Government spending, capital accumulation and the optimal policy rule: The role of public service capital

In this paper, we modify the Djajić [Djajić, S., 1987. “Government Spending and the Optimal Rates of Consumption and Capital Accumulation,” Canadian Journal of Economics 20, 544–554.] model in such a way that government consumption expenditure provides utility to households via the total stock of government services rather than the government consumption flow alone. By using such a framework, we show that the optimality condition for the public service capital stock is the marginal rate of substitution between public service capital and consumption that equals the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation between the two goods. In addition, we show that the relationship between private consumption and public service capital in a household's utility plays an important role in determining the transitional behavior of relevant variables. We also examine the second-best government consumption expenditure policy. By contrast, in the standard flow specification, e.g., Turnovsky and Brock [Turnovsky, S.J. and Brock, W.A., 1980. “Time Consistency and Optimal Government Policies in Perfect Foresight Equilibrium,” Journal of Public Economics 13, 183–212.], Ihori [Ihori, T., 1990. “Government Spending and Private Consumption,” Canadian Journal of Economics 23, 60–69.], and Turnovsky and Fisher [Turnovsky, S.J. and Fisher, W.H., 1995. “The Composition of Government Expenditure and its Consequences for Macroeconomic Performance,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, 747–786.], the second-best government consumption expenditure is decided on the basis that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the discounted sum of the marginal utility of the government's flow spending.     

Industrial policy in developing countries

Traditionally, proindustry policies were associated with incentives for import substitution and an inward-oriented development strategy. This is no longer so. Whereas in the past, world-market orientation was seen as implying reliance on primary production, today policies favoring international competition and export orientation are considered compatible with policies favoring rapid industrialization. Differences of opinion on the appropriate degree of public intervention remain. The debate between “purist” laissez-faire advocates and those who believe in industrial planning, public investment, and generous subsidies often obscures the real need for reduction in antiexport bias, rationalization of incentives, and reform of public-sector activities.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

Conditional Universal Consistency

Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally consistent:” they yield almost as high a time-average payoff as if the player knew the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover, given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. We also discuss cycles, and argue that the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, C63, D83.     

Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why “pack and crack” does not work

We show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins (“cracking”).     

The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls

The term strategy has been misused and even abused. Worse, the word scenario is often confused with strategy to the point that clarification is needed if we are to understand one another. As a prolongation of the work done by the Rand Corporation in the 1960s, strategic planning, management and prospective approaches have been developed to help organizations master change. Over the past 25 years, we have contributed by creating or further developing various methodologies and procedures such as the Mactor and MICMAC methods for use in scenario building. These tools are doubly powerful in that they stimulate the imagination, reduce collective biases, and promote appropriation. One of the main functions of the strategic futures exercise is to eliminate two errors that we usually describe as the “hammer's risk” and the “nail's dream.” In other words, we forget what a hammer's function is when staring at a nail (the nail's dream) or we know how to use a hammer and imagine that every problem is like a nail (the hammer's risk). In our case, we strive to give simple tools that may be appropriated. However, these simple tools are inspired by intellectual rigor that enables one to ask the right questions. Of course, these tools do not come with a guarantee. The natural talent, common sense, and intuition of the futurist also count!     

Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable?

We consider a homogeneous product oligopoly, where the Cournot equilibrium is regular and unique. We show that for a duopoly, a unique Cournot equilibrium is always locally stable. For a “n” firm asymmetric cost oligopoly a unique Cournot equilibrium is locally stable under very general conditions. The sufficient conditions for local stability of a unique Cournot equilibrium are much less restrictive than what the existing literature suggests. For a symmetric cost oligopoly the unique Cournot equilibrium is almost always locally stable, except for a perverse case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification number: L13.     

Alternative Energy Strategies for the United Kingdom Revisited: Market Competition and Sustainability

Energy and electricity demand forecasts for Britain made in the late 1970s by a research team from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), under the leadership of Gerald Leach, are assessed with the benefit of hindsight. These researchers broke the energy market down into some 400 end-use, fuel, and appliance categories. They then assessed the potential for energy saving in physical terms, using available technical fixes, for each category. The resulting “bottom-up” projecitons of energy consumption departed from the historic correlation with economic growth, or “top-down” approach. It enabled the IIED team to postulate an alternative, low energy strategy for the United Kingdom to 2025. This study subsequently had a great influence on energy planning elsewhere in the industrialized world, although it was not without its detractors.The IIED energy demand projections are reviewed in the context of both the greatly increased market competition in the UK from 1979 onward, and the need to achieve sustainable development. It is shown that, although total primary energy consumption in the mid-1990s was much in line with the forecasts in the Leach report, the reasons for this and the structure of the newly competitive energy market are quite different from that originally postulated. However, the critics of the IIED team did little better. Long-term energy projections (25–50 years) as one-off, static exercises appear to be of little value for energy planning purposes. They can, as in the case of the Leach report, be a great source of data and ideas, as well as stimulating debate about new strategies. It is argued that rolling projections using a rather broad, sectoral approach that is continuously updated at not greater than five-year intervals, in a similar manner to econometric forecasts, are more useful for energy planning purposes.     

Modelling price pressure in financial markets

We present experimental evidence that, unlike traditional assumptions in economic theory, security prices do not respond to pressure from their own excess demand. Instead, prices respond to excess demand of all securities, despite the absence of a direct link between markets. We propose a model of price pressure that explains these findings. In our model, agents set order prices that reflect the marginal valuation of desired future holdings, called “aspiration levels.”In the short run, as agents encounter difficulties executing their orders, they scale back their aspiration levels. Marginal valuations, order prices, and hence, transaction prices change correspondingly. The resulting price adjustment process coincides with the Global Newton Method. The assumptions of the model as well as its empirical implications are fully borne out by the data. Our model thus provides an economic foundation for why markets appear to search for equilibrium according to Newton’s procedure.     

