Corporate risk management and firm value: evidence from the UK market

The paper evaluates the effect of corporate risk management activities on firm value, using a sample of large UK non-financial firms. Following recent changes in financial reporting standards, we are able to collect detailed information on risk management activities from audited financial reports. This enables us to gain a better understanding of risk management practices and to investigate value implications of different types of hedging. Overall 86.88% of the firms in the sample use derivatives to manage at least one type of price risk. The hedging premium is statistically and economically significant for foreign currency derivative users, while we provide weak evidence that interest rate hedging increases firm value. The extent of hedging and the hedging horizon have an impact on the hedging premium, whereas operational risk management activities do not significantly influence the market value of the firm.     

CORPORATE HEDGING AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE

Although theory suggests that corporate hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, empirical studies show overall mixed support for rationales of hedging with derivatives. Although various empirical challenges and limitations advise some caution with regard to the interpretation of the existing evidence, the results are consistent with derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial strategy that considers the type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk management tools, and the operating environment of the firm. Moreover, corporations rely heavily on pass‐through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt to manage financial risk.     

The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging

We study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. We do so using an extensive, hand‐collected data set on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative realizations, thereby reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access to credit. Using a tax‐based instrumental variable approach, we show that hedgers pay lower interest spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. These favorable financing terms, in turn, allow hedgers to invest more. Our tests characterize two exact channels—cost of borrowing and investment restrictions—through which hedging affects corporate outcomes. The analysis shows that hedging has a first‐order effect on firm financing and investment, and provides new insights into how hedging affects corporate value. More broadly, our study contributes novel evidence on the real consequences of financial contracting.     

Corporate risk management: Costs and benefits

This paper establishes a framework within which the costs and the benefits of corporate risk management decisions can be analyzed. The most important conclusion is that risk management strategies should be pursued to enhance shareholder value. Although systematic hedging of all variation in the net cashflows may be in the best interest of the management, such behavior is inconsistent with maximizing firm and shareholder value. The extant empirical evidence cited is supportive of the notion that the strongest motive for risk management behavior is the avoidance of financial distress. However, there are offsetting costs to consider as well. The existence of these costs makes it imperative that shareholders understand the risk management process.     

Corporate reputation and hedging activities

This study examines whether corporate reputation affects derivative hedging. We posit that high-reputation firms are more likely to engage in hedging due to greater reputation costs and/or their commitment to lower financial risks. We find that high-reputation firms are more likely to engage in hedging, especially when their hedging efforts or effects are more observable to stakeholders. We also find that high-reputation firms are less likely to disclose the notional values of hedging positions and that interest rate hedging by high-reputation firms is detrimental to firm value. Our results shed light on the impact of reputational concerns on corporate risk management and disclosure policies.     

Corporate debt issues and interest rate risk management: Hedging or market timing?

Apart from the obvious reasons for raising capital, a firm can hedge its interest rate exposure by issuing debt, the value of which moves in an opposite direction from the value of its assets as interest rate varies. We examine whether firms in the UK market make full use of debt issuances for hedging purposes or if they have other considerations. Our evidence shows that firms’ choices of debt issues are primarily driven by debt market conditions in an effort to lower their costs of capital rather than managing their firm-specific interest rate exposures. This suggests that market timing, as opposed to hedging, is the primary motivation behind corporate debt issuances.     

A Simple Approach to Valuing Risky Fixed and Floating Rate Debt

We develop a simple approach to valuing risky corporate debt that incorporates both default and interest rate risk. We use this approach to derive simple closed-form valuation expressions for fixed and floating rate debt. The model provides a number of interesting new insights about pricing and hedging corporate debt securities. For example, we find that the correlation between default risk and the interest rate has a significant effect on the properties of the credit spread. Using Moody's corporate bond yield data, we find that credit spreads are negatively related to interest rates and that durations of risky bonds depend on the correlation with interest rates. This empirical evidence is consistent with the implications of the valuation model.     

