Ownership, institutions, and capital structure: Evidence from China

We employ a unique data set to explore the role of ownership structure and institutional development in debt financing of non-publicly traded Chinese firms. We show that state ownership is positively associated with leverage and firms’ access to long-term debt, while foreign ownership is negatively associated with all measures of leverage. Surprisingly, firms in better developed regions are associated with reduced access to long-term debt, suggesting the availability of alternative financing channels and the tightening of the lending standards under the on-going banking reform. The combination of ownership structures and institutions explains up to 6% of the total variation in firms’ leverage decisions, while firm characteristics alone explain no more than 8% of the variation. Further, we show that non-state-owned firms tend to have lower total and short-term debt than their state-owned counterparts in less developed regions. Finally, we show that state-owned firms’ easy access to long-term debt is positively associated with long-term investment and negatively associated with firm performance.     

Stock market-driven investment: new evidence on information,financing and agency effects

This study provides a theoretical model and empirical analysis to jointly examine the information, financing and agency effects, the three channels through which the stock market can actively influence corporate investment decisions and firm performance. First, stock market affects corporate investments, and such impact varies with different market valuation measures, types of investments and firm characteristics. Second, stock market valuation affects investments through the channel of corporate financing, supporting the financing hypothesis. Third, stock market-driven investments have differential impacts on the future operating performance of firms. Investments driven by market valuation of firm-specific information have a positive effect on future performance. In contrast, investments driven by market-wide sentiment have a negative effect on future performance. Fourth, consistent with the information hypothesis, market-driven investments are value-enhancing for firms with better external monitoring by analysts and institutional investors. Lastly, consistent with the agency hypothesis, market-driven investments are value-destroying when firms lack external monitoring, proper managerial incentives and independent board of directors.     

Debt shifting and ownership structure

Previous theoretical studies on the debt shifting behavior of multinationals have assumed affiliates of multinationals to be wholly owned. We develop a model that allows a multinational firm to determine both the leverage and ownership structure in affiliates endogenously. A main finding is that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates and therefore a less tax-efficient financing structure. This is due to an externality that arises endogenously in our model, where costs and benefits of debt shifting are shared asymmetrically between minority and majority owners. Our findings provide a theory framework for recent empirical findings.     

Corporate governance and research and development: Evidence from Japan

This paper investigates the effects of the ownership structure on the R&D intensity. Using the Japanese machine-manufacturing firm data from 1987 till 1998, we first found that the effects of R&D on stock market valuation and TFP growth were significantly positive in the latter half of the 1990s. Next, analyzing the determinants of the R&D intensity in 1998, we found that the shareholding ratios of large shareholders and the leverage ratios were positively correlated with R&D intensity, while the proportion of bank loans to total debt was negatively correlated with it. These results are consistent with the hypotheses that stress the disciplinary roles of large shareholders and debt. It is also consistent with a bank's holdup hypothesis. Finally, comparing the results of 1998 with those of 1989, we found that the positive roles of keiretsu affiliation and cross-shareholdings disappeared during the last decade.     

Debt maturity and firm productivity—The role of intangibles

Does the maturity of debt matter for productivity? Using data on Italian firms from 1997 to 2015, we study the relationship among debt maturity, productivity, and firm characteristics. We find that productivity is positively associated with short-term debt and negatively associated with long-term debt. This result supports the hypothesis that the less intense monitoring of firm performance and fewer liquidation fears stemming from the long maturity of debt causes a moral hazard, while short-term debt serves as a disciplinary device to improve firm performance in the short run. This effect is evident in small- and medium-sized enterprises and old firms. In contrast, large firms can utilize long-term financing to improve productivity through long-term investments. Firms improve productivity by purchasing intangible assets financed by short-term debt.     

Not Leverage but Change in Leverage Matters for Firms’ Future Growth: Evidence from Turkey's Top 1000

In the financial literature it is generally assumed that a firm's financial leverage is a good measure (proxy) of the firm's access to financing. In this study, it is argued that it is not the firm's debt (leverage), but the change in leverage that more accurately mirrors the firm's true likelihood to have access to external sources of financing. Applying a firm-type analysis and panel data techniques to data on the top 1000 private industrial companies of Turkey for the period 1997–2012, it is shown that it is the change in leverage ratio, not the level of leverage ratio itself that matters for the future firm growth, controlling for profitability, leverage and firm size.     

