新企业所得税下辽宁大中企业的纳税筹划应对策略

由于社会相关部门没能给企业提供及时的可供操作的纳税筹划方案，由于企业本身对纳税筹划重视不够等原因，致使辽宁大中企业税收筹划情况不尽如人意，企业没有得到应有的纳税筹划利益。新企业所得税法较比旧税法在纳税筹划方面可操作性更强，筹划的方法更容易把握，筹划的利益也更直观。企业应抓住这个有利的时机建设自己的纳税筹划队伍，或借助外部力量将企业所得税筹划工作开展起来，不但可以得到利益，也可以提高管理水平。具体可在纳税人、税基、税率等企业所得税要素上下工夫。     

论新形式下的企业所得税纳税筹划

企业所得税在企业纳税活动中占有重要的地位,且具有很大的税收筹划空间,本文从"两税合并"的政策背景入手,分析了新形式下的企业所得税纳税筹划的新思路与方法,并提出了筹划工作过程中应注意的问题和改进建议.     

浅析企业所得税纳税筹划问题及对策

现行企业要求实现企业价值最大化目标。投资、经营、税务等各方面的筹划成为企业财务管理中的一项重要任务。税法有具体规定,与会计准则又有不同的地方,纳税筹划的可行性也就只能在一定条件下得以实施。企业所得税的纳税筹划在一定经济环境和法制环境下,利用各种合理的税收筹划方法,能有效地为企业合理避税和减轻税负,产生很大的效益。本文从企业所得税出发,结合一定的税法规定和会计准则要求,分析了目前企业所得税纳税筹划的现状和存在的问题,在对问题的研究基础上,提出了改善企业所得税纳税筹划的建议和措施。     

“营改增”背景下辽宁大中企业所得税纳税筹划探讨

企业应抓住“营改增”的时机建设自己的纳税筹划队伍，或借助外部力量将企业所得税纳税筹划工作开展起来，不但可以得到利益，也可以提高管理水平。具体可在纳税人、税基、税率等企业所得税要素的安排上下功夫。     

新形势下企业所得税的纳税筹划研究

我国新企业所得税法与原税法在纳税人、税率、税收优惠及准予扣除项目方面都存在很大变化,这也为进行所得税的纳税筹划提供了空间.企业应及时转变思路,采取新的策略方法,适应这一变化.本文主要对企业纳税筹划内涵予以分析后,在企业纳税意义等问题的基础上,对企业所得税纳税筹划方法予以探究,不断促进我国企业所得税纳税筹划的合理实现,提升企业经济效益.     

企业纳税筹划的风险与防范研究

随着我国市场经济的发展与成熟，人们越来越关注纳税筹划。作为企业，不仅要充分掌握税法规定，熟练运用国家的税收政策，还应该能够合理选择税前扣除、税收优惠政策，科学进行纳税筹划，以达到增加企业税后利润的目的。本文着重探讨了企业所得税纳税筹划的措施与方法，并提出了相应的风险防范措施。     

新企业所得税法下企业纳税筹划的思考

企业所得税纳税筹划是企业经营管理的重要组成部分,可以促进企业调整自身的经济行为,在不违反国家各项政策和法律法规的前提下使企业的税负达到最低。本文对实行新企业所得税法下企业所得税纳税筹划提出几点建议。     

新企业所得税法下企业所得税纳税筹划的变化

新企业所得税法于2008年1月1日在我国内外资企业中正式实施.面对纳税筹划环境的变化,企业在进行所得税纳税筹划时应该关注哪些变化?本文基于财务管理的视角,通过对企业设立、筹资、投资、资金运营、利润分配的整个过程的分析,找出新企业所得税法下企业纳税筹划的变化及企业需要注意的地方.     

浅议新企业所得税法下的纳税筹划

时于现代企业来说纳税筹划是企业财务管理的重要内容,本文分析了在新所得税法背景下,企业从筹资、投资、生产经营等多角度进行纳税筹划,从理论和实践上探讨了企业所得税方面的纳税筹划.     

