Optimal regulation of technical progress in natural monopolies with asymmetric information

The focus of this paper is to characterize regulatory mechanisms for natural monopolies to provide for optimal technical progress when information is asymmetric. We model a Bayesian-Nash game where the monopolist has private knowledge of the cost-reducing effects of R&D investment to generate process innovations. In the first case, a price-regulated, profit-maximizing firm whose R&D level is unobservable sets its R&D level efficiently to maximize profits at the output level chosen by the firm. However, the level of technical progress achieved by the firm in this case is too high from the regulator's point of view since, in the second-best regulated solution of interest, the regulator has to provide for the R&D expenditures, assumed sunk, as well as for information rents transferred to the firm. In a second case, it can be shown that if the regulator can observe and set limits on the firm's investment in R&D, social welfare is improved, even though the regulated investment level is no longer efficient at the output level chosen by the firm. The reason for the welfare improvement is that losses in consumer surplus due to a decrease in output and an increase in the price are offset by a decrease in information rents and R&D costs transferred, causing the social costs of public funds to fall. Received: 31 July 1994 / Accepted: 15 January 1999     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

R&D项目投资评估的实物期权方法初探

本文分析了传统的NPV法在R&D项目投资评估中的缺陷,指出R&D项目投资本质上所具有的期权特性。在此基础上引入了实物期权方法,包括Black-Scholes期权定价方法和Geske期权定价模型。     

On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information

This paper deals with the optimal regulation for cost-reducing R&D and pricing in natural monopoly that is privately informed on its efficiency. We extend the work of Cantner and Kuhn (Rev Econ Des 4:191–204, 1999) and then we are able to analyse the entire effects of the interplay between agent’s efficiency and investment in R&D particularly considering the substitutability case.     

R&D investment and future firm performance: The role of managerial overconfidence and government ownership

We investigate the relationship among managerial overconfidence (MO), government ownership, and research and development (R&D) investment using data from Vietnamese public companies for the period 2007–2016. We also investigate how R&D investment, given MO and government ownership, affect future firm performance. Our results indicate that MO and government ownership are positively related to R&D investment. Conceptually, this study investigates novel factors affecting of R&D investment and their role in improving firm performance. Overall, this study emphasizes the importance of R&D investment in the corporate world, improving firm performance and, ultimately, economic prosperity.     

Family management,family succession,and R&D investment: An empirical study

Using data from the statements issued by A-share family firms listed on Chinese stock markets between 2008 and 2019, this paper explores the impacts of family management and family succession on R&D investment. We draw on the perspective of restricted and extended socioemotional wealth and differentiate exploitative R&D and explorative R&D in a detailed study. The study finds that the proportion of family members among board members or senior executives and the kinship of the CEO or chair of the board of directors have different effects on R&D investment, indicating that a diversity exists in how family members identify their role within the company. Furthermore, the participation of the controller’s children in the enterprise can promote explorative R&D investment instead of exploitative R&D, but only during the process of intergenerational succession. The findings differ from prior research in calling attention to the facts that the impact of family management is not always homogeneous owing to the dispersion of family members into different positions, and it can be misleading to conclude that R&D investment is more conservative in family businesses without considering the structure of R&D investment.

     

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

We embed the principal–agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for nonloyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is nonmonotonic in valuations such that some low-valuation consumers get higher surplus than high-valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher-quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.     

The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing

We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.     

基于实物期权法对R&D项目价值评估的研究——对布莱克-舒尔斯定价模型的改进

针对R&D项目投资的特点,探讨了采用布莱克一舒尔斯期权定价模型对R&D项目价值评估可能存在的缺陷,并提出一种改进方法,即将决策树和布莱克一舒尔斯定价模型结合运用,因为决策树能够模拟研发项目的阶段性决策过程,考虑到多个离散型不确定性因素的相关性,模拟并计算出对决策路径依赖的现金流,因此能克服纯粹使用布莱克一舒尔斯公式的不足,在考虑多个不确定性因素的影响下,实现对多阶段R&D项目价值的评估,作出正确的投资决策。     

Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation

With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.     

Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly

We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.     

Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market

Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperative R&D with Endogenous Technology Differentiation

We study a nontournament R&D duopoly. Before the standard R&D investment and quantity-setting stages, we consider a stage in which firms choose their R&D technologies. Spillovers negatively depend on R&D technology differentiation. We show that, in equilibrium, firms will choose identical or very similar R&D processes. Such equilibria may entail less differentiation than would be dictated by social welfare maximization.     

