INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND COMMODITY-LINKED FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article provides a framework for appraising new financialinstruments and evaluating the extent to which they can helpalleviate problems of incomplete credit markets and contingentclaims markets in developing countries. Although the issuesinvolved apply to any new financial instrument, we give particularattention to commodity-linked securities because many developingcountries specialize in producing a handful of primary commoditiesand are therefore exposed to substantial commodity price risks.The article looks at the supply of, demand for, and pricingof commodity-linked securities and discusses some issues thataffect their use by developing countries: their special legalstatus as sovereign debt; their feasibility (since to becometruly effective they will require liquid secondary markets);and the construction of an optimal portfolio of external debtobligations. It also discusses the potential for new financialinstruments—particularly commodity-linked securities—asa tool for risk management in developing countries.      

Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders

What affects a country’s decision of whether to formallyengage in a trade dispute directly related to its exportinginterests? This article empirically examines determinants ofaffected country participation decisions in formal trade litigationarising under the World Trade Organization (wto) between 1995and 2000. It investigates determinants of nonparticipation andexamines whether the incentives generated by the system’srules and procedures discourage active engagement in disputesettlement by developing country members in particular. Thoughthe size of exports at stake is found to be an important economicdeterminant affecting the decision to participate in challengesto a wto-inconsistent policy, the evidence also shows that measuresof a country’s retaliatory and legal capacity as wellas its international political economy relationships matter.These results are consistent with the hypothesis of an implicit"institutional bias" generated by the system’s rules andincentives that particularly affects developing economy participationin dispute settlement.     

Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure?

Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availabilitydepends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictionsthat make capital structure relevant may also be associatedwith a firm’s source of capital. Examining this intuition,we find firms that have access to the public bond markets, asmeasured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage.Although firms with a rating are fundamentally different, thesedifferences do not explain our findings. Even after controllingfor firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure,and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating,firms with access have 35% more debt.     

SIMULTANEOUS DEBT AND EQUITY ISSUES AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE TARGETS

Numerous empirical studies find evidence that managers behave as if they pursue target debt ratios. A possible alternative to the use of conventional, separate issuances of debt and equity to effect desired adjustments toward a target ratio is the simultaneous issuance of such securities. We extend prior research on such issues by exploring their use in the pursuit of capital structure targets. We find that the issuance of securities in general and the use of simultaneous issues of debt and equity in particular are at least partially influenced by where a firm's capital structure is relative to the average position in its industry. Further, shareholders' reactions to the announced plan to issue and to the issuance of securities are influenced, in part, by whether the issue moves the firm toward or away from the average capital structure in the industry. We also find evidence that the infrequent use of simultaneous issues relative to unaccompanied debt and equity issues is explained by their comparative flotation costs.     

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

THE INTERWAR DEBT CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH

This article analyzes the sovereign defaults of the 1930s andreports nine major findings. (1) There is little evidence thatfinancial markets of the 1930s were unsophisticated or thatbanks have a comparative advantage over the bond market in processinginformation. (2) Debt default in the 1930s depended on a combinationof factors, including the magnitude of the external shock, thelevel of debt, and the economic policy response, as well ason a range of non-economic considerations. (3) Countries thatinterrupted service recovered more quickly from the Great Depressionthan did countries that resisted default. (4) There is littleevidence that countries that defaulted in the 1930s later sufferedinferior access to the capital market. (5) The readjustmentof defaulted debts was protracted: the analogy with corporatebankruptcy proceedings is not applicable. (6) Although defaultled in some cases to a substantial reduction of transfers fromdebtors to creditors, on balance returns on sovereign loanscompared favorably with returns on domestic investments. (7)Creditor governments in the 1930s did act to accelerate thesettlement process. (8) Global schemes analogous to the Bakerplan were widely proposed but never implemented. (9) In contrast,debt buybacks played a useful role in the resolution of thecrisis.      

Innovation, Differentiation, and the Choice of an Underwriter: Evidence from Equity-Linked Securities

Investment banks imitate other bank’s innovative corporatesecurities and compete with the innovator to underwrite newissues. This article uses data of all the corporate offeringsof equity-linked and derivative securities in the SecuritiesData Company (SDC) to estimate the issuer’s demand ofunderwriting services provided by investment banks across differentvarieties of securities. It finds that the demand for the innovator’svariety is larger than the imitators’. This demand advantagedecreases with time and faster for securities that appear laterin a sequence of innovations. Imitation becomes less attractivelater in the sequence as information from earlier deals spills-overto all banks.     

