Trade Liberalization in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Credits: Estimates for Costa Rica

The paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model to quantify the welfare impact of trade liberalization—and compute the optimal tariff structure—for Costa Rica when trade-policy-induced foreign direct investment and international capital taxation with credits are present. It shows that complete trade liberalization reduces Costa Rica's welfare, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation. The optimal tariff structure for the Costa Rican economy turns out to be a mixture of relatively small import tariffs and subsidies.     

Tariff Reductions in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

This paper argues that the welfare effects of trade liberalization in the presence of foreign direct investment obtained under perfect competition cannot be extended to imperfectly competitive markets. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade liberalization may be paradoxically immiserizing when the traditional welfare-increasing result is corrected for the change in foreign capital revenue. Under imperfect competition this cannot occur, except under rather implausible assumptions. Indeed, a tariff reduction is expected to increase welfare when the welfare indicator is corrected for the presence of foreign capital, regardless of the type of market structure and the form of competitive rivalry.     

Economic liberalization and welfare in a model with an informal sector

The paper reexamines the conventional results relating to inflow of foreign capital, removal of protectionism and structural reform programmes, in a small open economy in terms of a two-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector. The paper shows that in the presence of labour market distortion and a protectionist policy, inflow of foreign capital may be desirable irrespective of the pattern of trade of the economy due to its favourable impact on welfare. But the welfare implications of tariff reductions and/or structural adjustment programmes, such as deregulating the formal sector labour market, depend crucially on the economy's trade pattern. The paper provides an answer to the question as to whether in a developing economy labour market reform and tariff reform should go hand-in-hand or whether one should precede the other for welfare improvement.
JEL classification: F10, F13, F21, O17.     

The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferences granted to Latin America

This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and US importers' lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.     

Black market for foreign exchange,capital flows and smuggling

The paper develops a geometrical model of the working of a black market for foreign exchange and considers such questions as: Can the black market exchange rate be a guiding instrument to exchange control authorities considering a change in the exchange rate? How does exchange control affect the current and capital account use of foreign exchange in the presence of a foreign exchange black market? What are the implications of changes in trade restrictions (such as import tariffs) for the black market exchange rate, supplies of foreign exchange to exchange control authorities, and current and capital account use of foreign exchange?     

MARKET ACCESS,INVESTMENT, AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS*

This article presents a model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms can expand through capital acquisitions. I show that demand elasticities are a crucial element in predicting which firms invest, in what location, and for what reason. High‐productivity firms, who tend to sell goods at a low elasticity, invest for market access (tariff jumping). Middle productivity firms, who tend to sell at a higher elasticity, invest for productivity improvement. The relative value of trade costs dictates which incentive is larger. In equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce aggregate productivity by reducing an important source of investment demand: foreign firms.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW WITH TARIFF-RIDDEN AND QUOTA-RESTRICTED IMPORTS*

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff-ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota-restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff-ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign-capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital-intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff-ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for both models.     

汇率冲击与劳动力市场调整——中国行业数据的经验研究

文章主要分析在汇率冲击下,中国可贸易行业1998—2009年劳动力市场的调整过程。文章利用实际有效汇率指标和动态面板估计方法分析影响劳动力市场调整的不同渠道。结果表明,汇率贬值通过出口渠道增加就业和降低工资,通过进口渠道降低就业和提高工资,通过效率渠道促进就业和降低工资。高贸易依存度行业的就业汇率弹性大于低贸易依存度行业,低加成比例行业的就业汇率弹性大于高加成比例行业,劳动力技术结构是影响就业汇率弹性的重要因素。     

Market access for sale

This paper focuses on the links between foreign lobbying and preferential market access granted by the United States' government to exporters in the rest of the Americas. We first develop a simple framework based on Grossman and Helpman [Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84 (4) 833–850.] to explain how lobbying by foreign firms affects their preferential access to the United States market. We then estimate the model using data on tariff preferences and lobby contributions for the 34 countries in the region. Empirical results suggest that foreign lobbying is an important force behind preferential market access to the United States. The structural estimates indicate that the weight given to foreign lobby contributions in the United States' government objective function is five times higher than the weight granted to tariff revenue forgone due to preferences. Thus, our results indicate that market access is up for sale and foreign lobbies are buying it.     

Foreign exchange controls in a black market economy

An investigation of the impact of foreign exchange controls in a black market economy is undertaken within the context of a choice-theoretic cash-in-advance general equilibrium model. While such controls may improve a ‘distortion-free’ economy's trade balance and balance of payments they are found to increase the domestic price of imports and lower the country's welfare. The ramifications of black market for economic welfare turn out to be ambiguous, depending crucially on the government's reaction to the leakage of foreign exchange into the economy via illegal activity.     

Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital

When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest in the initial period, and leads to loss of tax revenue. This dynamic inconsistency problem is resolved if the host government commits to non-preferential taxation in each period even if it does not commit to future tax rates.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening‐up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.     

