Determinants of interest rate swap spreads

This study argues that an interest rate swap, as a non-redundant security, creates surplus which will be shared by swap counterparties to compensate their risks in swaps. This action in turns affects swap spreads. Analyzing the time series impacts of the changes of risks of swap counterparties on swap spreads, we conclude that both lower and higher rating bond spreads have positive impacts on swap spreads. We also derive a risk–spread relation to test if swap counterparties are firms with differential credit ratings. Since the risk allocation between swap counterparties varies over business cycles, hence this factor needs to be controlled. We conclude that (1) similar results hold if the business cycle factor is controlled and (2) swap spreads contain procyclical element and are less cyclical than lower credit rating bond spreads.     

The Basel Committee proposals for a new capital accord: implications for Italian banks

Following a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings-based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk-weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.     

Do significant risk warnings in annual reports increase corporate bond credit spreads? Evidence from China

Based on listed companies issuing bonds on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2017, this study analyzes the relationship between significant risk warnings in Chinese companies’ annual reports and corporate bond credit spreads. The main findings are as follows. First, in the Chinese market, “substantial warnings of significant risks” can significantly improve corporate bond credit spreads, reflecting the risk-warning effect; second, state-owned property rights weaken this effect, which only pertains to listed companies with poor risk management and low information quality; third, significant risk warnings increase investors’ heterogeneous beliefs, also affecting credit spreads; and fourth, through textual analysis, it is found that the corporate bond credit spread is greater when the disclosed risk factors are more pessimistic and less similar to those of the previous year. The findings of this paper help to enrich the literature on credit spreads and risk disclosure.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Bank versus Bond Finance

How does uncertainty affect the costs of raising finance in the bond market and via bank loans? Empirically, this paper finds that heightened uncertainty is accompanied by an increase in corporate bond spreads, whereas spreads on bank loans remain unchanged. This finding can be explained with a model that includes costly state verification and in which banks maintain long-term relationships with borrowers and acquire information beyond what is publicly available. After an unexpected increase in uncertainty, the probability of borrower default increases. Banks leave the loan spread unchanged to maintain the relationship. In contrast, bond spreads increase because investors demand compensation for the increased default risk.     

Corporate Credit Spreads and the Sovereign Ceiling in Latin America

We exploit a panel of 72 US dollar-denominated bonds issued by Latin American publicly listed firms between 1996 and 2004, a period of regional financial crises, to answer the following three questions: (1) Is sovereign risk a statistically and economically significant determinant of the corporate credit spread, controlling for firm- and bond-specific characteristics? (2) If yes, do market participants apply the sovereign ceiling rule adopted by rating agencies in the pricing of our bond market data? And (3) how do market views compare with the rating agencies ceiling policy for each corporate bond? We find strong evidence of an economically and statistically significant effect of sovereign risk on corporate spreads across different panel econometric specifications and bonds. Moreover, markets do not apply the ceiling rule in 77–90% of the bonds we sample and these findings are consistent with rating agencies’ policies toward the latter for about 50% of the firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of firm- and bond-specific variables derived from the structural approach to credit risk and to the business cycle in each country.     

What explains corporate sukuk primary market spreads?

This study investigates the determining factors of international corporate sukuk pricing in the primary market for the period of 2004–2015. We present novel evidence for a unique data set covering all 63 international corporate sukuk issuances consisting of both a fixed margin rating as well a credit rating score. Our cross-sectional analysis indicates that both credit rating and maturity are significant factors which reduce issue spreads, whereas sukuk margin rating increases issue spreads. More prominently, Shari’ah scholar reputation and the type of sukuk are not statistically significant factors in the explanation of the issue spread. Our results are comparable with determinants of conventional bond pricing, and our findings further confirm existing sukuk market practices.     

Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market

We use the information in credit default swaps to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and nondefault components in corporate spreads. We find that the majority of the corporate spread is due to default risk. This result holds for all rating categories and is robust to the definition of the riskless curve. We also find that the nondefault component is time varying and strongly related to measures of bond‐specific illiquidity as well as to macroeconomic measures of bond market liquidity.     

Exploring the components of credit risk in credit default swaps

In this paper, we test the influence of various fundamental variables on the pricing of credit default swaps. The theoretical determinants that are important for pricing credit default swaps include the risk-free rate, industry sector, credit rating, and liquidity factors. We suggest a linear regression model containing these different variables, especially focusing on liquidity factors. Unlike bond spreads which have been shown to be inversely related to liquidity (i.e., the greater the liquidity, the lower the spread), there is no a priori reason that the credit default swap spread should exhibit the same relationship. This is due to the economic characteristics of a credit default swap compared to a bond. Our empirical result shows that all the fundamental variables investigated have a significant effect on the credit default swap spread. Moreover, our findings suggest that credit default swaps that trade with greater liquidity have a wider credit default swap spread.     

Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets linkages: Application to European data

We use EU sovereign bond yield and CDS spreads daily data to carry out an event study analysis on the reaction of government yield spreads before and after announcements from rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch). Our results show significant responses of government bond yield spreads to changes in rating notations and outlook, particularly in the case of negative announcements. Announcements are not anticipated at 1–2 months horizon but there is bi-directional causality between ratings and spreads within 1–2 weeks; spillover effects especially among EMU countries and from lower rated countries to higher rated countries; and persistence effects for recently downgraded countries.     

Price discovery of subordinated credit spreads for Japanese mega-banks: Evidence from bond and credit default swap markets

This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of subordinated credit spreads for Japanese mega-banks using the bond and credit default swap (CDS) spreads. The main findings are as follows. Subordinated bond and CDS spreads are cointegrated in most cases, and the CDS spread plays a more dominant role in price discovery than the bond spread. In addition, there are significant volatility spillovers from the CDS to bond spread. This information leadership for the CDS spread can largely be explained by stronger reactions of the CDS spread to some financial market variables and bank-specific accounting variables than the bond spread.     

Timeliness of Spread Implied Ratings

Rating agencies are known to be prudent in their approach to rating revisions, which results in delayed rating adjustments. For a large set of eurobonds we derive credit spread implied ratings and compare them with agency ratings. Our results indicate that spread implied ratings often anticipate the future movement of agency ratings and hence can help track credit risk in a more timely manner. This finding has important implications for risk managers in banks who, under the new Basel 2 regulations, have to rely more on credit ratings for capital allocation purposes, and for portfolio managers who face rating‐related investment restrictions.     

Modelling the economic value of credit rating systems

In this paper we develop a model of the economic value of credit rating systems. Increasing international competition and changes in the regulatory framework driven by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) called forth incentives for banks to improve their credit rating systems. An improvement of the statistical power of a rating system decreases the potential effects of adverse selection, and, combined with meeting several qualitative standards, decreases the amount of regulatory capital requirements. As a consequence, many banks have to make investment decisions where they have to consider the costs and the potential benefits of improving their rating systems. In our model the quality of a rating system depends on several parameters such as the accuracy of forecasting individual default probabilities and the rating class structure. We measure effects of adverse selection in a competitive one-period framework by parameterizing customer elasticity. Capital requirements are obtained by applying the current framework released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results of a numerical analysis indicate that improving a rating system with low accuracy to medium accuracy can increase the annual rate of return on a portfolio by 30–40 bp. This effect is even stronger for banks operating in markets with high customer elasticity and high loss rates. Compared to the estimated implementation costs banks could have a strong incentive to invest in their rating systems. The potential of reduced capital requirements on the portfolio return is rather weak compared to the effect of adverse selection.     

Insider employee stock option trading and stock prices

The question of which factors determine corporate bonds pricing is investigated by analysing the spreads of eurobonds issued by major G-10 companies during the 1991–2001 period. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, bond ratings appear as the most important determinant of yield spreads, with investors’ reliance on rating agencies judgments increasing over time. Second, the primary market efficiency and the expected secondary market liquidity are not relevant explanatory factors of spreads cross-sectional variability. Finally, rating agencies adopt a different, ‘through the cycle’, evaluation criteria of default risk with respect to the forward looking one adopted by bond investors.     

Measuring the effect of watch-preceded and direct rating changes: a note on credit markets

This paper analyzes the importance of distinguishing between watch-preceded and direct rating changes for the credit default swap (CDS) market by examining a total of 2991 rating change announcements, 1526 watchlist placement announcements, and 430 rating affirmations following watchlist placements. The results show that watch-preceded downgrades do not lead to significant CDS market reactions, while direct downgrades are associated with a significant increase in CDS spread levels. Likewise, we document that watchlist placements for downgrade lead to increases in firms’ CDS spreads. CDS markets do not react to rating upgrades but watchlist placements for upgrade result in an immediate decrease in CDS spreads. Rating affirmations following watchlist placements for downgrade lead to slight reductions in CDS spreads, while affirmations following watchlist placements for upgrade have no effect on CDS spreads. These findings demonstrate the importance for empirical research on the interaction between credit markets and rating announcements to differentiate between watch-preceded and direct rating changes, particularly for rating downgrades.     

