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1.
Gong Zhan 《Review of Derivatives Research》2011,14(2):205-239
Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and
mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to
the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to
a very limited extent. Both our theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts
only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water
and when the manager’s skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align
interests and provides positive managerial incentives. 相似文献
2.
Vincent K Chong 《Accounting, Organizations and Society》1996,21(5):415-421
This study examines the interactive effects of management accounting systems (MAS) design and task uncertainty on managerial performance. MAS design was defined in terms of the extent to which managers use broad scope MAS information. The responses of 42 managers, drawn from a cross-section of Australian manufacturing companies, to a questionnaire survey were analysed by using a multiple regression technique. The results showed that under a high task uncertainty situation, the extent of use of broad scope MAS information led to effective managerial decisions and hence to improved managerial performance. On the other hand, under low task uncertainty situations, the extent of use of broad scope MAS information led to information overload which was dysfunctional to managerial performance. 相似文献
3.
This study looks at equity sensitivity and organisational commitment and considers the possible moderation role that managers’ perception of organisational performance may have. Using an equity theory perspective, the constructs of equity sensitivity and organisational commitment, as well as the effect of perceived firm performance, are considered. A research model linking their interaction is proposed. Data are collected from managers of a commercial bank and moderated regression is used to test the hypotheses. Results support a positive effect of equity sensitivity on organisational commitment whereas high or low perceived firm performance is found to have a determining effect on this relationship. 相似文献
4.
A recent paper in Accounting and Business Research by Lau et al. (2008) offers systematic evidence to explain whether managers’ perceptions on fairness of performance evaluation procedures affect attitudes such as job satisfaction; and if it does, the different behavioural processes involved. Our paper re‐examines Lau et al.’s model and hypotheses to assess the external validity of their findings, based on a very different sample of managers. Drawing on recent organisational justice literature, it further develops the model and examines the potential interaction effects of fairness of performance evaluation procedures and other variables on job satisfaction. Finally, it extends the outcome variable to include manager performance. Using survey responses from 165 managers, supported by 24 interviews, drawn from three major organisations in the manufacturing and financial services sectors, we find that Lau et al.’s results on the indirect effects of fairness of performance evaluation procedures on job satisfaction are generalisable to other organisational settings and managerial levels. However, using their model we do not find support for the outcome‐based effects through distributive fairness. Developing a revised model we observe that the effects of distributive fairness on job satisfaction are indirect via organisational commitment. When the model is further developed to incorporate performance as the outcome variable, we observe similar findings. 相似文献
5.
In this paper we examine customer firms’ managerial compensation policies when they have important supplier relations. We show that firms with greater reliance on their suppliers tend to offer higher total- and equity-based pay but lower risking-taking incentives to its top executives. Our results are consistent with the argument that suppliers making firm-specific investments are concerned about the customer firm’s prospects. Therefore, firms with important supplier relations use the compensation policies of their top executives (more equity-based and less risk-taking) to signal their commitment to a stable and promising performance in the future. To address endogeneity issues arising out of time-varying omitted variables, we exploit a 2SLS procedure to supplement our baseline OLS findings. Our results are robust alternate measures of suppliers’ relationship-specific investments and econometric models. Overall, our results indicate that some of the heterogeneity in managerial compensation can be attributed to characteristics of the firm’s supply-chain relations. 相似文献
6.
Managers’ work-related values (WRVs) have important implications for designing appropriate management accounting systems (MAS) in organisations. This paper examines the effect of the interaction between managers’ WRV for innovation and budget emphasis (an integral part of MAS) on their organisational commitment. The sample consisted of 109 managers from production, marketing and support departments within Australian manufacturing firms. Hypotheses were tested using both quantitative and qualitative data collected by a questionnaire survey and post-survey interviews. The results indicate that the adoption of low budget emphasis led to high organisational commitment when managers’ WRV for innovation was high, but not when managers’ WRV for innovation was low. The results also indicate that marketing managers held higher WRV for innovation than production managers. The post-survey interviews provide further insight into how a more customer- and competitor-focused subculture of marketing managers and a more technical- and efficiency-focused subculture of production managers may promote the difference in their WRV for innovation, and affect their attitudes towards budget emphasis. The findings of the study have implications for design of performance evaluation systems for managers in functionally differentiated organisations. 相似文献
7.