How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game

We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremontet al.have shown, with quadratic consumer transportation cost the two sellers will seek to move as far away from each other as possible. We show that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria coordination failure invalidates the principle of “maximum differentiation” and firms may even locate at the same point.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43, L11.     

A characterization of the normalized restricted profit function

A duality theorem between production functions and normalized restricted profit functions is derived under the assumptions of joint biconvexity and independence of the production possibilities sets. Biconvexity is a natural generalization of the concept of convexity to the case of overall increasing returns which maintains at the same time the conventional property of diminishing marginal rates of transformation (substitution) amongst certain subsets of commodities.Specializing to the twice differentiable, locally strongly convex case, certain identities linking the Hessians of the production function and the normalized restricted profit function are derived. Using these identities, Le Chatelier's principle is demonstrated.     

The analysis of a price war strategy under market demand growth

We use the finite repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game model herein to discuss how firms choose their optimal strategy under a price war with market demand growth. This model has two players: one is an R-type player and the other is a TFT-type player. Each player has two strategies to choose from: a preemption strategy and a “wait” strategy. Our results indicate that: (i) if the probability that the opponent is an R-type (TFT-type) player is high, then the time when the opponent adopts a preemption strategy will be early (late); (ii) Market demand growth is an incentive for cooperation among firms; (iii) if the market demand growth rate is high, then the R-type player will not have an evolutionary advantage. We use the competition between cell phone manufacturing firms Nokia and Motorola in China as an example. When Nokia is an R-type player and adopts a preemption strategy, Motorola should preferably use a preemption strategy rather than a “wait” strategy. However, as a TFT-type player, this will benefit Motorola under the situation of market demand growth.     

Iterated strict dominance in general games

We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS^*) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS^* is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS^* by means of a “stability” criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS^*. We show by an example that IESDS^* may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS^* preserves the set of Nash equilibria.     

The international potential of traditional resource systems in marginal areas

Marginal areas of the world, including tropical highlands, tropical coastal zones, and arid lands, are problematical for development. They are ecologically special areas, often of vital consequence to the stability of more populated regions nearby. Commonly, their peoples are culturally distinct. To develop marginal areas it is suggested that “transformational” development may be appropriate. Transformational development recognizes the importance of equity and of working with existing resource systems already ecologically and culturally appropriate to the area. In marginal areas, a special application of transformational development could include incremental changes in existing systems and their connection to modern international systems so as to benefit the inhabitants of marginal areas and to supply commodities and goods demanded in the rest of the world. By rethinking ideas about resources, an exploratory framework for such transformation is examined. This framework uses the concept of “resource system”, a concept which might play an important part in the application of equitable future global development efforts.     

The quality effect: Does financial liberalization improve the allocation of capital?

We document evidence of a “quality effect” of financial liberalization on allocative efficiency, as measured by dispersion in Tobin's Q across firms. We predict that financial liberalization, by equalizing access to credit, is associated with reduced variation in expected marginal returns. We test this prediction using a new financial liberalization index and firm-level data for five emerging markets: India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. We find robust evidence that financial liberalization, rather than financial deepening, is associated with improved allocative efficiency.     

Giants, pygmies, and the social costs of fundamental research or price revisited

Social resource and opportunity costs of fundamental science are explored utilizing a model which integrates a) the determinants of the talent distribution of the cadre of fundamental scientists, b) the relationship of individual scientific productivity to scientific talent, c) the scientific value of aggregate scientific product, and d) the value of scientific personnel in nonscientific pursuits. On this basis, total, average, and marginal resource and opportunity costs of varying degrees of realization of “scientific potential” are derived. This comparative- static analysis is then applied to the United States over the period 1940 to 1975–1985, suggesting a four- to fivefold increase in the marginal resource cost and a five- to tenfold increase in the marginal opportunity cost of fundamental science over this period. In light of these findings and of the “free-good” aspect of the products of fundamental science, it is concluded that the level and mode of support for fundamental science must, ultimately, be determined with reference to the non- or quasiscientific contributions of fundamental scientists.     

The role of factor substitution in the theory of economic growth and income distribution: Two examples

While much empirical evidence suggests that the Cobb–Douglas production function may be a reasonable benchmark for aggregate analysis, we argue that the practice, particularly prevalent in contemporary growth theory, of adopting the Cobb–Douglas technology, may lead to misleading implications. Using two examples, we show that key implications of the models are highly sensitive to small deviations of the elasticity of substitution from unity. The first employs the standard neoclassical model and emphasizes the sensitivity of the speed of convergence to small changes in the elasticity of substitution. This in turn has profound consequences for wealth and income distribution. The second deals with foreign aid and highlights how the relative merits of “tied” versus “untied” aid are also very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution.     

Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium

The paper studies a large class of bounded-rationality, probabilistic learning models on strategic-form games. The main assumption is that players “recognize” cyclic patterns in the observed history of play. The main result is convergence with probability one to a fixed pattern of pure strategy Nash equilibria, in a large class of “simple games” in which the pure equilibria are nicely spread along the lattice of the game. We also prove that a necessary condition for convergence of behavior to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is that the players consider arbitrarily long histories when forming their predictions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83.     

A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same “side” may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield. In particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement. The different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures. Moreover, the conflict over procedure can be substantial, among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.