for the violated regression assumptions of the traditional market model event study. The results of both methodologies reveal that target shareholders enjoy significantly positive abnormal returns, whereas the bidder shareholders experience significantly negative abnormal returns. Overall, announcements of bank mergers generate positive wealth effects for the combined shareholders. However, the evidence presented in this paper underscores the importance of the choice of models describing stock returns in examining the impact of bank mergers.     

股权结构优化的公司治理研究——基于我国民营上市公司的所有权结构和控制特征的研究

我国民营上市公司多为所有权少数控制性结构,在控制方式上大多采用“金字塔“型的控制模式。所有权少数控制结构使得最终控制人对外部股东的侵害行为具有溢出效应,导致控股股东与中小股东之间产生的代理问题。优化股权结构及完善公司治理是提高民营上市公司经营绩效,促进证券市场健康发展的重要措施。本文从分析民营上市公司的所有权结构和控制方式对公司治理的影响入手,就如何优化股权结构,完善公司治理进行研究并提出相应对策。     

Moral management in competitive markets

The intrinsic motivation of a firm’s management for engaging in prosocial behavior is an important determinant of a firm’s social conduct. I provide the first model in which firms run by morally motivated managers engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a competitive setting. Moral management crowds out a competitor’s strategic CSR, increasing profitability and leading shareholders to strategically delegate moral managers, although necessary for socially optimal CSR is that shareholders be morally motivated as well. Shareholders appoint managers that engage in a socially excessive amount of CSR, counter to existing literature, whenever product‐market competition is sufficiently intense.     

国有资本投资运营公司成立提高企业价值了吗? ——来自中央企业和省级改革试点的经验数据

本文以2010—2018年全部A股上市公司为样本,通过倾向得分匹配和双重差分实证检验国有资本投资运营公司（两类公司）的成立对企业价值的影响以及市场竞争对两者关系的调节作用,研究结果显示：（1）两类公司成立后国有企业价值发生了显著变化,两类公司的成立显著提高了所属上市公司的价值;（2）受经营目标差异的影响,两类公司提高国有企业价值的作用在省级试点更为显著;（3）市场竞争显著影响两类公司作用的发挥,市场竞争越激烈,两类公司越能推动国有企业价值的提升。     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

Dividends and leverage: How to optimally exploit a non-renewable investment

In this paper we model the situation where a non-renewable investment is given, for instance a resource reservoir, and show how to optimally trade-off between dividends and leverage, in order to maximize a performance indicator for shareholders, up to the bankruptcy time. We then study the way market risk (the volatility of the market price of the resource) impacts the optimal policies and the default risk of the company. The moments when the policies are rebalanced are analyzed and we give a measure of the agency costs which appear between the shareholders and the debt-holders.     

吸收换股合并中的股东权益保护——中国铝业合并子公司的案例研究

中国铝业股份有限公司收购旗下两家上市子公司是一起典型海外企业整合上市子公司从而回归A殷的案例.本文以案例研究为主要方法,结合中国股权分置改革和类似中国铝业这样超大型海外上市企业迫切回归A股市场的背景,分析了并购过程中非流通股股东的成本和收益、流通股股东的利益得失,试图发现在这种超大型企业并购中,非流通股与流通股股东之闻...     

国有企业改革中的管理层收购:几个关系、收购原则及风险

管理层收购是国有企业产权改革的一种有效途径。但收购必须在国有资产管理部门的主持下,按照市场化的规则进行;如果收购过程本身处于管理层的主导之下,许多问题很难避免。本文论述了进行管理层收购需要正确认识的几个关系,然后提出了管理层收购必须遵循的原则,最后指出了收购过程中可能出现的几种风险。     

Top executive turnovers: Separating decision and control rights

This paper examines the relationship between performance and top executive turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor market performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs are value‐increasing events while voluntary resignations are value‐decreasing events. Large shareholders as active monitors, or part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the results. If large shareholders have any influence on CEO turnovers it is not revealed in our data. Indeed, separating control rights from decision rights does not appear to affect managerial turnovers. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

金融发展对企业技术创新模式影响研究——基于中国高技术产业的实证分析

运用中国高技术产业统计数据,实证分析了金融发展对不同技术创新模式的作用机制,并探讨企业所有权性质对这种作用机制是否存在以及存在何种影响。实证分析结果表明：我国信贷市场发展比股票市场发展对自主创新的促进作用更大,并且这种促进作用并不受到企业所有权性质的影响;信贷市场发展对于增加国有企业R&D经费进而促进自主创新的作用更大,而股票市场发展对于增加民营企业R&D经费进而促进自主创新的促进作用更大、更显著;我国金融发展对于国有企业的自主创新与模仿创新的促进作用较大,而对民营企业的促进作用相对较小。     

控股股东股权质押与高溢价并购

股权质押和公司并购都是资本市场近年来的热点问题,但鲜有研究关注两者间的联系。本文将其结合研究发现,控股股东股权质押的发生与公司并购事件显著正相关;当控股股东质押更多时,公司更易产生超额商誉,且并购标的为关联方时这一倾向将会加强。进一步分析发现,当面临更严格的外部监督环境时,控股股东在并购中质押股权的比例将受到抑制。本文的结果表明控股股东股权质押行为与高溢价并购的结合可能成为控股股东套现的一种手段,需要加强警惕和监管。     

国有上市公司的治理机制与过度投资

以特定行业388家国有上市公司2001-2005年数据为样本,在界定过度投资水平和分析投资决策机制基础上,选取治理机制中的股权结构、董事会和产品市场竞争三方面,分析并实证检验其对过度投资的影响。结果显示,国有股比例的增加使国有公司过度投资水平更高;股权制衡对投资过度有制约作用;地方控股较中央控股国有公司,过度投资水平更高。产品市场竞争对过度投资有制约作用,但不显著。董事会特征与过度投资之间无显著关系。