共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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We study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. We also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer. 相似文献
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This paper examines a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a divisional manager has superior information regarding the profitability of an investment project available to his division. The manager also contributes to the periodic operating cash flows of his division through personally costly effort. We demonstrate that it is optimal for the principal to delegate the investment decision and to base the manager's compensation on the residual income performance measure. Our analysis points to a class of depreciation rules and to a particular capital charge rate which together ensure that a profitable (unprofitable) project makes a positive (negative) contribution to residual income in every period. As a consequence, the compensation parameters for each period can be chosen freely so as to address the moral hazard problems without impacting the manager's investment incentives. 相似文献
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K. N. BHASKAR 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》1974,1(2):267-291
Weingartner, in 1963, published his solution to the Lorie and Savage problem of choosing the optimal combination of projects given that capital rationing occurs in more than one period. This paper discusses the rationale of the Weingartner model and develops a systematic way of treating lending. Indeed not to include lending can lead to sub-optimal results. Borrowing is then included into the model at the cost of making certain restrictive assumptions. 相似文献
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We document a robust cross‐sectional positive association across industries between a measure of the economic efficiency of corporate investment and the magnitude of firm‐specific variation in stock returns. This finding is interesting for two reasons, neither of which is a priori obvious. First, it adds further support to the view that firm‐specific return variation gauges the extent to which information about the firm is quickly and accurately reflected in share prices. Second, it can be interpreted as evidence that more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment. 相似文献
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