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Davidson M 《Medical economics》1996,73(9):165-6, 168, 173-4
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Reinhardt UE 《Medical economics》1981,58(15):25, 28, 30 passim
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Culture sometimes matters: Intra-cultural variation in pro-social behavior among Tsimane Amerindians
《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2008,68(3-4):587-607
Agent-centered models usually consider only individual-level variables in calculations of economic costs and benefits. There has been little consideration of social or cultural history on shaping payoffs in ways that impact decisions. To examine the role of local expectations on economic behavior, we explore whether village affiliation accounts for the variation in dictator game offers among the Tsimane of the Bolivian Amazon independently of other factors that could confound such an effect. Our analysis shows that significant differences in altruistic giving exist among villages, village patterns are recognized by residents, and offers likely reflect variation in social expectations rather than stable differences in norms of fairness. 相似文献
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Perry K 《Medical economics》1996,73(1):214-6, 219-20, 223 passim
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If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor. 相似文献