The distribution of money and prices in an equilibrium with lotteries

Summary. We construct a tractable fundamental model of money with equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible tokens and can offer lotteries on monetary transfers. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can analytically characterize the monetary distribution. Interestingly, such distributions match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity.Received: 16 April 2003, Revised: 11 February 2004JEL Classification Numbers: D30, D83, E40.A. Berentsen, G. Camera, C. Waller: The paper has benefitted from insightful comments of two anonymous referees, whom we thank. We also thank participants at the conference Recent Developments in Money and Finance, held at Purdue University in May 2003, and the EPRI/University of Western Ontario Money Conference held in October 2003. Correrspondence to: G. Camera     

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Summary. A model is presented in which banks update public records, accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. I show that inside money is more liquid than outside money, increasing the turnover rates of idle capital. The model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are monitored and can issue nominal assets upon request, which helps them to transfer capital in sufficiently high rates and to also become intermediaries. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig [5], and Kiyotaki and Wright [7].Received: 18 February 2003, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E51, G21, G24.Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti: I thank two anonymous referees, Susumu Imai, B. Ravikumar and Neil Wallace, as well as participants at the Economic Theory symposium Recents Developments in Money and Finance, and seminar participants at the Richmond Fed, Queens University, and Sabanci University for comments on an early draft. The hospitality and financial support of the Cleveland Fed Central Bank Institute and CNPq are greatfully appreciated. The authors opinions are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.     

Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model

Summary. This paper describes optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model with stochastic monitoring. An agent operates a risky project on behalf of a principal who can observe the projects revenues at a cost. We show that an optimal contract exists such that, at any history, either the principal claims the projects entire revenues or promises to claim nothing in the future. In particular, the agents expected income rises with time. Moreover, except in at most one period, the principal claims all revenues when audit occurs. We provide conditions under which all optimal contracts satisfy these properties.Received: 4 February 2004, Revised: 4 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, C7. Correspondence to: Cyril MonnetWe wish to thank Patrick Bolton, Vitor Gaspar, Mark Guzman, Martin Hellwig, Narayana Kocherlakota, Thorsten Koeppl, Albert Marcet, Benny Moldovanu, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim, the University of Minnesota, the Society for Economics Dynamics Meetings in New York and the Society for the Advancement in Economic Theory in Rhodos for helpful comments and discussions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

The Regulation of Private Schools Serving Low-Income Families in Andhra Pradesh,India

This paper sets out some findings of a research project carried out in private unaided schools in low-income areas of Hyderabad, India. The part of the research project documented here was designed to examine the question: Is the regulatory regime conducive to entrepreneurial action and market discovery with particular reference to the low-income schools in Hyderabad. This paper is narrowly focused, setting out the results of pattern matching empirical data with the Austrian economic concepts of entrepreneurship, rivalry, and market discovery. The research discovered that two regulatory regimes exist, one that is set out on paper in the Education Acts and associated rules, and another that operates in practice. That is, there is a combination of regulations on paper and regulations existing in an extra-legal sector. Generally it was found that the regulations in practice are consistent with market principles. Conversely the regulations set out on paper are not conducive to entrepreneurial innovation and market discovery. Recommendations for potential policy initiatives include the possibility of legitimising the extra-legal sector by introducing self-regulation possibly via self-evaluation systems for the private unaided schools.     

Money,price dispersion and welfare

Summary. We introduce heterogeneous preferences into a tractable model of monetary search to generate price dispersion, and then examine the effects of money growth on price dispersion and welfare. With buyers search intensity fixed, we find that money growth increases the range of (real) prices and lowers welfare as agents shift more of their consumption to less desirable goods. When buyers search intensity is endogenous, multiple equilibria are possible. In the equilibrium with the highest welfare level, money growth reduces welfare and increases the range of prices, while having ambiguous effects on search intensity. However, there can be a welfare-inferior equilibrium in which an increase in money growth increases search intensity, increases welfare, and reduces the range of prices.Received: 25 July 2003, Revised: 12 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E31, D60.B. Peterson, S. Shi: We thank Gabriele Camera, Aleksander Berentsen and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We have also received valuable comments from the participants of the workshop at Michigan State, the Purdue Conference on Monetary Theory (2003) and the Midwest Macro Meeting (Chicago, 2003). Shi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Bank of Canada Fellowship and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The opinion expressed here is the authors own and does not reflect the view of the Bank of Canada.Correspondence to: S. Shi     

A general equilibrium framework for the affine class of term structure models

The Duffie and Kan (1966) model, which can be considered as the most general affine term structure formulation, was originally specified in terms of risk-adjusted stochastic processes for its state variables. The goal of the present paper is to derive a Duffie and Kan (1966) model specification under the physical probability measure that is compatible with the formulation given by the authors under the equivalent martingale (money market account) measure. For that purpose, the Duffie and Kan (1966) model will be fitted into a general equilibrium monetary framework. The resulting analytical solution for the vector of factor risk premiums enables the econometric estimation of the model parameters using a time-series or a panel-data approach, and nests, as special cases, several other specifications already proposed in the literature.Received: November 2002, Accepted: February 2004, JEL Classification: E43, G11, G12Financial support by FCTs research grant PRAXISXXI/BD/5712/95 is gratefully acknowledged.     