Adverse Selection,Investor Experience and Security Choice in Venture Capital Finance: Evidence from Germany

This article analyses 336 German venture capital transactions from 1990 to 2005 and seeks to determine why selected financial securities differ across deals. We find that a broad array of financial instruments is used, covering straight equity, mezzanine and debt‐like securities. Based on the chosen financial securities’ upside potential and downside protection characteristics, we provide an explanation for the differing use of these securities. Our results show that investors’ deal experience, adverse selection risks and economic prospects in the public equity market influence the selection of financial securities.     

Capital Flow Controls,International Asset Pricing,and Investors' Welfare: A Multi-Country Framework

This paper investigates the impact of capital flow restrictions on the pricing of securities, on the optimal portfolio composition for investors of different nationalities, and on their welfare. Under capital flow controls, the equilibrium price of a security is determined jointly by its international and national risk premiums, and investors acquire nationality-specific portfolios along with a market-wide proxy for the world market portfolio. Removal of investment barriers generally leads to an increase in the aggregate market value of the affected securities, and all investors favor a move toward market integration. Introduction of different types of index funds in the world market generally increases world market integration and investor welfare.     

Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice

When capital market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its liabilities will be priced in a way that makes the firm indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities that the market appears to overvalue most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer the insiders' information from the firm's financial structure. This paper evaluates the extent to which a firm's choice of risky debt maturity can signal insiders' information about firm quality. If financial market transactions are costless, a firm's financial structure cannot provide a valid signal. With positive transaction costs, however, high-quality firms can sometimes effectively signal their true quality to the market. The existence of a signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms' quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt.     

AN EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL AGENCY DEBT PRICING PRACTICES

Debt issuance procedures for federally sponsored agency securities differ considerably from the methods used by the U.S. Treasury and most corporate and municipal debt issuers. This paper examines the debt issuing procedures of the three major federally sponsored agencies and the efficiency with which the fiscal agents for those agencies price new debt issues. The conclusions from the analysis are: (1) fiscal agents for the major federally sponsored agencies are extremely adept at estimating the equilibrium competitive yields for new debt issues; (2) pricing errors on new issues are generally due to factors beyond a fiscal agent's control, such as the volatility of debt market conditions; and (3) the debt pricing practices for federally sponsored agency securities are efficient and effective.     

Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities

The Weak Government Hypothesis states that government fragmentation leads to higher public deficits and debt. This relation can be explained by government inaction, common pool problems or the strategic use of debt that arise in coalition governments. Importantly, whereas government inaction models concentrate on the short-term effects of government fragmentation on indebtedness, common pool and strategic debt models imply that such effects will persist in the long term. We test these hypotheses using a large panel of data on municipal debt in 298 Flemish municipalities (1977–2000). We find that there is no long-run effect from weak governments. However, there is general support for the fact that the number of parties in a coalition has a positive effect on the municipality’s short-term debt levels–in line with government inaction models.JEL Code: E62, H72, H74     

How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure?

We examine the importance of industry to firm-level financialand real decisions. We find that in addition to standard industryfixed effects, financial structure also depends on a firm’sposition within its industry. In competitive industries, a firm’sfinancial leverage depends on its natural hedge (its proximityto the median industry capital–labor ratio), the actionsof other firms in the industry, and its status as entrant, incumbent,or exiting firm. Financial leverage is higher and less dispersedin concentrated industries, where strategic debt interactionsare also stronger, but a firm’s natural hedge is not significant.Our results show that financial structure, technology, and riskare jointly determined within industries. These findings areconsistent with recent industry equilibrium models of financialstructure.     

Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality since 1980

One of the most contentious issues of globalization is the effectof global economic integration on inequality and poverty. Thisarticle documents five trends in the modern era of globalization,starting around 1980. The first trend is that growth rates inpoor economies have accelerated and are higher than growth ratesin rich countries for the first time in modern history. Developingcountries’ per capita incomes grew more than 3.5 percenta year in the 1990s. Second, the number of extremely poor peoplein the world has declined significantly—by 375 millionpeople since 1981—for the time in history. The share ofpeople in developing economies living on less than $1 a dayhas been cut in half since 1981, though the decline in the shareliving on less than $2 per day was much less dramatic. Third,global inequality has declined modestly, reversing a 200-yeartrend toward higher inequality. Fourth, within-country inequalityin general is not growing, though it has risen in several populouscountries (China, India, the United States). Fifth, wage inequalityis rising worldwide. This may seem to contradict the fourthtrend, but it does not because there is no simple link betweenwage inequality and household income inequality. Furthermore,the trends toward faster growth and poverty reduction are strongestin developing economies that have integrated with the globaleconomy most rapidly, which supports the view that integrationhas been a positive force for improving the lives of peoplein developing areas.      

THE DEBT CRISIS: WHERE DO WE STAND AFTER SEVEN YEARS?

