Strategic managerial delegation and cross-border mergers

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the market structure in equilibrium and the most preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, when all existing firms can freely merge with each other in an international oligopoly under the segmented market assumption in three cases: the case wherein all the firms are entrepreneurial and the cases wherein they use two different types of managerial delegation contracts. We focus our attention on the coincidence/non-coincidence between the equilibrium market structure (EMS) and the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and/or total social welfare, as each firm’s production efficiency varies. When each firm’s production efficiency is relatively low, in all the three cases, the EMS coincides with the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare in a large area of the physical trade cost. On the other hand, when each firm’s production efficiency is relatively high, in the cases wherein they use the two different types of managerial delegation contracts, there exists an area of each firm’s production efficiency such that the EMS does not coincide with the most socially preferred structure with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare. Therefore, as each firm’s organizational structure proceeds from entrepreneurial to managerial delegation, a more active merger policy is needed with respect to each country’s social welfare and total social welfare.     

Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint: modeling agglomeration,externalities and trade

A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It covers agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities, and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmental externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.      

增长失衡与政府责任:基于社会性支出角度的分析

There exists a kind of growth imbalance in China’s current development process, which is essentially characterized by the imbalance between the nation’s wealth and the people’s welfare. This paper points out that growth imbalance results mostly from insufficient government social spending on people’s welfare. Consequently, the government should shoulder the basic responsibility for the provision of education, health and social security, quicken the transformation of government expenditure structure and increase the share of social spending, in order to improve the people’s welfare and achieve the rebalancing of growth. The increase in social spending can also promote the accumulation of human capital, which will help the conversion of economic growth pattern and the realization of sustainable and healthy economic development. Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2006, (10): 4–17     

Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards

In considering a country that imposes a minimum standard on an imported polluting good, which generates negative consumption externalities, we construct a common-agency model, in which a domestic environmental group and a foreign industrial lobby can influence the formation of the minimum standard by providing political contributions to the government. This paper investigates the effects of trade liberalization on the political equilibrium environmental standard, the pattern of trade, environmental disutility, and social welfare. We find that trade liberalization tightens the minimum standard, decreases imports of the polluting good, and reduces environmental disutilities. The importing country’s social welfare, however, does not necessarily increase with trade liberalization. The weaker the environmental group’s lobbying efficiency, or the stronger the foreign firm’s lobbying efficiency, the more likely it is that trade liberalization will enhance the importing country’s welfare.     

The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology

This study considers licensing of a cost-reducing technology through bargaining between a technology-holding firm and its rival firm in a Cournot duopoly market. To consider the relative bargaining power of both firms, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is applied as our solution. Then, we specify the combinations of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty that are realized through bargaining, and examine the effect on social welfare of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power. The principal findings are as follows. Regardless of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power, pure royalty licensing is carried out, and social welfare is non-increasing in its bargaining power. In our model, licensing through a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is often assumed in the literature, is regarded as the case in which the technology-holding firm has full bargaining power. Thus, the result on social welfare implies that the take-it-or-leave-it offer licensing mechanism leads to the socially worst outcome.     

Mobile phone termination charges with asymmetric regulation

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles’ market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, ‘collusion’ may well be in line with social welfare.      

Capabilities,Rights and Justice in the Context of Australian Aboriginal Welfare Policy

Since white settlement of Australia in 1788, the Aboriginal community has remained a conspicuously disadvantaged minority group. Decades of Federal and State government welfare policies have not prevented alcoholism, domestic violence and unemployment from undermining life in Aboriginal communities. Radically different policies are now being trialled, in recognition that a social emergency exists and in recognition that ‘money for nothing’ welfare handouts have not succeeded in developing human capabilities in Aboriginal communities. Despite the 2008 ‘sorry day’ apology, emotional hurts still run deep, and perceived injustices continue to impact upon the recognition of Aboriginal rights and the advancement of Aboriginal capabilities.     

Sustainable recursive social welfare functions

What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3′a), here called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.     

Quality upgrades and bypass under mandatory access

We analyze the interaction between the incumbent’s incentive to upgrade the quality of its network and the entrant’s incentive to build a bypass network when the regulator sets a two-part access tariff to the incumbent’s network. Under this context, the entrant’s investment in a bypass network is delayed with a higher incumbent’s investment in quality. Moreover, the possibility of investment in a bypass network by the entrant has a positive effect on the incumbent’s incentive to upgrade quality. We show that a regulator cannot achieve the first best with a constant access tariff. If he wants to design an alternative welfare improving access tariff, he should set an access fee increasing (decreasing) in quality if the business-stealing effect of quality upgrades is weak (strong). The analysis suggests that if the entrant’s investment costs are declining or its market share is increasing over time, it is not always optimal to require the incumbent to lease facilities at cost-based prices.     