The rational regulator's pricing response to enhanced opportunities to “bypass” the public telephone network

Various technological innovations make it profitable—given regulated service prices—for large business customers of local telephone companies to invest in private equipment and reduce their reliance on the public telephone network. Such bypass possibilities reduce demands and increase demand elasticities for regulated business services. The politics of state telephone regulation motivate two specifications of regulatory objectives—specifications designed to reveal positive implications of bypass for regulated prices. One views the regulator as practicing so-called residual pricing, and a generalization assumes that the regulator balances the interests of competing pressure groups. Implications for interpretation of political rhetoric and for future modeling are discussed.     

From “tax state” to “debt state”

The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition.     

Stability of money demand in Switzerland: A comparison of the M2 and M3 cases

Long-run parameters of money demand functions for Switzerland's M2 and M3 aggregate are estimated and their stability investigated. For both aggregates a single stable cointegrating vector is found. Around these long-run relationships a single-equation model for m2 and a single-equation model for cpi is built respectively for M2 and M3, and both estimated models are found to be stable. Testing forecast performance, the cpi model seems to be superior to the m2 model, providing some positive signs that the M3 model is stable in the sense that it does not suffer from a structural break during the period of estimation.We would like to thank Jürgen Wolters and two anonymous referees for their comments and Neil Ericsson, David Hendry, Katarina Juselius, Helmut Lütkepohl, Grayham Mizon and the other participants of the Workshop on Money Demand in Europe, Berlin, October 10–11, 1997, where an earlier version of the paper was presented, for their suggestions. The data may be obtained from the internet, http://wotan.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/oekonometrie/engl/data.html. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Swiss National Bank.     

The measurement of entry rates: Recondiseration and resolution

This paper extends the recent analysis of Audretsch and Fritsch on entry rates, and suggests a resolution to the possible policy confusion which they discuss. British data also show very different results for the determinants of entry depending on whether the ecological or labour market entry rate is used. It is shown that, in addition to the static, size-distribution effect discussed by Audretsch and Fritsch, there are dynamic factors at work which may lead to this result. However, there need be no conflict in policy signals arising from this, because the labour market approach can be shown to be a superior measure of entry rates where spatial analysis is undertaken.     

On the generic nonconvergence of Bayesian actions and beliefs

Summary SupposeY _n is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in Y, a complete, separable, non-finite metric space. The probability law indexed by, is unknown to a Bayesian statistician with prior, observing this process. Generalizing Freedman [8], we show that generically (i.e., for a residual family of (,) pairs) the posterior beliefs do not weakly converge to a point-mass at the true. Furthermore, for every open setG , generically, the Bayesian will attach probability arbitrarily close to one toG infinitely often. The above result is applied to a two-armed bandit problem with geometric discounting where armk yields an outcome in a complete, separable metric spaceY _k. If the infimum of the possible rewards from playing armk is less than the infimum from playing armk', then armk is (generically) chosen only finitely often. If the infimum of the rewards are equal, then both arms are played infinitely often.     

Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public record keeping

Summary. We relax a standard assumption on the matching technology in a search model of money. In particular, agents may remain in a long-term partnership as long as it is in their self-interest. With this simple modification, it is possible to support self-enforcing, intertemporal trade which resembles credit without a public record keeping device. We examine conditions for co-existence of currency and credit and the welfare gains/losses associated with the introduction of money.Received: 20 April 2003, Revised: 10 July 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E0.An earlier version of this paper was entitled Money and Search with Enduring Relationships. We wish to thank Narayana Kocherlakota, Rachel Kranton, Jeff Lacker, Andrei Shevchenko, Shouyong Shi, Ted Temzelides, Chris Waller, and especially David Andofolatto, Gabriele Camera, Drew Saunders, and Randy Wright for helpful comments on that earlier draft, as well as seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania, Purdue University, American Economic Association Meetings, Summer Econometric Society Meetings, and NBER Summer Workshop. Corbae wishes to thank the Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for research support.Correspondence to: D. Corbae     

Some notes on trichotomous choice discrete valuation

For some respondents, the bid offered by the dichotomous choice format used in the discrete choice technique can in fact be the true optimum. In this case the correct answer is neither yes or no, but indifferent. We shall show results from a trichotomous choice format and analyse whether it produces welfare measures with narrower confidence intervals than the dichotomous technique. Another well known problem in contingent valuation (CV) studies is that the volume of the good to be purchased from hypothetical markets is not, in many cases, defined in precise terms. We show how the trichotomous choice technique can be used to test for possible vagueness in the volume of the project to be valued.     