The past seven years have seen little improvement in the worlddebt situation. During this period, policymakers have shiftedtheir attention from demand reduction by debtor nations to supplyexpansion. Most recently, debt reduction has become the principalissue. This article reviews various ways of resolving the debt problem.There is widespread agreement among competing proposals thatan efficient solution requires both debt reduction and economicgrowth in debtor countries. Disagreement arises over whetherthe necessary debt reduction and consequent adjustment in policiesin developing countries can be generated by market forces alone.The alternative is usually thought to be intervention by governmentsand commitment of public funds. This article groups and analyzesproposed solutions according to their relation to these twopositions. The survey concludes that there is no clear-cut solution tothe problem. Methods vary widely in their implications for efficiencyand equity as well as in their capacity to improve the situationand to do so quickly. Inevitably, official policy will continueto be determined less by economic ideals than by exigencies.The more urgent the problem becomes, the more likely the balanceis to swing from reliance on the market to direct intervention.      

A Comparative‐Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity

We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short‐term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short‐term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short‐term money‐like claims. We argue that, if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more toward short maturities, thereby partially crowding out the private sector's use of short‐term debt.     

Determinants of corporate debt maturity in South America: Do institutional quality and financial development matter?

We test whether a country's level of financial development or institutional quality (or both) has a first‐order effect on corporate debt maturity decisions on a sample of 359 non-financial firms from five South American countries over a 12‐year period. We find that there is a substantial dynamic component in the determination of a firm's debt maturity, and firms face moderate adjustment frictions toward their optimal maturities. More importantly, the level of financial development does not influence debt maturity, whereas the institutional quality of a country has a significant positive effect on the level of long-term debt in a firm's financial structure. Our results support the hypothesis that the quality of national institutions is an important determinant of corporate financing in general and of debt maturity in particular.     

FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL STRATEGY

Even if the value of the firm is unaffected by its capital structure, managers may have reasons to choose a particular structure. The prices of the firm's securities reflect the “market's” assessment of the value and riskiness of the firm. Should managers disagree with the market's assessment of the firm's risk or value, they will also disagree about the relative returns on the firm's securities. Concern about shareholder welfare may, therefore, lead them to prefer a specific capital structure. If managers believe the market has underestimated the firm's value, they will prefer debt financing; if the market has overestimated risk, they will prefer equity; and, if managers disagree about both risk and value, they may prefer to finance using both debt and equity.     

Default Risk, Asset Pricing, and Debt Control

The pricing and control of firms’ debt has become a majorissue since Merton’s (1974) seminal article. Yet Mertonas well as other recent theories presume that the asset valueof the firm is independent of the debt of the firm. However,when using debt finance, firms may have to pay a premium foran idiosyncratic default risk and may face debt constraints.We demonstrate that firm-specific debt constraints and endogenousrisk premia, based on collateralized borrowing, affect the assetvalue of the firm and, in turn, the collateral value of thefirm. In order to explore the interdependence of debt financeand asset pricing of firms, we endogenize default premia andborrowing constraints in a production-based asset pricing model.In this context then the dynamic decision problem of maximizingthe present value of the firm faces an additional constraintgiving rise to the debt-dependent firm value. We solve for theasset value of the firm with debt finance by the use of numericaldynamic programming. This allows us to solve the debt controlproblem and to compute sustainable debt as well as the firm’sdebt value.     

FISCAL DEFICITS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although fiscal adjustment was urged on developing countriesduring the 1980s to lead them out of economic malaise, considerableuncertainty remains about the relations between fiscal policyand macroeconomic performance. To illustrate how financial markets,private spending, and the external sector react to fiscal policies,the behavior of holdings of money and public debt, private consumptionand investment, the trade balance, and the real exchange rateis modeled for a sample of ten developing countries. The studiesfind strong evidence that over the medium term, money financingof the deficit leads to higher inflation, while debt financingleads to higher real interest rates or increased repressionof financial markets, with the fiscal gains coming at increasinglyunfavorable terms. Consumers respond differently to conventionaltaxes, unconventional taxes (through inflation or interest andcredit controls), and debt financing, in ways that make fiscaladjustment the most effective means of increasing national saving.Private investment—but not private consumption—issensitive to the real interest rate, which rises under domesticborrowing to finance the deficit. Contrary to the popular presumption,in some countries private investment increases when public investmentdecreases. There is strong evidence that fiscal deficits spillover into external deficits, leading to appreciation of thereal exchange rate. Fiscal deficits and growth are self-reinforcing:good fiscal management preserves access to foreign lending andavoids the crowding out of private investment, while growthstabilizes the budget and improves the fiscal position. Thevirtuous circle of growth and good fiscal management is oneof the strongest arguments for a policy of low and stable fiscaldeficits.