Hedging the value of waiting

We analyze the optimal hedging policy of a firm that has flexibility in the timing of investment. Conventional wisdom suggests that hedging adds value by alleviating the under-investment problem associated with capital market frictions. However, our model shows that hedging also adds value by allowing investment to be delayed in circumstances where the same frictions would cause it to commence prematurely. Thus, hedging can have the paradoxical effect of reducing investment. We also show that greater timing flexibility increases the optimal quantity of hedging, but has a non-monotonic effect on the additional value created by hedging. These results may help explain the empirical findings that investment rates do not differ between hedgers and non-hedgers, and that hedging propensities do not depend on standard measures of growth opportunities.     

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.     

Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation

Firm value is influenced in many direct and indirect ways by financial risks which consist in unexpected changes of foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. The fact that a significant number of corporations are committing resources to risk management activities, however, represents only an indication for the potential of corporate risk management to increase firm value. This paper presents a comprehensive review of positive theories and their empirical evidence regarding the contribution of corporate risk management to shareholder value. It is argued that because of realistic capital market imperfections, such as agency costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing, risk management on the firm level (as opposed to risk management by stock owners) represents a means to increase firm value to the benefit of the shareholders.     

Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?

There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.     

Do Credit Spreads Reflect Stationary Leverage Ratios?

Most structural models of default preclude the firm from altering its capital structure. In practice, firms adjust outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value, thus generating mean-reverting leverage ratios. We propose a structural model of default with stochastic interest rates that captures this mean reversion. Our model generates credit spreads that are larger for low-leverage firms, and less sensitive to changes in firm value, both of which are more consistent with empirical findings than predictions of extant models. Further, the term structure of credit spreads can be upward sloping for speculative-grade debt, consistent with recent empirical findings.     

Corporate hedging and the cost of debt

For a large sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2009, we empirically examine the impact of corporate hedging on the cost of public debt. We find strong evidence that hedging is associated with a lower cost of debt. The negative effect of hedging on the cost of debt is consistent across industries, and remains economically and statistically significant under various controls and econometric specifications. A cross-sectional analysis based on propensity score matching suggests that hedging initiation firms experience a drop in cost of debt, while suspension firms sustain a jump. We confirm our findings after employing an extensive array of models to address potential endogeneity. The influence of hedging on cost of debt is mainly through the lowering of bankruptcy risk and agency cost, and the reduction in information asymmetry. Finally, hedging mitigates the negative effect of rising borrowing costs on capital expenditure and firm value.     

Hedging and earnings management in the light of IFRS implementation: Evidence from the UK stock market

This study examines the association between IFRS implementation, hedging and earnings management. It identifies the financial attributes of firms that utilise hedging and explores the IFRS transition process for hedgers and non-hedgers. This study also investigates the effects of a firm’s decision to use hedging or earnings management on firm value. The findings show that the transition to IFRSs has affected the equity, earnings, leverage and liquidity of hedgers in a significantly positive manner as opposed to non-hedgers, who presented a generally significant negative change in their respective figures. Hedgers tend to be larger sized and exhibit higher profitability, growth, leverage and liquidity. Hedgers also tend to have foreign revenues, be cross-listed in foreign stock markets and audited by a Big 4 auditor. This study reports that hedging and earnings management display an inverse relation. Firm value is found to be positively related to hedging and negatively related to discretionary accruals and managerial opportunism. Effective corporate governance mechanisms are found to display a negative association with discretionary accruals and a positive relation with firm value.     

Convex costs and the hedging paradox

Financial theory suggests that hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence of capital market imperfections, including direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and convex tax exposure. The influence of these costs, which are high when profits are low and low or negligible when profits are large, on the extent of firm hedging has not been consistently addressed in the finance literature. In Brown and Toft's (2002) model, more convex costs imply that a firm will decrease the extent of hedging. At the same time, one version of Smith and Stulz's (1985) tax hypothesis implies that a given firm is expected to increase the extent of hedging under a more convex tax exposure. I address this ambiguity in the literature by showing that, in incomplete markets, value-maximizing firms that stand to gain the most from hedging may in fact hedge less than otherwise identical firms with less to gain from hedging. This hedging paradox can partly account for the lack of conclusive evidence to suggest that convex costs can influence both a firm's decision to hedge and the extent of the firm's hedging. Finally, I introduce a new interpretation of empirical relations between potential hedging gains and the extent of hedging.     