Auditors’ Economic Incentives and the Sensitivity of Managerial Pay to Accounting Performance
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Bum‐Jin Park 《Australian Accounting Review》2017,27(4):382-399
The use of managerial incentives to manage earnings in order to enhance accounting performance‐based compensation is greater when auditors have economic incentives to compromise their independence. Hence, compensation committees face more difficulties in determining cash compensation when earnings quality declines. This study investigates whether boards of directors can mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders by being aware of the opportunistic earnings management encouraged by auditors’ economic incentives and actively adjusting performance‐based compensation for the reduced earnings quality. To this end, it examines how auditors’ economic incentives affect the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance. The findings show a negative association between the client's economic importance to the auditor and the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance, with this association more pronounced for firms that opportunistically inflate earnings, suggesting that boards mitigate agency problems by actively intervening to modify performance‐based compensation schemes for the reduced earnings quality. Additional analyses show that board effectiveness in determining compensation depends on its characteristics. These results suggest the urgent need to oblige companies to establish compensation committees, particularly in countries that lack such a mandatory requirement or where few companies have such committees. 相似文献
8.
VINCENT K. CHONG 《The British Accounting Review》1998,30(4):331-342
This study examines the moderating effect of tolerance for ambiguity, a personality variable, on the relation between management accounting systems (MAS) design and managerial performance. MAS design was defined in terms of the extent to which managers» use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decision making. The responses of 63 managers, drawn from a cross-section of Australian manufacturing companies, to a questionnaire survey were analysed by using a multiple regression technique. The results indicate that the use of broad scope MAS information interact with tolerance for ambiguity to affect managerial performance. The results indicate that an appropriate «fit» between manager's personality variable of tolerance for ambiguity and the extent of use of broad scope MAS information for managerial decisions will lead to improved managerial performance. 相似文献
9.
We study the relationship between compensation gap and firm performance in the Chinese market. Extant studies have shown that, for the publicly traded companies in China, compensation gap between senior executives plays a tournament role and motivates managers to achieve higher level of performance. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results confirm the above result. However, simultaneous regression results indicate that the tournament effect is more significant in firms with high managerial powers. Our finding suggests that previous findings using OLS might be incomplete. We also show that firms with better performance and greater managerial power tend to have greater compensation gap. Meanwhile, the relationship between managerial power and firm performance is, on average, negative. 相似文献
10.
Robert Kim 《Accounting & Finance》2023,63(2):1983-2012
This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry. 相似文献
11.
Costanza Meneghetti 《Journal of Corporate Finance》2012,18(1):65-91
I propose a simple model with complete and perfect information on the relation between managerial incentive compensation and choice between public and bank debt. The empirical analysis offers considerable support to the model's predictions. I find that managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance prefer bank to public debt. Further, I find a positive relation between cost of public debt and managerial incentive compensation and no relation between loan spreads and incentive compensation. Finally, I find that banks are more likely to include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the CEO's compensation is tied to firm performance. 相似文献
12.
《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2022,18(1):100295
We examine whether and how managerial ability affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The demand for shorter maturity debt is expected to be higher in firms operated by high-ability managers, who possess the superior skills needed to anticipate firms’ economic prospects and communicate their private information, thereby alleviating information asymmetry and bolstering their reputation. We document that firms with high ability managers are associated with more short-term debt financing. The effect becomes stronger for firms facing severe information asymmetry problems, unconstrained firms or high quality firms. Supportive evidence is found from the analysis of short- and long-term debt issuance activity. Our findings remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and debt maturity choice, and are not driven by omitted variable bias, endogeneity concerns or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the signalling theory for debt maturity structure and contributes to the literatures on managerial ability. 相似文献
13.