A Multifactor Model of Credit Spreads

We represent credit spreads across ratings as a function of common unobservable factors of the Vasicek form. Using a state-space approach we estimate the factors, their process parameters, and the exposure of each observed credit spread series to each factor. We find that most of the systematic variation across credit spreads is captured by three factors. The factors are closely related to the implied volatility index (VIX), the long bond rate, and S&P500 returns, supporting the predictions of structural models of default at an aggregate level. By making no prior assumption about the determinants of yield spread dynamics, our study provides an original and independent test of theory. The results also contribute to the current debate about the role of liquidity in corporate yield spreads. While recent empirical literature shows that the level and time-variation in corporate yield spreads is driven primarily by a systematic liquidity risk factor, we find that the three most important drivers of yield spread levels relate to macroeconomic variables. This suggests that if credit spread levels do contain a large liquidity premium, the time variation of this premium is likely driven by the same factors as default risk.     

Corporate social responsibility,credit rating,and private debt contracting: new evidence from syndicated loan market

We examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on loan spreads of syndicated bank loans, with a particular interest in how CSR and credit ratings are interrelated as a joint determinant of loan spreads. Focusing on private debt contracts, we show that both CSR strengths and concerns are related to their loan spreads. CSR strengths work to lower firm risk, hence reducing the loan spread, whereas CSR concerns increase firm risk, thus increasing the loan spread. Once we include detailed credit rating information in the models, however, CSR concerns lose significance, but CSR strengths remain significantly related to the loan spread. We also find that both CSR strengths and CSR concerns are related to loan spread for non-rated firms, but the CSR concern effect is stronger than the CSR strength effect for these firms. A further test shows that firm risk measured by stock return volatility plays as a direct channel through which a firm’s CSR activities affect loan spreads, whose result lends further support to our main results. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that CSR matters to the pricing of loan contracts beyond credit rating information and the results remain robust to the possible firm size effect and the endogeneity issues.     

The role of country,regional and global market risks in the dynamics of Latin American yield spreads

We analyze the joint impact of country, regional and global market risks on daily changes in yield spreads of Mexico, Colombia and Brazil. In contrast to previous studies, we consider a homogenous set of liquid Eurobonds which are representative of current emerging bond markets. All risk-factor groups are significant but country-specific differences exist. Spread changes of all three countries are mainly driven by global risk. The second most important contributor to spread changes is country risk for Mexico and Brazil but regional risk for Colombia. The sensitivity of spread changes to risk factors varies with bond maturity.     

The sovereign ceiling and emerging market corporate bond spreads

We use the spreads of emerging market bonds traded in secondary markets to study investors' perception of country risk. Specifically, we ask whether investors apply the “sovereign ceiling,” which says that no firm is more creditworthy than its government. To do this we compare the spreads of bonds issued by firms to those of bonds issued by the firms' home governments. We find several cases where a firm's bond trades at a lower spread than that of the firm's government, indicating that investors do not always apply the sovereign ceiling. Bonds for which this is true tend to have substantial export earnings and/or a close relationship with either a foreign firm or with the home government.     

Determinants of yield spread dynamics: Euro versus US dollar corporate bonds

This paper presents a systematic comparison between the determinants of euro and US dollar yield spread dynamics. The results show that US dollar yield spreads are significantly more affected by changes in the level and the slope of the default-free term structure and the stock market return and volatility. Surprisingly, euro yield spreads are strongly affected by the US (and not the euro) level and slope. This confirms the dominance of US interest rates in the corporate bond markets. Interestingly, I find that liquidity risk is higher for US dollar corporate bonds than euro corporate bonds. For both regions, the effect of changes in the bid-ask spread is mainly significant during periods of high liquidity risk. Finally, the results indicate that the credit cycle as measured by the region-specific default probability significantly increases US yield spreads. This is not the case for euro yield spreads.     

Recognition versus disclosure of finance leases: Evidence from Japan

This study examines whether credit market participants—bond investors and credit rating agencies—treat recognized and disclosed finance leases differently when assessing firms’ credit risk in Japan. I use firms’ credit risk, measured by bond spreads and credit ratings, to investigate the relations between recognized versus disclosed finance lease obligations and firms’ credit risk following the adoption of Statement No. 13, Accounting Standard for Lease Transactions. For a sample of firms issuing new bonds, I find that, unlike recognized finance leases, disclosed finance leases are not associated with bond spreads. Moreover, the associations between recognized versus disclosed finance leases and bond spreads are substantially different. Conversely, recognized and disclosed finance leases are associated with credit ratings and are processed similarly when credit ratings are determined. Taken together, my results suggest that the sophistication of capital market participants influences their credit risk assessments of recognized versus disclosed finance leases.