完善我国渔业管理制度的探讨

先进的渔业管理制度,是建立在对渔业资源变动规律、渔业生产的内在规律及社会经济环境充分研究基础上的.目前,世界上有些国家对本国的渔业实施总允许渔获量(TAC)制度,有的已发展到个人配额(IQ)、可转让配额(ITQ)制度.全球海洋渔业资源的分配,在考虑传统捕捞习惯的同时,趋向于沿海国专属及管理.     

美加两国实施ITQs制度之比较及启示

个别可转让配额(ITQs)制度是当前国际渔业管理中比较有效的一种管理手段,我国新版<渔业法>所规定的捕捞限额制度同ITQs制度没有本质上的差别.为了严格控制捕捞强度,加大渔业资源和环境保护力度,实施制度优势明显的捕捞限额制度已成为今后我国渔业制度发展的一个必然趋势.鉴于此,本文分析了美加两国引入ITQs的原因、ITQs的发展、ITQ制度的设计及其结果,并结合我国的具体国情提出了自己的观点.     

美加两国实施ITQs制度之比较及启示

个别可转让配额（ITQs）制度是当前国际渔业管理中比较有效的一种管理手段，我国新版《渔业法》所规定的捕捞限额制度同ITQs制度没有本质上的差别。为了严格控制捕捞强度，加大渔业资源和环境保护力度，实施制度优势明显的捕捞限额制度已成为今后我国渔业制度发展的一个必然趋势。鉴于此，本文分析了美加两国引入ITQs的原因、ITQs的发展、ITQ制度的设计及其结果，并结合我国的具体国情提出了自己的观点。     

韩国渔业管理的现状与总允许渔获量制度的引进

TAC制度最初在国际渔业管理中产生,即从总允许渔获量制度进一步发展成为配额管理制度。为顺应世界渔业管理发展趋势,弥补和完善韩国传统的以许可制度控制渔业努力量的局限性,决定并试行TAC制度。本文介绍韩国引进TAC制度的成功经验和问题。     

渔业配额捕捞的制度构成及解析

渔业配额捕捞制度主要由TAC设定、分配配额、交易机制、监管措施等层面构成。其中,TAC设定主要由锁定目标鱼种、求取MSY、确立TAC三个层面构成;分配配额主要由配额发放对象和分配方法两个层面构成;交易机制则由参与交易的主体和客体、交易场所以及反垄断措施等层面构成;监管环节包括渔船监测系统、观察员制度、捕捞日志等措施手段。结合发达渔业国实践经验,通过对制度各层面的剖析,希冀为我国配额捕捞的启动实施提供有益参考。’     

论TAC为基础的渔业管理制度

本文系统介绍了国际管理渔业中通用的以TAC为基础的渔业管理制度的内容、产生、发展和应用的情况，详细阐述了TAC渔业管理制度的作用及实际经验，指出我国渔业管理在借鉴TAC管理制度过程中的五大措施。     

关于实行捕捞限额制度的探讨

本文阐述了捕捞限额（TAC)的理论、发达国家的做法、我国《渔业法》关于捕捞限额管理的有关规定,探讨了实行捕捞限额管理中可能遇到的问题,提出了实行捕捞限额制度的具体建议。     

我国海洋渔业资源的保护和可持续利用

在介绍海洋渔业资源利用现状的基础上,本文主要通过对海洋渔业资源的共有性和资源管理的外部性进行分析,提出了实行TAC制度和改革渔业行政管理体制等海洋渔业资源保护的几点建议.     

山东省国内捕捞最优TAC配额组合的研究

随着我国海洋经济快速发展,科学合理利用海洋资源成为社会关注重点。渔业配额管理制度作为防止海洋资源枯竭、促进可持续发展的制度,能够科学合理地解决这个问题。将Mar kowi t z的投资组合理论应用到山东省海洋渔业国内捕捞中,通过数据模拟,得出山东省海洋国内捕捞的最优TAC配额组合。     

中国农业节水的根本出路在制度创新

目前我国灌溉用水效率很低，农业节水成为可持续发展的热点话题和难题。有人把眼光放在节水设施和技术上，水利主管部门认为提高农业用水水价是解决水短缺问题的最有效手段，也可以大大减轻日益严重的供水单位的经济亏损问题。农业节水的着手点到底在哪里？笔者带着这个问题，到华北的S灌区进行了1周的预调查，得出中国农业用水的根本出路不在节水技术，也不在提高水价，制度创新才是农业节水的有力杠杆和出路。     

