Limit order revisions

This paper empirically examines limit order revisions and cancellations which contribute to a significant portion of the order activity in many order-driven markets. We document that limit orders are more likely to be revised or cancelled if they are large and near the bid-ask quote. We show that order revisions generate net economic benefits to traders. Our evidence shows strong links between these activities and limit order submission risk using bid-ask spread, volatility and post-event return as proxies. We also find that these activities are less intense when the opportunity cost to monitor a stock is high, such as during lunch hours or when stock volume relative to the entire market is low.     

High-Frequency Trading and Market Performance

We study the consequences of, and potential policy responses to, high-frequency trading (HFT) via the tradeoff between liquidity and information production. Faster speeds facilitate HFT, with consequences for this tradeoff: Information production decreases because informed traders have less time to trade before HFTs react, but liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread) improves because informational asymmetries decline. HFT also pushes outcomes inside the frontier of this tradeoff. However, outcomes can be restored to the frontier by replacing the limit order book with one of two alternative mechanisms: delaying all orders except cancellations or implementing frequent batch auctions.     

Order Flow and Liquidity around NYSE Trading Halts

We study order flow and liquidity around NYSE trading halts. We find that market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly during trading halts, that a large proportion of the limit order book at the reopen is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and that the market-clearing price at the reopen is a good predictor of future prices. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to 'spread the quote' prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants.     

High-frequency trading and stock liquidity: An intraday analysis

This paper studies the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on intraday liquidity of CAC40 stocks listed on Euronext. Spreads display an intraday L-shaped pattern, while quoted depth follows an inverse pattern: low at the open and increasing towards the end of the trading day. When liquidity demand is particularly high, there is a high rate of order cancellations attributable to high-frequency traders who use frequent order cancellations to strategically manage their limit orders and close positions near the market close. Using the generalized method of moments estimator, we generate strong evidence that greater intensity of HFT is associated with lower spreads and higher depth. The positive effect of HFT on liquidity is due mainly to decreased adverse selection costs arising from asymmetric information among market participants.     

Fast and slow cancellations and trader behavior

We investigate how short-lived liquidity supply due to order cancellations affects the order-placement behavior of slow traders. When order cancellations increase, slow traders submit fewer and less aggressive orders. Both short- and long-lived liquidity supply have positive effects on the market overall, reducing spreads and increasing depth. We conclude that it is not necessary to require limit orders to have a minimum lifespan. We develop econometric and machine-learning frameworks that allow traders to predict whether a quote is likely to have a short or long life, increasing the ability of slow traders to respond strategically to changing order flow.     

THE DEALERS' PRICE/SIZE QUOTE AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We model trading in a competitive securities market where informed traders and liquidity traders transact with dealers. The dealers' entire published quote is modeled: bid-ask prices and the number of shares the dealer is willing to buy/sell at these prices (i.e., size quotes). We argue that size quotes are a more informative indicator of market liquidity than the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component. Moreover, the size quotes reveal several market characteristics that cannot be inferred from the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component alone. The model generates a number of empirically testable predictions that clarify certain key elements of market liquidity.     

Market making with minimum resting times

We show how the supply of liquidity in order-driven markets is affected if limit orders (LOs) are forced to rest in the limit order book for a minimum resting time (MRT) before they can be cancelled. The bid-ask spread increases as the MRT increases because market makers (MMs) increase the depth of their LOs to protect them from being picked off by other traders. We also show that the expected profits of the MMs increase when the MRT increases. The intuition is as follows. As the MRT increases, there are two opposing forces at work. One, the longer the MRT, the more likely the LOs are to be filled and, on average, shares are sold at a loss. Two, because the depth of the posted LOs increases, the probability that the LO is picked off by other traders before the end of the MRT decreases. The net effect is that a longer MRT leads to a higher expected profit. We also show that the depth of LOs increases when the volatility of the price of the asset increases. Also, the depth of LOs increases when the arrival rate of market orders increases because it is less likely that LOs will be picked off by the end of the MRT. Finally, our model also makes predictions about the overall liquidity of the market. We show that MMs choose to supply the minimum amount of shares per LO allowed by the exchange because expected profits are maximised when liquidity provided is lowest.     

Undisclosed orders and optimal submission strategies in a limit order market

Reserve orders enable traders to hide a portion of their orders and now appear in most electronic limit order markets. This paper outlines a theory to determine an optimal submission strategy in a limit order book, in which traders choose among limit, market, and reserve orders and simultaneously set price, quantity, and exposure. We show that reserve orders help traders compete for the provision of liquidity and reduce the friction generated by exposure costs. Therefore, total gains from trade increase. Large traders always benefit from reserve orders, whereas small traders benefit only when the tick size is large.     

Trader see,trader do: How do (small) FX traders react to large counterparties’ trades?

We show that information about the counterparty of a trade affects the future trading decisions of individual traders. The effect is such that traders tend to reverse their order flow in line with the better-informed counterparties. Informed traders primarily incorporate their own private as well as publicly available information into prices, whereas uninformed traders mainly magnify the effect of the informed. This pattern of interaction among traders extends to different order types: traders treat their own and others’ market orders as more informative than limit orders.     

Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets

This paper analyzes price formation under two trading mechanisms: a continuous quote-driven system where dealers post prices before order submission and an order-driven system where traders submit orders before prices are determined. The order-driven system operates either as a continuous auction, with immediate order execution, or as a periodic auction, where orders are stored for simultaneous execution. With free entry into market making, the continuous systems are equivalent. While a periodic auction offers greater price efficiency and can function where continuous mechanisms fail, traders must sacrifice continuity and bear higher information costs.     

The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.     

The securitization of gold and its potential impact on gold stocks

We study the market impact of a very successful financial innovation – the SPDR Gold Trust exchange-traded fund (GLD). GLD holds physical gold, and provides traders with a convenient and cost-effective way to gain exposure to gold. We find that after the introduction of GLD, the liquidity of gold company stocks declined, and their adverse-selection risk increased. Over the two-month period after GLD’s introduction, the stocks’ relative effective bid-ask spreads increased by over 15%, while their adverse-selection cost, as measured by the price impact of trades, went up by more than 30%. Gold stocks also experienced significant negative abnormal returns (−12% on average) in the month after GLD started trading. Our findings suggest that GLD attracted traders, especially uninformed traders, away from gold company stocks, and that the resulting negative demand shocks and decrease in the stocks’ liquidity caused their prices to decline. Our results show that existing securities can be seriously adversely affected when a new security enters the market.     

Can order exposure be mandated?

In this paper, we examine whether the hidden portion of limit orders represents depth that would be revealed if traders were not allowed to hide it, and the associated market quality implications. Specifically, we examine the decisions by the Toronto Stock Exchange to first abolish the use of hidden limit orders in 1996, and then reintroduce them in 2002. We find that quoted depth does not change following either decision, suggesting that the hidden portion of orders represents depth that would otherwise not be exposed. Using confidential order data for the period following the reintroduction of hidden limit orders, we find that total inside depth increases. For both events, volume does not change and the usage of the limit order book increases if hidden limit orders are allowed. This suggests that if traders are required to expose their orders they will not exit the market, but instead will switch to using market orders. We also find evidence to suggest that informed traders use hidden limit orders to minimize price impact if the probability of non-execution is small.     

Technology and liquidity provision: The blurring of traditional definitions

Limit orders are usually viewed as patiently supplying liquidity. We investigate the trading of one hundred Nasdaq-listed stocks on INET, a limit order book. In contrast to the usual view, we find that over one-third of nonmarketable limit orders are cancelled within two seconds. We investigate the role these “fleeting orders” play in the market and test specific hypotheses about their uses. We find evidence consistent with dynamic trading strategies whereby traders chase market prices or search for latent liquidity. We show that fleeting orders are a relatively recent phenomenon, and suggest that they have arisen from a combination of factors that includes improved technology, an active trading culture, market fragmentation, and an increasing utilization of latent liquidity.     

Informed trading and order type

Each trader must choose between a limit order, a market order, or using a floor broker. We hypothesize that informed investors will: (1) concentrate their trading in floor broker orders and (2) sometimes trade patiently. Consistent with our hypotheses, empirical results suggest that most informed trading occurs through orders executed by floor brokers and that informed floor brokers are sometimes patient. Regardless of their patience, however, quote revisions following trade executions are consistent with the hypothesis that markets recognize that floor traders are more likely to be informed than other traders. As a result, informed trading moves equilibrium security values.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Why do traders choose dark markets?

We examine U.S. equity trader use of dark and lit markets. Marketable orders executed in the dark have lower information content and smaller fill rates. Dark orders take longer to execute, but they execute at more favorable prices. Traders are more likely to go dark when the bid-ask spread is wider and those with higher dark participation are more sophisticated. Although market regulators have expressed concern over the rise in dark trading, our results indicate that dark markets provide important benefits to traders that lit markets do not.     

Lifting the Veil: An Analysis of Pre-trade Transparency at the NYSE

We study pre‐trade transparency by looking at the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook service that provides limit‐order book information to traders off the exchange floor. We find that traders attempt to manage limit‐order exposure: They submit smaller orders and cancel orders faster. Specialists' participation rate and the depth they add to the quote decline. Liquidity increases in that the price impact of orders declines, and we find some improvement in the informational efficiency of prices. These results suggest that an increase in pre‐trade transparency affects investors' trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market quality.     

Do Japanese candlesticks help solve the trader’s dilemma?

In this paper, we investigate whether Japanese candlesticks can help traders to find the best trade-off between market timing and market impact costs. Based on fixed-effect panel regressions on a sample of 81 European stocks, we show that implicit transaction costs are better characterized by using specific Japanese candlesticks patterns. Although market timing costs are not lower when Hammer-like and Doji configurations occur, market impact costs are significantly lower when and after a Doji structure occurs. We further check the potential gains through order submission simulations and find that submission strategies based on the occurrence of Doji result in significantly lower market impact cost than random submission strategies. These findings are of great interest for investors who look for occasional liquidity pools to execute their orders inexpensively such as institutional traders or hedgers.     

Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on Dark Trading

Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.