Local Government Debt and Firm Leverage: Evidence from China

China's local government debt financing has been expanded aggressively to support infrastructure investment, especially since the enactment of four‐trillion‐yuan stimulus plan to stimulate the economy post global financial crisis. At the same time, the rapid increase of firm‐level leverage ratio of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and the decline of leverage ratio of non‐SOEs jointly deteriorated China's credit misallocation problem. In this study, we empirically test the effect of local government debton firm leverage in China. We find that an expansion of local government debt significantly crowded out the leverage of non‐SOEs, while crowded in that of SOEs. Moreover, the effect differed across industries and sectors.     

Board size,corporate regulations and firm valuation in an emerging market: a simultaneous equation approach

We investigate the association between board size and firm valuation for a sample of 169 firms from 2002 to 2011 in South Africa (SA). The SA corporate context is interestingly and uniquely characterised by an urgency to meet affirmative action regulations, such as black empowerment in board appointments, limited qualified and experienced directors, especially black directors, concentrated ownership, weak enforcement of corporate regulations and greater government ownership. These features make SA corporate boards perform a weaker agency (advisory, monitoring and disciplining) role than Western European and US boards, but a stronger resource dependence role, by providing access to resources, such as business contacts and contracts. This suggests that any positive impact of board size on firm valuation is likely to depend on the effective execution of the resource dependence role more than the agency role. Our results suggest that board size has a positive association with firm valuation, consistent with larger boards providing better access to resources. Overall, our results support the resource dependence role of boards more than their agency role. The results are robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity, as well as different types of accounting and market-based firm valuation measures.     

Bank competition and the cost of debt: the role of state ownership and firm size

The argument on the puzzling relationship between bank competition and the cost of debt remains inconclusive as the effects of state ownership and firm size are intertwined. We find that bank competition is negatively associated with the cost of debt and observe that the negative effect of bank competition is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and weaker for large-sized enterprises. Our findings accord with the market power hypothesis. State ownership strengthens the negative impact of bank competition on the cost of debt, but firm size tends to weaken it. SOEs and large-sized enterprises are associated with a lower cost of debt compared to non-SOEs and small- and medium-sized enterprises, respectively.     

Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known “underinvestment” incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.     

Corporate financial soundness and its impact on firm performance: implications for corporate debt restructuring in Slovenia

This article studies the extent of corporate leverage and range of excessive debt of Slovenian firms during the recent financial crisis. Half of all firms (of those with some non-zero debt and at least one employee) are found to face an unsustainable debt-to-EBITDA leverage ratio beyond 4, accounting for almost 80% of total outstanding debt. Moreover, a good quarter of all firms experience debt-to-EBITDA ratios exceeding 10 and hold almost half of total aggregate net debt. We then examine how this financial distress affects firm performance in terms of productivity, employment, exports, investment and survival. We find that, while less important during the good times (pre-recession period), lack of firms’ financial soundness during the period of financial distress becomes a critical factor constraining firm performance. The extent of financial leverage and ability to service the outstanding debt are shown to inhibit firms’ productivity growth as well as the dynamics of exports, employment and investment. Micro and small firms are found to suffer relatively more than larger firms from high leverage in terms of export and employment performance during the recession period.     

Labour unions and leverage: evidence from firm-level union data

ABSTRACT

Using firm-level labour union data from Japan, this paper investigates the effect of labour unions on firm leverage. We find that as union coverage increases, both the level of and extent of change in leverage decreases. These relations remain robust when a firm falls into deficit. We also find that firms with higher union coverage have a higher interest coverage ratio. In addition, we find that firms with higher union coverage are less likely to choose issuing debt compared to issuing equity when they face financial distress. Our results imply that significant employee influence enhanced by labour unions increases fixed costs, crowds out the firm’s debt capacity and consequently reduces the firm’s leverage.     

Ownership Structure and Capital Structure: A Study of Vietnamese Listed Firms

This paper examines the relationships between ownership structure and capital structure for non‐financial listed firms in Vietnam during the period 2007–2012. Although different approaches are applied in this research, all results from those models are consistent. The study finds that while foreign ownership has a negative impact on leverage, state ownership has a positive influence. Managerial ownership has a positive relation with debt level, while the effect of large ownership on debt level is not conclusive.     

