Consumer Search Ability,Price Dispersion and the Digital Divide

The ‘digital divide’ in online activities is believed to arise from differences in Internet access, but this paper advances an alternative explanation that is related to consumer search ability. It argues that this leads to greater price dispersion, causing some consumers to be discriminated against. It analyses price data for the UK Internet motor insurance market, collecting data on 32,255 prices for 110 sub‐markets, where differences in price dispersion across these by age, occupation and sex of the driver are argued to reflect differences in search ability. Allowing for price dispersion to also depend on the insurance risk, it finds greater price dispersion for consumers with weaker search abilities, i.e. older, unemployed, retired or female consumers. As this is not explained by alternative hypotheses, the paper concludes that improved Internet access alone will not close the ‘digital divide’. The implication is that policymakers should address the online search abilities of individuals as well as Internet access.     

Behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination

We develop a model of behavior‐ and characteristic‐based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers’ heterogeneity.     

Bait and ditch: Consumer naïveté and salesforce incentives

We analyze a model of price competition between a transparent retailer and a deceptive one in a market where a fraction of consumers is naïve. The transparent retailer is an independent shop managed by its owner. The deceptive retailer belongs to a chain and is operated by a manager. The two retailers sell an identical base product, but the deceptive one also offers an add‐on. Rational consumers never consider buying the add‐on while naïve ones can be “talked” into buying it. By offering the manager a contract that pushes him to never sell the base good without the add‐on, the chain can induce an equilibrium in which both retailers obtain more‐than‐competitive profits. The equilibrium features price dispersion and market segmentation, with the deceptive retailer targeting only naïve consumers whereas the transparent retailer serves only rational ones.     

Learning in Advance Selling with Heterogeneous Consumers

Advance selling occurs when consumers order a firm's product prior to the regular selling season. It reduces uncertainty for both the firm and the buyers and enables the firm to better forecast its future demand. The distinctive feature of this paper is that there are both experienced and inexperienced consumers, with the former knowing their valuations of the product in advance. We show that pre‐orders from experienced consumers lead to a more precise forecast of future demand by the firm and that the optimal pre‐order price may be at a discount or a premium relative to the regular selling price. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning quality through prices and word‐of‐mouth communication

This paper studies the effect of word‐of‐mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word‐of‐mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high‐quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low‐quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high‐quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low‐quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word‐of‐mouth communication improves consumer welfare.     

Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

Price Dispersion and Consumer Reservation Prices

We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of firms: the highest price is the monopoly price, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many firms. The equilibrium pricing pattern is the same when prices are chosen sequentially.     

SEMI‐NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS

This paper studies the estimation of the distribution of non‐sequential search costs. We show that the search cost distribution is identified by combining data from multiple markets with common search technology but varying consumer valuations, firms' costs, and numbers of competitors. To exploit such data optimally, we provide a new method based on semi‐nonparametric estimation. We apply our method to a dataset of online prices for memory chips and find that the search cost density is essentially bimodal, such that a large fraction of consumers searches very little, whereas a smaller fraction searches a relatively large number of stores. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sources of downward bias in estimating the demand income elasticity for urban housing

Housing demand studies, whether relying upon individual or grouped data, have limited their observations to similar housing units and/or similar housing consumers to help control for product heterogeneity. Yet similar housing units tend to locate in clusters; tenants tend to segregate by race and income. The unintended results may be: (1) for grouped data, selection of a product subgroup with a supply price elasticity small enough to matter; (2) for individual data, selection of a consumer subgroup possessing a lower income elasticity than all housing consumers. Evidence is given that the supply price elasticity is sometimes small enough to matter when grouped data are used.     

Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Consumer Search: An Examination of the Retail Gasoline Market

This article proposes a new explanation for why retail prices respond more quickly to cost increases than cost decreases. I develop a search model that assumes consumers’ expectations of prices are based on prices observed during previous purchases. This model predicts that consumers search less when prices are falling, which results in higher profit margins and a slower price response to cost changes. I then empirically examine patterns of retail gasoline price response and price dispersion to show that this model predicts observed price behavior better than previously suggested explanations.     

Pay to Switch or Pay to Stay: Preference-Based Price Discrimination in Markets with Switching Costs

In many markets, firms can price discriminate between their own customers and their rivals' customers, charging one price to consumers who prefer their own product and another price to consumers who prefer a rival's product. We find that when demand is symmetric, charging a lower price to a rival's customers is always optimal. When demand is asymmetric, however, it may be more profitable to charge a lower price to one's own customers. Surprisingly, price discrimination can lead to lower prices to all consumers, not only to the group that is more elastic, but also to the less elastic group.     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.     

Multiproduct price competition with heterogeneous consumers and nonconvex costs

This paper extends the oligopolistic model of price competition to environments with multiple goods, heterogeneous consumers, and arbitrary continuous cost functions. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with an endogenous sharing rule is proven to exist. It is also shown that, in environments with fixed costs and constant marginal costs, all (symmetric and asymmetric) equilibria exhibit price dispersion across stores. Furthermore, the paper identifies scenarios in which prices will necessarily be random. In these markets, stores keep each other guessing because, given the fixed costs, they would incur a loss if their price strategies were anticipated and beaten by competitors. This is interpreted as an important economic feature that is possibly behind random price promotions such as weekly specials.     

Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider a duopoly market with heterogeneous consumers. The firms initially produce vertically differentiated standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on quality. The firms first choose whether to customize their products, then engage in price competition. We show that the low‐quality firm never customizes alone; customization becomes more likely as the difference between the firms’ qualities increases; and less likely as the fixed cost of customization increases. We extend the base model by relaxing two important assumptions—uniform pricing and exogenous quality. The main conclusions with uniform pricing continue to hold when price customization is allowed. In the second extension the firms’ qualities are endogenously determined. We show that the firms choose to be either substantially differentiated in quality or nondifferentiated.     

Is the environment‐friendly factor attractive to customers when purchasing electric vehicles? Evidence from South Korea

In a bid to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, several countries worldwide are implementing policies to promote electric vehicles (EVs). However, contrary to expectations, the diffusion speed of EVs has been rather slow in South Korea. This study analyzes consumer preferences for the technological and environmental attributes of EVs and derives policy and environmental implications to promote market diffusion of EVs in South Korea. We conduct a choice‐based conjoint survey of 1,008 consumers in South Korea and estimate the consumer utility function using a mixed logit model considering consumer heterogeneity. Based on the consumer utility function, we analyze consumers' willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for EV attributes such as driving range, charging method, charging time, autonomous driving function, carbon dioxide (CO₂) reduction rate, and purchase price. The results indicate that the current low acceptance of EVs is due to their relatively high price and lack of a battery charging technology that satisfies consumers' expectations of the charging method and time. One interesting finding is that Korean consumers have a relatively higher WTP for the CO₂ reduction rate of EVs than consumers in other countries; however, they do not consider CO₂ reduction over other technological attributes when choosing EVs. This implies that the rate of CO₂ reduction of EVs is not an important factor for South Korean consumers when buying EVs. We also calculate the effect of CO₂ reduction with the market penetration of EVs and find that CO₂ reduction through the diffusion of EVs depends on the country's electricity generation mix.     

A non-parametric approach to smoothing by aggregation over preferences

A distributional dispersion condition on C² monotone preferences, defined by unit normals to indifference surfaces, yields a C⁰ mean demand function when one integrates over such suitably diffuse consumers with convex preferences, regardless of the distribution of their initial endowments. For non-convex preferences, the dispersion condition implies that at any price vector, individual demands are finite sets for almost every agent. A stronger dispersion condition, involving both utility functions and unit normals, yields C⁰ mean demand functions with monotone non-convex preferences.     

Remanufacturing for the Circular Economy: An Examination of Consumer Switching Behavior

For the circular economy to be tenable, consumers need to not only return products after use, but also purchase products that are remanufactured. However, research finds that consumers have a poor opinion of remanufactured products and are typically not prepared to adopt them. Thus, development of the circular economy is dependent upon deeper understanding of consumers’ attitudes and behaviors. Research typically considers either micro‐level or macro‐level factors when assessing consumer perceptions of remanufactured products. The current research incorporates macro‐level factors of price, government incentives and environmental benefits with the moderating influence of micro‐level consumer attitudes to examine consumers’ intention to switch from purchasing new products to remanufactured products. The findings suggest that a consumer's attitude toward remanufactured products is an important moderating factor predicting consumer switching behavior to remanufactured products. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

The impact of corporate social responsibility associations on trust in organic products marketed by mainstream retailers: a study of Italian consumers

This paper investigates the determinants of consumer attitudes toward organic products marketed by mainstream retailers under a private label. Since organic products are credence goods, consumers cannot directly verify whether these products comply with official standards. Organic labels are the primary source of consumer trust in organics, but these labels must be noticed and understood before consumers will actively seek them out. In that some consumers may not prioritize product labels when they shop, it is sometimes up to retailers to strengthen consumer trust. Within the antecedents of this trust, we isolated the contribution of the corporate social responsibility associations held by consumers about retailers. We surveyed Italian customers interested in organics and found that they are more likely to trust the private‐label organic products sold by a retailer when it is considered socially responsible. Our results also show that consumer trust translates into brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a premium price for organic products. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders

Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures the existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but nonstandard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multisender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero‐profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high‐quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, compared to the complete‐information benchmark, the separating prices of both firms are distorted upwards when the degree of vertical differentiation is large, and downwards when it is small.     

Warranties as a device to extract rent from low‐risk users of a product

We develop a simple model that provides a new rationale for why a monopolist should bundle its product with a warranty even when all parties are risk neutral. In our model, a risk‐neutral monopolist faces two types of risk‐neutral consumers—low‐risk users that are unlikely to cause product failure and high‐risk users that are more likely to cause product failure. We find that when the firm fails to provide a warranty, a low‐risk user acquires a strictly positive rent by pretending to be a high‐risk user and receiving a price discount. By imposing a warranty, however, the monopolist can increase the price to high‐risk users, which in turn removes the incentive for a low‐risk user to pretend to be a high‐risk user, and the firm successfully extracts rent from the low‐risk user. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.