This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debtin the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing toinformation asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contractsallow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. Themanager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosinginvestments that generate greater information asymmetry. Anaptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investmentsthat generate greater information asymmetry have more volatileoutcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky,causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and thereforecompensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At theoptimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and theshareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts.Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship betweenleverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-bookratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability,a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance,and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance andinvestment opportunities. 相似文献
14.
This study examines the combined effects of two management interventions, assigned goals and monetary compensation, on performance in a routine task. It investigates the effects of assigned goals (four goal levels: low, medium, high, impossible) and three types of compensation scheme (fixed-pay, piece-rate and budget-based). A laboratory experiment involving 180 undergraduate accounting students showed that, in some circumstances, assigned goals dominated performance effects while, in other circumstances, monetary incentives played a major role. Over medium to high levels of difficulty, assigned goals had a positive and dominating effect on performance, regardless of type of compensation. When the assigned goal was low, however, performance-contingent pay schemes had an additive effect on performance, while at an impossible goal level, budget-based incentives had a negative effect on performance. Of the interventions tested, the highest performance resulted from using incentive-based compensation when the budget (assigned goal) was relatively low (80% achievable). 相似文献
15.
We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners. 相似文献
16.
Anwar Boumosleh 《The Financial Review》2009,44(4):525-539
This paper studies the effect of incentive-based compensation on directors' monitoring of management. Using total accruals to measure the level of earnings management, I find that director stock option compensation is associated with higher levels of total accruals. I interpret this result to suggest that director stock options are more likely to align interests of directors with those of managers and that this convergence of interest manifests in lower transparency and reliability of financial information. The results suggest that director stock option compensation provides incentive for directors to compromise their task in the financial reporting process. 相似文献
17.
According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value (CFV) and levels of executive compensation. In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value (PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value (LCFV). Furthermore, we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry. 相似文献
18.
This paper examines whether high-ability managers’ earnings smoothing is motivated by the need to mitigate the adverse effects of heightened information asymmetry triggered by mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on managers’ reputation capital (job loss) and firm value. We document that acquirers led by high-ability managers engage in more pre-acquisition earnings smoothing and experience more significant announcement abnormal returns and operating performance in post-M&A periods than their low-ability counterparts. This result is consistent with the theory of managerial response to asymmetric information, amplified by M&As, where high-ability managers use earnings smoothing as a signaling device to ensure that the market quickly discovers their superior abilities, to increase acquirers’ future growth prospects and avoid the adverse effects of information asymmetry on managers’ job security and career prospects in a competitive executive labor market. 相似文献
19.
This study investigates the effect of credit and liquidity risks as well as the moderating role of managerial ability on the likelihood of European commercial bank default during the period 2006 to 2017. We employ data envelopment analysis and a tobit model to measure banks' efficiency, the z-score to measure the likelihood of their default, and perform endogeneity and model specification robustness tests. Our results reveal that both risks significantly affect the likelihood of bank default and that the high skill of managers does not attenuate this effect. Rather, in the case of credit risk, managerial ability extenuates this effect. Managerial overconfidence and narcissism may explain the latter result. Another plausible explanation is that highly skilled managers who are likely to be rewarded with performance-based compensation schemes may be incentivized to hide bad news for an extended period of time. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood of bank default. 相似文献
20.
Zhilan Feng Chinmoy Ghosh Fan He C. F. Sirmans 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2010,40(4):446-479
Our objective in this paper is to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and CEO compensation structure
of REITs. Based on detailed analyses of data on institutional ownership, performance, CEO and board characteristics over the
10 year period 1998–2007, we find significant evidence that large institutions influence governance through CEO compensation—greater
institutional ownership is associated with greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation (higher pay-performance sensitivity
of CEO compensation), and higher cash and total compensation for CEOs. Further, we find that institutions are less active
when managers are performing in a superior fashion. Two important conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, similar to
unregulated firms, institutional owners do act as monitors in REITs. Broadly, this result suggests that governance is necessary
for REITs. Second, institutional investors set a high pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs, but are willing to pay higher
cash compensation to induce managers to take risk. 相似文献