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1.
We consider a country made up of two regions, where each region owns a local public firm and a domestic private one. A national authority decides whether or not to merge the two local public firms. The result depends on whether the goods produced by the firms are homogeneous, substitutes or complements. We find that if the two local public firms produce the same good, the national authority is indifferent as to whether to merge or not. When local public firms produce different goods two cases arise. First, if the firms in each region produce homogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms when the goods are complements, independent in demand and weak substitutes. Second, if the firms in each region produce heterogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms only when the goods are close complements. Therefore, there is greater scope for mergers in the former case than in the later. 相似文献
2.
We analyze two firms’ choice between merging, allying, and trading assets. We consider a setting in which firms have assets, skills, and core capabilities; skills are the component of organizational capital that increases in the course of joint operations, core capabilities the component that does not. We find that the two firms trade assets for them to operate separately in case the two firms have high initial skills; the two firms merge in case they have similar core capabilities; they ally where there is little equilibrium double moral hazard. We compare the times to dissolution in the alliance with those to divesture or post-merger integration in the merger; for all but the last jointly operated asset, we find that joint operations cease earlier in the alliance than in the merger. 相似文献
3.
Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game. 相似文献
4.
We develop an upstream–downstream model to analyze downstream firms' incentives to bundle. In our framework, the upstream firms are content providers (such as television stations) and the downstream firms are system operators (such as cable/satellite operators). We show that an a la carte regulation (i.e., a regulation that forces downstream firms to unbundle) leads to higher consumer surplus, if the unregulated equilibrium exhibits pure bundling (PB). Hence, our model predicts that in the television industry, which is mainly characterized by PB, an a la carte regulation will be beneficial for the consumers. If, on the other hand, the unregulated equilibrium is characterized by mixed bundling, then an a la carte regulation will increase consumer welfare provided that demand for multiple purchases is strong. 相似文献
5.
Competitive Mixed Bundling and Consumer Surplus 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Mixed bundling in imperfectly competitive industries causes some prices to rise and others to fall. This paper studies under what conditions mixed bundling works for or against the consumer interest. We find that if buyers incur firm-specific costs or have shop-specific tastes then competitive mixed bundling lowers consumer surplus overall and raises profits—the same is true of competitive volume discounts. Competition without these volume discounts causes all prices to be kept low as larger customers are targeted; with volume discounts the prices for heavy users drop, but more is extracted from small users. The consumer surplus result is reversed if the differentiation between components as opposed to firms is key. 相似文献
6.
7.
In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 11–130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322–336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent's payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides. 相似文献
8.
We study sequential mergers under incomplete information where the follower is ignorant about the leader's merger synergy. When the follower's own synergy is sufficiently large, incomplete information induces both firms to merge more. These additional mergers benefit both firms and total welfare but hurt consumers. If the follower's synergy is very small, the leader is unable to take any strategic action, and most results are reversed. The analysis suggests that incomplete information strengthens the strategic complementarity between the two mergers and thereby increases the likelihood of a merger wave. 相似文献
9.
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the corresponding order of pairs, at each step a rank-priority mechanism considers a rank-priority pair and matches an available student to an unfilled school if the student and the school rank and prioritize each other in accordance with the rank-priority pair. The Boston or immediate acceptance mechanism is a particular rank-priority mechanism. Our first main result is a characterization of the subfamily of rank-priority mechanisms that Nash implement the set of stable matchings (Theorem 1). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete information, no rank-priority mechanism implements the set of stable matchings (Theorem 2). 相似文献
10.
This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interaction between the pre‐ and post‐merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informational asymmetries arising from the pre‐merger period, and problems of cooperation and coordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree to merge and abstain from putting forth any post‐merger effort, counting on the other partner to make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goes ahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers are more likely to fail. 相似文献
11.
Chrysovalantou Milliou Apostolis Pavlou 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2013,22(4):787-809
In this paper, we provide an explanation for why upstream firms merge, highlighting the role of R&D investments and their nature, as well as the role of downstream competition. We show that an upstream merger generates two distinct efficiency gains when downstream competition is not too strong and R&D investments are sufficiently generic: The merger increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices. We also show that upstream firms merge unless R&D investments are too specific and downstream competition is neither too weak nor too strong. When the merger materializes, the merger‐generated efficiencies pass on to consumers, and thus, consumers can be better off. 相似文献
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13.