The Effect of Interest Rates on the Value of Corporate Assets and the Risk Premia of Corporate Debt

A growing number of papers have applied option pricing techniques to the valuation of risky debt. This paper deals directly with how a firm's relationship to interest rates affects its debt. A sequential binomial model is used to price the zero-coupon bonds of a firm whose value is related to interest rate changes.The results show that the strength of the relationship between firm value and interest rates (interest-rate risk) can have a significant impact on the value of a firm's debt. The model produces its most powerful results when the volatility of firm value is high and the term structure has a steep (negative or positive) slope; there is no impact when the term structure is flat. Our results indicate that empirical studies of yield spreads may have severe shortcomings if the relationship of firm value to interest rate changes is ignored.     

Exposure,hedging, and value: New evidence from the U.S. airline industry

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. airline industry is a natural sample to analyze the relation between corporate risk exposure, hedging policy, and firm value. First, we find that airline exposures to fuel prices are higher when fuel prices are high or when they are rising. Second, we analyze the relation between exposure coefficients and the percentage of next year's fuel requirement hedged by airlines. In response to higher fuel price levels, rising fuel prices, and higher levels of exposure to fuel prices, airlines tend to increase their hedging activity. Finally, we explore the previously documented jet fuel hedging premium illustrated in Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006). We find a positive hedging premium in our analysis; however, the interaction of hedging and exposure does not affect firm value. We conclude that airlines increasing hedging activity because of higher fuel price exposure are not valued higher compared to those airlines employing more stable hedging policies.     

The Value of Corporate Risk Management

We model and estimate the value of corporate risk management. We show how risk management can add value when revenues and costs are nonlinearly related to prices and estimate the model by regressing quarterly firm sales and costs on the second and higher moments of output and input prices. For a sample of 34 oil refiners, we find that hedging concave revenues and leaving concave costs exposed each represent between 2% and 3% of firm value. We validate our approach by regressing Tobin's q on the estimated value and level of risk management and find results consistent with the model.     

The determinants of Norwegian exporters’ foreign exchange risk management

Abstract

This paper examines foreign exchange (FX) hedging by Norwegian exporting firms to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the hedging decision. The paper contributes to prior studies by, first, focusing on exporters to ensure that the companies in the sample have FX exposure, thereby allowing a more rigorous test of the theoretical determinants of hedging, and, secondly, in contrast to most previous studies that have focused on FX external hedging instruments, the use of both internal and external instruments is examined. Univariate, multivariate and multinominal analyses all provide evidence consistent with the firm value maximization hypotheses of underinvestment and risk aversion. Also, the following characteristics of firms—size, extent of internationalization and liquidity—are found to be related to the decision to hedge FX risk. However, the evidence on the links between the firm characteristics and the decision to hedge is not consistent across internal and external FX hedgers, and also varies for individual hedging instruments. Therefore it is argued that the empirical evidence on the theoretical determinants cannot be generalized to cover the full range of FX hedging strategies (which includes internal hedging instruments). Unlike empirical studies for other countries the evidence for Norwegian firms does not support the hypothesis that the avoidance of financial distress and the need to resort to external capital markets is a significant determinant of the hedging decision. Whilst the evidence suggests that country-specific factors may play a role in determining the use of FX hedging, it does not imply that the different policies adopted are necessarily inconsistent with the firm value maximization hypothesis.     

How should firms selectively hedge? Resolving the selective hedging puzzle

We provide a model of intertemporal hedging consistent with selective hedging, a widespread practice corroborated by recent empirical studies. We argue that the optimal hedge is a value hedge involving total current value of future earnings. More importantly, the hedging decision is independent of risk preferences of the firm or agent. Our closed-form solutions imply several implications for the risk management policy in a firm. In order to lock in profits a hedge increase is recommended in favorable states of nature, while in bad states the firm should decrease the hedge and wait. Our main new empirical implication is that selective hedging should be more prevalent in industries where managers are exposed to convex cash flow structures and are more likely to “value hedge” their exposures.