On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems

Summary We characterize equilibria of general equilibrium models with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems. This characterization is similar to Negishi's characterization of equilibria of economies without externalities or taxes as solutions to social planning problems. It is often useful for computing equilibria or deriving their properties. Frequently, however, finding the optimization problem that a particular equilibrium solves is difficult. This is especially true in economies with multiple equilibria. In a dynamic economy with externalities or taxes there may be a robust continuum of equilibria even if there is a representative consumer. This indeterminacy of equilibria is closely related to that in overlapping generations economies.An earlier version of this paper, entitled Externalities and Taxes in General Equilibrium, was presented at the North American meetings of the Econometric Society, June 1988, at the University of Minnesota. We are grateful to David Backus, Kenneth Judd, Patrick Kehoe, and Rodolfo Manuelli for helpful conversations. National Science Foundation grants SES 86-18325 and SES 87-08616 provided financial support.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Explaining Russia's Currency and Financial Crisis

The paper attempts to sketch a framework for understanding Russia's August 1998 financial and currency crises with reference to the main theories put forward so far. Our thesis is that, while not fitting easily into any pre-existing framework, the Russian crises shares many features of first-generation models inasmuch as it was largely due to inconsistencies among an overvalued peg, tight money, and an evident inability to address the fiscal deficit. In other terms, it derived from the incompatibility between standard IMF stabilisation policies and the difficulties that Russia was facing as a transition economy. On the other hand, by touching both currency markets and the banking sector, the Russian Episode shares also important features of the twin crises framework.The analysis considers the role of exchange rate movements and capital flows on Russia's rising vulnerability, fiscal problems and the building up of the public debt. It assesses the state of the Russian Banking sector and discusses the contagion effects of the Asian crisis and policy response. It shows how the core of the Russian crises lies in an unsound, IMF-backed, defence of the rouble, which in 1998 had become increasingly unsustainable.     

Environmental market creation: saviour or oversell?

In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the notion of market creation for the conservation of environmental assets. Market creation establishes a market in the external benefit or cost in question (e.g. biodiversity or pollution reduction) and leaves the relevant parties to adjust their behaviour accordingly. While most attention has been paid to market creation through tradable permits and taxes (the polluter-pays), it is less easy to secure a perspective on beneficiary-pays initiatives. Both polluter-pays and beneficiary-pays initiatives are examples of modified Coaseian bargains in which governments intervene in the bargains to lower transactions costs, establish property rights, deal with public goods issues, or act on behalf of disadvantaged groups. This paper reviews four major initiatives in this respect - debt-for-nature swaps, bioprospecting and the Global Environment Facility at the global level, and the Costa Rican Forest Law at the local level. It finds that while there is much to applaud in initiatives in these new markets, serious questions remain about the modest flows of funds associated with such global bargains, and the extent to which they secure environmental improvements relative to the baseline of business-as-usual.JEL Classification: D49, D62, H41, O19, Q57, Q2I am indebted to members of the Wildlife Conservation Research Unit at Oxford University and to David Simpson of Resources for the Future and University College London for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are entirely my responsibility.     

Information processing for a finite resource allocation mechanism

Summary deal with an organization havingm individual agents (the agents) and one central agent or agency (the coordinator), and the problem of allocating a fixed supply ofn commodities among the agents. The coordinator wishes to distribute the commodities in such a way as to maximize an objective function whose arguments are functions known (implicitly) to the individual agents, but not to the coordinator. The more information the coordinator obtains about the individual agents' functions, the better the allocation decision he or she can make; however, gaining such information is costly, so that the coordinator must balance the potential gain against the cost of acquiring additional information. We find a satisficing solution to this problem which is computable and which terminates in a finite number of steps.We would like to thank Leo Hurwicz, Ken Matheny, Shailendra Mehta, Bill Novshek, Roy Radner, Stan Reiter, Vernon Smith, Mark Walker, and, especially, John Ledyard and Tom Marschak, for helpful comments and suggestions. We must, of course, however reluctantly, accept responsibility for any remaining defects.     

Natural resource accounting

There is as yet no consensus on the most appropriate way to incorporate the degradation of environmental capital into national income accounting procedure. Net product is currently derived by deducting from gross product the depreciation of man-made capital only. Deducting depreciation of natural capital in a similar manner will give a figure for true net product that provides a better indicator of that level of current income which is sustainable into the future. The user cost and net price methods of calculating the value of natural resource depreciation are analysed and assessed. On the basis of this assessment, the net price method is then used to adjust the national accounts of Zimbabwe for depletion of forests, soils and mineral resources, for the period 1980 to 1989. The results suggest that economic depreciation of natural resources represents approximately 2% of annual GDP, although this is regarded as a significant underestimate. The implications for integrating natural resource depletion into policy making, within the current national political climate, are then addressed.     

Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy

This paper analyzes the impact of alternative political institutions on sustainable fiscal policies. We study the choice of intergenerational transfers as outcomes of an infinite social security game among successive selfish median voters. Majoritarian systems accord the current median voter maximum fiscal discretion but no direct influence over future policy. This political arrangement sustains, among others, dynamically inefficient transfers and volatile, non-stationary sequences. Constitutional rules award to the minorities veto power over fiscal policy changes proposed by the majority. This unanimity provision is equivalent to partial precommitment. Under constitutional rules, sustainable fiscal policies feature Pareto efficient, non decreasing transfer sequences.