所得税筹划在我国企业中的应用

随着我国社会经济的不断发展，市场竞争的日趋激烈，企业要在激烈的竞争环境中立于不败之地，通过纳税筹划，降低税收成本成为纳税人的必然选择之一。所得税是针对企业生产、经营所得和其他所得依法征收的一种税，有非常大的筹划空间，对企业所得税筹划得当，往往会获得可观的效益。因此，文章通过对新的企业所得税制的分析，为企业提供应对措施，从而积极主动地进行所得税筹划，使企业能做到依法纳税与合理避税、节税的协调统一，做到整体利益的最大化。     

On the timeliness of tax reform

This paper analyzes efficient government reactions to unanticipated tax avoidance. Quickly reforming tax laws to reduce the effectiveness of new tax avoidance techniques prevents widespread adoption, but indirectly encourages the rapid development of new avoidance methods if prior users are permitted to retain their tax benefits. Tax reforms that immediately prevent new avoidance mean that innovators need not fear imitation by competitors, and cannot rely on copying the innovations of others. Such an activist reform agenda diverts greater resources into tax avoidance activity, and might thereby lead to a faster rate of tax base erosion, than would a less reactive government strategy. Efficient government policy therefore entails either the retroactive elimination of tax savings, with possible associated costs, or else a deliberate pace of tax reform in response to taxpayer innovation.     

The effects of tax reform on labor supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when analyzing how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue and the welfare cost of taxation. Our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of taxpayer response.     

Tax progressivity, income distribution and tax non-compliance

This article examines the determinants of tax non-compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive “tax advice” industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability. We apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry. This tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence, the level of non-compliance, is the convexity of the demand schedule. We show that in this context, this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre-tax income, the progressivity of the tax-schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income. It is shown that lower pre-tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities. Therefore, the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline. One way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions.     

Asymmetric tax multipliers

Using recently published tax series by Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2013) we examine whether or not positive and negative tax shocks have asymmetric effects on the U.S. and U.K. economies. We find that in the U.S. positive tax shocks—tax increases—do not affect output while negative tax shocks—tax cuts—have large, positive effects. In the U.K., tax increases substantially reduce output while tax cuts have no significant effect.     

International tax coordination: regionalism versus globalism

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature. The model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination. With high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world, the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination, even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy.     

Capital tax competition: bane or boon

This paper reviews potential advantages and disadvantages of capital tax competition. Tax competition may introduce, mitigate, or exacerbate inefficiencies in both the private sector and the public sector. In different models, tax competition may either limit or increase public expenditures and taxes on mobile factors, with differing welfare consequences. We also discuss the implications of tax competition for redistributive policies and for policies dealing with risk, and we identify some of the possible empirical implications of tax competition.     

Designing tax policy in federalist economies: An overview

The emerging economic federations of the European Union, Russia, and South Africa, along with the established federations in Australia, Canada, and the United States, confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy. This paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies. We conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities. The usual ‘assignment’ view of federalis recommends central government policies — for example, resident-based taxation or grants-in-aid — to correct these failures. These recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner. The ‘political economy’ view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered. Alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered.     

The determinants of tax morale in comparative perspective: Evidence from European countries

Applying a multilevel model, we argue that tax morale is a function of individual- and contextual-level variables. Evidence presented in this article, based on the 2004–2005 European Social Survey and information on institutional settings, shows that tax morale in European countries varies systematically with socio-demographic characteristics, personal financial experiences, political attitudes, on the one hand, and regional GDP and tax arrangements on the other hand. Moreover, cross-national differences in tax morale are also related to ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations.     

What jackpot? The optimal lottery tax

The payout rate on lotto is normally fixed. We show that such a policy is generally suboptimal from the lotto authorities' point of view. The payout rate should be allowed to vary according to the number of rollovers that have occurred. To illustrate our argument, we simulate and optimize an econometric model of the lotto market in Israel. We also consider whether it is profitable to increase the frequency of lotto from once to twice a week.     

Tax competition,tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

There is little doubt that the step towards a monetary union in Europe will increase both the distorionary effects of existing differences in national tax systems and the intensity of tax competition for internationally mobile commodity and factor tax bases. This paper discusses selected issues of commodity and capital tax coordination that are likely to be affected by monetary unification. Starting from the distortive present scheme of value-added taxation in Europe we first analyze the effects of a switch to a general origin-based VAT as a way to maintain national tax rate autonomy over this important tax base. While an origin-based VAT would neither distort trade flows — both within the EU and with third countries — nor investment decisions in the long-run, its short-run effects are likely to be severe in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. In the field of capital taxation the focus switches to the feasibility of regional harmonization measures when there is no cooperation with the rest of the world. We argue that in a monetary union the mobility costs of capital will be significantly lower within the EU as compared to outside investments. This provides an efficiency argument for minimum source taxes on both interest income and corporate profits even if cooperation with third countries is infeasible.