Health effects on children’s willingness to compete

The formation of human capital is important for a society’s welfare and economic success. Recent literature shows that child health can provide an important explanation for disparities in children’s human capital development across different socio-economic groups. While this literature focuses on cognitive skills as determinants of human capital, it neglects non-cognitive skills. We analyze data from economic experiments with preschoolers and their mothers to investigate whether child health can explain developmental gaps in children’s non-cognitive skills. Our measure for children’s non-cognitive skills is their willingness to compete with others. Our findings suggest that health problems are negatively related to children’s willingness to compete and that the effect of health on competitiveness differs with socio-economic background. Health has a strongly negative effect in our sub-sample with low socio-economic background, whereas there is no effect in our sub-sample with high socio-economic background.     

On the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions

This article examines the impact of input prices on an entrant’s make-or-buy decision and on the subsequent social welfare level for three alternative models of downstream competition. For each particular model, it derives the range of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake: (a) the productively efficient make-or-buy decision; and (b) the socially optimal make-or-buy decision. The main conclusion of this article is that the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal in the case of the Hotelling model, is socially optimal for the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the efficient decision in the case of Cournot competition and is not necessarily socially optimal in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model. Last, this article examines the conditions under which the efficient and/or socially optimal make-or-buy decision undertaken by an entrant fulfills the regulatory two-fold goal of promoting service-based competition and encouraging facilities-based competition. Therefore, this article also provides the optimal access pricing policy that results in the best feasible outcome in terms of social welfare, productive efficiency, competition level and investment level for a given downstream competition model.     

Welfare reform: A game theoretic perspective

Traditionally, the debate over welfare reform has been infused with passion and driven by ideology, but reform itself has proceeded in careful steps. In recent years, however, the status quo has been dramatically altered as the need for fundamental change has become apparent as the starting point for reform. Using the state of Wisconsin’s aggressive approach to welfare reform as a model of what is administratively possible, we portray reform as an n-person iterated coordination game in order to examine potential outcomes under the larger rubric of ratinal decision-making and utility maximization. In so doing, we demonstrate that game theory offers an alternative framework for dissecting and discussing complex social issues such as welfare reform.     

Extending the Learning-By-Exporting Hypothesis: Introducing a Credit Constraint

This paper develops a theoretical framework which can be used to examine policy implications from the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This work builds on previous theoretical literature by introducing a credit constraint. When credit is available, the analysis suggests that supporting a learning sector via an export subsidy is not necessarily advised to improve social welfare. The learning sector’s goods may be over-produced (relative to another non-tradable sector goods) when consumers can borrow freely for their consumption. If the learning sector’s goods are over-produced, social welfare will be improved via a tax on production.

Household Transport Demand in a CGE-framework

The main objective of this study is to improve the modelling of household demand for transport services in a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The new extended model is then used for numerical calculations to test how the Swedish economy reacts to a carbon target. Special attention will be given to distributional effects and the connection between labour supply and work journeys in a sparsely populated country like Sweden. A differentiation between trip purposes and trip length, a complementary relationship between work journeys and labour supply, and a subdivision of households by density of population and income influence the numerical results. Our main conclusions from the analysis of a carbon target are that if the carbon tax revenue is recycled by decreasing the employers’ social contribution fee, welfare costs are lower than with lump-sum replacements of tax revenue to households. The welfare cost may be reduced even further if work journeys are not additionally taxed as compared to the base year. However, the lower total welfare cost is obtained at the expense of making society more unequal, since both labour tax recycling (cuts in employers’ social contributions) and exempting tax on work journeys will make low income groups carry a higher burden. An increased carbon dioxide tax is also shown to increase welfare differences between sparsely populated areas and city regions in Sweden.      

Validity of the “Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation” in a unionized mixed-duopoly

Developing a location-price spatial model in a unionized mixed-duopoly, we find that the welfare-maximizing nature of the public firm implies a lower degree of product differentiation such that, in contrast to the private duopoly, the “Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation” is not reproduced. Considering two different wage-regimes for the public firm, this paper examines the effects of wage regulation imposed on civil servants. It is shown that, when a public firm’s union is prohibited from collective bargaining, the firm is more competitive, and the degree of differentiation is less. Moreover, regulation always reduces both the private firm’s profit and the level of social welfare.     