Tariffs,quotas, and voluntary export restraints with endogenous labor supply

This paper develops a two-good, small-country, general equilibrium trade model with endogenous labor supply and wage taxes, and where trade is restricted by a tariff, or an import quota, or VERs. Within this framework we derive (i) the employment and welfare effects of the three types of trade restrictions, (ii) the price effect of an import quota and VERs, and (iii) the shadow price of foreign exchange under each type of trade restriction. The present results are compared to those where (i) factor supplies are fixed, and (ii) perfect international capital mobility exists.     

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND MULTILATERAL TARIFF COOPERATION*

Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.     

The impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection

This paper examines the impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection. We employ a two-step selection model where the first step accounts for the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the original antidumping determination and the second step estimates the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the duration of the measures. We find the duration of antidumping protection is about 17% shorter for preferential trade agreement members compared with targeted countries that are not preferential trade agreement members. The impact on duration depends largely on whether preferential trade agreements have rules related specifically to antidumping. Preferential trade agreements with rules are associated with a 28% reduction in the duration of protection, whereas the duration for preferential trade agreements without rules is not statistically different from the duration for non-preferential trade agreement countries. While the duration of antidumping measures against China is longer than for other countries, the impact of preferential trade agreement rules is robust to controlling for China.     

Manipulable behavior in international trade

In this paper, we present a Cournot duopoly model to analyze the manipulated behavior in international trade. The WTO is assumed as an arbitrator for the exchange in an oligopolistic industry and sets tariff rules according to the SDT principles; a firm's cost is private information both for the WTO and the foreign rivalries. Subsequent to our analysis of several cases we find that a firm may misreport to the WTO for more production revenue and the government may collude with a firm for higher welfare. It is shown that the misreporting and collusion incentives are related to the WTO tariff rule, the misreported cost and market size. Furthermore, a strategy proof tariff rule has been designed in which firms can never make his revenue better off by misreporting production cost.     

Capital flows to an emerging financial market in Turkey

Increased globalization in financial markets implies that the percentage of all shares under foreign ownership in domestic stock markets has been rising. Speculative attacks on the foreign exchange market in February 2001 led to deep economic crisis in Turkey. This article will explore various indicators of the financial crisis in Turkey based on a macro-model. The foreign share of the domestic economy is a key variable to establish the degree of vulnerability during a financial crisis. An empirical investigation shows that the percentage of shares owned by foreigners on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been increasing since 1995 and is currently about 50 percent of the total. Furthermore, the general index of stock market prices in 1999 was at its highest level since 1995. This would imply that the general price index of the stock market is another strong indicator of an impending financial crisis. An empirical investigation of Turkish data based on a theoretical model is presented in this paper. An unexpected capital outflow would certainly cause exchange rate fluctuations, balance of payments problems, and international debt crisis. Hot money inflows boost share prices and keep the real exchange rate high. However, short-term stay of capital implies a sudden capital outflow that creates financial crisis, which results in international debt crisis. This in turn leads to a further increase in loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Relatively high stock market prices may suggest an impending financial crisis. Using Turkish stock market price data, an impending financial crisis can be statistically predicted.     

人民币升值对中国股票市场的影响机制分析

汇率和股票价格波动之间具有很强的相关性,汇率的变动会通过贸易、货币供应、利率、心理预期等机制引起股价的波动。虽然受外汇管制、金融市场发展程度及市场开放度的影响,人民币汇率通过传统的传递机制对中国股票价格波动受到一定限制,但在人民币持续升值的压力下,外资以直接和间接方式对国内股票市场造成的冲击已是不争的事实。     

Comparison of deep integration in the Melitz,Krugman and Armington models: The case of The Philippines in RCEP

We estimate the welfare effects of a modern mega-preferential trade agreement--the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership--with three versions of market structure: (i) perfect competition, Armington style; (ii) monopolistic competition based on Krugman (1980); and (iii) monopolistic competition in the style of Melitz (2003). We develop a new numerical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) with heterogeneous firms and extension of the Krugman model that allows small countries to impact the number of varieties. We hold both the trade and FDI responses constant across the three market structures. We find that in all three market structures, there are substantial gains from deep integration, but virtually no gains from preferential tariff reduction. Both our Krugman and Melitz style models produce significantly larger welfare gains than the Armington structure, especially if third countries benefit at least partially from the deep integration reforms via either spillovers or wider liberalization.     

The January effect in the foreign exchange market: Evidence for seasonal equity carry trades

In this study, we investigate monthly seasonality in the foreign exchange market. Given the well-known recurrent higher returns in some month than in others in stock markets around the world, we consider it likely that a seasonal outperformance of a country’s stock market over another is associated with similar seasonal patterns in capital flows and exchange rates. A seasonal profit (carry trade) opportunity can be created by the simultaneous appreciation of a country’s currency and the outperformance of its stock market. By focusing on the world’s key currency pairs, the US dollar-Deutsche mark and the US dollar-euro, and by using a Markov-switching framework, we document persistent January and December effects in the foreign exchange market from 1971 to 2017. Analysis of the German-US stock returns differential and their bilateral capital flows reveal similar month effects in 65% of the whole sample.