The value of information for auctioneers

An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [D. Bergemann, M. Pesendorfer, Information structures in optimal auctions, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007) 580–609], who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric.     

Recursive utility and preferences for information

Summary. This paper presents an axiomatic foundation for recursive utility that captures the role of the timing of resolution of uncertainty without relying on exogenously specified objective beliefs. Two main representation results are proved. In the first one, future utility enters the recursion through the type of general aggregators considered in Skiadas (1997a), and as a result the formulation is purely ordinal and free of any probabilities. In the second representation these aggregators are conditional expectations relative to subjective beliefs. A new recursive representation incorporating disappointment aversion is also suggested. The main methodological innovation of the paper derives from the fact that the basic objects of choice are taken to be pairs of state-contingent consumption plans and information filtrations, rather than the temporal (objective) lotteries of the existing literature. It is shown that this approach has the additional benefit of being directly applicable to the continuous-time version of recursive utility developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992). Received: February 18, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997     

The social value of information on product quality

In the context of a seller with private information about product quality, I show that revelation of information on product quality is sometimes, but not always, socially valuable. When it is socially valuable, there is generally a tradeoff between the acquisition and revelation of finer, but more costly information and the revelation of coarser, but less costly information. As a result, it can be socially optimal for firms to reveal only coarse private information.     

The value of information in monotone decision problems

We study the information preferences and information demand of decision-makers facing uncertainty. We focus on monotone decision problems in which the posterior beliefs induced by the decision-maker’s information can be ordered so that higher actions are chosen in response to higher signal realizations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for decision makers with different classes of payoff functions to prefer one information structure to another. We also provide conditions under which two decision-makers in a given class can be ranked in terms of their information demand. Applications and examples are given.     

The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction.I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative distribution functions of the head start. The stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if his head start distribution is not stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. I identify why my results for an uncertain head start differ qualitatively from uncertainty about a cost function or a valuation.     

The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty

This paper discusses the value of information in supermodular and submodular games, using a simple duopoly model where the level of demand is uncertain. It is shown that the value of information issuperadditive (resp.,subadditive) between players if the game issupermodular (resp.,submodular). For example, in a Bertrand (resp., Cournot) market with (possibly imperfect) substitute products, one firm's information acquisition increases (resp., decreases) the other firm's incentive to acquire the same information. Furthermore, when the game is either supermodular or submodular, the value of information is higher when the player isexpected to be informed according to the opponent's belief than when the player is expected to be uninformed; this result is reversed when the game has asymmetric modularity (i.e., one player's action is substitutional to the other's, and the latter's action is complemental to the former's). These qualitative observations have a potential to be applied to a larger class of games with uncertainty where payoffs are smooth (e.g., twice continuously differentiable) in actions and states.     

Existence and fairness of value allocation without convex preferences

Shafer (Econometrica, 48 (1980), 467–476) proved that in a finite exchange economy value allocations exist, provided that each agent has convex, complete, transitive, compact and monotone preferences. However, if preferences are not convex, then value allocations may not exist. To remedy this difficulty we enlarge the set of value allocations by introducing the concept of approximate value allocations, and show that in a finite exchange economy approximate value allocations exist, even if preferences are not convex, or compact, or monotone. This value existence result can be used to provide a very general value existence theorem for a sequence of finite economies. Further, we show that value allocations may discriminate in favor of or against a coalition of agents.     

Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information

We obtain the optimal contract for the government (principal) to regulate a manager (agent) who has a taste for empire-building that is his/her private information. This taste for empire-building is modeled as a utility premium that is proportional to the difference between the contracted output and a reference output. We find that output is distorted upward when the manager’s taste for running large firms is weak, downward when it is strong, and equals a reference output when it is intermediate (in this case, the participation constraint is binding). We also obtain an endogenous reference output (equal to the expected output, which depends on the reference output), and find that the response of output to cost is null in the short-run (in which the reference output is fixed), whenever the manager’s type is in the intermediate range, and negative in the long-run (after the adjustment of the reference output to equal expected output).     

Assessing information provision and respondent involvement effects on preferences

We develop a test of the effect of information and respondent involvement on preferences for passive-use values using three treatments. Individuals from a rural community participated in one of three groups, each with a different level of involvement in the valuation assessment. The first group was highly involved, attending three meetings which allowed for information acquisition and preference construction. The second group was involved in a single meeting, and the third group was minimally involved through telephone contact and the completion of a mail administered survey. The hypothesis examined was that the degree of involvement in the exercise would affect the magnitude and consistency of preferences across the groups. The hypothesis that the preferences differ was not accepted. Furthermore, the hypothesis that variances in preferences would be higher in less involved groups was also rejected. While the analysis is based on relatively small samples the findings suggest caution in claiming that increasing degrees of respondent involvement improve economic measures of trade-offs.     