不同所有制下管理者过度自信与公司债务融资的关系

本文以2002—2008年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,利用OLS回归模型考察了在不同所有制公司中管理者过度自信与债务融资之间的关系。研究结果显示:在不同所有制的上市公司中,管理者过度自信对公司债务融资的影响存在差异。与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司的管理者更加过度自信,更倾向于选择债务融资;在债务期限方面,不同所有制公司的过度自信管理者都倾向于使用长期债务,但在国有上市公司中这种倾向表现得更为显著。     

Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt leverage stands as a key variable in the design of a control contract as it has a strong disciplinary role. A simple option valuation model is used to show that debt is also a governance variable because it can moderate or enhance private benefits. It is argued that an asymmetrical self-regulation mechanism may develop in the case of control by a dominant shareholder. The joint questions of control, private benefits, and debt levels are linked within an inside corporate governance framework. At low levels of leverage, debt is relatively less disciplinary compared with a non-private benefits case. When leverage exceeds a threshold point, it becomes strongly disciplinary. We show that under given conditions, a self-regulation mechanism develops where the controlling shareholder is incentivized to hold less debt when he/she wants to increase his/her private appropriation rate.     

高管持股对创新可持续性的影响研究

企业创新活动一旦中断将会产生巨大的调整成本损失。因此,如何保持企业创新可持续性是企业创新研究的重要问题。结合委托代理理论,探索了企业高管持股对创新可持续性的影响,并进一步讨论了高管过度自信与产权性质的调节作用。使用2003-2014年中国A股制造业上市公司面板数据进行实证分析,结果表明：高管持股对企业创新可持续性具有显著正向影响,高管过度自信则弱化了两者间正向关系,而相对于非民营企业,民营企业高管持股对创新可持续性的正向作用更强。同时考虑两种情境效应的综合影响时,在民营企业中高管过度自信的负向调节作用更强。最后,考虑了遗漏变量带来的“选择偏差问题”和内生性问题,采用基于Kernel匹配得分法的反事实检验,为实证结果提供了稳健性证明。     

Debt, managerial compensation and learning

Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt and bankruptcy on managerial compensation and learning. In this model, compensation has two roles to play—providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt, through bankruptcy, acts as a substitute of compensation in both dimensions and derive conditions under which debt lowers average compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and increases learning. We also examine the choice of debt and show that firm value can be increased due to debt's effect on managerial compensation, abstracting from other costs and benefits of debt. Finally, we conduct comparative statics with respect to the underlying parameters.     

Ownership structure and diversification in a scenario of weak shareholder protection

This work examines the influences of ownership concentration and insider ownership on corporate strategies for diversification within a scenario characterized by poor protection of shareholder interests. We find evidence of a quadratic relationship between ownership concentration and diversification, and a cubic relationship between diversification and insider ownership. These results point towards the high probability of both expropriation and entrenchment phenomena, respectively, in this kind of scenario. We also find that concentrated ownership requires high levels of insider ownership, in order to prevent negative externalities of diversification. Another result shows that entrenchment externalities affect diversification before they erode firm value, which suggests that for low levels of diversification, firm value is still not negatively affected. Additionally, our results show that control mechanisms, such as debt, director remuneration and compliance with codes of good practice, are negatively related to the level of diversification. Overall, our results confirm the theoretical relevance of agency theory in explaining managerial attitudes towards corporate strategy, i.e. diversification. Furthermore, companies characterized by deficiencies in shareholder legal protection, concentrated ownership structures and a higher likelihood of managers being entrenched, should focus on the correct functioning of corporate governance mechanisms.     

ENDOGENOUS DEBT‐EQUITY RATIO AND BALANCE‐SHEET CHANNEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND WELFARE

This paper endogenizes the debt‐equity ratio and embodies financial leverage in a cash‐in‐advance model of endogenous growth. Our analysis finds that the debt‐equity ratio is positively related to the balanced‐growth rate, since it serves as a ‘financial accelerator’ to stimulate investment projects. Compared to previous studies, this positive relationship gives rise to an additional balance‐sheet effect, which substantially affects the macroeconomic consequences of monetary and taxation policies. Due to the existence of the balance‐sheet effect, we also find that the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.