Protecting Ecosystems and Alleviating Poverty with Parks and Reserves: ‘Win-Win’ or Tradeoffs?

National parks and reserves are globally popular approaches to protecting biodiversity and the supply of ecosystem services. Because these protected areas limit agricultural development and exploitation of natural resources, they are frequently opposed in developing nations where reducing poverty is an important social objective. Conservation advocates argue that protected areas can alleviate poverty by supplying ecosystem services, promoting tourism and improving infrastructure. Thus ‘win-win’ scenarios may be possible in which ecosystems and their services are protected and poverty is alleviated. Previous studies (Andam et al. in Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 105(42):16089–16094 2008; 2010) suggest that Costa Rica’s protected area system reduced deforestation and alleviated poverty. We demonstrate that these environmental and social impacts were spatially heterogeneous. Importantly, the characteristics associated with the most avoided deforestation are the characteristics associated with the least poverty alleviation. In other words, the same characteristics that limited the conservation effectiveness of protected areas may have improved the social welfare impacts of these areas. These results suggest that ‘win-win’ efforts to protect ecosystems and alleviate poverty may be possible when policymakers are satisfied with low levels of each outcome, but tradeoffs exist when more of either outcome is desired.     

Neoliberal Capitalism: A Time Warp Backwards to Capitalism’s Origins?

The global economy’s neoliberal transformation recalls Polanyi’s analysis of the great transformation. Present policies of destroying the welfare state or breaking resistance to substantial real wage reductions, strongly recall the 1930s, Speenhamland and Vienna succumbing to the attack of political forces powerfully sustained by economic arguments. Brought about deliberately, “globalisation” is the preferred neoliberal argument. Deregulation, reducing public economic influence, the WTO-system and multilateral treaties lock-in present policies, reducing future governments’ options of change and preventing the return of Keynesianism. Privatisation opens huge private profit opportunities mostly realised at substantial costs to individuals or social costs, as the British railway system or boosting private pension funds illustrate. State intervention is generally condemned, but bailing-out speculators is welcome. Seen as dangerous to neoliberal capitalism, democracy is rolled back. These developments and economic crisis have again given rise to right-wing movements. The attack on Keynesian welfare policies occurred as predicted by Kalecki in 1943. The effects of neoliberalism are discussed in detail at the examples of trade policy, the liberalisation of capital accounts (promoted by the IMF in open breach of its own constitution), and the attack on the public pension system, which opens a riskless bonanza to private investors.     

Eco-Labeling and Market Equilibria with Noisy Certification Tests

An intriguing alternative to traditional methods for regulating externalities is the provision of information about firms’ environmental attributes. An increasingly important example of this approach is “eco-labeling,” where a third party certifies firms’ products. Such schemes are currently used in a variety of countries. This paper investigates the equilibria that may occur with eco-labeling, and the attendant welfare effects. I model certification as a noisy test, subject to both type I and type II errors, but where green firms more likely to pass than brown firms. While it commonly leads to an increase in the fraction of green units in the market, the introduction of an eco-label can either increase or decrease welfare.     

Bankruptcy and firm finance

This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare. We analyze agents’ incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare losses of “poor institutions” and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.      

Price Premiums for Eco-friendly Commodities: Are ‘Green’ Markets the Best Way to Protect Endangered Ecosystems?

‘Green’ markets represent a means through which public goods can be privately provided. A green product is an impure public good consisting of a private good (e.g., rain forest honey) bundled with a jointly produced public good (e.g., biodiversity protection). In the context of ecosystem protection, popular green commodities include eco-tourism excursions, coffee grown under forest canopies (‘shade-grown’), tagua nuts for buttons and ornaments, rainforest nuts and oils for cosmetic products, and rain forest honey. We examine the dynamic efficiency of eco-friendly price premiums in achieving ecosystem protection and rural welfare goals by contrasting the use of price premiums to the use of payments that are tied directly to ecosystem protection. We demonstrate analytically and empirically that direct payments are likely to be more efficient as a conservation policy instrument. Depending on the available funds, the direct payments may be better or worse than green price premiums in achieving rural welfare objectives. If direct payments are not feasible for social or political reasons, we demonstrate analytically and empirically that the price premium approach is likely to be more effective at achieving conservation and development objectives than the currently more popular policy of subsidizing capital acquisition in eco-friendly commercial activities.