Social value of public information re-examined

As an extension of Hirshleifer's horse race example into a competitive exchange market framework, this paper quantitatively re-examines the condition under which social value of public information can be positive. For a prototype economy of two risk averse traders, we prove that their discordance of beliefs makes the social value of a certain class of inconclusive information either positive or negative depending on whether their endowments are or are not predominantly associated with states they regard as more probable, whereas it has been known that information acquisition is always socially wasteful under concordant beliefs.     

Correlated risks and the value of information

A decision maker faces two correlated risks and can obtain information on only one of them. Intuition suggests that the existence of a high correlation (in absolute value) between the risks should increase total information value. Indeed in such a case information about one risk induces a relevant information on the other one. Using a simple example, we show that this intuition is often correct, but that it can also be mitigated by other factors.     

中小企业信息化水平测评方法研究

文章提出了建立中小企业信息化水平评价指标体系,针对我国中小企业的特点选择了评价指标,运用层次分析法对指标权重进行了确定,提出了变权重的评价方法,使指标体系更适于对不同行业的中小企业信息化水平做出准确的评价。     

The market for preferences

Learning processes are widely held to be the mechanism by whichboundedly rational agents adapt to environmental changes. Weargue that this same outcome might also be achieved by a differentmechanism, namely specialisation and the division of knowledge,which we here extend to the consumer side of the economy. Wedistinguish between high-level preferences and low-level preferencesas nested systems of rules used to solve particular choice problems.We argue that agents, while sovereign in high-level preferences,may often find it expedient to acquire, in a pseudo-market,the low-level preferences in order to make good choices whenpurchasing complex commodities about which they have littleor no experience. A market for preferences arises when environmentalcomplexity overwhelms learning possibilities and leads agentsto make use of other people's specialised knowledge and decisionrules.     

Learning about compliance under asymmetric information

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms’ pollution levels and this information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future. If a firm is less successful than its peers in reducing emissions, it faces the risk of being targeted for increased inspections in the next period. This risk of stricter monitoring might induce high-abatement cost firms to mimic low-abatement cost firms by choosing lower emission levels, while the latter might try to avoid being mimicked. We explain firms’ compliance decisions and the inspection agency's monitoring strategy by means of a signaling game which incorporates dynamic enforcement and learning. Interestingly, we show that the ongoing signaling game between firm types might lead to firms over-complying with the emission standard.     

The competitive firm and the role of information about uncertain factor prices

This paper studies the role of information about uncertain input prices for a competitive firm. The production decision has to be taken when the price of an input factor is perceived as random. However, a signal is observable in advance, conveying some information about the future factor price. Transparency is linked to the informational content of this signal. The impact of a higher level of transparency is analyzed from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the information signal is observed. The change of factor use, production amount and cost are determined by comparing the strength of the curvatures of total and marginal product. By contrast, ex ante profit always increases, independently of the shape of the production function.     

The implications of nurse staffing information: the real value of reporting nursing data

There is a dearth of information about the relationship between the patient care contributions of nursing and its financial contributions to an organization. As consumers and legislators are becoming more aware of the ramifications of nurse staffing issues, and as they endeavor to address them with legislative solutions, the decision on how best to develop optimal staffing strategies may soon be taken away from nursing leaders. To maintain control of this important issue and develop solutions that will help highlight the economic and patient care contributions of nurses, a thorough understanding of the problem, and a new commitment are needed from nursing leaders to take charge of the issue. To relate nursing care to patient outcomes, meaningful data on the nursing care provided is needed in addition to data on the nursing needs of patients. Staffing and performance monitoring tools should be used to effectively plan, implement, and control financial and operating resources as well as measure the economic value of the nursing profession's contribution to the cost and benefits of patient care.     

Imperfect common knowledge and the information value of prices

Summary. When economic agents have diverse private information on the fundamentals of the economy, prices may serve as a poor aggregator of this private information. We examine the information value of prices in a monopolistic competition setting that has become standard in the New Keynesian macroeconomics literature. We show that public information has a disproportionate effect on agents’ decisions, crowds out private information, and thereby has the potential to degrade the information value of prices. This effect is strongest in an economy with keen price competition. Monetary policy must rely on less informative signals of the underlying cost conditions.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 19 November 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: E31, E32, E58.This paper supersedes the discussion in the first half of our longer paper that circulated under the title “Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models”. We thank Andy Filardo, Marvin Goodfriend, Nobu Kiyotaki, John Moore, Stephen Morris and Lars Svensson for advice and comments at various stages of the project, and to Herakles Polemarchakis, Roko Aliprantis and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and guidance. The views are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the BIS. The second author acknowledges support from the U.K. ESRC under grant RES 000220450. Correspondence to: H.S. Shin     

佛坪大熊猫保护区见闻

憨态可掬,国宝,世界珍稀动物,这些关键词概括了我对大熊猫了解的全部。应该说,我对它既熟悉又陌生。说熟悉,是我在北京动物园多次见过它;陌生,是因为我对它生活习性和生存地域的了解均为空白。前不久,中国人与生物圈国家委员会的有关同志赴大熊猫重要栖息地陕西佛坪考察,我随同