Conflicting uses of marine resources: can ITQs promote an efficient solution?*

This paper examines the allocation problem arising from conflicting demands for marine resource use by (i) commercial fishers, (ii) recreational fishers, and (iii) conservationists. It is shown that decentralised trading of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) is capable of an efficient allocation of resource use between the first two parties. In contrast, it is found that the standard ITQ system is not capable of performing the same ideal co‐ordination between the conflicting interests of extractive users, that is, all fishers, and the non‐extractive ones, that is, conservationists. The reason is that quota trades between individual fishers and conservationists are inevitably accompanied by (positive) externalities on both other fishers and conservationists. As a result, decentralised quota trades between these parties cannot be efficient. The fundamental economic observation is that quotas for conservation and for extraction constitute two different goods. It follows that a socially optimal market allocation of these two goods requires two prices instead of the single quota price in the standard ITQ system. Thus, to achieve efficiency, the ITQ system has to be extended to incorporate both types of goods. It is shown in the paper that if fishers and conservationists can organise themselves into groups, trades of conservation quotas between the two groups can in principle lead to fully efficient allocation. An interesting implication of this modified ITQ system is that the need for a fisheries authority to set the total allowable catch (TACs) disappears.     

论渔业自然资源特性对ITQ制度交易成本的影响

本文在阐述我国海洋捕捞渔业自然资源特性的基础上,通过剖析它对个体可转让配额制度交易成本的影响,提出相应建议:我国单一鱼种产量低的特征会使得渔民在遵守该制度时的守法者成本上升;海洋生物组成复杂多样的特征会使当局确定总可捕量的信息搜寻成本、分配配额的决策成本和执行成本上升,会使渔民因兼捕性增强而需要为完成交易多付固定交易成本、信息搜寻成本和讨价还价成本;资源的地域差异性较大一方面将增加专用资产的投资而增加交易成本,另一方面将降低区域间配额分配难度而降低交易成本;海域的宽阔和海岸带广延性将导致当局的监督成本增加.     

Asset Pricing in Created Markets

We investigate the applicability of the present-value asset pricing model to fishing quota markets by applying instrumental variable panel data estimation techniques to 15 years of market transactions from New Zealand's individual transferable quota (ITQ) market. In addition to the influence of current fishing rents, we explore the effect of market interest rates, risk, and expected changes in future rents on quota asset prices. The results indicate that quota asset prices are positively related to declines in interest rates, lower levels of risk, expected increases in future fish prices, and expected cost reductions from rationalization under the quota system.     

关于制约捕捞限额制度实施若干因素的探讨

本文根据我国新《渔业法》有关实行捕捞限额制度的规定,探讨了实行该项制度管理的主要制约因素,并针对当前亟需开展的工作和未来实施该制度管理时可能出现的问题,提出若干建议。     

Highgrading in Quota-Regulated Fisheries: Evidence from the Icelandic Cod Fishery

A model with nonlinear discarding costs is developed for a fishery with an individual transferable quota (ITQ) program. The model shows that limited hold capacity and ITQs provide incentives to discard fish. The model is applied to the Icelandic ITQ-regulated cod fishery to test for highgrading and to predict the discarded quantities of different grades of fish. The results indicate that vessels are involved in highgrading, but there is no evidence of quota price-induced highgrading. The predicted total discarded quantities are 4.7% and 2.7% of total landings for gillnet and longline vessels, respectively. These correspond well with official biometric estimates.     

Profit and Price Effects of Multi‐species Individual Transferable Quotas

Regulators in many countries have adopted individual transferable quotas as a means of dealing with the open access problem inherent in fisheries. Using individual vessel data prior to and after the introduction of ITQs in Canada's multi‐species Scotia‐Fundy mobile gear fishery, the paper uses an index number profit decomposition to compare vessel performance over time and across individual vessels. The approach allows us to undertake both an ex post evaluation of short‐term impacts of ITQs and an ex ante evaluation of longer term impacts. With respect to short‐term impacts, the results suggest that larger vessels have benefited the most from the introduction of ITQs, but that all vessels have enjoyed increases in the prices received for those fish species that are included in the quota program. With respect to longer‐term impacts, the transferability provisions of the ITQ program have encouraged exit and more efficient operations to prevail.     

Optimal vessel size and output in the Australian northern prawn fishery: a restricted profit function approach*

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are to be introduced into Australia’s Northern Prawn fishery in the near future. Total allowable catches (TACs) are to be set with the objective of maximising economic efficiency in the fishery. Under ITQs, vessel owners have the ability to adjust their fishing activities to maximise profits and changes in fleet structure resulting from management changes need to be considered when determining TACs. A restricted profit function for the fishery was estimated to determine the optimal vessel characteristics and output levels as a guide to how the fleet may adjust under an ITQ system. Vessels were found to be currently close to their optimal size given average historic prices and current stock conditions. However, higher tiger prawn stocks are expected to result in the average size of vessels increasing, with rising fuel prices also likely to result in capital being substituted for fishing days. Optimal average vessel‐level catches of the main species are lower than current average vessel catches for a wide range of input and output prices. These changes in vessel characteristics and behaviour need to be incorporated in the derivation of the optimal TACs if economic efficiency objectives are to be achieved.