IS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE R&D ALWAYS JUSTIFIED? A DISCUSSION BASED ON THE LITERATURE ON GROWTH

Many economists have long held that market failures create a gap between social and private returns to research and development (R&D), thereby limiting private incentives to invest in R&D. However, this common belief that firms significantly underinvest in R&D is increasingly being challenged, leading the rationale behind public support for private R&D to be questioned. In this paper, we attempt to clarify the perspectives of two sources: the theoretical literature on endogenous growth, and its recent developments in integrating a geographical dimension, and the empirical literature that measures the social returns to R&D in relation to the private returns. Ultimately, we are able to clearly distinguish among different types of market failures and compare their relative impact on the gap between the private and social returns to R&D. Two main conclusions are reached. First, systematic firm underinvestment in R&D is not demonstrated. Second, even though instances of underinvestment do occur, they are mainly explained by surplus appropriability problems rather than by knowledge externalities. This suggests the need for a new policy mix that employs more demand‐oriented instruments and is more concentrated on identifying efficient allocations among activities rather than merely increasing global private R&D investment.     

管理层持股、研发投入与股权资本成本

企业研发投入具有风险性,会导致资本成本提高,研发融资负担加重,进而对企业研发活动的积极性产生负面影响。利用2007—2013年中国A股上市公司数据,对研发投入的资本成本效应和公司治理机制缓解研发投入资本成本效应的作用进行研究,结果显示：企业研发投入与股权资本成本之间显著正相关,研发投入的资本成本效应明显;提高高级管理者、董事会与监事会成员等管理层的持股比例有助于降低研发投入的资本成本效应。进一步研究发现,研发企业的信息披露程度对高级管理者持股降低研发投入资本成本效应具有替代作用;研发投入带来的收益率增加有助于抵消研发投入导致的股权资本成本提高。     

会员制两部定价法在酒店行业中的应用

针对目前酒店业常用定价方法的弊端，采用会员制两部定价法的原理，对会费和会员价进行了研究分析，得出了最优会费以及最优会员价的制定。分析发现，将会员制的管理与两部定价法结合起来，能够将统一定价下的消费者剩余转化为生产者剩余，增加酒店收益，提升酒店竞争力。     

Behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination

We develop a model of behavior‐ and characteristic‐based discriminatory pricing where consumers are heterogeneous both in tastes and in price sensitivity. Each firm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it and those that have bought from the rival. Furthermore, each firm learns the price sensitivity of their own consumers. We show that using this additional information may yield higher profits than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to price sensitivity. We also discuss consumer surplus implications of such behavior‐ and characteristic‐based price discrimination, and we show that the impact of price discrimination depends on both the consumer type and the level of consumers’ heterogeneity.     

要素市场扭曲、区域差异与R&D投入

本文利用要素市场扭曲指数及中国高技术产业1997～2009年省际面板数据,考察了要素市场扭曲对R&D投入的影响及区域差异。结果表明,要素市场扭曲对R&D资本投入和R&D人力投入有着不同的影响,抑制了R&D资本投入增长,促进了R&D人力投入;而且其对两者的影响都存在着显著的区域差异。在此基础上,运用门槛检验方法对这种区域差异的影响因素进行了探讨,研究发现,在区域经济发展水平、人力资本水平、财政收入、产权结构和对外开放程度等因素的不同门槛值区间,要素市场扭曲对高技术产业R&D投入的影响程度和方向都存在着明显的差异。     

研发投资、舞弊风险与审计费用

以2007—2018年中国A股市场研发投资额大于零的非金融类上市公司为研究对象,实证研究研发投资强度对财务舞弊风险和审计费用的影响以及CPA审计治理效果。研究结果表明：研发投资强度与财务舞弊风险和审计费用均正相关,并且财务舞弊风险在研发投资强度对审计费用的影响中存在部分中介效应。使用工具变量法进行内生性分析发现,研发投资强度在前三种度量方式（研发投入额÷总资产、研发投入额÷净资产、研发投入额÷公司员工数）下具有很强的外生性,而在第四种度量方式（研发投入额÷营业收入）下是内生的。对审计治理效果进行分析发现,虽然高审计收费保证了CPA较高的执业努力程度,但与审计合谋正相关的异常审计费用的存在使得CPA审计治理效果并不佳,并且对研发投资强度大的客户、财务舞弊风险高的客户和高新技术企业收取更高的异常审计费用通常与更高的审计合谋倾向有关。