Pekka Ilmakunnas 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2002,23(2):69-82
A model of service duopoly is formulated, where the arrival of customers and their service time in the firm are stochastic. The firms first choose the service capacity, and given the capacity they then choose the price in a Bertrand competition. Capacity choices have a negative externality on the competitor, since increased capacity in one firm decreases its expected full price (price plus cost of waiting) and leads to a flow of customers from the other firm. If the firms choose capacities strategically, it is optimal to underinvest compared to the non‐strategic case, but this result may arise in different ways. By underinvesting the firms commit themselves to longer queues (lower quality) to relax price competition. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
14.
Intra-Industry Capital Structure Dispersion 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Why do firms in some industries exhibit very similar debt ratios, while firms in other industries do not? This paper examines the dispersion in leverage ratios among firms within an industry, and relates this dispersion to industry characteristics. We find that more concentrated industries and industries where the use of leasing is more intense exhibit greater intra‐industry dispersion. We also document greater dispersion in industries where firms use less incentive compensation, sit more insiders in their boards, are older, and have larger capital expenditures in relation to their assets. 相似文献
15.
The impact of venture capital financing method on SME performance and internationalization 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
One of the basic premises of venture capital is leverage, which often means adding money and other resources to speed up growth.
As a result, small- to medium-sized venture funded firms are expected to show significant growth at an early stage. Our research
examines how equity based-venture funding methods affect SME performance and internationalization. We divide venture capital
financing into several categories: incremental financing where firms receive their venture capital funding in portions, lump-sum
funding where firms receive their funding in one lump-sum, syndication where two or more external investors participate in
a single financing round and non-syndicated financing where one investor participates in a single financing round. The results
show that type of equity-based venture capital financing affect performance and internationalization. Annual sales growth
rate and annual turnover are used as proxies for performance. Export ratio is used as a proxy for internationalization. Staged
financing and financing through a syndicate has a positive effect on performance and internationalization when used separately.
We observe a negative effect when syndication and staged financing are used in combination. 相似文献
16.
We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below‐cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition‐softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition‐softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare. 相似文献
17.
Li-Hsueh Chen Shawkat Hammoudeh Yuan Yuan 《The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance》2011,51(4):408-418
This study examines the asymmetric adjustments to the long-run equilibrium for credit default swap (CDS) sector indexes of three financial sectors – banking, financial services and insurance – in the presence of a threshold effect. The results of the momentum-threshold autoregression (M-TAR) models demonstrate that asymmetric cointegration exists for all pairs comprised of those three CDS indexes. The speeds of adjustment in the long-run are much higher in the case of adjustments from below the threshold than from above for all the pairs. The estimates of The MTAR-VEC models suggest that the dual CDS index return in each sector pair participates in the adjustment to equilibrium in the short- and long-run taken together. But in the long-run alone, only one of the two spreads in each pair participates. Policy implications are also provided. 相似文献
18.
I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to adopt knowledge (absorptive capacity). I set up a model in which firms choose locations anticipating potential gains and losses from other firms’ R&D activity. I apply the model to the US software industry and obtain the following results: the data supports localized knowledge spillovers; firms that have higher absorptive capacity are sorted into more agglomerated counties; ignoring firm heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of gains from spillovers; spillovers play an important role in explaining the geographic distribution of firms, but only within regions with high R&D activity. 相似文献
19.
Fiona M. Scott Morton 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2002,11(1):135-168
This paper asserts that brand pharmaceutical firms (those mostly involved in the invention and production of new drugs) engage in a set of complementary activities that are different from those of generic pharmaceutical firms (those that primarily make off-patent medicines). Complementarities of the Milgrom-Roberts variety within, but not across, these two kinds of firms make it more efficient for pharmaceutical firms to specialize in either brand or generic production. Using FDA data, I show that this is indeed the case. I then examine the firms that produce both types of drugs to see if there are market-level strategic synergies between brand and generic products. I find generic entrants that belong to a corporation that owns the brand in the market are (1) not more likely to enter, (2) not more likely to be approved faster, and (3) not more likely to deter other generics from entering. Thus the advantage, or synergy, from mixing brand and generic activities in one corporation must arise elsewhere in the operations of the firm. If not, the integrated pharmaceutical firm is not the most efficient organizational form for the production of ethical drugs. 相似文献
20.
Paul W. Dobson 《Managerial and Decision Economics》1992,13(6):485-491
This paper considers the pricing and output decisions of firms which are related by the complementary nature of their products. The paper focuses on the problems which may result from non-co-operative behaviour of such firms. At the extreme, it is shown that non-cooperative complementary firms may ‘rationally’ choose to produce nothing. The paper considers the conditions which lead to this market failure result, and whether encouragement by government for the firms to co-operate or merge is required to make the market operate more efficiently. 相似文献